


# WUNSCH 25

#### INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF PSYCHANALYSIS OF THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

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CONTRIBUTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE 2023-2024 ICG

**'KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN THE PASSAGE TO THE ANALYST'** VIIIth INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF THE SCHOOL 2 May 2024, Paris

EDITORIAL

Wunsch 25! Our "wish" for the School is now a quarter of a century old!

From one text to another, this 25th issue of the SPFLF Bulletin carries forward the wish for a 'School put to the test' through the 28 contributions that comprise it. We hope these diverse voices will cross the linguistic and geographical boundaries of the IF-SPFLF and that *Wunsch* 25 will convey the orientation and the necessary intranquillity for a School community 'in progress...'

"The School or the Trial (*l'École on L'épreuve*")" Lacan declared in 1967 in the first version of the *Proposition*.

The questions raised by the members of the 2023–2024 ICG about their experience in the Cartels of the Pass, as well as the presentations given at the VIII<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the School *Knowledge and Ignorance in the Passage to the Analyst*, all submitted themselves to the trial of saying. A bit more "mis-saying," a bit more "well-saying" about what is at stake in this passage, this junction: *'the one in which the psychoanalysand becomes the psychoanalyst*.<sup>2</sup>'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. First version of the Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the school', Autres Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 586.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the school', Autres Écrits, op. cit. p. 252: 'This thick shadow covering this connection that I am dealing with here, the one where the psychoanalysand passes to the psychoanalyst, this is what our School can work to dissipate'.

Thus, virtually all the texts published in this *Wunsch* 25 evoke the fundamental paradox that articulates the function of speech and the act of enunciation, transference and the act of the psychoanalyst, the impossible and the contingent. Each author, in their own way, advances and questions that radical, archaic point that Lacan dared to names "the one we must necessarily suppose at the origin of the unconscious, that is, this something through which, insofar as the subject speaks, he can only advance further along the chain, in the unfolding of statements. Yet by moving toward the statements, he thereby, in the very act of enunciation, omits something that is properly what he cannot know – namely, the names of what he is as the subject of enunciation".<sup>3</sup>

This ineffable point must be said: it is the wager of the experience of the pass, of the dispositive that accommodates it, and of those who commit themselves to sustaining this 'community of experience.'

Our wish for the School entails a radical choice: daring certain 'points of saying'<sup>4</sup> so that *doxa* does not further obscure the "thick shadow" that logically tends to cover this passage.

It must be said; we are all the more pleased that the publication of *Wunsch 25*, celebrating a quarter-century of the 'spirit of the Forums' of this School, coincides with the re-edition in French of *La Psychanalyse, pas la pensée unique<sup>5</sup>* and its nearly simultaneous publication in Spanish and Portuguese.

We therefore hope that the Inter-American Symposium in Buenos Aires and the European Convention in Venice in July 2025 will resonate here and there with the diverse accents of the desire for psychoanalysis.

Dominique Touchon Fingermann Secretary of the 2023-2024 ICG for Europe

Translation: Daphne Tamarin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. *Identification*, unpublished seminar, lesson of 10 January 1962.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Soler, C. 'Point of view', see this Wunsch 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> C. Soler, L. Soler, J. Adam, D. Silvestre, *La psychanalyse, pas la pensée unique*, Paris, Éditions Nouvelles du Champ Lacanien, 2024.

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## THE ANALYTICAL PRACTICE OF THE PASSAND

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"I am not going to take it on the same plane, where I hoped two years ago, to close the loop, which remains unfinished, of the act in which the psychoanalyst is founded, instituted as such. I will take it on the level of the analyst's interventions, once the experience has been instituted within its precise limits." (LACAN, 1969).

As a result of one of the passes that I listened to and that ended in nomination, I cut out a fragment of the testimony that located how decisive it was, in terms of the authorization as an analyst, the juncture in which the passand presented her resignation to a welfare, institutional work, sustained for years, to turn more decisively to the analytic practice. In the cadence of the text, which in the procedure of the Pass is always in several voices, it followed that such a decision was interwoven in the analytic movements of that time, which atomized a persistent jouissance in the main symptom. I found there a didactic and clinical effect at the same time that leads me today to write these lines and to share a question that the procedure of the Pass could point out: how does the inaugural act on which a psychoanalyst is founded logically connect with his daily work? How does this moment of the final phase of an analysis articulate with the beginning and the sustaining of the analyses that one conducts?

I emphasize, with the quotation of the epigraph, the two planes present in every interrogation of the analytic act. If in Seminar 15 the perspective of the inaugural authorization of someone who is passing through the final phase of his analysis is accentuated, in Seminar 17, Lacan will unfold the issue from another angle, that of the interventions. A first plane highlights the logic of the moment of the passage from analysand to analyst, while the second plane emphasizes rather its pragmatic side. This second perspective of the analytic act is investigated not so much in the foundational moment proper to the final phase of the analyst's analysis but in his practice over time.

I find in Lacan's circumstantial expression that *he is always passing the pass* a way of highlighting, through the formal verbal tense, the importance of the temporal variable when distinguishing the assumption of the analytic act from its consequences to be unfolded in the diachrony of an analyst's duty with his analysands. In other words, the daily pass from subject to object that we embody as analysts has as a condition of that instituting moment of the pass itself that is logically prior, as Lacan emphasized. Of course, it remains for us to think how, in what contexts, under what modalities this articulation could continue to be questioned in the current conditions. What we know is that the ethics of the analytic act, without paragon or predetermined norms, governs the politics of a treatment and that within the diverse modes of verification we count on the procedure of the Pass, which has varied and had its vicissitudes since its invention to date.

So, from this double perspective of the analytic act and my first participation in the Cartels of the Pass, I extract two facts to put into consideration: 1- the low proportion of nominations in relation to the passes heard and 2- the high proportion of passands whose practice as analysts was installed a long time before their demand for the Pass. After these two facts, I add the concern that haunts me: could we not take better advantage of the epistemic potential of the procedure if we were able to naturalize nominations a little more? Frankly, I am not entirely clear about what 'naturalizing the nominations' would be, but I put it this way because I am inclined to think that a higher number of ASs (Analysts of the School) is what would allow us to carry out a regular School work that would favor a broader and more effective didactic and clinical spectrum in terms of transmission.

The twenty-odd Passes heard from both sides of the Atlantic, with some exceptions, concerned psychoanalysts who were working in their offices well before the request for a Pass to School. And I understand that this temporal factor has some relevance to observe and continue reading. Our context of the Pass is quite different from the incipient experience proposed by Lacan with the intension of capturing that decisive inaugural moment of self-authorization. Thus, if the logic of the analyst's desire as an operator is valid both in the inaugural pass and in everyday practice, how can we make the importance of the testimony on the analytic practice gravitate at the level of the School? How can the key references of the pass from analysand to analyst be coupled to the exercise of his or her *metier*? Lacan's effort to separate the plane of the logic of the "act" and the "exercise" in Seminar 15 is clear and explicit, but I also believe that there is a concern to link them from Seminar 17 onwards.

The procedure of the Pass attempted to reveal the so-called "didactic analysis" by trying out a new way of investigating the incidence of personal analysis in one's own authorization as an analyst. Likewise, if there is a didactic value in the pass it is because it involves an epistemic reason that transcends the personal effects that concern the parties involved. The passand *hystorizes* his analysis (and not exactly his life) as a function of this radical ethical conversion that derives from the pass. There is a nodal, implicit question that in some way the procedure asks each passand: how did his analysis influence his becoming an analyst? What of his own analysis enabled his authorization, beyond the eventualities of life and the multiple determinations of desire? It is obvious, given the meager number of nominations with regard to the number of passes, that it is not at all easy to verify these coordinates. Even if in the Cartels of the Pass there is a clear collective attempt to locate the logic of the pass from analysand to analyst.

I wonder then how to give it more prominence and give value to what an analyst can tell the community about how he/she became authorized in the impossibility of knowing to which an analysis leads, what changed in his/her way of intervening, how he/she manages to *hystericize* discourses and operate to produce analysands from a certain moment of his/her analytic path. Or, in other words, I would emphasize that what can be captured from analytic practice of the passand is a determining index for the Cartel of the Pass.

I think we are reasonably careful not to encourage speaking of the analytic act in the first person because it would be improper if not outright wrong. But I also think that an excess in not talking about one's own practice could explain, at least in part, some testimonies that seemed to me to be too far removed from the way someone begins to analyze others and to operate in a freer way or simply less conditioned by symptoms, fantasies or delusions. Obviously, we cannot expect someone to talk directly about his practice, a deduction that eventually concerns the Cartel of the pass. Strictly speaking, nothing can be claimed beforehand about a testimony!... But this elementary principle does not exempt us from questioning the uses of the Pass and to think together how to obtain and extend a palpable and transmissible didactic value. I have the impression that exploring and emphasizing a factual perspective - not to be confused with an empirical one - could facilitate the nominations, trusting that the very structure of the procedure avoids any shortcut of the ego that could detract from the legitimacy of the text.

At least in the Pass I referred to at the beginning of these lines, the passand's account of her own practice was important at the time of definition. Neither the fact that she did it in the first person nor the sifting of the passers did not detract one iota from the authenticity of the telling and the strength of the enunciation at stake. I believe that tuning our listening and discussions to that precise connection between personal analysis and the variations in practice that a testimony may offer, is a valid and perhaps less demanding way for everyone to nominate an AS.

Finally, what alternatives do we find to facilitate a more regular and fruitful work with testimonies in our School?

Bibliography:

Lacan J. (1969-70): The Seminar, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, volume 17, class 2, section 2, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 2008, p. 33.

Translation: Carolina Zaffore.

### AFTER-EFFECT (APRÈS-COUP): THE TEST OF TESTIMONY

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It is the *passand* who begins this game of sleight of hand: they must transform all the twists and turns of their analysis into something that can break its narrative. Reaching the point of deadend in their analysand's discourse, they alone can assert the sense that arises from it, that often holds in very few words. But, to provide proof of this passage, they must unravel the braided threads of their *hystorisation* in the fragmentary writing of this test, which, in haste, must strike home with the *passer*. This testimony of their passage to the analyst is not about extending their analysis or reproducing its account in extenso. The *passand*'s act of speaking now sustains a different issue: demonstrating how the chain and the weave of their subjective logic interlace, showing where they intersect above and below, to the point of letting the spark of solitude shine through, that solitude that allows one to stay the course when faced with the horror of the act (heading toward the worst, as Beckett would say). Two recent exhibitions in Paris, by Olga de Amaral and Chiharu Shiotta, aptly showed us how the gaps and vanishing points among taut, interwoven, knotted threads let through a certain light, if observed from a certain perspective.

It seems, however, that some *passands* neglect, along the way, the sudden urgency that drove them to engage in this procedure: the subtle *Dire* ("saying") not to be forgotten. Unless it is the *passers* themselves who, too caught up in the thick shadow of truth, fail to be sufficiently attuned to the splashes where the real might be suspected.

Hence the *passers* are put to the test of the pass. They collect this testimony and each, in turn, must reflect back the spark of this experience of encounter before the jury that our School calls the *Cartel*, because its logic includes the real.

A moment of suspense follows.

The Cartel depends on what each *passer* can transmit of the unheard, not without a certain hope that their 'performance' might confirm the 'competence' discerned by the analyst who appointed them to bear this responsibility. Indeed, there is an expectation of logical, ethical, and poetic qualities that in various ways manifest the *passer*'s relationship with the real but just as much with truth, cautioned by experience of its value as fiction, lure, or lie.

The Cartel put to the test of testimony: it is now. It is therefore our turn to 'communicate' the didactic dimension of the experience: that unique experience of each pass heard, that incomparable experience in the series of passes our *Collège* has received over these past two years of fulfilling its duty.

Just like the *passand* and the *passers*, we must now reduce the experience to a few statements, wagering, beyond any misunderstanding, on the effect of *le dire* ("the act of saying") which is still seeking its words. Thus, once again since the experience has been underway, and despite

"the aporia of its report,"<sup>1</sup> we will "take the risk of talking about it,"<sup>2</sup> without settling for the "testimonies of perplexity and embarrassment"<sup>3</sup> that Lacan noted after his address at the Grande Motte Congress in 1973. First of all, there is an affect of "end of the line": something like a disappointment about the conclusions and the few nominations that were decided. An after-effect, no doubt, a rebound effect following the enthusiasm for, and the undertakings shared by this School at work, orchestrated by the *Collèges* responsible for both animation and orientation?

Disappointment? Disappointed expectations? But what exactly do the Cartels of the Pass hope for, which by definition, awaits the unexpected: the unheard of a secret passage between the twists of truth and the real, in surprise at the analyst's act?

#### Encounters

The Cartel sets a date with the *passers*. An encounter, however, is not a mere appointment; it is unpredictable, even if one still expects both the *passers* and the Cartel to have a certain openness to the *kairos* of the encounter. What sort of disposition/position is this? When discussing what the analyst receives and collects, Lacan in 1948's "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis" speaks of a "discreet fraternity."<sup>4</sup> For there to be an encounter, this "fraternity" is required—a certain equivalence of positions before the Other who is lacking. We understand the "discretion" of this fraternity in its mathematical sense, which refers to absolute difference, irreducible to any phallic measure. Indeed, *discretus* in Latin denotes what is "separated," discontinuous.

Over these past two years, I have joined two Cartels and listened to four passes. We were fortunate to hear the testimonies of eight *passers*, who were able to account for their encounters with the *passands*, in keeping with that "discreet fraternity."

Any possible empathy or identification did not, in my opinion, undermine seriousness or discretion.

The Cartels, for their part, being by principal ephemeral and assembled according to the chance of the passes, the availabilities, and the 'transferential incompatibilities' among participants, remain open to the suspense of future encounters. Over the course of these two Cartels, I joined eight of my colleagues from the ICG, whom I already knew otherwise through our shared tasks in that *Collège*. Yet the time of the Cartel produces a different effect of encounter between each of us, a "discreet fraternity" as well, whose starting point turns out to be our shared ignorance and the unique openness in psychoanalytic discourse to the point of silence that signals the incomparable presence of each *One*, despite the cacophony of languages and their strangeness. This is not always the case, but as far as these two Cartels are concerned, we were satisfied with these encounters outside what is common: the individuals did not obstruct the functioning.

#### Logic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan J. Discours à L'École freudienne de Paris, Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris 2001, p 263

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan J. Intervention dans la séance de travail « Sur la passe » du samedi 3 novembre parue dans les Lettres de l'École freudienne, 1975, n° 15, pp. 185-193.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan J. Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, Norton & Company, p. 101.

What did this favorable disposition on everyone's part allow us to hear?

From the testimonies, one expects the logic of the treatment. This logic is determined by the logic of the signifier, which fundamentally misses what there is to say.

But it is precisely those misses, those impasses of the *Subject Supposed to Know*, that organize and pace the 'moments of the pass', from which we indeed expect certain effects.

The fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis are not there to measure or evaluate the *passands* and their analyses. But how could we find our bearings if we do not track, within the *passers*' enthusiastic accounts, the imprint of those concepts that orient the psychoanalytic clinic: the unconscious, repetition, transference, and drive? How can we find the analyst there without hearing in the testimonies of the pass, how fate and the curse of repetition get reduced to a singular mark and to the effect that issues from it? How can we validate that passage without noting the simplification of the '*traumatisme*' to its dimension of '*trou-matisme*'? How could we locate the naming of an AS if we do not see evidence of a new capacity for sign and sense to be tied together differently?

Most of the time, we were able to follow the thread of the *hystorisation* of these stories that were taken for destiny; but rarely did we grasp the solution in continuity and its consequences for the transference to the *Subject Supposed to Know*, as well as its effects on knowledge and jouissance.

What is well-conceived is well stated, so the saying goes: these statements often did not, or could not, shed light on the concept 'of the analyst', which in principle would have been tested by the dispositive and provided evidence of the extension of psychoanalysis, as indicated long ago: "Psychoanalysis, standard or not, is the treatment one expects from a psychoanalyst."<sup>5</sup>

The pass puts into question – puts on the spot – what is expected of the psychoanalyst so that "psychoanalysis may remain an act yet to come."

#### Lucky Escape

We therefore expect the *psychoanalysand* in the test of the Pass to demonstrate the logic of the signifying alienation that shaped their destiny and to show what escapes from it. This 'lucky escape' only becomes apparent in its effects; the Cartel may find itself spattered by it, 'of the analyst' could be one of these flashes.

Are the *passers* sufficiently sensitive and affected by these effects of separation to spark a ricochet between the five members of the cartel?

But those five must also be in enough agreement for their shared ignorance to resonate in favor of the knowledge (of the analyst). Is this always the case?

Translation: Daphne Tamarin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan J. Variations on the Standard Treatment, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, Norton & Company, p. 274.

#### CARTEL OF THE PASS, EXPERIENCE OF A SHARING

Anastasia Tzavidopoulou Paris, France

An orientation compass for the nomination of an AS by the Cartel of the Pass could be: the passand extracts an unprecedented enunciation, a formalized saying, resulting from his treatment, and which testifies to the passage from analysand to analyst. In order to dissipate the "thick shadow" this compass is easier to formulate theoretically than it is to hear. First difficulty, because, even if the decision of the Cartel is a collegial decision, what the ear retains is an individual matter. And what the ear retains is linked to the analysis of the subject who participates to the Cartel of the Pass, the end of his analysis and its conclusion. Having had to deal with the final point of his own analysis, even if this was done outside of the dispositive of the Pass, is for the ear essentially to capture something of the "sensitive plate", the one that makes the bridge between the passer and the Cartel, and which sensitizes the cartel. And we know it, there are several endings as much as subjects and final points as well.

Following Lacan, it's always about "the pass to the analyst". There is a second difficulty in the continuation of "the pass to the analyst" that we have to deal with: "the desire of the analyst", an unprecedented desire. Can it be heard? If it cannot be formulated as a subject who speaks and says that... how, then, to catch it? One hypothesis to consider: could it be in the form of a lack, an incompleteness, something carried by the passer that is elusive and which the Cartel of the Pass would have to catch? That was transmitted by the Cartels leading to a nomination and that almost leads to a nonsense: a shadow that would dissipate a another thicker one. And the bad question to ask the passers: "What did you hear about the desire of the analyst?" This would thus go beyond the 'good passer' that we've often talked about in our meetings. Because if it can be easier to designate a 'bad' passer, the opposite is not evident. This question will undoubtedly last for the following ICG (International College of the Guarantee), as it was already encountered by the previous ones, and opens to another one: the designation of passers. To be continued.

In the dispositive of the Pass, the Cartel that arrives at a nomination would have something to share with the passand and the passers, but also and differently, with the entire ICG: a common good which has to be with a surprise, a satisfaction, a questioning, a loss, a relief or even an impasse, different variations of this singular enunciation. From Pierre Bruno's words that I may use, the "radicalism of its singularity"<sup>1</sup> that this enunciation bears This sharing seems essential to me and it forms the School; and my experience during the two years in the ICG didn't allow me to accomplish it: no nominations in the Cartels in which I participated. There was, of course, sharing, but a partial one which was about debates, elaborations, and discussions that we had among ourselves. A sharing in the scope of a common good which, even if it's not addressed to the entire analytic community of the School, participates in its life.

What could sharing a common good be? I am stepping into a reading, based, firstly, on Pierre Bruno's words, the "radicalism of its singularity" that the passer is supposed to have extracted, and secondly, a quote from Lacan in *Television* that I have already mentioned in *Echos* No 8 :

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The following footnotes correspond to French bibliographic references.

Bruno, P. Une psychanalyse : du rébus au rebut, Toulouse, Érès, 2013, p. 314.

"Happy are those cases in which fictive "passes", pass for an incomplete training; they leave room for hope" ("Heureux les cas où passe fictive pour formation inachevée: ils laissent de l'espoir".)<sup>2</sup>

In an discussion I had with Nicolas Bendrihen, he pointed out to me that the "fictive" and therefore imaginary aspect of the passes ("*passes fictives*") do not allow us to hear *that thing* that constitutes for the passand what Lacan called a "window to the Real". This imaginary maintains the possible; it's a fiction that does not fix the impossible as the result of a treatment and the conclusion of an analytic journey. However, according to Lacan, this leaves room for hope, as it always allows for further elaborations, reflections that feed our discourse. The training can only go on and it's precisely about this point that a sharing within the Cartel takes place, as both clinical and theoretical aspects of the teaching goes on. Thus, the construction of the fantasy is different to its traversal; the therapeutic effects do not always constitute a logical conclusion; affects such as satisfaction, enthusiasm, or mourning do not respond to the "metamorphosis" of the subject and the production of new knowledge; the fall of the subject supposed to know does not constitute the end of the treatment … just to give a few examples of this teaching. In a way, the dispositive of the Pass, and in particular the Cartel in which we participate, obliges us to extend our training as it leads us to question the knowledge acquired by the passand, a knowledge at the edge of a common good.

Having participated in the dispositive of the Pass as a passand, before my experience at the ICG, I realize how this knowledge changes place. As a passand, we testify with conviction to a knowledge. The Cartel of the Pass is supposed to hear not the conviction but the knowledge itself.

These fictive passes, even if we can learn from them, do not reach the "radicalism of singularity". By 'radical' I mean the conclusion of the "logical impossibility (which embodies the Real)",<sup>3</sup> 'radical' as an incarnation of a Real that makes "impotence (which accounts for fantasy)"<sup>4</sup> bearable. Impotence leads to impossibility, which, from then on, sustains the analyst's position. Because it's the impossible as a "power",<sup>5</sup> that puts a distance to the mirage of truth and that, occasionally, permits analysis.<sup>6</sup> So, if there is something impossible to formulate concerning the desire of the analyst, the act itself is sustained by this impossibility turned into power. The analyzed subject, passed to the analyst, is not duped by being waste, waste at the limit of what can be said, the product of his metamorphosis, in order to sustain his act.

This is the question that arises: if our community is always waiting impatiently for the testimonies of the AS, how to share a conclusion that deals with impossibility, and therefore with the Real, a conclusion as a common good offered to the School, if it's not through a joke, a *Witz*, as Lacan suggested. It's something such as a *Witz* that the Cartels which, arriving at a nomination, transmit to the ICG with all the difficulty that this implies. In the 'Proposition', we can read that the results of this experience must first be communicated to the School for critique. These results, which must be communicated and offered to critique, constitute the common good that forms the School, because if "psychoanalysis is intransmissible", "it is for each analyst to reinvent it from what he has managed to extract from having been, for a time, a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J., « Télévision », Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 510. Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic

*Establishment*. Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J., ... *ou pire*, Paris, Seuil, 2011, p. 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. L'envers de la psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p. 217. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 1969-1970, trans. R. Grigg, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, p. 187. <sup>6</sup> Ibid.

subject of analysis".<sup>7</sup> Reinvent what? Could it be believing in the unconscious?<sup>8</sup> A belief that must be constantly reinvented? If Lacan, rather late in his teaching, makes strong statements saying that he expects nothing from people but something from the functioning, we could recognize a fragment of this experience in the Cartels of the Pass: it is not about the members of the Cartel nor about the passers because it's not about people. The functioning, and more precisely the functioning of the Pass, would have this attribute of mobilizing a collegial logic and structuring the School, despite the various questions about the 'good' or 'bad' passers and the analysts who have or have not finished their analysis. Could the Pass be a sort of symptom of psychoanalysis in order to ensure its continuity?

Translation: Anastasia Tzavidopoulou.

#### From ignorance to unknowing (insu)?

Anne-Marie Combres Cahors, France

At the May 2024 meeting, I posed the question, for each Cartel of the Pass, of knowing, based on the consequences for the subject, of whether there has been a passage – a passage from ignorance to unknowing – or whether there has been none at all? This, rather than focusing on the moment of passage.

With regard to what Lacan wanted when he set up the procedure: to seize the passage, the moment "when the act could be seized in the time it occurs",<sup>1</sup> we note that passands often report a moment of precipitation that occurred long before, and sometimes several years after, the end of their analysis. This was the case for most of the testimonies we heard in this ICG, particularly in the cartels I took part in.

It is a change, then, from what Lacan originally intended, and while our procedure remains oriented by the one he set up, it differs from it in this respect.

In what leads someone to take the step of meeting an analyst and the subsequent step of entering in analysis, ignorance is put forward: they suffer, and even if they can sometimes say what it is they suffer from, we don't know the cause. Lacan insisted on this at the start of his teaching: "The subject who comes to analysis nevertheless places himself, as such, in the position of the one who is ignorant. No entry is possible without this reference – we never say it, we never think about it, even though it's fundamental".<sup>2</sup> This ignorance shifts throughout the work, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lacan, J. « 9e Congrès de l'École Freudienne de Paris sur "La transmission" », Lettres de l'École, 1979, n° 25, vol. II, pp. 219-220.

<sup>&</sup>quot;The transmission of psychoanalysis. The Proceedings of the IXth Congress of the Freudian School", held in Paris July 6-9, 1978 at the Maison de la Chimie.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lacan, J. « Discours à l'EFP », Autres écrits, op. cit., p. 281.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J., Discours à l'EFP, Silicet 2-3, Paris, seuil 1970, p. 15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J., Le Séminaire, livre I, Les écrits techniques de Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 298.

what the passer can say about it in his testimony is how a new knowledge for him came to put an end to it.

The Cartels of Pass are also in a position of ignorance as to what they are going to hear, but it's not the same thing: it's a question of setting aside referential knowledge to approach each case, but expecting nothing from the testimonies seems very difficult!

For our Cartels, we have also had to let the testimonies of the passers resonate, in the moment of the encounter with them, letting the story resonate, the words of the passand that they have passed on to us. But beyond that, in the Cartel's own work sessions, after the fact, letting ourselves be worked on by what we've heard... A position of "learned ignorance"? And the need to try to infer from it the singular saying of this or that passer that could lead to a nomination.

This work of elaboration in the Cartels in which I took part was also marked by the problem of translation: we didn't all speak the language of the passers or the passands, and we had to "play" with the passages from one language to another. But, curiously, I might add, precisely because the members of the Cartels were also curious about the passand's language – a foreign language, not just in linguistic terms, but because the language of the other is always foreign to us – this curiosity served us well in our exchanges, to get as close as possible to the realities at play in the testimonies.

It is also important to note a particularity of the Cartels of the Pass: the product is not specific to each individual, but collective: it's a question of deciding on a nomination or non-nomination...

What guides the Cartel's decision? Rather than the criteria we might have had in mind, it's the conviction aroused by the testimony transmitted by the passers.

Of course, there's a wager involved in the nomination, since the passers nominating AS are expected to be "those who can bear witness to crucial problems at the pointy end of psychoanalysis". Colette Soler recently underlined an essential aspect of Lacan's work on the question of unknowing (*insu*): "the pass is that point where, having come to the end of his psychoanalysis, the place that the psychoanalyst has held in his journey, someone takes the step of taking it. Understand well: to operate as one who occupies it, even though he knows nothing of this operation, except what it has reduced the occupant to in his experience".<sup>3</sup> She emphasized this dimension of the unknown of the operation, and thus of the unknowing which, for the analysand who has passed over to the analyst, can provide a framework for the knowledge to come.

When there was a nomination, the Cartel's satisfaction could be understood as a recognition, a re-discovery that 'it works'! Recognition in both senses of the word: we recognize it, but we're also grateful... which leaves us with the same question Lacan asked himself in *L'insu*: "I'm still questioning psychoanalysis about the way it works. How is it that it holds, that it constitutes a practice that is even sometimes effective?".<sup>4</sup>

Translation: Anne-Marie Combres and Daphné Tamarin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan J. Discours à l'EFP, op cit, p. 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan J. *L'insu, 17 mai* 1977.

#### **TESTIMONY: BETWEEN TRUTH AND ACT**

*Didier Castanet* Toulouse, France

Several questions immediately arise when we examine testimony in the farmwork of the Pass. Is testimony an act?

Do we expect truth from testimony?

How does the truth of the unconscious speak, or take the floor?

The question of testimony is perfectly described in Giorgio Agambem's book, which I recently reread. I repeat that one does not come out unscathed after reading it. Agamben's great merit is to refuse that Auschwitz remain in the realm of the unspeakable, a mystical slope towards dark adoration. He strives to "listen to the untestified", to restore speech to those expressions of suffering that belong to no language. This book is an ethical cartography of testimony. For Agamben, it is crucial to highlight the "ethical and political significance of extermination" by denouncing the confusion between categories of law and ethics, judgment and truth, which, in my opinion, obscure its meaning without our knowing (*à notre insu*). The question of testimony clashes with an unrepresentable conception of truth, with "facts so real that nothing, in comparison, is true." Such is the aporia of Auschwitz: historically determined facts no longer coincide with a truth that transcends them.

Some former deportees, like Primo Levi, have testified about what the actors themselves could not testify to, as it was precisely to strip them of this human capacity for testimony.

So what is the specific crime of Auschwitz? According Agamben, it is having created "a place where the state of exception perfectly coincides with the rule, where the extreme situation becomes the very paradigm of everyday life," (p. 59).

He continues, "Auschwitz constitutes, from this perspective, the moment of a historical collapse of these procedures, the traumatic experience where the impossible was violently forced into reality. It is the existence of the impossible, the most radical negation of contingency – therefore the most absolute necessity." (p. 194).

Now, regarding this real, neither the rules of law, nor morality (that is the feeling of guilt or shame), nor cultural references, such as those of Greek tragedy or its Nietzschean transcendence, will succeed in expressing what is beyond all testimony – when the only one who could speak, the one to whom even the dignity of their own death has been taken, the *"Muselmann*," the one *"*responsible for managing the crematoria and gas chambers," can no longer do so (p. 10 and 28-29).

In part 4 of the book, entitled *The Archive and Testimony*, Agamben starts from Foucault's method in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, modifying the perspective to reformulate the question of testimony. He tells us (p. 190), "It is not, of course, about returning to the old problem that Foucault sought to eliminate: how can a subject's freedom carve out a path through the rules of a language" but rather about situating the subject in the gap between a possibility and an impossibility of speaking, asking: "How can something like an enunciation occur on the level of language?"

In other words, it is no longer about identifying, as he tells us (p. 189), "the obscure margin inscribed in every discourse, which surrounds and limits any concrete act of speech," nor about observing the disappearance of the subject in the anonymous murmur of "anyone speaks," but rather showing how the subject is constructed from its "contingency," that is, from the possibility it had, "to have or not to have language." Speaking is, each time, choosing language, based on this contingency. If impossibility is forcibly introduced by some system, then contingency is denied, as well as the possibility of any testimony.

Re-engaging truth for a subject – that is, this relationship to the real that makes them speak – is the question that psychoanalysis reopens each time and seeks to keep open. In doing so, it invites those who engage with it to no longer take as evident the habits of their *jouissance* and the language that commands them.

The question of truth is, for Lacan, one of a major issue of psychoanalysis, one of the main issues.

We remember that at a certain point, Lacan attributed to psychoanalysis the idea of being a "love of truth." In the January 14, 1970 session of his *Seminar XVII*, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, he states, " the love of truth is the love of the weakness whose veil we have lifted, it's the love of what truth hides, which is called castration" (p. 52).

Truth is not fully spoken and will make room for "I, the truth, speak." This formula implies the primacy over the enunciated, meaning that the emphasis is not on what is said – and whether it is true or false – but on the "I" who speaks. Lacan insists that truth does not necessarily state the truth, but what makes it truth is simply that it speaks. In other words, truth is not the truth of the enunciated, but the truth of the enunciation, in the sense that it calls upon a true subject of speech.

In a second phase of Lacan's elaboration, if "I, the truth, speak" is not abandoned, it gives more room to what truth does not say, cannot say, and thus to a saying that contains its own impossibility.

The question of testimony is displaced because the problem arises of how to attest to a truth that is impossible to say, which Lacan calls the "real." This refers us to *Seminar XX* and *Television*, where Lacan states that "truth cannot be fully said."

There is a point of disjunction between truth and knowledge, or rather between truth and discourse, in the sense that truth is a real that is encountered, but not known. It is experienced,

but words fail to express it, or more precisely, what is said can only evoke an impossibility to say (*dire*).

So how can a truth be worthy of being heard and received?

And, to testify to the not-all truth (*la vérité pas-toute*)? The witness of a "not-all" truth is the one whom truth makes speak. He is the one who speaks in relation to a truth that he does not stop lacking, even though he is driven by the compelling necessity to say it. It is his relationship to the incompleteness of truth that makes him an authentic witness, whereas the false witness is paradoxically the one who claims to tell the whole truth.

In the Pass, there is something cumbersome in the testimony given by the passand, and he wishes, in some way, for a relay to be taken up in the form of a response. However, it cannot be just any response. It must be, as much as possible, homogeneous with the testimony. The testimony is a gift, but a particular kind of gift – a gift of unconscious knowledge, which sets a limit to meaning. The response, therefore, must not be overly full of meaning. It should simply say "yes" or "no"– what you have given us of your knowledge has passed. This response should tend toward a certain void of signification.

Testimonies are thus evidence of the effect of psychoanalysis on a speaking being who has gone as far as possible in elucidating what it means to speak – for a being who does not resign himself to merely processing information but instead enjoys the effects of the signifier.

More precisely, these testimonies of the pass speak to us about a subject's relationship with what fails – and what, in some way, will continue to fail. In 1976, in the 'Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*', Lacan associates truth and lie in a different way from before, when he emphasized, in a very Freudian manner, that repressed truth speaks through its other side [*envers*]. He speaks of a truth that one always fails to say and a truth that lies: "All I can do is tell the truth. No, that isn't so – I have missed it. There is no truth that, in passing through awareness, does not lie. But one runs after it all the same", 'Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*,', p. vii.

And what does this truth promise? Perhaps something it cannot fulfil – namely, telling the whole truth. This is what Lacan tells us in his Seminar XVI, *From an Other to the other*, in the session of February 12, 1969 (p. 147): "In another of the articles there, called "The Freudian Thing,' I wrote something about truth that could be understood as follows: that its property is that it speaks." "So, you will say, 'truth speaks – sure, that's obvious'. That is what you would say if you didn't understand any of what I say, which is quite possible. I never said that. I had truth say, "I, truth, speak. But I did not have truth say, for example, 'I, truth, speak in order to say myself as truth. The fact that it speaks doesn't mean that it tells the truth. It's truth and it speaks. As for what it says, you've got to work it out yourself."

Translation: Anastasia Tzavidopoulou

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#### THE PASS IN LACAN'S SCHOOL AND IN OURS

Glaucia Nagem de Souza São Paulo, Brasil.

There's something I've called the pass, which is practiced in my school.  $(Lacan)^{1}$ 

In the creation of his first School, Lacan set up two basic dispositives: in 1964, in the 'Founding Act', the Cartel, which was set up to "carry out the work";<sup>2</sup> and in 1967 the Pass, collecting the "testimonies of the crucial problems, at the nodal points where they are found",<sup>3</sup> was invested with this task or, at least, was always in the process of resolving it. This place implies that you want to occupy it: "one can be in it only if one has requested it *de facto*, if not formally".<sup>4</sup>

The operation of these dispositives presupposes the participation of some people and the extraction of knowledge at their end. From the Cartels, we expect something of what has been studied or of the crises faced within them. I propose that we think of the Pass in this twofold way: on the one hand, when there is a nomination, those who participate in the dispositives (the cartelisands of the Cartels of the Pass, the passers and the passands nominated AS) can produce the knowledge that has been transmitted by listening to the passand's testimony through the passers. But also, on the Cartel, can't we think about the crises faced in its operation?

My experience in this ICG taught me why Lacan refers to the pass as a 'leap'<sup>5</sup> in the hiatus produced at the end of an analysis. This is audible in the Cartel of the Pass when the passand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Seminário 19, p. 50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ato de Fundação. Outros Escritos p.235. Founding Act, in *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Os Analistas da Escola.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Proposição de 9 de outubro de 1967 sobre o psicanalista da Escola. P. 249. ). Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Seminário 15, O Ato Analítico, p.146.

who transmits this leap, is 'neither psychoanalysand nor psychoanalysed',<sup>6</sup> testifies to this inbetween and the leap made towards the analyst's desire. Another factor I've experienced in the Cartels I've participated in where there has been a nomination is that the Cartel's response is not in the place of an 'I know because I know', which could lead to the idea of a kind of 'telepathy'. The Cartels arrive at the answer in a 'groping' way, in the dark. A mixture of knowing what you're doing without knowing what you're seeing.<sup>7</sup>

Reaching a nomination in the Cartels I took part in wasn't a thoughtless or even impulsive action. It required us to discuss, think, stop, go out for lunch and talk again, stop again and even meet over Zoom before deciding. It's neither easy nor obvious to decide on nominations. It's not a matter of emotion, of feeling but, as Lacan emphasizes several times in his addresses and writings on the Pass, it's a matter of knowledge. Knowledge that isn't based on how much study each person has done on the subject. It's knowledge that comes from listening, from a few details that slip through the passer's testimony and, above all, from the debate among the members of the Cartel that lead to the conclusion of the nomination.

The Pass can also echo what Lacan says about the Cartels dealing with crises in their functioning. It's worth making it clear that it's not the Pass that's in the spotlight, but the School and its functioning, because it's from the School that the Pass brings its echoes. We always repeat that 'the passer is the Pass', but how do the passers arrive at the Pass? How does the passand arrive at the Pass? The Pass seems to occupy a central place in our School insofar as it doesn't allow us to conceive of 'The' School, but rather to come into contact with the fact that the School is structurally holed.

Our School has invented its own mechanism for the functioning of the Pass, which is not the same as Lacan's School. We've kept the conceptual basis, structure and orientation, but we've changed several elements. I highlight a few points: in Lacan's School, it wasn't a question of a 'Cartel of the Pass', but of a 'Jury of acceptance'; the Members of the School that the Analysts of the School (AS) decided could take part in this jury; they were appointed to the role, whereas in our School it is the Analyst Members of the School (AMSs) who are voted onto the International College of the Guarantee (ICG), who take part; there were three passers to take part in listening to a Pass, whereas in our School we opted for two; the passers were appointed by the ASs, whereas in our School they are appointed by the AMSs.<sup>8</sup>

Let's just stick with these initial indications. Until the end of his life, Lacan would modify it, but the interesting thing is that he expected there to be enough ASs in his School for them not only to be 'produced' from the dispositive of the Pass, but also to sustain the dispositive itself. Over time, Lacan himself realised that he didn't have enough ASs to sustain the dispositive. This doesn't seem to be a problem with the dispositive or even a fact that discredits it. It's just a step that made Lacan rethink and rearrange his dispositive, and that made us opt for the AMSs to take on this role. It's worth remembering that his School was not intended to be international, which meant that there was no linguistic issue that in our dispositive makes us think and articulate in such a way that we have cartelisands in the Cartels of the Pass who represent our five linguistic zones.

The School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field was set up as an international, plurilingual School with no fixed headquarters. We have opted for a School that is sustained in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Alocusão sobre o ensino, Outros Escritos, p.310.

 $<sup>^7</sup>$  Aula de 15 de fevereiro do seminário 24 – p.54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Um procedimento para o passe. In: Documentos para uma Escola II – Lacan e o passe. P.21-22.

biennial instances without the figure of A director. The School is of the Forums insofar as they are expected to address the School and sustain it from the Members of the School who are part of them. In order to set up the bodies to support the School, we decided that in each location they would meet in forums and organise themselves as their members decided. From the number of 30 Members of the School, a Local Dispositive of the School (LDS), Epistemic, and of Reception, is formed, and from 50 Members of the School, an LDS of the Guarantee is formed. It is from this LDS of the Guarantee that the work of the dispositive of the Pass begins. This is important in order to follow the difference between our School and Lacan's School in the treatment of the Pass when the forums, in their various configurations, don't maintain these numbers of Members of the School. The effects reach the Pass to the extent that, without the constitution of an LDS with 50 members, it is not possible for the AMSs to participate in the dispositives by nominating passers or participating in the secretariat of the Pass and the ICG.

Now, since our School is international in scope, how do we create the possibilities for the Dispositive of the Pass? In order to better promote exchanges among the members of the School, we decided to work with five languages: Spanish, French, English, Italian and Portuguese. We have members who live in countries where other languages are spoken, but to keep our documents translated, we chose these five languages. Perhaps Lacan would be interested in the functioning we have invented, because in it we make operative what he insists – that "we can only speak of a language in another language".<sup>9</sup> The plurilingualism and internationalism of our School echoes Lacan's later reflections on language in its relationship with the Real.

In our School, the AMSs are responsible for appointing the passers. In this respect, it's worth thinking that, in line with the proposition that 'the passer is the Pass', in our School the weight lies on the appointment of the passers by the AMSs. This is a recurring theme in our School's discussions. Currently, AMSs are nominated by Members of the School who, within the timeframes set by the ICG, can send in their recommendations along with at least one other colleague. In our ICG, within the International Accreditation Committee, which is responsible for appointing new AMSs, we put together a document with some recommendations to guide these appointments. This is extremely important, because the appointments need to be aligned with the orientation of our School. It cannot take place in the politics of friendship or even the misuse of transferences. The recommendations that were added to our documents aim to maintain our basic orientation.

If in Lacan's School there was a wager on the nominated ASs sustaining the dispositive of the Pass, our wager is that the responsibility lies with the AMSs. When should we appoint a passer? What is expected of a passer? What is the role of the AMS in the work of the ICG? And what is the place and role of the Secretariat of the Pass within the LDSs? These are the questions that run through the discussions in our ICG after listening to the passes. That a nomination doesn't happen because it wasn't possible to transmit to the Cartel of the Pass what, from the passand's testimony, constitutes the possibility of an AS, is not a problem. That's structural. However, how do we think about cases in which the passer arrives affected by their own history? Or is so in transference to the theory or to the analyst that they act more on the theory and its transference than on their listening? Or when the problems of local transferential ties interfere with the passer's account?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Seminário 24, Staferla, p. 73.

If the assertion that the passer is the Pass carried the responsibility of the ASs in the structure of the Pass of Lacan's School, in ours the responsibility lies with the AMSs. We had very few responses to the question that the ICG sent to the AMSs about how each one thinks about appointing passers for the Pass. Would this not be a good time to insist on this question? And in the Spaces of the School let this place, so central to the Pass, that of the AMS, circulate a little more?

What about the passers? What guides each of them to the Pass? Not being nominated doesn't mean that the passer was mistaken about his/her movement. However, in some situations, it made us wonder what is being transmitted in our School about what the Pass is, and what is it to present oneself to the Pass. Lacan repeats several times that the Pass can be the vector to indicate the progress of psychoanalysis and call into question how one reaches the end of an analysis. He also raises the question: how does someone who has been analysed want to be a psychoanalyst?<sup>10</sup> Since it would be a(b)normal for someone who has been analysed to want to be an analyst!

The Pass in our School highlights the plurilingual dimension as well as the issues of management and ties in the various places that support it. In this dispositive, we can hear the echoes of the issues that have shaken the place of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts both in our School and, I dare say, in the world. I learnt and came away touched by the importance of maintaining a discussion about the responsibility of the Members of the School in the transmission of psychoanalysis and in the appointment of new AMSs. And consequently, the responsibility of the AMSs of our School in maintaining psychoanalysis and sustaining the dispositive of the Pass. We set up this School as a counter-experience to the misuse of the One, and we always repeat that definition. Repetition is necessary, because the One is always lurking out there in the human longing to have a One to tell them what to do and for some who allow themselves to be bewitched by this place. Hence the importance of the Pass and the Cartel in the construction of our School!

Translation: Pedro Pablo Arévalo.

<sup>10</sup> Seminário 25 p.33

# KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN THE CARTELS OF THE PASS

*Martine Menès* Paris, France

The Cartel of the Pass, just like the psychoanalyst, must not ignore they ignore.

It is not enough, but it is a prerequisite. Ignorance is one of the conditions of its task. The Cartel places itself in the position of being surprised rather than listening to what it should listen to according to the current doxa (which changes) but always according to Lacan's indications. How do we discern a subject's possibility of passing to the analytic act? The emergence of an unprecedented desire? Nevertheless, is the echo of the crossing of the fantasy enough to leave it behind without ignoring it? How to listen beyond?

The montage instituted by Lacan for the Pass is unique: listening to the words of one (passand) through the words of others (passers). Listening to the singular stories without passing through an historical anamnesis. Listening, or not, to new knowledge about the former pathos; relieving without allegiance.

It is an almost a priori matter of distinguishing an end of the analysis, in which the Cartel of the Pass most often has the testimony of the passage to the analyst in charge of an unprecedented desire. As fragile as the lightning that has already disappeared when we see it.

The Cartel does not have an a priori knowledge of the position of the passand. Nothing is left of this after the testimonies of the passers, whose accounts are sometimes so different that their particular listening has not found the same singular knowledge, the same treatment of the real, of the fantasy, of the symptoms in the passand. Nevertheless, they may emerge as identical conditions, even if spoken very differently. In its absence, the Cartel could be very uncomfortable to hear two different stories. Lacan has warned: "Psychoanalysts are the savants of a knowledge about which they cannot converse with each other".<sup>1</sup> The Cartel of the Pass embraces that impossibility, which leaves room for what is impossible to convey.

There is no such thing as an guaranteed pass. It's a wager one must make with a portion of ignorance. Can the intimate conviction shared among the members of the Cartel operate as decisive knowledge? Could it be that recognizing (or believing that one recognizes) the passage to the analyst will lead the Cartel to enthusiasm? Or enthusiasm is, like other affects (except for anxiety), a deceptive one. As for the reduction of the analyst of the passand, their fall as Subject-supposed-to-know, it can be identified and considered by a member of the Cartel as effected thus leaving room for the desire of the analyst or, on the contrary, as impossible for the same passand, who would remain stuck to an ideal image, the living embodiment of the Other. Therefore, it is also a matter for the Cartel to identify whether it is an assured desire or the persistence of a demand (becoming an analyst) that maintains the fantasy of an Other in place.

But the Cartel is not alone; it is the Cartel of the School; it is the vector of the intention of psychoanalysis. It does not have all the power, as it is delegated by the School, which says what

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité, p.359. 1967.

it expects from a psychoanalyst. The closed discussions within the Cartel bear witness to this and take it into account.

But then, would naming an AS be one of the impossible missions identified by Freud? Michel Silvestre pointed out in *Delenda* no. 5 "that it is a matter of knowing if 'psychoanalyst' is a possible predicate." So, the Cartel of the Pass is always in a wager of confirming or not the self-designation that the passand makes. In fact, the analyst takes authority from himself and others, Lacan adds, and furthermore, they do not decide alone.<sup>2</sup> The title of AS is not a label; it is an invitation to witness the obscure aspects of the theory for a limited time by addressing the School – psychoanalysis in intention par excellence.

Therefore, the Cartel recognizes or not the analyst as an Analyst of the School as well. It is a wager, whether kept or not, as the development will demonstrate in the teaching of these 'who are taught' of the passage to the analyst.

So, the pass will consist of, as Lacan says in his lesson from February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1977, "L'insu que sait de l'un-bévue", recognizing each other, that is, among different knowledge, what will lead to the designation of an AS. A recognition that is proven in its continuation by the transference/s to the work/s. To recognize oneself between s(av)oi/r, and what's more, in the dark, Lacan adds, implies taking the invisible into account.

So, the lightning could become light, shedding once more new knowledge on the Cartel's ignorance.

Translation: external

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. Les non-dupes errent, leçon du 9 avril 1974, unpublished .

### THERE'S NO HAPPY LOVE, THERE'S NO PERFECT PASS<sup>1</sup>

*Mireille Scemama* Charenton-le-Pont, France

The work of the Secretariats of the Pass

The Secretariat of the Pass is a part of the dispositive of the Pass. It is the first link to receive the passand's demand in this collective logic, this ballet of three, and it is a key player in the dispositive. What is its function? They receive the request from the person who wishes to enter the dispositive of the Pass. The difficulty lies in receiving the request and questioning it, without taking the place of the Cartel of the Pass.

A difficult task: that of taking in the passand's request and assessing it. There's something to grasp. Can we define it? (before ChatGPT does it for us!) What is there to grasp? What drives anyone to ask for the Pass? The experience of the Cartels of the current ICG has noted, for certain passands, a demand for the Pass was for a guarantee of the end of the analysis, very far from the desire of the analyst. This is a disappointment for the passand because non-nomination does not answer this question of the guarantee of the end of analysis. Could this point be spotted by the secretariat?

The pass "aims not to ensure that there has been an analysis but to authenticate the transformed being of the analyst".<sup>2</sup> Coming out of one's neurosis is not enough. The analyst's desire, an "unprecedented desire", cannot be reduced to a therapeutic end. When the request is received, the question arises as to its timeliness: 'is this the right time', and basically, what could define 'the right time'? There is no universal answer. The 'right time' is different for each passand. The moment of the turning point in the treatment does not necessarily correspond with the request for a Pass. The request for a Pass may be motivated by an impasse. I refer you to the article by Colette Sepel in *Wunsch* 10 entitled '*Pourquoi la passe*' [Why the Pass].

A few years ago, in this position of the Secretariat of the Pass (CRG: Local Committee for Reception and Guarantee), I remember insisting to future passands on the question of what motivated their requests and why now. Basic questions, it seems to me. For one of them, it was a dream that precipitated the request for a Pass at a time when the analysis had ended several years earlier. It should be noted that many passands use dreams to orient themselves in this experience. This dream, interpreted by the passand as an effect of truth, was enough to allow this subject to enter the dispositive of the Pass. He was nominated AS. For another, the decision presented itself as evidence, even as a certainty. The details requested were not conclusive, hence the decision was taken with the other members of the CRG not to let him enter the process. Another request was made to enter the process without nomination. Although a subject may, of course, make several requests, our ICG regretted the lack of transmission about the singularity of this situation.

The aim of the Cartel of the Pass is to nominate the ASs when it can read in the text of the passers what the passand's desire of the analyst is. There is a responsibility to nominate or not to nominate. This has already been evoked.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Text presented at the Symposium of the Pass as an introduction to the debate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Soler, C. « Styles de passes », WUNSCH N° 10.

The Cartel is a place of elaboration, of production of knowledge. The decision to nominate emerges as a product of the Cartel's joint elaboration. In the Cartels of the Pass there are also modalities of impasse. An impasse on the part of the passer may be a barrier to transmission. Carmen Gallano mentioned the fact of not having known how to question the passands as a modality of impasse. In one of the Cartels in which I participated this year, one of the passers, who had not questioned the passand, had heard something of the analyst's desire that the Cartel neither heard nor extracted, and this was confirmed by the second passer. We also heard testimonies of the pass in the form of biographical accounts.

Elisabete Thamar mentioned in *Wunsch* 10, after the first international meeting of the School in Buenos Aires, that "the question of the pass, of what we hope to find in the testimonies of the end of analysis, was not unanimous".<sup>3</sup> Have we made any progress on what we expect, and what we are really expecting? We have as our basis Lacan's theoretical coordinates, including the Proposition of 1967 and the Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI of 1976. Each experience is unique. Anastasia Tzavidopoulou<sup>4</sup> elaborates on this point (*Wunsch* 23): 'At the end of the process, "there will be something of the psychoanalyst",<sup>5</sup> the product of his or her own experience, and the article 'of' reflects the particular, the specificity of each subject analysed in his or her singularity... . In the process, we are confronted with the 'One' of experience, because we are obliged to take into our own account something that eludes the psychoanalyst's knowledge.

When it doesn't pass, apart from the disappointment that is always present, including for the members of the Cartel, the elaboration is sometimes more delicate: in the Cartel in which I was present, there was always unanimity when it didn't pass. Testimony of the order of a life story... The desire of the analyst in the testimony can also be the subject of debate.

What does the Cartel learn from its experience and how to transmit it? Marie-José Latour (*Wunsch* 23) suggests calling what guides the discussions 'Clinic of the Pass'.<sup>6</sup>

The Pass is a unique singular experience of a particular truth that puts the School to the test.

There is no perfect pass.

Translation: Pedro Pablo Arévalo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Thamer, E. « La passe pas toute : l'épreuve du passer » Wunsch n°10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Tzavidopoulou, A. Promotion of a forfeiture', Wunsch 23, p. 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. : "On the subject who is finally in question", in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B.

Fink, New York and London, Norton & Company, p.196. Trans. mod.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Latour, M-J. 'The interpretation of the Cartel and contingency', Wunsch 23, p. 25.

#### WHY THE PASS?

Pedro Pablo Arévalo Barcelona, Spain.

From an individual perspective, what can be the reasons for an analysand, or someone analysed, to request the Pass? The dispositive was conceived to try to clarify what happens in the passage from analysand to analyst. However, as Lacan asks himself in the 'Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI', what could motivate someone to request it?<sup>1</sup>

I have learned of various motives in my experience as a member of the 2023-2024 ICG, as well as through articles by previous ICG members, and through several passands I have met personally, some of them nominated AS. The motives are not always explicit but can be deduced from the testimonies.

Among the various reasons, I attribute the greatest importance to the profound transformation experienced by the analysand with the end of the analysis and the passage from analysand to analyst, and the consequent need to transmit to others what has been experienced, as if it were a great weight to be shared. More than a decision of the Ego, it is something that comes from within, we could say from the Id, and that imposes itself on the subject. This is where I place all the cases of nominations I have known.

But there are other possible reasons for this demand. One of them is to submit to the Pass, seeking proof that one is fit to practice as a psychoanalyst, a search for authorisation by the Other. In some cases, the demand may be an attempt to separate from the analyst. In contrast, sometimes the wonders of analysis and love for the analyst are expressed. On some occasions, the AS's testimony of the pass generates enthusiasm and commitment in some analysands. Others expect a final answer that confirms or verifies that their analysis is over, so that the Pass marks the end of the analysis. Likewise, sometimes the Pass is understood as a way of complying with the School or of entering it. Sometimes a retroactive sense to the analysis is sought in the Pass; that is, the Pass as a knowledge in which the  $S_1$ s of the analysis are articulated. Finally, on occasions we perceive an aspiration to conclude in the Pass something that was not resolved in the analysis. Faced with this variety of reasons, we might be tempted to classify them as 'valid' or 'invalid'. I am not so sure of this being advisable, bearing in mind that we are a School of the Pass.

This takes us from the individual perspective to the level of the School. In this sense, why do we continue to support the dispositive of the Pass? Why has the commitment not been exhausted? Why, in spite of so few nominations, are there still numerous requests for the Pass?

The low number of nominations is something that has occurred since the dispositive was born. At times this has given rise to individual unease with some institutional echoes. So far, the School has been able to assimilate these situations and, after more than twenty years of existence, the Pass is more vital than ever. For example, in the 2023-2024 ICG we heard twenty-three passes, and received four more that the incoming ICG will attend to. How to explain this vitality of the dispositive?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. The Preface to the English-Language Edition. In *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. viii.

A symbolic order reason that helps to explain this vitality is that, according to the Guiding Principles, ours is a School of the Pass. As far as the imaginary is concerned, the testimonies of the ASs and the events related to the Pass are the order of the day in the School and generate great expectations. With regard to the real, hystorisation gives a certain logic to the trajectory of an analysis, highlighting encounters with the real. This frequently touches something of the real of those who listen to the testimonies of the ASs. There is always something new, something surprising, something moving, something that mobilises affects. This explains not only the vitality and validity of the pass, but also, I would say, its non-domesticability.

Even in cases of non-nomination, passing through the dispositive produces changes, and there is no going back. For everyone there is a before and an after the Pass. It is something of the order of an act. And the energy that will no longer be directed to testifying to the pass before the community, will now go in other directions. The elaboration continues, as an effect. There is a palpitating desire that is channelled in one way or another.

Of course, the effects of nominations and non-nominations reach everyone according to their institutional location. It is not the same to be in a place where importance is given to the end of analysis and the pass, as it is to be in one where this is but one issue among many. AMSs do not attend ASs' presentations, if there is any, and passers are rarely or never designated. In such an environment it is not easy for demands for the Pass to arise.

Being in the pass, according to the formula of the Proposition, designates not only a clinical moment, but also establishes a link with the School, the analysand's choice to associate his analytic experience with an analytic community. Thus, the experience of the Pass produces a link between the intimate and singular character of the pass and the collective character of the community of the School.

The Pass energises the School by shaking it up. Both the subject and the School can emerge strengthened. The doctrine that is developed on the pass makes psychoanalysis come alive. The dispositive ensures the transference of analysts to psychoanalysis. Pass and School have a common purpose, and cannot exist one without the other.

In a School that gives importance to the Pass, it is analysed differently from other institutions. Likewise, it is analysed differently in a forum or clinical college where importance is given to the pass and the end of analysis, than it is in one where it is not. Finally, I quote from the editorial in *Wunsch* 4:

"The main purpose of the Pass is not (...) the selection of new ASs, but the actual analytical consequences of this Pass in the community of the School. And here, it seems to me, there is a moment of urgency currently.

We cannot ignore the historical moment in which we find ourselves, marked by the rise of psychotherapies of all kinds, and the related attempts at regulation (...). There are different positions (...) depending on whether psychoanalysts are allied among themselves and militate for psychoanalysis to remain outside the regulation (...) or whether they accept and sometimes even ask to be included in the regulation of psychotherapies. In all cases, the specificity of psychoanalysis is in question.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Soler, C. (2006). Wunsch 4, Editorial.

Today, nineteen years later, we can see that psychotherapy has settled comfortably into certain institutional spaces. Likewise, in some countries there are movements seeking to recognise university degrees in psychoanalysis. The dangers of these realities make the doctrine of the School of the Pass more necessary than ever. It is another answer, in this case in the political dimension, to the question 'Why the Pass?'.

Translation: Pedro Pablo Arévalo.

# BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYMPOSIUM OF THE PASS VINTAGE 2024

Radu Turcanu Paris, France

1.

As everywhere else, repression is also playing up in our School bodies. That is why we started this *Symposium of the Pass* with a reminder. The ICG of which I was a member took office in January 2023, and from the beginning of our mandate we raised the question of the passes in *face-to-face* rather than *video* format, as during the Covid crisis. After a real *disputatio*, the arguments of which crossed the Atlantic, and by convening the place of the Pass in our School of Psychoanalysis, treasury and other considerations were driven to the background.

Indeed, there is nothing like the presence of speaking bodies when it comes to encounters between *passand* and *passers* and between *passers* and the Cartel of the Pass. Or to the moment of conclusion for the five prisoner-*cartelisands*, in a logical time that also needs to be embodied.

Who knows? If changing desires or policies will call into question the relevance of these *transpositions* of bodies in the future, invoking fatigue, duration, expense, pollution and whatever else one might think of, they could be rendered obsolete. Until this further notice, *video* meetings shall remain nevertheless an exception.

2.

During this *Symposium of the Pass*, we also talked about the 'case' of the passers, who are not named, but designated by the AMS; rather 'denominated'. Thus, the proposal to find a common denominator to guide this designation was brought up again. I have already mentioned this in *Reply No. 1* to the *Argument* for the Study Day of the School at the European Convention (Venice, July 2025 – see the Convention website).

But *what then* of a 'what the hell' marking the leap from *I think* to *I act*, as for Caesar before the Rubicon, as Lacan shows? If someone agrees to be a passer, they do so at their own risk. And when the AMS 'designates', it is his own conception of psychoanalysis and the pass which is at stake, underlying thus any possible classification of analysands in the class of passers.

The designation of the passer is therefore not only a challenge for the analysand who accepts the task, but also reveals the position of the AMS within the School and the logic of his or her own appointment as AMS. It was surprising how few AMSs designate passers in Europe, for example.

The discussion drifted towards the question of the appointment (nomination) of AMS. This appointment is generally guided by analytical practice, as well as the work of elaboration and transmission of psychoanalysis, and the inclusion of this work in the School, with the aim of both the *intentionality* and the *extensionality* of psychoanalytic discourse. It was proposed to find a common denominator with regard to the method of submitting AMS proposals to the relevant bodies, both locally and internationally. And what if, in addition, the criterion for nomination

were to be the conviction, even the certainty, that the future AMS, guided by his or her practice as an analyst, is able (has the desire) to designate passers?

3.

There was a third point submitted for discussion at this *Symposium*, this time concerning the work of the secretariats of the pass and, once again, the criteria used to accept or refuse requests for the pass. It was pointed out that it happens that some applications are not sufficiently justified, and therefore they should not be accepted.

Indeed, it remains *essential* to assess these pass requests reasonably. At the same time, how can we underestimate the hole that dwells within the reason and the request? A hole as a point of indecisiveness and inconsistency that means that any Pass, in its trajectory, can find its resolution, its answer to the enigma of desire. With a bit of luck, it will be a *joke* as a *touch* of the real.

We can also smile in the face of these recurring holes in the dispositive of the Pass that annoy us and sometimes make us lose the compass. But isn't the actual course to be set on the transmission of what makes a hole? Isn't that the one that remains? Even 'touched', the real will never abolish its grimace at our (de)nominations.

Translation: Radu Turcanu.

#### A DIFFERENT STYLE: THE FAULT THROUGH WHICH I TRIED TO PASS MY PASS".

Rebeca García Madrid, Spain

Lacan, in his speech on 3 November 1973, 'About the experience of the pass',<sup>1</sup> after pointing out that analytical societies have been governed so far by the laws of competition and therefore by the group laws and the Master's Discourse, comments that he "wanted another mode of recruitment", as "the first step in a different style of recruitment", with the aim of isolating what the Analytic Discourse concerns.

This different style points then to a different way of thinking about the link with the School, which sets all its members and instances to the test.

It is a collective logic that wagers on *a radically new experience, because the Pass has nothing to do with analysis.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Lacan, J. About the experience of the pass - Congress of the Grande-Motte, 3 Nov 1973 en <u>www.ecolelacanienne.net/</u> Pas-tout Lacan.

The system in our School is organized in such a way that it could not function without a series of links between all the elements involved: passands, Secretariats of the Pass, AMSs, passers, Cartels of the Pass.

So we could think of a Borromean way of working: if one of the elements fails, the others are loosened.

#### "... I will put it, in terms of logic.

What reason in terms of logic? Because logic is defined as that which aims at reabsorbing the problem of the supposedly knowing subject."<sup>2</sup>

After two years of being part of the ICG experience (2022-2024), I have wondered at different times about the basis of this collective logic put into action in the device of the pass and which sets in motion so many of the School resources.

Lacan, after six years of experiencing with the pass, gives some orientations that allow us to think some features of this logic.

On the one hand, it is not a functioning that illuminates a Universe, nor is it of the didactic order, of what is taught or what is learned, the subject has not learned at all..... It was revealed... before him, is of the order of an experience and the experience is not didactic.

It is another relationship with knowledge that is *revealed*, not as a knowledge that would come from outside, but as something that appears to the candidate, but also to the passers and the pass cartel, when the veil is lifted.

What is the *revelation* in experience to avoid falling into the temptation of the ineffable? Lacan talks about the different positions of those involved in the device: What is revealed in the analytical experience makes the passand "candid-a", so that the passand can convey something of that moment of subjective destitution where the object **a** *represents a certain number of polarized enigmas* <sup>3</sup> fails clearing an empty space that would make it possible the passage from the analysand to the analyst, if some consequences are drawn.

The *candid* bets on ignorance, rather lets himself be surprised by what he finds, is close to *dupe*.<sup>4</sup>

In the Proposition of 9 October 1967, Lacan comments:

Thus, the end of psychoanalysis harbours naivety, which raises the question whether it must be taken as a guarantee in the passage to the desire to be a psychoanalyst.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. Seminar XV, The Analytic Act – Lesson of 21 February 1968.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. "On the experience of the pass".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent , en <u>www.ecole-lacanienne.net</u> / Pas-tout Lacan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 10.

As for the passer, it is important that he does not appear to be puffed up or pretending to be an analyst with the candidate, positions which hinder the transmission of an experience, "insofar as a saying that in its contingencies is carrying a cause of a desire".<sup>6</sup>

What is expected from the pass cartel? Perhaps at this point, Lacan's commentary on the Heraclitus' famous aphorism on the lightning, leads us to think that all those *heterogeneous*, can withstand the temptation of building a universal of knowledge that asphyxiates the dimension of experience itself, which is crossed by a real and which relies on the unknown as the farmwork of knowledge. It would be a matter of *letting it pass* that at a moment, in the various testimonies, illuminates, reveals some aspect of the real thing at stake.

Lacan talks about the passage, the fault through which I tried to passage my pass".

It is in this fault that the cartel and the whole device works to give an answer to the untransmissible nature of psychoanalysis which leads each analyst to reinvent it.<sup>7</sup> It is the fault that paradoxically organizes the collective logic that drives the device.

Without that failure, without that crack, the transmission of an experience does not circulate; other things may circulate, but they will be of the order of other discourses. What each analyst has been able to *reinvent requires the passage*, a corridor that is an open place, not a place in which to settle, remains open, as the proposals that Lacan has made throughout his teaching on the passage. In fact, in this text he speaks of the pass *as a first step*.

The reinvention of each analyst and the pass would be the answer to the intransmissibility of the  $psychoanalysis^8$ 

Participating in the pass cartels has allowed me to see an effect of enthusiasm and joy, in all participants, and especially in most passers, even if there was no nomination. Satisfaction for having been able to test this collective, paradoxical and contingent logic?

Finally if Lacan speaks of the pass as a "first step in recruiting in a different style" Are we as members of the School, nominated or not, challenged to continue thinking about other steps?

Translation: Montserrat Grau

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Gallano, C. Subjectivity and collective logics -"Politics of the real", VV.AA, Ediciones S&P, Barcelona, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lacan, J. Closing of the 9th Congress of the Freudian School of Paris on "Transmission" in <u>www.ecolelacanienne.net /Pas-tout</u> Lacan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Bruno, P. Final y Pase Ediciones S&P Barcelona 2015 p. 12.

### SUBJECTIVE URGENCIES AND THE END OF ANALYSIS?

*Teresa Trias* Barcelona, Spain

Is it possible to act with urgency in requesting the Pass? What does Lacan tell us about urgency? Are they subjective urgencies, or are there other types of urgencies?

It has caught my attention that, at the end of the 'Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI', Lacan tells us that cases of urgency were a hindrance to him. And he tells us further, "I point out that, as always, cases of urgency were a hindrance to me."<sup>1</sup>

And in *Autres écrits*, "I would mention that, as always, I was entangled in urgent cases as I wrote this."

I put together the two possible translations. The first is in the Directory 2023-2024 [Spanish version] and the second in *Autres écrits*.

Either way, cases of urgency were a hindrance or were entangling him, emphasizing the signifier **always**. I understand that they were a hindrance or an entanglement to the objective to be achieved: the nomination of AS.

Earlier in the same Preface he speaks about the satisfaction of the end of analysis and that the urgency that presides over the analysis is to achieve that satisfaction. He is talking to us of the hystorization of the analysis, of its course and its deciphering. He speaks to us of the end of analysis, but he is going to say something else about the pass: the proof of the hystorization. The analysis is set to prove, to discern, whether the desire of the analyst is there or not. Not to "be an analyst", not to practice psychoanalysis, but whether there is or is not that desire. This infers the lack, the object cause of desire.

A finished analysis is not synonymous with there being an AS. Lacan even points out to us that if there is no desire they should return to their studies. Does he mean to continue with the epistemic? I put that in question. There may be an analyst, but not an analyst of the School. Although, study alone is not going to resolve what did not happen in the pass. They should go further in their analysis. Therefore, clinical and epistemic must be linked.

The clinic and the episteme of Lacanian psychoanalysis, not of an analytical therapy since, at times, the analysis can become therapeutic only. Hence, the urgencies 'entangle' him.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Editor's note: this is the English translation of the sentence in the Spanish version of the Preface to the English language edition of Seminar XI' which is included in the Directory 2023-2024. The official English translation can be found in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis,* trans. A Sheridan, ed. J-A Miller, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. ix. This is an accurate translation of the French in *Autres écrits: "Je signale que comme toujours les cas d'urgence m'empêtraient pendant que j'écrivais ça"*. Thus, the distinction that the author is drawing does not apply here.

The urgency is present in all analysands and "for each one a therapeutic urgency is there".<sup>2</sup> The therapeutic can resolve emotional and vital situations without a doubt, but Lacanian analysis has a plus, it goes beyond the therapeutic. The therapeutic benefit will be given, in part, from the moment the analysand takes the step of assuming his own symptom in the form of a question. If it forms a question, it is the beginning of an analysis since it becomes an analytical symptom to be deciphered, thereby taking responsibility for it. The beginning of knowing what happens and why it happens. Knowledge produces a benefit that reduces jouissance. "The symptom changes its use, that is, it exchanges its value of insufficient jouissance for a value of knowledge: it is the entry into the transference."<sup>3</sup>

Let's continue with the Pass and the proof of hystorization. What does Lacan mean by putting it to the test? In the Pass, the passand explains, transmits, at best, his own hystorization to the passer. He hystorizes himself, as Lacan tells us in the aforementioned Preface. The passand will give his own version of his analysis, the crucial points, the logical times.

I say explain, transmit, at best, with every intention. Because it is not only explaining, but reaching whoever is listening. Here lies the transmission. If he only explains, the transmission belt will not be produced and it will be impossible for something to pass from the passer to the Cartel of the Pass. He will tell a story. It may or may not be interesting in terms of history, but it will not fulfil the objective of what is sought.

For the Royal Spanish Academy, transmitting is "making (something) pass or move from one thing or from one person to another".<sup>4</sup> In any case, there may be transmission, something may pass, but not what must be passed. This 'something' must be perceived as different and unprecedented.

I said earlier that a finished analysis is not synonymous with there being an AS. In some of the passes I have listened to, the analyst of the passand had considered the analysis finished. So, what happened? Was there a push towards the Pass? Was there urgency? Did the passand not know how to transmit, did the passer not know how to listen and, in turn, transmit, or did the Cartel of the Pass not know how to listen? As I just said, it is necessary that there is a transmission belt.

How can something that touches the real be transmitted? The logical explanation is hystorization. Transmission occurs when something passes from the passand to the passer and from him to the Cartel of the Pass.

This concatenation, this chain of three reminds me of the transmission from one generation to another. The transmission that occurs from one generation to another is because there is desire, not because it is said that there is desire but because there is desire and it is transmitted. It is something of the unconscious that is transmitted. "[W]ith a desire that is not anonymous"<sup>5</sup> wrote Lacan to Jenny Aubry in relation to the transmission of desire from parents and the subjective constitution of the infant in neurosis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Soler, C. "¿Urgencias terapéuticas?", página 106, Asociación Foro del Campo Lacaniano de Medellín.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Soler, C. "Los fines propios del acto analítico", página 64, Finales de análisis, Manantial.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Real Academia Española.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. "Note on the Child", Analysis 2, 1990, p. 8.

The analyst's desire is linked to the analytic act of the end. It is a desire produced by having 'accepted' being waste or a remainder, without remaining as such. We can understand it as a desire linked to the subject's own jouissance. A jouissance that no longer mortifies and that transforms the subject. Acceptance does not mean considering oneself waste or a remainder but being able to do with that real, being able to get out of the repetition that produces jouissance, getting out of it, lightening it. It is not resigning oneself to it but having found a 'gap' to avoid repetition, having found a way out, a loophole through which one says, 'that is it', as a certainty.

This transformation of the subject will act as a support to be able to place oneself as the object cause of desire in the analytic dispositive, taking the place of the analyst. Lacan asks himself who is willing to occupy this difficult-to-assume place.

Translated by Daniela Avalos

Wunsch n°25



RICARDO ROJAS Member of the ICG 2023-2024

died on 27 September 2024, We regret 'su querida presencia' and publish one of his texts: *'Mourning and satisfaction, at the end?*' We would like to thank our colleague Beatriz Maya for giving us access to a text by Ricardo Rojas, who died on 27 September 2024.

The ICG 2023-2024 pays tribute to his commitment and to the work we were able to share.

#### MOURNING AND SATISFACTION AT THE END?

Ricardo Rojas Medellín, Colombia.

...When this Meeting was organized, the need to return to this topic reappeared for me, which has had a particular interest, and it became the occasion to see how much my conceptualizations had advanced since I made them public back in November of 2007, in a Meeting in Medellín. Its content was published 11 years later in *What happens in the pass (Lo que pasa en el pase)*, of the Association of Latin America North, reflections in the article: *The pass in Lacan's teaching is not without end (El pase en la enseñanza de Lacan no es sin final)*.

After so long it is now time to approach this topic again and to put the question of what is maintained and what is transformed in my conception. Many important things happened in the meantime, I experienced the dispositive of the Pass in the role of the passand at the end of 2011; from 2014 to 2016 in the role of Analyst Member of the School I was chosen in Latin America North to participate as a member of the International College of the Guarantee, where I participated in many Cartels of the Pass, and some nominations took place. In addition, from 2016 to 2018 I was a member of the Secretariat of the pass in the Committee of the Guarantee of Latin America. As an A.M.S (since 2006), 5 of my analysands proposed as passers were randomly chosen and they fulfilled the function, three of them in cases of nominations of A.S. That is, I have participated in the dispositive of the Pass, from different viewpoints, different moments of its functioning. I have revised the echoes of the dispositive, both from those who received the nomination of Analyst of the School as from those that didn't. In other words, thirteen years and a half ago I spoke from the non-experience, a bit propelled by my then recent designation of Analyst Member of the School by the Commission of International Accreditation, and trying to think on the matter from the theory developed by Lacan.

Precisely, this is what it is all about, that some enthusiasm for thinking psychoanalysis would persist, for producing a knowledge (*saber*): "*without which* – as Lacan points out in the 'Note to the Italians' – "*there is no chance that analysis will continue to rise in the market*". Here, the need of theoretical elaboration that accounts for the concepts that underlie a *praxis* such as psychoanalysis, an elaboration with ethical aims. Today we are at the very same point of enthusiasm, actively participating in the chance to exchange in different spaces that have a praxis or not, of the dispositives of the School and of psychoanalysis. Spaces that go from the small cartels to the Seminars and wider Meetings. A benefit of the pandemic these days has been to be able to participate in exchanges from distant places on the planet, to be open to that dialectic constituted by the permanent that our School provides, for in it, we all in permanent formation.

This allows that many of the things elaborated in 2007 be modified and enriched. That is the *"swirl"* of the School and the possibility of continuous transformation.

Precisely the main theme of this article had emerged in the development of a dialectic with a colleague from the other side of the Atlantic, whose central thesis was *The pass is without end*, while my position was absolutely contrary. Perhaps a precision I would give my 2007 text, in the title, would be: *The pass is not without the satisfaction that marks the end*, that is, the reference to the Lacan of the *Preface* of 1977, used in my article, would pass from being a simple common element to being central in the matter.

We are confronted then with an ethical matter which consists in thinking the aims of an analysis, its distinctiveness, that is, the objectives proper to it, this is why the ends of analysis must be thought about in relation to the aims of an analysis, its objectives and, at the same time, the aims of analysis depend on the end as final, be it possible or not. That's why the End of analysis becomes a central topic in a School of Psychoanalysis, conjugated with the formation of analysts, for, as is pointed to in the 'Proposition of the 9th of October of 1967': "This does not exclude the possibility that the School provide a guarantee that an analyst has come out of its training" or "That the School can guarantee the analyst's relationship to the training it dispenses".<sup>1</sup> I understand that the guarantees of the School do not belong to an individual but that it comes to guarantee the formation. The guarantees of the School are not just a Step-stool (Escabel) more to nurture the individual's narcissism. It would be wrong of anyone to exhibit them as theirs and demand the honors. The analyst is rather the result of that which is dispensed as formation in a School. This begins with the offer of the dispositive of analysis, by an analyst who, though in the solitude of his office, does not offer it without the presence of the third, the barred Other that the School constitutes. This is what gives political support to the analysts of its School. They are indeed, and not by being in a list of members, but as participants in the "swirl" of its activities and of the other dispositives. In addition to the personal analysis, there is also in the formation dispensed by the School: the cartel, the supervision and finally the dispositive of the Pass which hones into the ethics of psychoanalysis, that is, its ends and aims.

Because this intricate relationship of the analyst with the formation that it dispenses is the only thing that can be guaranteed, analysts who are always in formation, always in question, which again brings the need for analysts to think psychoanalysis. As Colette Soler was saying in her Seminar this year, it is not enough for there to be those who practice psychoanalysis, in order for it to continue with a presence in social discourse, it is necessary that there be those who continue thinking psychoanalysis.

Freud is not the same as Lacan. In many matters there are clear differences, of which the end of analysis is an example. In regards to the end, Freud found a double limit, a therapeutic and an epistemic one. The first one is linked to the claim and protest, the rejection of that which is discovered in analysis, that is, castration. The second one, the epistemic, concerns the revelation of the unconscious; in this case the limit is primordial repression, the impossibility of lifting it completely and thus gaining absolute access to the unconscious. Given the previous situation, there is no end of analysis for Freud, therefore being the actual fact of no longer meeting with the analyst as that which marks the end of analysis, something evaluated in each case, at the mercy of subjective evaluation, and rather recommending that it is good to return periodically.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. *Analysis* 6, 1995, pp 1-2.

Lacan never agreed with this; he always saw the chance to identify an end and, his theory of the end of analysis was always supportive of his elaboration of psychic structure. It is not my objective in this paper to trace all the theories of the end that Lacan put forward through the course of his teaching, I will only touch on what has to do with mourning and satisfaction, two affects that take place in his elaborations of the end. I recommend the reading of Colette Soler's text *El fin y las finalidades de análisis (the end and the aims of analysis)*, which gathers a series of conferences given in Buenos Aires at the end of 2011 and is published by Letra Viva, you will find in it a broader development of what we are addressing here.

From this text one can extract that the issue of mourning and satisfaction in the end appears in two moments in Lacan: On the one hand, in the *Proposition of 1967* and his text *L'étourdit* and on the other, his last text written on the end in 1977, the *Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI*. As much as us can wonder whether these conceptions are different or complementary, if one replaces the other, or if, rather, one clarifies something that was not understood in the first. This last option is one that I introduce, parting from the first reading of the matter in 2007 and this new rereading in 2021, being illuminated by having attended Colette Soler's course in the Clinical College of Paris 2020-2021 that she called *Urgencies* and which, hopefully, will be published by Ediciones Hispanohablantes del Campo Lacaniano next year. In this seminar Colette comes and goes multiple times over the text of the *Preface* and the matter of the satisfaction of the end of analysis, introduced by Lacan in that text.

In the dialectic with Patrick Barillot, who maintained that the pass is without end, one of the main arguments was supported in the thesis that Colette Soler developed in Buenos Aires in 1986, published in the article: 'The outcomes of analytic treatment', in her book Finales de análisis (Ends of analysis), published by Manantial. The central thesis was that the moment of the pass was followed by a moment of mourning, a time in which the relation of the analysand with the analyst is to be resolved in terms of object, a mourning that lasted some time. The former deduced parting from, first, two phrases of Lacan in the Proposition pointing that "Peace does not immediately seal this metamorphosis"<sup>2</sup>, this peace would arrive through mourning. I was stressing in 2007 that the moment of the pass was not a process, but rather, as Lacan outlines in the seminar of the Analytic Act, a leap, something of the dimension of an Act which has nothing to do with a process that would make it similar to the Kleinian or Winnicottian theories of mourning. Colette, in her seminar of this year, sees this phrase of Lacan in a different way, different from how she saw it in 1986. In this moment she outlines that the metamorphosis of the subject is the consequence of traversing the fantasy, of the revelation of the failure of the Subject-supposedto-know and the fact that there be no more respondent than the object a, all consequences with a characterization of minus, which thus, requires a plus to counterbalance, so that the end is marked, which is what is outlined in the text of the Preface, the satisfaction of the end. This would be the "peace" advanced in the text of the Proposition. I said in my text of 2007:

«Peace is here nothing other than Befriedigung, the satisfaction [referencing in footnote the class of May 10th of 1977 from his Seminar on the Logic of Fantasy where Lacan says: "satisfaction, in Freud's text Befriedigung, which introduces the notions of the peace that follows"], "Satisfaction is found without any displacement, pressure, defense or transformation, this is why it characterizes sublimation". And yet with a stronger affirmation, sublimation "which does not cease to be drive satisfaction". In the Proposition this is an anticipation of what later he will outline in the Preface in 1977».

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 10

After this long quotation, where I intuit a much more encompassing relationship between the End of analysis and Sublimation with the satisfaction of the end. I was advancing something in 2007 regarding the Knowing-how-to-do-with-there which I prefer to translate as *making do with (ingeniárselas)* and after the developments of Colette Soler in her Seminar *The Other narcissus*, I would think also of the relations to the Step-stool (*Escabel*). That is, a way for one more path of research is opened before me, which I now feel animated to develop, and for which I will constitute a Cartel.

I will go on deconstructing with the help of Colette Soler in her Seminar of this year, as I did with the previous, this second argument taken from Lacan by my European interlocutor in these exchanges of 2007:

From where then could an accurate testimony on whoever crosses this pass be expected, if not from another who, like him, is still this pass, namely in whom at this moment is present the désêtre where his psychoanalyst harbours the essence of what has been passed on to him like a bereavement, knowing thereby, like any other in the function of training analyst, that it will pass onto them, too. Who would be better able than this psychoanalysand in the pass to authenticate therein what it contains of the depressive position?<sup>3</sup>

Colette Soler recalled this year that Lacan had to clarify, in the *Discourse to the EFP*, that subjective destitution is for the analysand, and the *lack-in-being* for the analyst. She also pointed out that if one looks at the text closely, it can be well perceived that Lacan is referring to mourning yes, but in the analyst not in the analysand in the pass. This is in support of what he outlines in the *Proposition*, regarding subjective destitution, which on the contrary, he says it "*makes being singular and strong*" and illustrates this with one of the examples of *The applied warrior* by Paulhan. Then, in no way is the being strong compatible with a mourning. If in the pass there is something of a depressive position and mourning it would be on the side of the analyst.

Colette in her last session of the Seminar pointed out that there is a tendency to bring the mourning at the end in the analytic world, to see that negative side of the end as explanation. I believe that pre-judgement had all its weight in attempting to stretch a phrase of Lacan, justifying with it the issue of needing a time of mourning at the end. This observation of Colette is applicable to her own theorization of 1986. With that aim, those who sustain this thesis, included Colette at that time, utilized a paragraph of *L'étourdit*:

The analysand only ends up making object a the representative of his analyst's representation. As long as the mourning for the object a, to which at last he has reduced him, the psychoanalyst persists causing his desire: rather manic-depressively. (...) It's the state of exultation that Balint, despite approaching by what it's not, describes so well: there is more than one therapeutic success which finds here its reason and eventually in a substantial manner. Then the mourning comes to its end.

It was quite strange or perhaps a patent example of disavowal, that this would result in thinking that Lacan would have ended up constructing a theorization of the end of analysis sharing Balint's point of view, when in the very same text of the *Proposition* while clearly taking distance, he said that:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Editor's note: This paragraph is from the 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 10.

With the end of hypomanic analysis, described by our Balint as being the last word, as it were, of the psychoanalysand's identification with his guide, we touch upon the consequence of the refusal denounced (a shady refusal: Verleugnung?), which no longer leaves anything but the refuge of what is the order of the day, now adopted by the existing societies, the alliance with the healthy part of the ego, which resolves the passage to becoming the psychoanalyst by postulating this healthy part of him from the outset. What point is there henceforth in his passing through the experience.<sup>4</sup>

Clearly, we see what Colette was stressing in the last session of her Seminar of this year: "*it is the complacency of the analytic world in valorizing the mourning phenomena that which could mean an adherence to the mirages of the truth under the disguised form of its painful resignation*".

The same phrase from before, from *L'étourdit*, said clearly that the hypomaniac state of exultation explained or gave reason substantially to more than one "therapeutic success". Then "exultation" is quite different form "enthusiasm", therefore "there could have been analysis, but analyst not even close" as he says in the Note to the Italians. It's not mourning that finishes with the mirages of the lying truth, condition of the satisfaction of the end, for finishing with that mirage is rather the end of mourning. To be in mourning, as Colette was saying, "is to not have said good bye, and how not to see this, mourning is a particular way to enjoy loss", it's a success that in the end secures the "therapeutic success" of the strong ego, the same one demanded as a criterion of analyzability, that is... no progress in the treatment whatsoever.

It is not through the lost object of the depressive position of Kleinian mourning that we will resolve the enigma of the phrase: "*The analysand only ends up making the object a into the representative of the representation of his analyst.*" The representative of the representation is the one that acts as the representation, at the same time it is the binary signifier, the *Vorstellung* that fails in representing the Thing, unrepresentable, unable to represent anything other than its attributes: there are no representations in the unconscious, only what acts as representation, the object in its place of semblant.

Only a few words about satisfaction. Colette did an entire work of deconstructing what she called "the superegoic command of satisfaction': one more effort to reach satisfaction. Satisfaction is not an affect of the end, as such it can represent a *varieté* of the end, but there are also the varieties of fundamental humor in an in-itself of pain as an unfathomable decision, which Colette wonders if, like psychiatry, we could pathologize it, 'melancholize' it or rather wonder what to do with that. It was something that she left quite open-ended, and anyway, phenomenology is not the aim of psychoanalysis.

It leaves us thinking about the time proper to psychoanalysis, leaning into thinking that it is not the logical time of the prisoners the one that would aid us in conjecturing the urgency of satisfaction at the end, nor grammatical time used by Lacan at certain moments in his teaching; he tells us that only modal time, that of the logical modalities, would be helpful to think this matter. As in 2007, I only have a few intuitions. It is important to keep to account that to which Lacan never renounced: to the passing of the pass as a "leap" which discards that it be a process, though I believe haste [*la hâte*] and its relation with the "*a*", are intimately linked with creation, with the new signifier of Seminar XXIV, *L'insu*, with poetry intimately linked with sublimation.

As you see, a paper takes us to the point to which we ought to recommence...

Translation: Gabriela Zorzutti.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

Wunsch n°25

# VIIITH INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MEETING

### <u> 2 May 2024 -</u> PARIS

# KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN THE PASSAGE TO THE ANALYST

### **OPENING**

Dominique Touchon Fingermann Nîmes, France

This VIIIth Meeting of the School of the EPFCL once more puts into question psychoanalysis in intension. It will, in other words, again examine what, in a psychoanalysis, produces a psychoanalyst: the passage from analysand to analyst. Psychoanalysis in intension, which determines the extension that the School and its Forums definitively aims to support in various places, it is the very subversion of the link wherein 'something of the psychoanalyst' is produced.

Not predicable, shall we say. Yet Lacan, after having specified it as the desire of the analyst in order to extract from it the act that depends on it, finally proposed a matheme which writes the operation proper to it: the Discourse of the Psychoanalyst. The contingent result of this unprecedented link can be 'of the psychoanalyst', and so on...

'So that psychoanalysis becomes an act that comes again'<sup>1</sup> we count on a practice which supports its logic and on the fortuity of finding practitioners up to the ethics this logic demands.

The SPFLF's International College of the Guarantee, the ICG 2023-2024, like all those preceding it, supports the dispositive of the Pass and the living experience that flows from it. Each pass is received with the utmost consideration for the upheavals that occur here and there during the course of analyses; but what orients the Cartels is obviously a particular attention to what, in the testimonies, can denote the 'passage to the analyst'.

Work on this question was started at the last Meeting of the School in Buenos Aires, on the initiative of the preceding ICG. We are taking it up and propose it by indicating, from the outset, in the statement of our title, an affirmation: the passage to the analyst that an analysis can provide produces a radical transformation in the relation to knowledge, that is, to the unconscious. Therefore: KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN THE PASSAGE TO THE ANALYST. Psychoanalysis is an experience of knowledge, this is what makes it 'didactic'. This experience of knowledge begins with that 'something' which completely escapes the sufferer, he knows nothing about it but, by chance, he can meet a good listener who *will know how to make* a question from this ignorance and make it speak. This experience of speech, 'the practice of the ballad' addressed to the analyst, will move the initial 'I don't want to know anything about it' into the inexhaustible pathway of a knowledge supposed to this drifting subject, into what Freud called 'his representations', and which Lacan will characterize as lucubrations. The transference, that 'love which addresses itself to knowledge'<sup>2</sup> tireless decipherer, is the vector of the 'practice of meaning' which will have to find its end : the not known that knows of the one-blunder (*l'insu que sait de l'une bévue*). In response to the impasse of the Subject Supposed to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. Introduction de Scilicet, Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. Introduction à l'édition allemande des Écrits, Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 558.

Know, there can occur a pass to the analyst. With the transference as support, the analytic learned ignorance is a pressure toward knowledge. Thus there is a route, a crossing, whose stake is the end of the analysis, that is, a profound modification of the relationship to knowledge and to the jouissance it ciphers, brought about by the practice 'of the analyst', that is, the position of the unconscious: putting knowledge 'in the place of truth'.

Lacan called this crossing the 'pass'. Sleight of hand [*tour de passe-passe*], subtle passage from the knowledge of the analysand to the knowledge of the psychoanalyst. The knowledge of the analysand is first oriented from the Subject Supposed to Know; the psychoanalyst's act as the reverse side of neurosis will favor the analysand's bumping up against the impasse until he can bear this non-known knowledge without recourse to representations, lucubrations, fictions of the lying truth which vectorized his address to the Other.

This knowledge is horrifying because, in contrast to the supposed knowledge, there is no respondent in the Other. "Horror of knowing"<sup>3</sup> says Lacan, in order to underline the stakes of this passage, for the knowledge turns out to be connected to a jouissance which does not produce a relation, and thus leads one to "confronting the sexual impasse", that is, to castration and the attached jouissance. By debunking the sexual theories that neurosis concocted and confined within the limits of the fantasme, this unknown knowledge sends the one who made the journey back to his solitude, *troumatique*, that Lacan could write: there is something of the One (*Ya de l'Un*).

What then remains of our transferential loves and of their desire for knowledge? A desire to know can emerge from it and reverberate the effects (affects) of a non-knowing knowledge.

Indeed, if "analysts are the sages of a knowledge about which they cannot converse",<sup>4</sup> they can put it to use, put it into act and make it known beyond. Let us hope that the AMSs and the *passers* they designate are attentive to the unexpected and unheard of the effects of this non knowing knowledge ... On the side of the Cartels of the Pass ... let us count on the wisdom of their ignorance.

The School, the School, always begun anew ... so that there be the chance of an analyst.

Translation: Daphne Tamarin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. Note Italienne, Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports à la réalité, Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 359.

#### WHAT CAN BE KNOWN IN AN ANALYSIS?<sup>1</sup>

Elynes Barros Lima, AS Fortaleza, Brasil

"It will be enough that each knows something about it, and he will do well to leave it at that."<sup>2</sup>

Some people – psychoanalysts or not – think that, at the end of their analysis, the analysand would, finally, know everything, "know the good and the evil",<sup>3</sup> and that it would be this knowledge that would enable him to 'be a psychoanalyst' – pure illusion. Illusion, because in the experience of psychoanalysis, what is at stake is not of the order of knowledge, but rather, of a very particular knowledge; and to arrive at this knowledge, it is necessary, in fact, that the analysand knows ignorance.

What is this particular knowledge?

In 1968, Lacan said in his seminar that science had unified itself and reduced all knowledge to a single one, assigning it the same value, thus inaugurating a 'market in knowledge'. However, he insists that knowledge is not work and should not be linked to the laws of the market. Knowledge is value, the value that is sometimes incarnated in money, but the value that interests us as psychoanalysts is the value of renouncing jouissance: "it is by renouncing jouissance that we begin to know a little",<sup>4</sup> says Lacan. This knowledge would then be "what the truth lacks", that is, the small object *a*.

"We are in this without knowing",<sup>5</sup> but we are not fooled, says Lacan. The knowledge extracted from the analytic experience serves precisely to prevent us from being fooled in this relationship with the Other. It is a question of knowing how to get out of it, and more precisely of knowing how to enter what is at stake and which, according to Lacan, is always about a necessary failure.

In my case, the step towards the exit was taken precisely by coming up against ignorance: S(A). However, until you get to that point, it was a long journey.

At first, there was anxiety at the trauma, which had the effect of inhibiting my knowledge. And since I thought I already knew too much at the age of seven, I could not show that to the Other, who knows everything. As a result of this process, I did not learn to read until I was 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Text presented at the VIII International Meeting of the School: 'Knowledge and ignorance in the transition to analyst', Paris, May 2024.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 1969-1970, trans. R. Grigg, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, p. 185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Allusion to the episode of the conversation between the serpent and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Holy Bible, Book of Genesis ch. 3, verse 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. O Seminário livro XVI, De um Outro ao outro, [From an Other to the other], Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2008. Aula de 20 de novembro de 1968, p. 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Idem, aula de 5 de março de 1969, p. 203.

So, there was an Other who knew everything, who knew 'The truth' and before whom I should hide what I knew.

As you can see, there is a relation between truth and knowledge, but how would these terms be articulated? Lacan, with his 'little signs' - S1, S2, \$, a – tries to clarify this relation in a very simple way; he says that it is enough to give the unary trait which he called S1, the company of another trait, S2, so that we can verify two things: first, that this relation established between the S1 and the S2 is an insertion into jouissance, the jouissance of the Other; and second, that this insertion into jouissance produces a work that walks on the "*dark side*" of the search for truth.

However, what the analytic experience must reveal is that, to quote Lacan: "the only way in which to evoke the truth is by indicating that it is only accessible through a half-saying, that it cannot be said completely, for the reason that beyond this half there is nothing to say".<sup>6</sup>

In my journey, the search for truth, which Lacan called "love of truth" or even "passion for the signifier", produced a dream that imposed a limit on the search for this totalizing knowledge:

Globo Network (a large television company in Brazil) is broadcasting a report: a scene of abuse in the street being transmitted in real time on the news. In the left-hand corner of the screen, a beggar dressed in rags was leaning back against a column where someone was standing; then I ask myself: people, can you tell that this is abuse?

By encountering the truth dressed in rags, that is, with remnants that cover almost nothing, I was able to move from the position of "the Other knows" to the question, "what can I know?"

That step also marks the end of the search for a Manual – if the Other knows, he has a Manual, I thought – for the encounter with Manoel's poetry. Critics say that in his *Materia de Poesía* – a revolutionary book – Manoel de Barros rails against what is grandiose, attributing value to apparently unimportant things. He then tells us what poetry is useful for:

"All things whose values can be disputed by spit from a distance serve for poetry [...] All that which our civilization rejects, steps on and pisses on, serve for poetry. The madmen of water and banner serve too much! The good-for-nothing is best! The poor devil is colossus [...] Everything that is good for rubbish is good for poetry".<sup>7</sup>

Very astute that Manoel; he seems to know that in "matters of poetry" (dealing with poetry), what counts are the residues, residues of enjoyment.

However, to achieve that reduction that can serve as 'material for poetry', it is necessary, in a psychoanalysis, to operate a reduction of the fiction of the family romance to a fixation of jouissance materialized in the signifier. In an analysis, this reduction can occur in the turn of discourses, as Lacan demonstrates in his seminar, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*.

In the beginning, wanting to know everything is what is at stake in the Master's Discourse, which, as I said earlier, is nothing more than the love of truth. What the analyst institutes is the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Barros, M. de. Poesia Completa. São Paulo: LeYa, 2013, p. 133.

hysterization of discourse, which is the "structural introduction, under artificial conditions, of the hysteric's discourse".<sup>8</sup> This discourse establishes a field conducive to signifying production; this signifying reduction makes it possible to cipher jouissance, which consequently involves a loss, a loss of jouissance.

In this reduction, then, we are dealing with the passage from the search for the 'dark meaning of truth' to truth as knowledge. We find truth as knowledge in the discourse of the analyst; in this structure, the S2 is next to him, under the bar, making evident that in this case it is not about truth, but about the limit of truth: "the effect of truth comes from what falls from knowledge, that is to say, from what is produced from it".<sup>9</sup>

There is something that must be considered regarding the knowledge that the psychoanalyst carries: the place where it is seated: for there to be a chance of an analyst, it is necessary that a certain operation, called psychoanalytic experience, has brought the object *a* into the place of the semblance. And that it is "by situating object *a* in the place of semblance" that the analyst "can investigate the status of truth as knowledge".<sup>10</sup>

When we say with Lacan, that there is a real at stake in the formation of the analyst, it is precisely to know, as he himself affirms, that "of truth, we do not have to know everything. All it takes is a bit"<sup>11</sup> because Real and truth are not to be known, they are like a dyke, a dam, to convince us of any attempt at idealism.

What we discover in the experience of any psychoanalysis is something of the order of a very particular knowledge: it is about the link between the signifier S1 and the signifier S2; interrogating this link of S1 to S2 is at the heart of this experience, and that is enough.

Encore, what would enable both the poet and the psychoanalyst in their craft?

(...)

Before leaving Paris, I went to a store to buy a pen [*stylo*, in French] to take as a souvenir to a friend in Brazil. To test it out, the sales assistant wrote on the packaging: "*Bon stylo*!" [Good pen/style].

Translated by Nathaly Ponce

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Lacan, J. Radiofonia. In: Outros Escritos. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2003, p. 443.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore

<sup>1972-1973,</sup> ed. J-A Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Lacan, J. Radiofonia. In: Outros Escritos. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2003, p. 442.

### WHAT RESONATES FROM AN EXPERIENCE

Rebeca García Madrid, Spain

I. The School: "A common good"?

This is about reflecting on the experience of participating for the first time in the Cartels of the Pass, that are constituted in the ICG, and what it has meant.

In this case, Cartels of the Pass are ephemeral, and they bring together five colleagues from both continents, who meet, on some occasions, for the first time, navigating as well as possible between different languages.

At some point the question arises:

What kind of school is this one that devotes such an amount of time, of financial and personal resources to bring these five colleagues in the cartel together to live an experience **without** guarantee as to its results?

Without "guarantee" as in any true experience. As Lacan indicates: "Experience is what has its price because it is what is not known in advance."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the Cartel of the Pass, like a strange collage evoking the lack, as Lacan indicates in his Seminar X,<sup>2</sup> is brought together by suspending possible theoretical references, to allow the testimony of the passand and the passers to resonate with the surprise that allows the unknown to operate and where "the un-known is arranged as the framework of knowledge".<sup>3</sup>

The dispositive of the Pass allows for an experience that, based on singular testimonies, builds "community," in the deepest sense that the etymology *con-munitas* gives us: where *munitas* refers to a debt, a gift, a task, an ethical obligation that is **always** "with" the other.<sup>4</sup> A community without essence, in the process of becoming, therefore, open to contingency.

If at some point in his Seminar X,<sup>5</sup> Lacan refers to the convenience of a "communal dimension" of teaching, the dispositive of the Pass, with all the participants that it implies (passands, passers, AMSs, analysts, Cartels of the Pass), supposes a strong wager by the School on the possibility of a common work of those we call the "*scattered, ill-assorted*", who set to work to bring their resources together at the time of the Pass, which "requires the encounter between what is most valid in a personal experience with those who will call on it to confess, regarding it as a **common good**."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. Carta del 26 Enero 1981 - "Escisión, excomunión, disolución", B. Aires, Manantial, 1987.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, Anxiety. 1962-1963. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Espósito, R. Communitas. Origen y destino de la comunidad, B. Aires, Amorrortu, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, Anxiety. 1962-1963. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. 'Act of Foundation', Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment. Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss,

A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 105, (translation modified).

A "common good" that, in this case, aims to maintain an open School, under construction, as something alive. Paradoxically, the production of this "common good" will be possible on the condition of maintaining "the un-known as the framework of knowledge."

The astonishing thing about the Cartel of the Pass is the desire and expectation of something **without knowing what**, the setting up of an experience that cannot be anticipated from theoretical references or readings of past experiences, even though these may have served as a guide.

#### II. Some surprises

'Desiring and hoping for something without knowing what' meant that in the Cartels in which I have been lucky enough to participate, surprises were not long in coming: there was the verification of the rigorous and determined work of the passands in functioning as 'analysers of their own analysis', transmitting in large part the logic of the treatment in their analytical journeys, as well as, in all cases, the therapeutic benefits of the analyses.

It was also a surprise to verify the valuable work of the passers, each from the singularity of his listening to the passand, so that the testimonies of one passer, on occasion, could illuminate those of the other.

Sometimes the surprise came from moments when the unconscious had taken the lead over the testimonies of the passands, to make an appearance in the testimonies of the passers in the form of slips of the tongue, misunderstandings, neologisms, dreams, but also certain affects that involve the body: affects of anxiety, enthusiasm, urgency, perplexity or surprise at the effects on their own analysis.

Also, forms of contingency, in the meetings of the passers that served as a 'sensitive plate', allowing us to clarify the decisions regarding the possible nomination.

Another very satisfying surprise was the moments of elaboration and listening between the members of the Cartel and also the experience of sharing the richness of the different languages throughout the work.

III. The matheme and the poem: what 'happens' there?<sup>7</sup>

The Cartel of the Pass, through the story of the subject and the course of the treatment, seeks to articulate a logic that allows us to situate the trauma, the fantasy and the symptom, but it also seeks to situate that which creates a limit for the subject, that which concerns a real without meaning and puts an end to racing after the lying truth.

In the encounter with this limit of the real, the subject's response is fundamental: the fall of the subject supposed to know of the transference, how the redistribution in the economy of jouissance would have occurred and if this hole in knowledge has produced the desire of the analyst, a passage to the analyst, "the knowledge acquired is the knowledge of an end to the aspiration to knowledge: the synonym for castration."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Fingermann, D. La (de)formación del analista, , B. Aires, Escabel, 2018, p. 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Soler, C. Lacan – the Unconscious Reinvented, trans. E. Faye and S. Schwartz, London, Karnac, 2014, p. 77.

This is the crossroads for the Cartel because it is about deducing an *episteme*, to be extracted as one extracts a gold nugget, from the ethical position of the passer confronting the real, as C. Soler points out "that it is the incalculable of the ethical subject, that makes the procedure of the pass, with its paradox, necessary".<sup>9</sup>

The paradox that supposes trying to know something of the unformalisable by means of the statements, where Lacan proposes in his last formulations on the pass, to approach it through the signs or from the side of the affects.

Perhaps for this reason some Cartels<sup>10</sup> testify to the difficulty of 'arguing' the 'yes' of the nominations and trying to cover up "[t]his dark cloud that covers the juncture ... at which the psychoanalysand passes to becoming a psychoanalyst...".<sup>11</sup>

What could possibly make something from that passage resonate, since that is the Cartel's wager?

I will bring up something of the 'astonishment' that could illuminate one of the testimonies.

The passand produces a dream about finishing her interviews with one of the passers. In that dream only one phoneme appears, an interjection (which in Spanish we write between exclamation marks), of barely two letters, which reproduces a sound. It is therefore an onomatopoeia that has no meaning in itself, but which is open to multiple meanings: irony, laughter, disbelief, decision, affirmation, closing a matter and, of course, it always brings satisfaction.

Roman Jakobson,<sup>12</sup> interested in the "emotional stratum" of language, tells us the interjection "represents the purely emotional stratum of language", an emotive function that "**seasons**" speech, on a phonetic, grammatical and lexical level, although it does not change the meaning of the sentence, which remains outside, showing something other than the meaning, the attitude of the speaker.

Can we understand this dream as a poem, as a "less foolish saying"? "The poet says what he has to say to us in the least foolish way".<sup>13</sup>

The effect of this interjection in the cartel, which each person heard in his or her own language in a comical way, made something of what had been inter-said in the testimonies of the passands resonate, after the confirmation of an analytical journey in which the confrontation with the real had made possible not only therapeutic benefits, but an operation of emptying and cutting out meaning that led to an end to analysis, had effects on his life and strengthened at every step the desire for School.

At another point in his teaching, Lacan was going to put poets in relation to knowledge: "...poets

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Papers by Fernando Martínez and Julieta De Battista, in *Wunsch* n.º 23 – SPFLF, March 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Jakobson, R. Lingüística y poética. [Linguistics and poetics] *Ensayos de lingüística general*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, Ed. J-A Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998.

who do not know what they say, nevertheless always say things, as we know, before others."<sup>14</sup> It is thus that 'not knowing' could have a resonance in a saying with consequences. This is how the Cartel understood it.

Translated by Daniela Avalos

#### THE SCAR OF CHANCE EFFECTS?

Nicolas Bendrihen Paris, France

When Lacan evokes, in the seminar *The Logic of the Fantasy*, the intersection of the subject with the body, and the object *a* as the fall from the body, he has this formulation which made me pause on this question of knowledge and ignorance in the passage to the analyst. He says, on June 7, 1967, a few months before the October Proposition whose aim is to collect testimonies of this passage, that 'didactic psychoanalysis is, of course, more than necessary for them [he is speaking of psychoanalysts] to, let's say, heal chance effects'<sup>1</sup> – chance is in the plural in the Seuil version, it's in the singular in all other transcriptions consulted.

What is a chance effect? Lacan is in the middle of elaborating the theme of the sexual act, the body and jouissance (the lesson was titled 'The Question of Jouissance'); he mentions prematurity just before launching into the effects of chance...:

- First, we can consider that it is indeed the presence of each living being in the world which is a chance effect, all the more so if taken in the logic of the living being. Each one is an effect of chance...
- On the level that interests psychoanalysis, and in the context of the lesson, a chance effect seems to me to be linked to the encounters of each subject with jouissance. This applies to everyone (Lacan says 'to heal the chance effects, as they are in everyone'). And since Lacan speaks of prematurity, perhaps this concerns the encounter with sexuality, always too early, always traumatic, always irrupting in a bit of the body where it was not expected. Chance in the sense of random, even if nowhere in the zones that Freud called erogenous. Chance, then, these encounters of jouissance with signifiers that attempt to account for them even if, at this point in his teaching, Lacan does not yet speak of the coalescence of language and jouissance.
- These chance encounters participate in the writing of the fantasy, the trace of a jouissance of a piece of body, the minting between the subject and *a*, the writing on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Lacan, J. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* 1954-55. Ed. J-A Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. Le Séminaire, livre XIV, La logique du fantasme, Paris, Seuil, 2023, p. 372.

which psychoanalysis can operate. That this then makes a framework of reality, and in a certain way destiny (the fantasy as an unconscious axiom, window onto the real) veils the part of chance, of the real, at the origin of these encounters with jouissance. Could not the fantasy be a lucubration of knowledge about a hazardous non-sense?

- The problem with chance is that speaking beings do not like it, they're rather busy thinking about determination, and veiling all contingency with the fabrication of a moreor-less earthly intention. It's an effect of chance, to deny it, so intolerable can it be to think that life and encounters are random. And to see life as a tale of sound and fury told by an idiot, that means nothing, as Macbeth says, and which we will speak about in Toulouse in a few months.<sup>2</sup> It is tied to the very structure of speech, to the signifying articulation which creates meaning, signification, and makes one believe in causality, coherence, logical enchaining. Free association demonstrates it (it is the Freudian A.B.C), determined as it is by the framework of fantasmatic reality, except for certain emergences, certain surges of *lalangue* which come to break the quiet river of speech.
- The major effect of chance could be therefore to think that there is none! To make encounters of jouissance, random, real, a story, a destiny, through repetition, and the putting into signifying form. Lacan says it in a notable way in his lecture *Joyce the Sinthome*: "Such are the happenstances that drive us from pillar to post, and from which we shape our destiny, for we are the ones who weave it as such. We shape our destiny from them, because we speak (...) We are spoken, and, because of this, from the happenstances that drive us, we form something woven".<sup>3</sup> A very clear articulation of the other/Other as supposed to know with the destiny that each one makes for himself.<sup>4</sup>

What can a didactic psychoanalysis, as Lacan calls it in the passage from which my title comes, do about these effects of chance?

Lacan speaks of the scar – that is, what comes after the wound, or even after the act that healed the wound. Can the analytical scalpel heal the effects of chance? We of course hear about the therapeutic dimension of analysis, we should not ignore this, namely its effect on anxiety – we will hear about it from tomorrow,<sup>5</sup> on inhibitions, symptoms ... Lacan brought up this dimension a few years earlier in the seminar *Transference*, just before speaking of the scar of castration: "It's now not enough to speak of  $\varkappa \alpha \theta \alpha \varrho \sigma \zeta$  [catharsis], of didactic purification, if I may say so, of the greater unconscious in the analyst, all this remains very vague."

That does not suffice in this healing. To heal chance effects, would it not require a new operation on the scar of fantasy to give chance its place, to exhaust through the successive turns of the saids the fantasmatic historiality of each person's recounting in accounting for the real encounters that mark the subject, raised to the level of fate, but which are only chance? Would it not be a matter of taking note of what suddenly appears, 'the space of a lapsus,' ['*l'esp d'un* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Journées nationales 2024 de l'EPFCL – France, Toulouse.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. The Sinthome, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2016, p. 142.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> On the articulation of the Other and chance, one can read the text of Cathy Barnier, « *L'art de perdre* », [The Art of Loss, *Champ lacanien*, nº 27, Paris, EPFCL, 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> XIIth Rendezvous of the International of the Forums, Paris, 2024.

*laps*<sup>3</sup><sup>6</sup> without immediately covering it with the weft of fate which speaking beings never cease to weave? It is perhaps one of the knowledges of the analyst, determinant in the passage from analysand to analyst, in the overcoming of the horror of knowing, to no longer ignore the fact that there is chance in every trauma. That there is chance that no elaboration of knowledge will overcome. That each story is only a more-or-less skillful attempt to create a destiny, and in the pass the analysand can take its measure and make himself its witness. Destitution of the Other of destiny, a rent in knowledge, the fall of the subject supposed to know which the cartels try to hear in the stories that are told to them, and these not always in draft form.

Do we collect testimonies of this type in the Pass? And is it possible for an analyst to remain in time, both in his function and in the après-coup elaboration of his act, a little released from this inevitable return to what makes sense, to this lying truth?

In the *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud, who has more than demonstrated the overdetermination of our acts, nevertheless can say: "Indeed, to believe in chance is already to testify to a certain degree of culture; in the eyes of the primitive, in the uneducated being, that the child is, everything that happens has an intention."<sup>7</sup>

This seems to me to have the greatest relation to what a psychoanalysis teaches, and to the passage to the analyst from which despite all our efforts we cannot – and fortunately – derive a definitive theory. What is at stake in this passage is a knowledge that there are signifiers as unarticulated, real emergences that do not determine destiny, that touch on ignorance, that we cannot know what was going to happen, and which is one of the names of chance. The hystorization of the pass, it seems to me, could open this gap in the dense shadow of familial stories and novels that can inhabit our dispositive. This could involve a passand who would no longer systematically veil chance in that which he will have reduced of his history. He would then attempt the wager of the unbelievable contingency by drawing lots for two passers, who will meet a few others that will do their best, namely giving more-or-less place for surprise. And if they hear what holes the story, they will be able to nominate this scar of an analytical operation AS, the trace of the after-life insurance of the fantasy, paradoxical knowledge of the certainty of precarity, of the provisional, of the ephemeral and of the happenstance. And perhaps the trace of the joy of this knowledge.

Translated by Esther Faye

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. 'Preface to the English-Language Edition' in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental

Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans A. Sheriden, W. W. Norton & Company, New York; London, 1981, p. vii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Freud, S. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933 [1932]) SE XXII, p.122.

#### WANTING A HOLED KNOWLEDGE

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Having gone through an analysis is the minimum requirement to become a psychoanalyst and this crossing may lead to a conclusion of impossibility. The knowledge of psychoanalysis refers to the knowledge of the unconscious and it is interesting to recall some expressions such as 'Knowledge without a subject' or 'knowing how to deal with it'. These two allow us to appreciate that this knowledge is distinguished from others and from the Absolute Knowledge;<sup>1</sup> the latter implies that there is knowledge in the real but it does not speak and it is necessary to speak in order to say anything at all.

The knowledge of truth is articulated on the basis of Lacan's proposal of the 'There-issomething-of-One'. The course of an analysis gives us the recognition of an irreducible unconscious.

At the end of the analysis, there are only small bits, some knowledge about the failure of the structure, the knowledge punctured by the real of sex, the recognition of what cannot be known. Ignorance is revealed on its positive side, which is not the negation of knowledge, but its most elaborated form.<sup>2</sup> So, in the passage from analyzand to analyst, do knowledge and ignorance converge? Not only do they converge, but it is necessary to recognize them. A necessary convergence of knowledge and ignorance in this passage and a way of naming it is with the expression 'holed knowledge'. A knowledge that recognizes a not-known, that moves away from the conception of a closed knowledge and entails sustaining its incompleteness. The aforementioned allows us to move away from a conception that would suppose that, through the experience of analysis, one could access a point where everything that had previously been veiled would be captured or that it is an access to the meaning of what has happened throughout life.

What knowledge is extracted from the analytic trajectory? First of all, I emphasize a change from a position of 'book knowledge' to another, that of 'holed knowledge'. In the first one, a position distanced from experience, a not wanting to know. An armor of love built with pieces of referential knowledge, where 'book' condenses the illusory aspect of this knowledge together with a position of fear and silence linked to the fantasy. 'Book' also alludes to the fantasy of 'preparatory course' that could be 'completed' before taking each step in life, with the effect of being held still. In the other one, 'a holed knowledge', a position of facing what is presented, recognizing the limitations and, of course, the distinction between perceptual knowledge [*conocimiento*] and intellectual knowledge [*saber*]. This enables me to take each step without a model to follow, without lucubrations or supposing that it could be otherwise; without guarantees, without expecting a certain effect, giving way to the unexpected.

In the analytic journey, a contingency places me at a decision point where I answer from a new position. An event that provokes a change of course. Then, an equivoque with its own name.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Dilon, A. y Otros. *El fracaso del Un-desliz es el amor. A la manera del seminario oral de Jacques Lacan* 1976-1977. México 2008, Ortega y Ortiz editores, S.A. de C.V. 15/2/ 1977. Pág. 126

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. *Escritos* 1. *Variantes de la cura-tipo*. [Variations on the Standard Treatment] Bs. As.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011. Pág. 343.

An operation that allows the emptying of all reference to meaning that nourished the fantasy and the symptom; an operation where the void in all speech resounds. An equivoque that allows for the opening towards the real outside of meaning. Letting myself be taught by the knowledge that was housed in the symptom. I glimpse the failure of the subject supposed to know, the failure of the structure. To have experienced the exit from the 'necessary deception' of the subject supposed to know is an extracted fiber, unavoidable, for the passage from analyzand to analyst.

Another time. The expression 'wanting to write' emerges, sprouts without calculation, having an effect of surprise. A change of satisfaction, reduction of satisfaction in speaking and opening to a minimal writing. Then, in the solitude and silence of the night, a dream: I hear a 'ha' coming from my ear; it is my voice that pronounces it. The disruption of a minimal unit that comes out of the body, out of this gap open to the outside. It comes out and enters at the same time, a movement where inside and outside are indistinguishable, a register of the non-orientable. Only an instant, but as a rumbling sound wave that seems to come from the real, like a breeze of madness. I try to articulate it but it does not allow itself to be trapped by meaning; it belongs to another order, outside the signifying articulation.

Moment of a jump. Movement to make the request to enter the dispositive of the Pass. Already without the armor of 'book knowledge', I enter lightly. Stripped of any model or idea of how the performance should be, giving place to the singular, to hold a living, vibrating text, that is, resonating in my body, as a possible way for it to resonate in another.

To enter recognizing a holed knowledge, with a position of facing it in a way that is determined but limited at the same time. A position that involves the hystorization of the analytic crossing, the moments of passing through it, and the subsequent leap. At the same time, it involves what words do not reach, recognizing the impossible in a transmission. The unconscious is a knowing-how-to-do with language that goes beyond what is possible to account for via language. The wager that something of that hole resonates. The wager to generate an empty place that can accommodate, also, why not, the new being produced in that dispositive.

It follows that the transmission in the Pass departs from an 'assured position of knowledge' or from the consideration of the dispositive as a place where what is collected in the analytic traversal will be 'deposited' in the manner of an accumulated 'knowledge' of experience. We would be in the field of imaginary competence. From there, a path that would be directed towards meaning would be blocked.

I resume; with the expression 'a holed knowledge' I underline this modification in the position with respect to knowledge, a knowledge about the impossible and the desire that came with it.

I focus on the passage from analyzand to analyst and on the title given to this text. To recognize that there is a knowledge detached by the experience of the analyzand and the decision to occupy and operate from the place that the analyst has occupied throughout the journey, is to do so even when nothing is known of this operation, except that to which the experience has reduced the occupant.<sup>3</sup> I emphasize the latter, that 'one only knows to what in the experience it has reduced the occupant'. Lacan himself is surprised as to why someone who, through his or her experience as an analyzand and who knows what psychoanalysis is, can still want to make this passage to the analyst.<sup>4</sup> How can a 'wanting' be derived from this 'knowing'?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. Otros escritos. Discurso en la Escuela Freudiana de París. Bs. As.: Paidós, 2016. Pág. 294.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. El Seminario de Jacques Lacan. Libro 19...O peor. Bs. As.: Paidós, 2014. Pág. 190.

'To want', infinitive verb in its impersonal form, which I will use here in its meaning of 'determination, decision'. I add this 'wanting' because it seemed important to highlight the dimension of the decision, of a choice that is played both at the end of the analysis, in the conclusive act and in the passage from analyzand to analyst, with its disruptive leap, which is to be distinguished from the continuous or programmed, and, of course, in the dispositive of the pass, when requesting to enter it. On the other hand, this 'wanting' alludes to that expression that breaks into the analysis by surprise, which I enunciate as wanting to write, linked to a modification of satisfaction, to a reduction of jouissance that unfolds in speaking and opens the door to a decision.

- Lacan, Jacques. Escritos 1. 2<sup>a</sup> ed. 2<sup>a</sup> reimp. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011.
- Lacan, Jacques. Otros Escritos. 1ª ed. 3ª reimp. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2016.
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Translated by Sebastián Báquiro Guerrero

#### POINT OF PASSAGE?/NO PASSAGE?

Anne-Marie Combres Cahors, France

I do not know if the equivoque of my title can be translated into the different languages we will be speaking or hearing over the course of these study days, so I must make it clear: in French, a point of passage [*point de passage*] indicates a place where one passes through, or the passage from one state to another. But '*point*' also means 'there is no'...

Based on the testimonies of the ASs (Analysts of the School) and the work of the Cartels of the Pass on the passers' testimonies, we would like to try and pinpoint what does or does not make the point of passage from analysand to analyst ... If Lacan specified that "The unconscious is that knowledge [*savoir*] which guides us",<sup>1</sup> how then, by knowing there is also ignorance, can it orient and illuminate this point? He also insists that "the analyst should realise the significance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. *Séminaire* 1977-1978, *Le Moment de Conclure* [The Moment to Conclude] (unpublished), Session 15 November 1977.

of words for this analysand, which unquestionably, he ignores." In *Un désirant nouveau* [*A new desirer*] Colette Soler reminds us that "the weight of words is not their meaning, but their charge of jouissance", in other words, the private *lalangue* of each analysand.<sup>2</sup>

If the analyst is not aware of the significance of words for the analysand, isn't it also a form of ignorance that is at work in the Cartels of the Pass? Just as the analyst receives each of those who approach him, putting aside what he already knows, shouldn't we, the members of the Cartels of the Pass, put aside the doxa – to remain open to the unexpected that may emerge from a testimony? Were we not caught up in theoretical doctrine, waiting for the following to be identified/revealed/confirmed: the traversal of the fantasy, identification with the symptom, the fall of the subject supposed to know, as criteria that could lead to a nomination? "The Cartel can sometimes obstruct the testimony of an Analyst of the School, when the scattered ill-assorted begin to form a group, forgetting their fundamental ignorance".<sup>3</sup> When I mentioned in my opening remarks for these study days that it was important to know that there is ignorance, I hadn't remembered Sol Aparicio's intervention in *Wunsch* n°8, on the ignorance of the Cartels.

The question frequently arises as to what is expected of the Cartels that receive testimonies, and in particular, of the passers. Indeed, we often hear them – the passers – say that when they received the call attesting to their designation, they rushed to the texts recounting the testimonies of ASs or other passers, and to the writings circulating in the School about the experience of the pass.

As far as ignorance is concerned, perhaps it is precisely that of the passers which is necessary, so that they are not tempted to put themselves in the position of analyst when they hear a passand? 'Being the pass' does not call for knowledge about what is going to be said, but for a way of being. We have often used the expression 'sensitive plate' in this way, an expression I have looked for but haven't found in Lacan's texts .... Of course, it happens that the passers are touched by the experience of the passand, that they are sensitive to it. But they are more like Brechtian passers, as we said at the ICG I took part in a few years ago, meaning that they are distanced from, they do not identify with, and, they do not play the part of the analyst, but they do transmit. Lacan put it this way: "Those who find themselves occupying the position of passer have positioned themselves in some cases as analysts. This is absolutely not what we expect of them. What we expect from them is a testimony, the transmission of an experience".<sup>4</sup>

In the Cartels in which I have participated, we have noted the difficulty in locating this point of transition from the analysand's desire to the analyst's desire, which we would have liked to grasp, as Lacan said in 1967, "in the time in which it occurred". He modified his expectations at the end of his teaching, to emphasise first of all the mark that the analyst must bear. The mark that the fellows must find he says in the 'Italian note' – without specifying if those fellows are passers or what he was then calling the jury .... Even if it is undoubtedly more a question of recognition than judgement, in this case, since it is the mark that the analyst must bear ... it is up to the analysts who make up the Cartel to extract it from the passers' testimonies. An acknowledgement that Lacan specifies: "The Pass in question, I have only envisaged it in a tentative manner, as something that means nothing more than *recognising each other among ourselves/ among evening [se reconnaître entre soir*], if I may express myself in this way", on the condition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Soler, C. Un désirant nouveau, Editions Nouvelles du Champ Lacanien, 2023, p. 91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Fingermann, D. Wunsch n°1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. Intervention in the work session 'On the Pass', Saturday, November 3, 1973, in Lettres de l'Ecole

Freudienne, 1975, n. 15, pp. 185-195.

that we insert there an '*av*' after the first letter: "*se reconnaître entre s(av)oir*" [*recognising each other in knowing*].<sup>5</sup>

To recognise is not to name: "No one can name anyone analyst, as Freud named none".<sup>6</sup> So isn't there a paradox with what the Cartels of the Pass are doing: namely, naming, which is supposed to provide a guarantee that there is an analyst in the passand they are going to name? But, in fact, to say that there is an analyst is not equivalent to naming ... and to name someone an Analyst of the School is a wager ... a wager on his or her ability to bring the elements of a new knowledge to the School.

The transition to analyst is deduced from the testimonies of the passers and goes hand in hand with the destitution of the subject. Isn't this one of the points that the Cartels of the Pass have to examine? How will the passer bear witness to the passand's narrative, not of his life but the narrative required by his symptom – what we might call the enquiry – and to what he will have deciphered from it in his analytic treatment down to the very form he will have given it? As Marie-José Latour puts it: "This process of logic will have reduced the vanity of the narrative to the point of defining its orientation, where the passage to the analyst is singularly indicated".<sup>7</sup>

Lacan, in 1976, added enthusiasm, the enthusiasm of knowing oneself to be refuse, what one must know how to be in order to occupy this place for others. Knowing how to be waste, refuse, a "determined refuse" [*ordure décidée*]<sup>8</sup>, I would add 'worthless', to echo Gaëlle Obiegly's fascinating latest book.<sup>9</sup>

So, isn't the question for each Cartel of the Pass to know – from the consequences – whether there has been a passage – a passage from ignorance to unknown *[insu*] – or whether there has been none *[point*] at all? Rather than focusing on the moment of passage?

Translated by Chantal Degril

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. L'insu, unpublished, session of 15 February 1975.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. Préface à l'édition anglaise du Séminaire XI, Autres Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 572.

<sup>7</sup> Latour, M.J. Les fronces du réel et le liseré du fantasme [The furrows of the real and the border of the fantasy],

Toulouse 19 January 2024, Seminar 'What does Psychoanalysis Teach?' Season III.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lacan, J. "in the eyes of a psychoanalyst who has good reason to know it, for he himself puts himself in that place. One has to go via this determined refuse [*ordure décidée*] so as, perhaps, to *retrouver*, to find again something that might be of the order of the real". The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, (1975-76) *The Sinthome*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge, UK and Malden, USA, Polity Press, 2016, p. 105.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Obiegly, G. Sans valeur. Montrouge, Bayard, coll. Littérature intérieure, 2024.

### EFFECTS ON THE PASSAGE FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PASS

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Gratitude.

The Pass is often understood as a 'brooch', the finishing touch of an analytical journey, generally carried to completion. That is, something after a full stop.

But presenting oneself for the Pass has an effect on the analysis itself and its ending, and even on its conclusion. The decision to account for the effects that the analysis produced on the passand, on the conclusion of the analysis and its effects, is one more turn, a recapitulation of an experience that makes a difference compared with a concluded analysis that is not directed to the Pass.

Analysis and Pass are not the same, obviously. They are connected, but there are substantial differences between them. However, in order to understand and account for what happens in the Pass, parameters and concepts of analysis are **inevitably** resorted to. **I point this out because** in preparing this work the question arises as to whether an experience in which the testimony of a supposedly concluded analysis is heard, elaborated and judged from the outside, could be based on concepts specific to the Pass which are different from those of an analysis.

Related to this, for the epistemic work in the ICG 2020-2022, the question of 'our references, those of the members of the Cartels, when listening to the testimonies' was proposed as an axis. These previous references (or prejudices) mean a potential difficulty insofar as they can mediate the listening to **the account** of a passand's testimony. A difficulty that is also based on the fact that listening is not exempt from what is known or supposed to be known previously. Knowledge acquired in his own analysis and also based on a theory, which for Lacan, was evolving. Thus, the question arose as to whether it could be otherwise, or if through collective work within the ICG, these **previous references of each cartelizand**<sup>1</sup> could be eliminated or at least reduced.

Between ignorance and knowledge.

The passand knows what he wants to transmit and makes the demand to enter the dispositive. He/she can testify about the crucial problems... . But does he/she know what he really transmits? There is probably ignorance about the knowledge he/she transmits.

The passer, theoretically without knowing it previously, that is to say without calculation, is called to listen and transmit, not without surprise at his designation, but he does not know what he is going to listen to, nor what he is going to transmit; he ignores what makes a transmission. The Cartel may, since it is a choice, know what it is for, but its members do not know what they are going to find in what they hear, that is, what is transmitted to them, and with this they will make a judgement and a work of doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Sidi Askofaré, Debates ICG 2020-22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. (1967). Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. Russell Grigg,

Analysis 6, 1995, pp. 10-11.

Taking the baton from the reference to Lacan in Castanet's Opening 2, "Not knowing is ordered as a framework of knowledge",<sup>3</sup> it gives meaning to this paradoxical succession of ignorances and knowledges.

It is a constant in Lacan to put 'knowing – not knowing' into dialectics. He makes not knowing, more precisely 'learned ignorance', the condition of the analyst's function, because there, what is known, blocks the knowledge ... to come. Making 'not knowing' a framework, is giving it a function, a work context, similar to that of silence in order to listen. It is a 'not knowing' that harbors the possibility that something will arise, although this does not imply that there is a guarantee. Referring to analysis, Lacan will say that "analysis cannot find its measure except in the ways of learned ignorance."<sup>4</sup>

This framework encourages and invites the words of the analysand: "Say what comes to mind", and from those words, from those sayings, a saying is expected from the analysand. The saying that will transmit something of **a** subjective truth enclosed in the symptoms, repetitions, in the chain of associations, in his/her speech after all. But Lacan warns that, although the analyst places himself in the 'not knowing', this does not authorize him to be satisfied with knowing that he knows nothing, because what is at stake is what he has to know.

Can this logic be implemented to the procedure of the Pass?

There is at least one added difference in the Pass because more elements are involved:

- a passand with his desire and his intention,
- two passers with their desires and their respective pressures,
- and five cartelizands, with their desire and their previous references.

All of them are animated by a desire, each one by their own and unique one. That is, several subjectivities in which the desire to transmit and the desire to listen are articulated, but also intentions and expectations, are more or less recognized. At least, something new is expected, some effect, some contingency or phenomenon that we can place on the axis of ignorance and knowledge: driven by **a desire** to transmit, and **a waiting** to listen. But at the same time, they can object and interfere with what is slipped in. And sayings slip into whatever saying can make its way, perhaps a new saying of the passand.

When it comes to the transmission of a testimony of an analysis, probably of a real, of something inexpressible, that the passand glimpsed in his journey, and it is assumed that he himself will have difficulties in sifting and accounting, or realizing that he/she is doing it. How do we know that those who are listening are sufficiently purged of their own experience, of their own references? It is an everyday dichotomy in the role of analyst, and also described for the passer: **sensitive plate**. **But,** is it applicable to the cartel? Letting oneself be impressed by the testimony, and in doing so placing oneself in not knowing, with the difficulty of bearing the demand or the need to know to make a judgment, and the uneasiness of not reaching it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. (1967). Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School'. Trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. (1966). Variantes de la cura tipo [Variations on the Standard Treatment] Escritos (Vol. 1, pp. 311-348).

Madrid: Siglo XXI (1984), p. 348. [Translator's note: the translation is from the Spanish text.]

But is relying only **on** improvisation and spontaneity, a solution that avoids the effect of what is already known? I don't think so. That's where the analyst is number two and the Cartel of the Pass serves for this purpose: listening, being impressed, but then **debating**, elaborating and judging and therefore founding.

This proposal is already in Freud in an early note referring to the analyst. Not only by postulating the instrument of evenly suspended attention but when referring to the dilemma between research and analytical treatment. Freud advises subordinating research to treatment because success in cases designed for research is jeopardised. **I quote**: "the most successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, without any purpose in view, allows oneself to be taken by SURPRISE by any new turn in them, and always meets them with an open mind, free from any suppositions".<sup>5</sup>

If we think about it in relation to the Cartel, the possible SURPRISE when listening is a unique experience. But the work in a cartel is, not unintentionally, <u>collective</u>. That is to say, there are several singularities at play. This raises the question of how the singular and the collective are articulated: identification? transmission? resonance? Presenting to others and debating, opens the possibility of moving away from identifying what the passand has heard with the cartelizand's own experience, **and can object** to the illusion of having perceived some fundamental point. The collective also has its reference in the joke, where, as Lacan points out, unlike the comical, which is organized in pairs, in the joke at least three<sup>6</sup> are needed for there to be the validation of what has happened by a third. Thus, I believe that what causes SURPRISE in one can be validated, in its proximity to truth, by the rest of the members of the group.

While SURPRISE, no matter how much you expect it or try to avoid it, is a reaction that escapes one's will and also, in part, one's previous knowledge, it can fulfill a function of transmission that avoids the previous references and can be, thus one more element to consider in the judgement and in the elaboration of the Cartel of the Pass.

Freud will say that SURPRISE is one of the conditions of the formations of the unconscious, a sign that a desire has passed into the unconscious and that in an instant, in a flash of lightning, it has been glimpsed.

It may happen that it is not clear what is surprising. The unconscious cannot be perceived except in surprise, says Nominé.<sup>7</sup> Then the elaboration may allow the building of a knowledge, dialectizing what caused surprise. As in the aporia of the prisoners, the reaction experienced by one of the members – of the Cartel in **this case** – can find its resonance in the others and in a collective conclusion. The idea that it is not clear, or that what is happening is not clearly known, I do not think is the worst sign.

It would be worth applying here what is referred to as the analytic act, which "happens through a saying, from which a subject changes..." and in him/her, ... it is by not thinking that he/she (the analyst) operates....<sup>8</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Freud, S. (1912) Recommendations on Analytic Technique, SEXII, p. 114. [Author's capitalization for emphasis.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. (2017 [1957-1958]) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V, Formations of the Unconscious, Ed. J-A Miller,

Trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge UK, Malden USA: Polity Press, Lesson of November 6.

<sup>7</sup> Nominé, B. La sorpresa [The Surprise], Ajaccio 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lacan, J. (1967-68). *El acto psicoanalítico*. Reseña del Seminario 1967-68 Otros escritos (pp. 395-403). Buenos Aires: Paidós, pp. 393 y 397.

This, I believe, is also applicable to the **Cartel of the Pass**. The work comes later, as in Freud's recommendation: first let yourself be surprised, then investigate. Begin with a moment of seeing, a time of understanding, developing a knowledge until the moment of concluding in a judgement, arguing and developing a doctrine.

Just as Glaucia Nagem points out in Opening no. 7, in Lacan's reference to lightning, a flash can be an antidote to the complacency that analysts can fall into, when their way of operating becomes functional, knowing how to press the appropriate buttons. Lending oneself to the surprise and allowing it to happen, as long as it is brief, is an instant of seeing what is disturbing and what can cause discomfort, or call for elaboration.

It's not for nothing, I believe, that Lacan sometimes refers to Theodor Reik, when he gives SURPRISE (*überraschung*) the value of a sign, "the illumination, the brightness that, in the analyst, designates that he apprehends the unconscious, that something is revealed that it is of the order of subjective experience, of that which happens <u>suddenly</u> and on the other hand, without knowing what it has done on the other side of the stage. That is the *überraschung*. It is on this path, on this line, that he knows everything, or at least that he is on his own path.<sup>9</sup>

Later on Lacan gives greater weight to surprise: a sign of a true interpretation "and this surprise that every **true interpretation** immediately brings to light, has as its dimension, as its foundation, the dimension of the I am not".<sup>10</sup> That it is a sign of truth. In this case I am not referring to the analysand, but to the Cartel, when perhaps the truth in the testimony of the passand can produce an overflowing of the previous references, both when listening to the account of the passers, as at some point in the heard testimony, which is always in an external position to the experience of the passand. However, here we can paraphrase the same warning made by Lacan regarding knowledge: giving surprise all its value does not authorize us to be content with being complacent about what is to come... or, paraphrasing Picasso: "When the surprise comes, let it catch me working".

Highlighted points from *El psicólogo sorprendido* [The Surprised Psychologist], *T. Reik*, by Yamil Trevisan

- A question throughout the book: Why is it difficult for a psychoanalyst to tell others about the experience of what happened in a session? How do you arrive at an interpretation or meaning of a dream?
- It goes against the prejudice that the analyst knows what the patient needs.
- Quote: "There are cases in which it seems more like a verification of the theory, rather than building a theory after finishing the case. This way of proceeding acts as a barrier to the reality of the case".
- We do not always know what we have heard when we hear a case.
- Between theory and clinical practice, R. proposes "an oscillation within certain limits: sometimes very close to the material, sometimes too far from it for an overall vision".
- When we find something, we do not always know right away what we have found.
- "Often it is enough that a sentence said by oneself is heard by another as something else".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Lacan, J. (1964-65). The Seminar, Book 12, Crucial Problems in Psychoanalysis, Lesson of January 6. Unpublished.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Lacan, J. (1967). The Seminar, Book 15, The Psychoanalytic Act. Unpublished.

- Appealing to surprise in the analytic phenomenon: "Before knowing oneself, you have to ignore yourself".
- "If I want to understand the form of psychic shuddering that is specific to analysis, I try to determine its special character in a more general way, but with as much precision as possible, it presents itself to me in the form of surprise". Yamil compares it with the thrill that music causes in the body: it hits it and makes it vibrate.
- Then he compares surprise with the joke.
- Reik extends the effect of surprise produced in the analysis to the analyst.
- It appears that Freud wrote 'The Question of Lay Analysis' in support of the complaint that Reik had suffered due to a psychotic patient...
- According to Roudinesco, colleagues envied and criticized Reik because of his brilliance and arrogance, and also for his identification with Freud (his beard, cigars, clothes...)
- On the back cover of the book: "... always far from the systems, he will affirm the impossibility of a total understanding, in his eyes suspicious, and at the same time as the need to accept the suffering that can arise from the surprises of the unconscious".

Translated by Elisa Querejeta Casares

### SURPRISES AT THE END

Dimitra Kolonia AS Paris, France

There's never a dull moment at the end of an analysis! I'm talking about the surprises that are discoveries at the end, which destabilise, right up to the end, what we know, and what we imagined, or even hoped to know at the end of the process. These discoveries, from the final phase to the end of the process, are a concentrated learning for the subject. Didactic analysis.

Consequently, if each analyst can speak of knowledge and ignorance in the passage to the analyst, does the fact of having participated in the dispositive of the Pass change anything? And if so, what? I have the idea that it might change something, precisely at the level of knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

So is the pass didactic? Although equivocal, I'm posing the question here for the Pass in the dispositive. I would say yes. The Pass can be didactic, in the sense that the passage through the dispositive can be instructive for the passand.

The effort of articulation that the dispositive of the Pass requires, such that the passand orders his own treatment into a narrative, can shed new light, which is a piece of knowledge.

This exercise of reduction which is the testimony, apart from the singular style, implies for the passand a sorting out of what he has known of the process of his analysis. To be able to hystorise one's analysis requires a certain unsticking from it. And this unsticking is also necessary in order to be able to think about one's own experience.

Of course, nothing stops you from thinking about your analysis outside the dispositive. At the end of an analysis, there is an *acquired knowledge*. But is it the same thing to think about it for oneself and to think about it with the aim of transmitting something, of bearing witness, addressed to *whom*, the School? In following this logic, trying to testify to others what you *know for yourself*, is this not inscribing this knowledge in a social bond?

In the dispositive, the passand experiences once again, as in analysis, the limits of knowing (lack of knowing). What to say about the passage to the analyst? How to say it? What to say about desire when it is unspeakable (lack of saying)? The dispositive is both a hole in knowledge and a necessity emanating from the hole, and it helps to keep open the question of the analyst's desire, not just for those who participate in it, but for the whole community.

The dispositive of the Pass is a place which invites the passand to transmit the knowledge coming out of his analysis. The effort of articulation that this requires can shed extra light, if still partial, on his own experience. It is this light, this piece of knowledge, that I see as an epistemic gain. It has no bearing on the treatment, which is no longer in progress, but it is a piece of knowledge about the treatment as process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The development that follows stems from my own experience of the dispositive and as such has subjective value.

This light lies in the gap between what the passand knows and what he knows he knows. Sol Aparicio says "we perhaps forget that the passand knows more than he knows he knows".<sup>2</sup> The passand is inevitably confronted with this gap.

In this place that is the dispositive, time is not One; it seems to me cut up. Besides, I'd rather speak about logical times. Through these times, the elaboration of the passand is a *knowledge in progress*.

The effort to think through one's analysis and to hystorise it with a view to the testimonies.

To receive one's own message while listening to oneself speaking to the passers, and to grasp in a different way what one hears oneself saying.

Once the testimonies have been completed, a distance from one's own history can be established, which leads to starting to think about one's analysis beyond one's own history as a subject.

And then, snatches of light again in the effort to formalise this knowing about the treatment, in the après-coup of the dispositive, this time by addressing it directly to the School.

In this way, the dispositive can help to shed light on an analysis, not only as an (accomplished) experience, but also as an experience that teaches, or even as an operation that can be thought of beyond the history of the subject. It is in this sense that I think the Pass can be didactic. And it can be, because the knowledge is not a "closed whole<sup>3</sup>".

The knowledge obtained thanks to the passage through the dispositive is not subversive, as I think that of an analysis is. The passand gains knowledge about the work and the knowledge already acquired in analysis. He is taught by this effort to articulate what he has already obtained in analysis.

So what is subversive about the knowledge gained from analysis?

First of all, it dethrones truth as knowledge. The truth of fantasy does not say the truth. The analysand discovers a truth that lies while he believed it to be true. The fantasy no longer makes sense. "So much for that!". Isn't this – fairly common – reaction basically a sign of the identification of the mirage of truth, of a fall of jouissance into sense? It produces effects on the space of the transference and the fall of the subject supposed to know.

This moment, far from being a conclusion, is a cut. It opens a passage towards a knowledge that is necessary for the continuation and ending of an analysis. The passage to the analyst passes through it. This knowledge concerns the subject's jouissance. At the end of the process, the subject discovers that jouissance is not the Other's. Separation. Identifying with his jouissance is the sign of an acceptance of what the subject did not want to know, his castration; the fate of the parlêtre, impossible to make disappear (knowing about the impossible).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Aparicio, S. '*L'ignorance des cartels*', *Wunsch* n°8, Première Rencontre internationale d'Ecole à Buenos Aires, March 2010, p. 24. "We perhaps forget that the passand knows more than he knows he knows and that it is above all on this margin that the cartel has to make a determination".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Seminar XVII, trans Russell Grigg, W.W. Norton & Co., N.Y., 2007, p. 30.

At the end of an analysis, ignorance and knowledge are no longer in the same place as before. The knowledge gained from the treatment does not make ignorance disappear, and this is another

subversive aspect of this knowledge. The subject does not know everything. Ignorance will never be exhausted. The unconscious is not elucidated up to its very last word. The subject will always have symptoms. The couple will never be *One*. A pretty picture of impossibilities! So why undertake an analysis? What is it that it changes?

To emerge from impotence by affirming and accepting the impossible, to have identified one's jouissance, this changes enough so that the subject is no longer quite the same, before and after. The

analysis of the analyst is concerned with this change. If a passage from ignorance towards a knowing is necessary to arrive at the end of the analysis, this implies that it happens in every completed analysis. But not every completed analysis inevitably produces an analyst.

"The non-analyst does not imply the non-analysed".<sup>4</sup> So, what distinguishes an analyst from the one who is analysed? I don't think that what distinguishes them lies in the logical passages traversed in the process, in the knowledge gained.

"The analyst (...) must have discerned the cause of his horror, his own, detached from that of all others, the horror of knowing. (...) If he is not carried to enthusiasm by it, he may well have had an analysis, but as to being an analyst, no chance. It is this that my recently established 'Pass' often illustrates".<sup>5</sup>

This question of affect, the effect of the horror discerned, leads me to a final question with which I would like to conclude. If the Pass, in the dispositive, is didactic, if there are logical moments there, would there be affects specific to the dispositive, didactic affects, that could teach us and contribute to the elaboration?

Once the testimonies to my passers had been completed, a satisfaction emerged, already known and experienced, after the identification of the fantasy and the lying truth. But in the dispositive, was it the speaking well (*bien-dire*) of a knowledge that was articulated, that was satisfying? Of a knowledge that *was found there in* the testimony? An affect produced by the epistemic gain of the dispositive? A redoubling of the affect of satisfaction, via the dispositive, from the end of the analysis to the end of the testimonies?

Over time it was not this satisfaction that intrigued me, but the unexpected affects that emerged after my demand for the Pass and my entry into the dispositive. They were therefore independent, chronologically speaking, of my testimony and of the nomination, and it is in this capacity that they interest me.

What is it that arouses, for a passand who enters the dispositive of the Pass, a joyful state, serene and lively, like the series of affects I have experienced? Are they the sign of something? It's hard not to see the mobilisation of the libido, which was, moreover, very much turned towards the dispositive and the Pass, during that moment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. Discours à l'École freudienne de Paris, Autres Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 270.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. 'Italian Note' (trans. Susan Schwartz).

Is it the joy of addressing your discoveries to a partner which is the School? The joy of demonstrating the solitary path of singular discoveries? The joy of the desire that is the joy of our work? The joy of the relief of emerging from impotence?

Yes. But above all, I make a hypothesis and link these affects to the decision to enter the dispositive. This decision, in which the subject alone decides, without authorisation from the Other, is an act. The separation from the Other, enacted at the end of his analysis, is replayed, confirmed, redoubled, in this decision to undergo the Pass. I make the hypothesis that these affects are linked to this separation and the fact of authorising from oneself.

Both on leaving analysis and on entering the dispositive, a decision on the part of the subject is necessary. In analysis, a decision in relation to the real and his jouissance. In the dispositive, a decision to enter the dispositive and make the Pass, faced with the opening of the unconscious. In relation to the real, the subject must respond by making a decision, an ethical one. Does he want to know something about it by risking himself, or not?

If, as Lacan says, "the psychoanalyst has a complex relationship with knowledge, denying it, repressing it, at times wanting not to know anything about it",<sup>6</sup> I don't think making the Pass can be such a moment.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. 'The knowledge of the psychoanalyst', lesson of 01/06/1972.

#### TO WORK FOR UNCERTAINTY

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I thank the current International College of the Guarantee for organising this Meeting of the School and for this invitation.

Here we are once more, trying to dissipate the thick shadow that covers up "this juncture where the psychoanalysand passes to the psychoanalyst" as Lacan invited us to do in 1967 in his *Proposition of 9 October on the Psychoanalyst of the School.*<sup>1</sup> As we have been saying since the beginning of this meeting, this task does not only concern the passand but also all those who participate in the dispositive, members of the Cartels of the Pass, passers, AMS (Analysts Members of the School) who designate the passers.

"To dissipate the thick shadow"... I owe it to Anne-Marie Combres to have drawn my attention to this signifier 'dissipate'. It evokes obviously the fog when it is lifting, but also equally, the undisciplined child who creates a bit of disorder in the boxes [*cases*] and it is a term whose equivocity is present in the five languages of the IF.

As we know, Lacan did not shy away when faced with the vertigo created by new hypotheses and we know his taste for shaking up the expected, as well as his practice of an elaboration which does not owe much to the rectilinear. An invitation to indiscipline?

1.

In 1967, Lacan created the Journal of the Freudian School of Paris, titled *Scilicet*, to which he gave the meaning 'You can know' in his own translation. Let's note the intransitive form of this formula that indicates to me a movement rather than an aim. 'You can know' is indeed an invitation that presides over the offer by the psychoanalyst, who, however, is not promising a totalised knowledge because the unconscious makes an objection to it.

For the analysand who passes to the analyst, the question is to be posed a little bit differently: could we formulate it in this way: 'You know ... but what? And how?' In the introduction of the first issue of *Scilicet*, in which the first text is the *Proposition*, doesn't Lacan give us some indication? He writes: "You can know now that I have failed". Could we imagine testimonies of passands starting in this way? Could we think of the Pass as an 'antechamber for failure'?

This is not a joke, if we believe in the titles of the texts that follow the one on *Proposition*, in *Scilicet*, which convoke, among other auspices, 'the mistake' [*la méprise*], 'the failure' [*l'échec*] and other similar semantic formulas? All this was brought up by Lacan well before the Deauville meetings in 1978 where he announced, without any affect – because of its logical structure – the complete failure of the Pass<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. 'Interventions aux Assises sur la Passe,' Deauville, 1978, dans Lettres de l'Ecole n°23, L'expérience de la passe, p. 190.

In effect, after having taken note [*pris acte*] of his failure in breaking the charm that insinuates itself in any teaching, Lacan positions his overview as the possibility of knowing what will stem from this failure. Today we do not have this kind of overview anymore, however wouldn't our use of the Pass in our School gain in being repositioned in the perspective of the failure from which, in turn, one would gain in knowing what could happen from it? This does not prevent us, following Lacan, from underlining the paradox contained in presenting oneself in front of an assembly in the name of a failure.<sup>3</sup> Obviously, it is neither a matter of promoting the praise of failure, nor of cultivating a passion for defeat. The capitalist discourse does it already. It even succeeds in fabricating from it something that sells. The propositions of the type 'How to make a success out of one's failure' are legion in the search engines.

One has to give the reason attached to the structure of failure in the Pass. This failure is not of the order of a *faux-pas*, nor even of the order of a guilty abandonment that would make us 'drop the case'. This failure is neither a renunciation dishonestly attributed to fatigue, nor a lazy abstention that can only lead to regrets and remorse. It is neither the syndrome of incompleteness that some pretend to identify when an artwork which is inhabited by the fragmented and the lacunary, objects to the Sum. Rather this failure is inscribed in the fluidity of a logic, to which some people have attributed some formulas, as brief as they are pertinent. Whether it is about 'failing better' (with Beckett) or to know 'why it fails' (with Giacometti), don't we recognise here the movement of the 'You can know'?

#### 3.

There could not be any QUALIOPI<sup>4</sup> certification which could be applied to the passage to the analyst. To tick all the boxes of what we believed we could cut out in the cadaster that Lacan left us, does not say much about the certainty of the analytic act nor of the abyss that makes its law.<sup>5</sup> How could we have a definitive view on what is ruled by the flash of lightning? A definitive knowledge? An effect of reading always involves some light besides the shadow. It would be as false as it would be vain to think we could dissipate once and for all what does not fit into the boxes. Locating it, as we do with ignorance,<sup>6</sup> already constitutes a result.

Ignorance is neither the opposite of knowledge nor the other side of it. We know that if knowledge increases, so does ignorance in the same proportion. Their relationship would rather have to be inscribed in a Moebian structure. If we like to consider the *hystorisation* of the psychoanalyst not so much as the complete narrative of a career but rather as a mosaic from which we are certain the tesserae cannot be exhumed, we would be better placed to extract its logic from disorder and to welcome its dimension of enigma. Isn't that what Lacan indicates when reminding us in his seminar of the status of elucubration of the bits of deciphered knowledge?<sup>7</sup> It is challenging, indeed, but also satisfactory to verify that what holds those disjointed fragments is stronger than our need for order.

#### 4.

Between the subject's knowledge, which falls under the 'You can know' and can contribute to establishing some certainty linked to the structure, and the unconscious as knowledge, which is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. 'De Rome 53 à Rome 67 : La psychanalyse. Raison d'un échec', in Scilicet nº1, op.cit., p. 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In France, this is the name for the quality mark of the certification of suppliers of training assigned by the Ministry of Labour.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. 'La méprise du sujet supposé savoir', in Scilicet n°1, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar Book VI, Desire and its Interpretation, 1958-1959, trans. Bruce Fink, Polity Press, 2019, p. 275.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lacan, J. *The Seminar Book XX, Encore*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York, W.W Norton & Company, 1998, p. 139.

without a subject and whose only hold is the one allowed by the certainty of the act, and therefore between the subject's knowledge and the unconscious as knowledge without a subject, there is an irreducible *gap* [in English in the text] that I have tried to circumscribe with the signifier 'uncertain'.

In the passage from the fragment to the chunk, gathered in the dispositive of the Pass, one can note its diversity. Whether it is about 'slices of knowledge' (Michaux), or 'novels in three lines' (Fénéon), other poems in five lines that Edward Lear called *limericks*, haikus, or epiphanies and other aphorisms, these tropes of subtraction, as opposed to the slogan, testify to an essential operation in an analysis. For a long time, the analysand leaves this subtraction to the care of the analyst. It is up to him though to produce it, without being sure of its effects. The fact that *lalangue*, articulated in a singular way, always goes much further than what the subject can say about it,<sup>8</sup> testifies to an uncertainty which remains in the care of the one who does not look so much at succeeding, but who puts all his effort into preventing its complete disappearance. Could not we formulate in this way what has been perceived of it, in the flash of '*the esp of a laps*', in this unprecedented passage from the analysand to the analyst?

Lacan has often made reference to Blaise Pascal and, in particular, to the fact that the latter would have failed at everything, for example, the infinitesimal calculus that he was very close to discovering. Lacan explains this failure by the fact that Pascal was more interested in desire.<sup>9</sup> I owe to the magnificent book by Marianne Alphant: *Pascal. Tombeau pour un ordre*<sup>10</sup> [*Pascal. Tomb for an order*] the title of this paper, which is extracted from one of the '*pensées*' [thoughts] by the very one whose work has resisted all attempts at domestication and who knew how to ask for support only for his work:

"Working for the uncertain, going to sea, walking over a plank."11

Translated by Chantal Degril

# WITH THE WINDOWS OPEN FOR THE PASS

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Listening to the passes during my participation in the 2019/2020 ICG produced in me an interest in the effects of doxa, and how they can be heard in some testimonies through something that, surprisingly, we could call a certain 'unconscious calculus' that appears in dreams and other unconscious formations of the passers. But are passers exempt from these effects of doxa in their listening? At the time, I wrote an article entitled 'With the windows open

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibidem

<sup>9</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar Book X, Anxiety 1962-1963. Trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Alphant, M. Pascal. Tombeau pour un ordre, Paris, P.O.L., 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Pascal, B. Pensées in Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, Gallimard, La Pléiade, 1954, p. 1166.

for the pass', which was published in *Wunsch* 21, in which I said: "I am working on the listening of passes from the point of view of what I have called 'the ethics of good listening', paraphrasing the 'ethics of saying well".

I started from a paradox presented by Primo Levi in *If this is a man*? "Why does the suffering of every day translate in our dreams so constantly into the ever-repeated scene of the narration that others do not listen to?". This paradox is important for psychoanalysts, because it points to the fact that, if there is an impossibility of telling, there is, on the other hand, an obstacle to listening, sustained by the passion of ignorance. This obstacle is challenged by the desire of the analyst. To enter into analysis, there must be a desire to know on the analysand's side, and a power to listen to the resonances beyond the narratives, on the analyst's side. This does not imply that psychoanalysis loves knowledge (it is not a *philos sophia*), nor that the psychoanalyst is the partner of truth. On the contrary, the discourse of the analyst allows the subject to produce such an inversion that treats the passion of ignorance to the point of "having circumscribed the cause of the horror of knowing." We have already recited by heart that this is not enough to sustain the mark carried by an analyst. Something else is needed, which Lacan once called enthusiasm. It is what would allow the analyst who came from there to operate with the *docta ignorantia*, that which sustains the paradox of "knowing about your not knowing", as Nicolas de Cusa taught in the 15th century.

The clinical pass implies, therefore, verifying the failure of the relation between knowledge and truth. Just as a more dignified love is born from the possibility of sifting the horror of the knowledge of the sexual non-relation, we propose that a 'joyful knowledge' (gavo saber) is born from the analytic treatment of the passion of ignorance. Lacan is precise in considering joyful knowledge as a virtue that consists in biting sense and scraping it as much as possible, wearing it down. Of course, we owe this to Nietzsche: "Perhaps then laughter has become allied with wisdom", as he proposes in his work The Gay Science. Some commentators on Television suggest that Lacan is associating joyful knowing with the jouissance of meaning promoted by transference. Perhaps because of this precise passage in The Gay Science: "the expression signifies the saturnalia of a spirit that has peacefully resisted a terrible and prolonged pressure - patiently, severely, coldly, without submitting, but without hope – and that is now suddenly assailed by hope, by the hope of the treatment, by the intoxication of the treatment". It happens that the 'saturnalia', an ancient Roman festival in honor of Saturn had nothing to do with sense, but with the body, like the carnival – which we Brazilians know very well. It was a temporary suspension of the social order and conventions, and a new bodily regime, a new jouissance beyond the regime ordered by phallic jouissance.

This new knowledge is, therefore, joyful. It is clear that the subject does not need an analyst or an analysis in order to experience the different affects or passions: joy, choler, sadness, hope, etc. But here joy is not trivial. As Adam Potkay teaches in the preface to his *The Story of Joy*, it is a passion we feel when "something happens that fulfills a desire we did not know we had." It is, then, "our revenge against communicative language." Joy, he adds, "figures as the transition from the presentable to the unpresentable, revealing the gap between signifier and signified." Joyful knowing is thus of the order of the act: "How best to climb the mountain? Go up and do not think about it," a less religious and more Lacanian version of Pascal's wager.

Joy in English, *gioia* in Italian, *joie* in French, *alegria* in Portuguese and Spanish and *freude* in German. Freudian joy, in my experience of listening to the passers, that emerges from the testimonies, especially when nominated. However, windows must be opened to let oneself be

touched by it. I return to the poem by Alberto Casiro (Fernando Pessoa's pseudonym) quoted in my text from *Wunsch*:

#### It is not enough to open the window

To see the fields and the river It isn't enough to open the window. To see the trees and flowers It isn't enough not to be blind. It is also necessary to have no philosophy. With philosophy there are no trees, just ideas. There is only each one of us, like a cave. There is only a shut window, and the whole world outside, And a dream of what could be seen if the window were opened, Which is never what is seen when the window is opened.

Our challenge, therefore, is not only to suspend our love of knowledge, and our orthodoxy (true opinion) that sometimes prevents us from listening to the radically foreign stigma of each and every one, but also to shed linguistic biases, cultural, parochial, and colonial doxas (opinions), which, I must say, is extremely difficult and challenging. I think we must recognize this difficulty if we do not want to maintain the idea of a transcendental School isolated from the cities, discourses, and idiosyncrasies of our time, or worse, if we do not want to transform the Pass into a purified and idealized experience based on the repetition of our jargon and clichés.

That the wager of the pass sustains a topological School and, therefore, founded on the RSI, is heresy. What it means, as I interpret it, is a non-theological trilogy: a love more worthy than Christian love, a relationship with knowledge that does not establish a univocity with truth, as in faith, and a hope that is not based on the guarantee of salvation. May the pass, then, sustain a Lacanian hope, a wager on the future of psychoanalysis.

Translated by Nathaly Ponce

#### FROM LUCUBRATION TO THE UNTHOUGHT OF: WHAT'S NEW?

*Christelle Suc AS* Albi, France

Ignorance is the condition of entry, Lacan points out. We only want to know because we don't already know. To speak, then, is to produce meaning where there is none, to obtain knowledge that responds, that responds to the lack in order to fill it. The search for completeness. A request addressed to another to whom we attribute knowledge, knowledge about what? Knowledge about oneself.

Entering analysis with a desire to know. I think the analyst has this knowledge. To have knowledge in order to make my being and that of the Other consist. To have in order to be.<sup>1</sup>

So we search, relentless searchers. And so much the better, because it's only by looking that we find, even if what we find is not necessarily what we were looking for!

The drive for knowledge, rooted in ignorance, is the driving force behind the treatment, but not without *jouis-sens*.

At the entry, then, ignorance but not without belief: believing that the Other knows, that he has the key to the truth, believing that what we suffer from, means something, believing that the montage of fantasy is reality. A race to decipher, with a certain taste for understanding. S1 seeks its S2. Towers of saids [*dits*]. Words go round and round in circles, but as they go round, they furrow deeper. The circle narrows. Peeling away signifiers.

The problem with words is that there's always one after the other. One calls on the other, but sometimes the other is not what we expect or, the echo sounds something other than what is said: a chance, then, for the stranger to resonate, the one who is not invited but who invites himself. Cut.

At the same time, there is a construction of textual knowledge and a reduction of knowledge, a reduction to almost nothing. To the question 'What can I know?' Lacan answers 'from where I can know'. Knowledge articulated in statements from the locus of the 'I', of the 'I think'. But the not-invited, the clandestine that is lodged in what is said is not 'I think', it has not been thought of. Hiatus.

There is no single status for ignorance and knowledge. Round of concepts. Ignorance protects from ignorance, knowledge from knowledge. So let's be a little more precise.

Lacan says passion, the passion of ignorance, which he qualifies as the passion of being, with love and hate, ternary. Why the passion of being? Because ignorance and knowledge work together to artificially create a being that does not exist by veiling the original lack.

Ignorance, the ignorance we hold dear, protects us from the fundamental, structural ignorance that lies at the heart of knowledge. Ignore in order to ignore that you are ignorant. To know in order not to know that you cannot know. Ignorance and knowledge, the moebian one side and the other side?

Where there is nothing, allows something to be. The wall of ignorance that shields the hole; we see the wall but not what's behind it. Ignorance allows us to ignore the division that constitutes us. Ignorance is another name for the refusal of castration.

Is ignorance the sister of fantasy?

This ignorance-defence will be cracked by a slip of the tongue: I'm repeating a refrain from my childhood that includes the word knowledge and, by a slip of the tongue, I'm saying it backwards. I'm startled when I hear what I've just said: there's knowledge that I know but that I don't know. Thunderclap. A turning point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Translator's note: The author writes "(*S*)*avoir pour (s)être*" to indicate the relation of knowledge (*savoir*) to being (*être*).

From this slip of the tongue, the not wanting to know is glimpsed. But ignorance is important, I can testify to that. Despite all my efforts and contrary to what I believe consciously, one might say, I can see that I don't want to know anything about it. It's a struggle between me and me, there is no Other in this affair. Resistance that makes an enigma: what is it I don't want to know? The signifiers dry up, the sessions slip by. And then a dream, more like a nightmare. An awakening! A point of horror emerges.

With the partial lifting of repression, the refusal to know is initiated. The horror of ca-voir.<sup>2</sup> The flow of words is cut off, the mind runs dry, there is nothing to cover up the glimpse of this point of horror. When *ca-voir*, *veri-tait*.<sup>3</sup> I would have preferred not to know, I say. Traversed. Affected.

Then, from an equivoque that makes the sexual resonate, that of the infantile, the meaning to which I was clinging slips away, my little fantasmatic song dissolves. It sounds false. A displacement occurs, imaginary adhesions are peeled away and with them the belief that was associated with it; the truth only appears as fictive, the truth insofar as I no longer hold it to be true.

The intimacy of fantasy opens onto the ex-timacy of the Real. No more plug. The subject supposed to know falls, there is no other who responds. No complement for knowing or being. No shining object. Radical solitude.

Disbelief unmasks ignorance. A crack in the wall, but contingency is needed for it to fall. Contingency is not decided, it happens. It just happens.

If the task of analysing takes years and is done in words, signifying addition, the passage, instantaneous tipping point, subtraction, is only done in *'hacte'* (act and haste). The circuit of analysis that only happens in short-circuit, the logical outcome that is as unforeseeable as it is unthinkable and therefore unthought. A dazzling moment, outside the signifying chain, a sound imprint, vibrations of language, a moment in which I am not, I do not think, suspension. Return of the 'where'. There, there is no I, there is, 'not-I'.

The conclusion of the treatment in a click of the fingers, a 'blink of the eye', to paraphrase Lacan, is achieved without knowing it (equivoque). With the emergence of a word, not a serial signifier but a non-serial one, a step we've learned but which has taken hold, it's turned upside down. The stamping of jouissance which, by giving it a name, reduces it and the mark as irreducible. Jouissance cannot be treated by knowledge, it cannot be resolved or dissolved in the symbolic, there is no zero of jouissance. There is what is written without the subject wanting it, knowing it.

In this moment, a bodily event, a hole in the chest with a slight gasp. It's a matter of the body plus words. No reason for being but a resonance of being, an almost nothing, a small breath. Plus the question, life. Passage from being to ex-istence, from what there is not (being) to what there is (jouissance, because we have a body).

During my analysis, I had an image of a jigsaw puzzle, I was looking for pieces that I positioned – now I can say it – within the framework of fantasy. For a long time I would say that I'm missing one last piece to finish my analysis. Of course, I wanted to do the whole puzzle. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Translator's note: '*ça-voir*' which means "seeing It/Id", jouissance, is homophonic with *savoir*, the verb 'to know'. <sup>3</sup> Translator's note: '*veri-tait*' is homophonic with '*vérité*, 'truth' and appears to combine that word with '*tait*', third

person singular or the verb 'taire', 'to keep silent'.

whole thing that insists! Searching for the last piece of knowledge that would only cover up, again. And then, this unprecedented moment, when this last piece is not more but less. Last, then, not on the side of a complement but last because it produces the stop-cut. An additional piece, not a complementary one. Not all of knowledge. It is the one that discovers – opens and glimpses - the empty square, what we were dealing with without knowing it. The empty square of the puzzle. The empty square is empty, it's a square of 'not-being'. Exile of the subject.

A piece of knowledge acquired in the treatment, passed to the body, which borders on the empty space. The a-perceived is converted into knowledge that is not *non-su* [not known] but *insu* [unknowable], *hors-je* [outside-I] but not *hors-jeu* [outside-the-game].

From the request of the fool – the analysand doesn't know that he knows – to the leap of desire, – the analyst knows that he doesn't know, not-without-knowing.

I'll end with a quotation from Lacan, because if you're only a poet, you're not a poet in your own home. With words, their flowing, rustling, sonorous breath:

"We dream of merging with what we extrapolate in the name of inhabiting language (...) we imagine that there is an absolute knowledge of reality.

Ultimately, in nirvana, we aspire to drown in this absolute knowledge, of which there is no trace.

We believe that we will be confused with this knowledge that is supposed to sustain the world, which is nothing but a dream of every body".<sup>4</sup>

Translated by Susan Schwartz

# IN PRAISE OF NON-KNOWLEDGE AND ITS RELATIONS TO TRUTH

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From the time of his return to Freud, Lacan praised non-knowledge [non-savoir]. In the very definition of transference, Lacan speaks of the non-knowledge of the analyst: he is a subject supposed to know, but he knows nothing of this supposed knowledge, and this makes it possible to approach each new case with fresh eyes. What is expected of the Cartel of the Pass, it seems to me, is not what is already known, but what is individual truth, and it is that which makes the School.

There is no initiation for participation in the Cartel of the Pass, because there are no accumulated truths from this experience, but a knowledge to come. This knowledge does not have a use-value; on the contrary, it is knowledge that leaves a hole and is to be transformed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. «Réponse à une question de Catherine Millot, Improvisations: Désir de mort, Rêve et Révéil » dans L'Âne, 1981, N°3, p. 3.

into a singular truth. In other words, real knowledge, and therefore impossible to possess and accumulate, as it is in the university. Lacan links truth and the real, the former which deceives and the latter which does not.

In the pass, there is no time to understand; the experience of the pass confronts us with the effects of truth, which have nothing to do with teaching, but with a desire to know. The moment of conclusion is precipitated by a gain in knowledge, no more hesitation, no more wavering, but rather, certainty. This feature marks the difference with other discourses and practices, particularly psychotherapies, which produce healing, therapeutic effects without any gain in knowledge.

The pass is an experience of truth, to each his own; it is not comparable to the experience of analysis, where the question is one of knowledge. There is a palpable shift away from the knowledge that was assumed at the start of the experience. The demand for the Pass is addressed to a collective, not to a subject; the demand is addressed to the School. We pass from the individual, from biography, from the logic of a life, to a collective logic which implies a different calculus of effects, of the effects of speech, of free association. For the pass, Lacan took up the model of Freud's *Witz*.

This is my first experience in a Cartel of the Pass.<sup>1</sup> During this first experience, we ended up with the nomination of an AS and a non-nomination. I will give the reasons that led me to say 'yes' for one and 'no' for the other. There were a number of factors that confirmed the nomination.

The **first** is of the order of lightness, not pathos, in the testimony of the passers. Lacan alludes to the weight of words, full words and empty words, but in the sayings of the passers, there were no more floating elements. Lightness was strangely fixed at a point of certainty that organised, not only the discourse, but the very life of the subject. A new direction, a turning point, a before and an after were clearly designated.

A **second** element was the fall of the analyst as subject supposed to know and its effects after the event, which clearly showed a moment of urgency, of haste that marked a crossing over and a change in the locus of knowledge. Knowledge was everywhere and nowhere. The desire to know was clearly linked at that moment to the desire for the School.

A **third** element was the particularity of the passand's symptom, which was clearly caught up in medical and scientific discourse. The analytic experience enabled him to position himself in the face of the flaws in this discourse. The tension between the medical discourse and the analytic experience was at the heart of the testimony. A new relationship with signifiers and the use of speech also had an effect on the passand's body. The body was silenced, and he was compelled to testify as a matter of urgency.

But it was a **fourth** element that completed the other elements. Lacan insists on the effect of the *mot d'esprit*, the witticism, which touches the root of words based on a displacement from the side of the pathos of the symptom, towards something else, an opening towards comedy, the lie in truth. It is on this point that I would like to insist. In the case of nomination, the formation of the unconscious that presented itself to us was no longer a formation to be read, but was written.<sup>2</sup> There was nothing left to interpret, nothing left over. It was precisely a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> My colleagues in the cartel were Ricardo Rojas, Didier Castanet, Rebeca Garcia and plus-one : Glaucia Nagem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Michel Bousseyroux, makes this distinction : *Psychanalyse le pas-comme tout le monde*, Paris ENCL, 2022, p. 26.

formation of the unconscious that signed the crossing over from the position of analysand to that of analyst.

In 1974, in the 'Italian Note',<sup>3</sup> Lacan spoke of knowledge as something to be extracted and invented. The knowledge he speaks of in this text is a knowledge in the real from which the sexual non-relation can be deduced. It's a question, then, of the end of analysis in the refuse [*rebut*] of learned ignorance. On the basis of this knowledge without a subject, analysis will lead the subject to rid himself of the excess of jouissance with which he has been dealing up to that point. In this regard, Lacan gives us a valuable indication of how to see the hidden truth; he speaks of style.<sup>4</sup> Style as a means of transmission. In every nomination of an AS, there is a style behind it, in the Baroque sense of the word, meaning that it is stylized, unique and fashioned.

How do you verify the pass? In the Cartel, it comes from a surprise that has arisen, not only among the passers, but also in the Cartel, a surprise in the face of a production of the unconscious: in a dream, something of the order of pure sound emerges, but in the form of a writing, therefore not to be read. An image, an ear from which three letters emerge to produce an effect of truth, a person's ear, a speaking ear, hence a reversal. From an opening where words usually enter, a word comes out, surprise! surprise! because there is nothing more, nothing that asks to be interpreted, but rather, that interprets.

This element, which passes from the passand to the passer and then to the Cartel, is a poetic effect. There is a polyphony of meanings; none of the languages spoken in the Cartel could catch it. This three-beat effect gives an indication that something has passed in the very mode of saying it. As in the Baroque style, the illusion of life is revealed by a simple detail that transforms the drama into a human comedy. Anamorphosis. We find again these close links to a new desire, beyond the end of analysis, finding something else, perhaps something completely new. Lacan distinguishes between the 'jaculation' of the signifier, which is related to the way in which *lalangue* has permeated a given subject, and the mode of crystallisation, the 'materiality' of *lalangue*. These three letters were not of the signifier, as a symbolic element, but of the real of its jaculation. This distinction puts the analyst in a position to return to the sound imprint, to find the cipher that the symptom writes savagely. He becomes refuse [*rebut*].

These few considerations allow us, perhaps, to approach what Lacan calls the 'real nomination'<sup>5</sup> as 'truth'. Thus, the 'truth effect'.<sup>6</sup> The reasons for saying no to the second passand emanate from the absence of those elements that appeared in the first testimony. There are two types of conclusion, a conclusive conclusion, a nomination, and a suspended conclusion. Lacan invites us to reinvent the analyst with each nomination, that is to say, an analyst in act, that is to say, he offers himself as an object that is lacking in the School, the truth can only be encountered as lacking and therefore impossible to say in its entirety. The AS comes to give a little 'condiment', of 'what one says lies',<sup>7</sup> to the School. The nomination of AS has nothing to do with the non-knowledge that Lacan praised at the beginning, but with an unknowable knowledge. The analyst does not know, but he is it. The strength of a testimony lies in its incompleteness; the real is encountered as lacking.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. « Note italienne », dans Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, pp. 308-309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. 'Psychoanalysis and its Teaching' 1957, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. B. Fink, New

York and London, Norton & Company, 2006 p. 383.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan J., Le Séminaire « RSI », inédit, leçon du 13 mai 1975

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan J., 'On a purpose', 1966, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, p. 305.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Translator's note: in French this is written "qu'on dit-ment" which is homophonic with "condiment".

## WHAT IS DIDACTIC IN THE PASSAGE TO THE ANALYST?

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'An experience emerges from the analysis, which it is completely wrong to describe as didactic. Experience is not didactic'. Lacan (1973), On the Experience of the Pass.

Lacan's questioning of the didactic analysis of the IPA is inseparable from the institutional connotations of those times. His School aims at a distribution of knowledge more in line with a formation that does not deny the radical inapprehensibility of our praxis.

If he tried to delete the term didactic, it was to emphasize that, strictly speaking, all analysis is didactic (not only that of the analyst) and that experience as such is necessary but requires elaboration and theorization to qualify it as didactic.

I think that the procedure of the Pass is the way Lacan chooses to recover and grant a certain specificity to the analyst's analysis, to produce a didactics more in line with the analytic discourse. Now, such specificity mainly concerns the outcome of the analysis, *a multifaceted final turn*<sup>1</sup> that Freud envisaged and that Lacan explored and developed. Is there any didactic plus that emerges from this moment of passage from analyzand to analyst? It is from this angle that I will approach the issue that summons us today.

What can become didactic not so much from the work of analysis but rather from its undoing? What of that can be transmitted and to what extent formalized?

In order to unfold these questions I propose three coordinates of this 'passage to the analyst' that the procedure of the Pass can help to unravel and that I derive from the ongoing elaboration of the Cartels of the Pass: 1) what someone comes to grasp from dependence on the signifier; 2) the consequences linked to its authorization in actual practice; 3) the potential capacity to recount how his or her analysis influenced his or her authorization.

I start from the choice of the term 'passage' over 'pass' because I believe it better expresses the temporal tension inherent to the subjective destitution of the final phase of an analysis. The term 'passage' makes it possible to calibrate the various registers of time at play without falling into the exclusivity of the instant or of what follows. The final phase of an analysis where I point out both the active passage from analyzand to analyst and the necessary path to an effective termination. A phase then that clears the different registers of temporality that concern us: that of the signifier in its anticipation and retroaction, the a-chronological aspect of the unconscious (rather than the atemporal) and especially that which concerns the contingent factor at play in the decisive or irreversible moments for each one of us.

I suggest discussing, under the three coordinates raised, the didactic turn that the passage from analyzand to analyst entails, where knowledge and ignorance are intertwined and the indications of which are always read in a partial way, consenting to the radically unfathomable that it entails.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Freud, S. (1937c) 'Analysis terminal and interminable', SE XXIII.

## 1) To know oneself to be an object:

The first coordinate concerns the structural aspects that locate not so much what is learned but what is revealed of the dependence on the knowledge of which one is the effect. Although the subordination of the subject to the signifier is visible from the beginning of an analysis, it is the subjective destitution of the final phase that imposes a specific knowledge: to know oneself as an object.

I note here an elementary didactic effect that emerges from the encounter with a fact of structure, that object that is in truth a holed knowledge [*saber agujereado*], which will no longer be represented by the falsehoods that fantasy and the historical-living truths that dissimulate the random and primary effect of the signifier on the body provide.

This first coordinate locates what is taught by the very fact of grasping the rule of language at its different levels. Then will come the clinical translations that we will be able to collect and, eventually, authenticate in the Cartels of the Pass.

## 2) Knowing how to ignore:

One way of such authentication would be to examine on the basis of the passers' testimonies, what the passage from analyzand to analyst expresses, although always in an indirect way, in the concrete practice of the passand.

Ignoring what one knows of the fiction of the subject-supposed-to-know, and knowing how to introduce what one really ignores of the other's symptom, can be rehearsed. But only genuine authorization, correlative to a deposed subject, enables this operative knot between knowledge and ignorance without forcing it.

Likewise, passing from the position of subject to object and vice versa is something that can be cultivated, but subjective destitution gives this everyday passing a renewed flexibility and authenticity. How, then, does the destitution of the final phase connect with the analytic act for others? Lacan suggested that the way in which one offers the ground rule is an index of the point one has reached in one's own analysis.

On the other hand, if we question the temporality that marks the passage from analyzand to analyst, perhaps contingency is its clearest expression, as Freud anticipates in his text on the use of the interpretation of dreams: "I know that for the physician it is too much to demand that the treatment resigns the conscious goal-representations and surrenders to a guide that undoubtedly appears to us as contingent".<sup>2</sup> I think that embracing contingency as a guide and giving it its rightful place in the analysis one conducts is something that is apprehended in the outcome of the analyzing position more than on its path.

In the same text he underlines the decisive importance of the tempo of an analysis, in line with Lacan's idea that the "transference is essentially a relation to time and its management".<sup>3</sup> I emphasize that the passage from analyzand to analyst provides a didactic plus in a temporal key. How does this figuration of finitude translate concretely? Perhaps its clearest translation lies in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Freud, S. (1911) "The Handling of Dream Interpretation in Psycho-analysis", SE XII. [Editor's note: these words are translated from the Spanish translation of Freud's work.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. (1964) 'Position of the Unconscious', *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006. [Editor's note: these words are translated from the Spanish translation of Lacan's work.]

the management of time and the importance given to the rhythm of each analysis with a view to an end.

I believe that both the deposed subject and the consent to the symptom in the analysis itself modify the mode of intervention in the analysis that one conducts, and although this cannot be stated directly, it can be approached within the framework of speech as proposed by a procedure such as the Pass. In short, the design of the operation of subjective destitution is what we find at the core of the technique. How transmissible are these links? Do we find them in the testimonies?

#### 3) To know how to historicize:

I think that there is one more didactic twist in the passage from analyzand to analyst that concerns us especially and challenges us: the potential use of retroaction to historicize the analysis itself, its phases, its logic and its fundamental movements.

To capture how the conquest of an unconscious knowledge that in some sense was already there took place, to locate the temporal scansions, the signifying logic and the successive overturnings that lead someone to the threshold of his or her authorization as an analyst.

How has personal analysis played a role in arriving at this authorization, which by definition is non-transferable? What can be ordered and transmitted to others in the procedure of the Pass? A story that runs between several actors (passand, secretariat, passers, Cartel members) gauging speech in the present tense that recovers the retroaction and challenges the programmed contingency.

Finally, a few years after Lacan's proposal, are we building a didactics of the Pass? How does the School support the work of the AS in the finite time of his or her function in order to extend its didactic effects to the collective?

#### Translated by Sebastián Báquiro Guerrero

# **PUNCTUATIONS**

#### WHAT LIGHTNING LEAVES IN THE SHADOWS

Anastasia Tzavidopoulou Paris, France

We follow Colette Soler in punctuating this theme, about which colleagues have spoken throughout this study day. We could certainly affirm that knowledge and ignorance run through the entire analytic experience. This theme proposed by the ICG (International College of the Guarantee), 'Knowledge and ignorance in the passage to the analyst,' was a wager, at least for me, because it was going to make us summon what Lacan called the "frame of knowledge": what an analyst, that is to say someone who has gone to the end of his analysis, is going to make us hear by summoning the frames of knowledge of analytic theory and Lacan's teaching about the pass, but *also* that of the singularity of his experience? This is the wager of this study day.

In this frame of knowledge, we come up against the 'I don't know anything' at the beginning of the treatment, passing through the pass, the clinical pass, which is a turning point, a shift, up to the Pass as dispositive, which could possibly lead to a nomination. And today we have been called in a certain way to articulate something around this 'I don't know anything' which both opens and closes the treatment, and which per se involves knowledge and ignorance.

Dealing with this theme involves, as we have heard during the various interventions, a dialectic between knowledge and ignorance: treating one *with* the other and not separately. This dialectic would include a third term which, even if it does not appear in the theme, runs through it. We have heard it. This term, which would link the two, bears the names non-knowledge, the non-known [*non-su*], unknown knowledge. I recall Lacan's expression: analysis essentially progresses in non-knowledge.<sup>1</sup> I start with this expression to emphasize principally the verb 'to progress,' 'the analysis progresses.' Where is it progressing to?

'Knowledge and ignorance in the *passage* to the analyst.' The term 'passage' testifies to the fact that there is a before and an after. Is this *a* progression? It is *during* this time that the 'I don't know anything about it' of the beginning will be modified at the end. The subject is unaware of what his unconscious carries as knowledge; what his speech will reveal to him is 'a knowledge unknown to himself.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. 'Variations on the Standard Treatment', Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, Trans. B. Fink, New York; London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 299.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. Talking to Brick Walls, Trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2017, p. 10.

There would be a chronology to be followed: we begin an analysis in ignorance, it is even the condition, for as Lacan emphasizes, the subject who comes to analysis finds himself in the position of the one who is ignorant.<sup>3</sup> And this position, that of 'I know nothing about it' is even fundamental for his entry into analysis. But this position at the beginning does not exclude a relation to knowledge. And, still following Lacan, we arrive at the end at a revelation, that of non-knowledge which is not a negation of knowledge but its most elaborated form;<sup>4</sup> without falling into a 'mystagogy<sup>25</sup> (the word is Lacan's). And there we find an 'I know nothing about it' which shifts the analysed subject and his relation to knowledge from that of the beginning, which shifts it from the 'I know nothing about it' of the subject under transference. For if the subject is ignorant, he attributes knowledge to the Other. The 'I know nothing about it' of the end, the result of the experience, is no longer the same: it is the one that will support the analytic position and operate in the act, and on the limits of the sayable. The 'I know nothing about it' of the end, if it maintains close relations with that of the beginning, is *a nothing of knowledge* which "heals the effects of chance" to use this beautiful expression of Lacan about which Nicolas Bendrihen<sup>6</sup> spoke.

This knowledge as a product of the treatment, the ASs, the Analysts of the School, are supposed to transmit to the analytic community. It would confirm and solidify the frames of knowledge as Freud and Lacan taught us. And at the same time, it is non-knowledge, this elaborated form of ignorance which would be the guarantee of their act. It would be like a paradox to hear, a paradox which precisely summons on the one hand logic, that which operates because it is ordered in the articulation, "in a chain of letters that are so rigorous",<sup>7</sup> and on the other hand something incalculable, the no as prefix of the knowledge of a subject "non-marked by naivety",<sup>8</sup> an expression of Lacan. The "non-marked by naivety": is it the one who emancipates himself without combativeness, without obstinacy but with a certain ingenuousness, from the doxa and predicates of discourses, who emancipates himself from the 'I don't know anything about it' of the transference to assume his act and above all to accept his destiny and the end of the games? This is undoubtedly the revolution that the analytical discourse precisely brings to the function and structure of knowledge.<sup>9</sup>

'Naivety,' a surprising term that appears in the 'Proposition' in dialogue with that of incompetence. If naivety contains a certain freshness, spontaneity and almost emotion, if it even contains something of the order of the comic, incompetence, for its part, refers us rather to nullity, to an ignorance that excludes all knowledge. "Thus [I quote Lacan] the end of psychoanalysis maintains a naivety, raising the question of whether it should be considered as a guarantee in the passage to the desire to be a psychoanalyst".<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954, Trans. J. Forrester,

Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J. 'Variations on the Standard Treatment', *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, Trans. B. Fink, New York; London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 297.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J. 'De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité', Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil, p. 359.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Bendrihen, N. 'The scar of chance effects', VIII<sup>th</sup> International Meeting of the School, SPFLF, 'Knowledge and Ignorance in the Passage to the Analyst', 2 May 2024 – Maison de la Chimie, Paris.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of the 9<sup>th</sup> October 1967', *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 6: 'What he [the psychoanalyst] has to come to know can be traced out upon the same relationship "in reserve" according to which all logic worthy of the name operates. This does not mean anything in "particular," but it is articulated in chains of letters that are so rigorous that provided that not one of them is left out, the unknown is arranged in the framework of knowledge.' 8 Lacan, J. Proposition of the 9<sup>th</sup> October 1967, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Lacan, J. Talking to Brick Walls, Trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2017, p. 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of the 9th October 1967, Analysis 6, 1995, p. 10.

The question arises. And we should ask it in the School, in the Cartels of the Pass in which I take part for the first time, when the *dense shadows* seem to dissipate and lets a knowledge be heard, the *condition* for the passage to the analyst and his desire. The question regarding naivety arises when, at the same time, the analysed subject finishes his analysis less duped. The naive subject is inexperienced, the analysed subject is the product of a progression and an experience of a non-cumulative knowledge. This is perhaps where the question should be asked. It should also be asked about the wager, as Martine Menès emphasized during our discussions, to deal with the part of ignorance; and to deal also with the part of what the lightning leaves in the shadows. We would have to take on a certain asymmetry that we could almost hear according to Matthew: 'Let your left hand not know what your right hand is doing.' We heard it today, the Cartels of the Pass would be tempted to grasp the certainty of an unknown knowledge, the certainty of an incompleteness. They would be tempted, as Armando Cote wrote in his opening, to hear the passage from *tacere* to *silere*.<sup>11</sup> I would go so far as to say, before handing over to Colette Soler, that in the Cartels of the Pass, we should also wager that the future Analyst of the School could become an object-cause for the School – we spoke about it one afternoon at the Espace AS in Paris - by donating his knowledge, his unknown knowledge, to the analytical community and why not, to contaminate it.

Translated by Esther Faye

# POINT OF VIEW

*Colette Soler* Paris, France

I've called my punctuation a point of view, because there is no enunciation except from a point of view, or perhaps a point of saying. So I am adding mine to those we have heard today.

It's obvious that Lacan, in proposing that the unconscious is a knowledge and more, that there is a knowledge of the analyst, confronts us with questions that Freud could not have put to himself, since he was content with his expression 'believing in the unconscious' after the experiment with the interpretation of free association. What beautiful simplicity!

As for me, I can only start from one thing I know: everywhere that knowledge is being developed, in the hard sciences as well as in what are called the humanities, and equally in the great currents of philosophy, everywhere, we know that knowledge and ignorance are twins, almost Siamese, and that the more one of them, knowledge, expands, the more the other, ignorance, gains in surface area. Not only does logic show that knowledge has holes in it, but the exercise of knowledge verifies it.

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  Cote, A. Opening No 9, 'Psychoanalysts are savants of a knowledge of which they cannot speak', VIII<sup>th</sup> International Meeting of the School, Knowledge and Ignorance in the Passage to the Analyst, 2 May 2024 – Maison de la Chimie, Paris.

Hence a question. If this is the case, how can ignorance be ignored to the point that it requires a long journey for the analysand to finally arrive – and it doesn't always happen – at taking the measure of his ignorance and assuming the act of not knowing to which his experience of unconscious knowledge has led him? We have to suppose that the analysand enters in a position which is one, not of learned ignorance, but of what Lacan calls crass ignorance, that is, not kin to a knowledge. This expression 'crass ignorance' is not very agreeable to hear, but we can say it more agreeably, with the soft term that Anastasia put forward: he's in a position of naivety. Yes, the *naïf* is the one who doesn't know, not yet, that his hopes are going to bump up against a real. He'll need an analysis, didactic, if he's to have any chance of progressing in ignorance, of moving from the crass to the learned, in the measure that he will learn from his analysis.

So at the end he will have become the opposite of a *naïf*. In French, popular parlance sometimes labels him 'someone who has learned a thing or two', as experienced in any case, because in psychoanalysis learned ignorance can only be at the end. He knows then that he will never have more than a bit of the Unconscious knowledge he has believed in, and that this is the fault of speech articulated in language, the only analytic path, which never attains the all. End of the mirage, his elucubration of knowledge is holed.

We pride ourselves on this result, but what's it worth actually? If this is all there is to it, reaching the same conclusion that all the language artificers have come to before him, is the gain so considerable? One can say 'yes of course', since the difference from all the others is that the knowledge of the unconscious is specific to each, not universal, singular, and that each one is therefore implicated at the deepest level, in his flesh, unlike the knowledge of science.

However, if Lacan denounced the "mystagogy of non-knowledge" it was to indicate that the fascination with non-knowledge, even the most learned, has a meaning, that of avoiding the real.

I'm talking about the real at stake in psychoanalysis. This real is not just that of language that logic allows us to approach, and where it establishes in effect that knowledge and ignorance are twins. And in truth, I'm saying this to you, as other texts say, knowledge and ignorance do not in fact keep anyone from sleeping, not at the entry nor at the end of analysis - unless we turn them into monetizable knowledges, as is all knowledge of the master outside psychoanalysis.

What keeps us from sleeping, and I'm speaking here through an image, is our body of jouissance, more precisely, what the real of language does to our body of jouissance, and it happens, in fact, that it wakes us up, less at the end than at the beginning, it's true. The words to say it, this real, in psychoanalysis are desire, drives, symptom. It's the register that Freud called economic, and it's at this level that there is a passage to the act of the analyst, if the analyst's desire is indeed a new desire, as I have put it. With the question, certainly, in this case, of what is the knowledge of the analyst, but this comes second.

So I'm going to leave you with an affirmation that should call out to us, I think, coming as it does from the man who invented the Pass, just as Freud invented the unconscious. It says that it is the not knowing that counts in the end – and it's not that of the unconscious. I'll give it to you straight: in the passage to the analyst the subject changes place "in order to operate like the one who has operated for him" – so, the analyst – up to here not a problem, the sentence is just descriptive – but he adds, and I quote, "while of the operation he knows nothing". And this is perhaps the ignorance or the new naivety of the end that matters: it's not the non-knowledge of the unconscious but the non-knowledge of "the operation" for the one who has just engaged in the analytic act. This is no doubt what he was also referring to when he described the analysts

who came to talk to him fresh from their analysis as "rhinoceroses in a china shop". A temporary ignorance, one hopes, and thus to be reduced like the breakage of the rhinoceros.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre


Wunsch n°25

# Forthcoming Events

Vth Inter-American Symposium of the Forums of the Lacanian Field 4-6 July 2025. Buenos Aires, Argentina

'The analyst and the clinician'

# Study Day of the School 4th July 2025



InterAmerican School Meeting 2025

# **REINVENTING PSYCHOANALYSIS:** A School activating, with repetition, what's new

#### PRESENTATION

"Reinventing psychoanalysis" is that to which, according to Lacan's affirmation,<sup>1</sup> every analyst is "forced" to do, due to the overwhelmingly "annoying" fact that psychoanalysis is "non-transmissible." He affirms this in the context of the question for the possible transmission at stake in a testimony of the "way in which one becomes analyst," that is: what makes it so that, after having been an analysand, one becomes analyst? In other words, the question he attempted to respond to with his *Proposition* of 1967<sup>2</sup> which established the dispositive of the pass.

For Lacan, annoying is both, the non-transmissibility of psychoanalysis, and its effect, which he stresses, is the "one missing": that reinvention to which each analyst is forced to do. It is to this matter precisely, that he had attributed his 'deception' on the pass.

What is necessary for each one to reinvent? Here the indication of Lacan: "the way in which psychoanalysis can endure;" something each analyst will, indeed, have to deal with "in terms of what one will be able to draw from the fact of having been an analysand for a while". These are matters to which, as Lacan pointed out, he had tried to give "a bit more body" to with writings such as that of Other.

We thus borrow Lacan's expression in order to outline our proposal when organizing this Sixth InterAmerican Meeting of our School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field: to encourage, to animate, to enliven, giving 'a bit more body" to the School work around that which Lacan calls us to reinvent. Something to which, though annoying, it is best to remain disposed towards; certainly, not from annoyance, but from the enthusiasm of taking a perspective on what is at stake: "activating, with repetition, what's new".

> *Dyhalma Ávila* San Juan, Puerto Rico

Translation: Grabiela Zorzutti


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. (2003). Intervención sobre la transmisión. IX Congreso de la École Freudienne de Paris

<sup>(1978).</sup> Trad. de Michel Sauval. Acheronta 17. https://www.acheronta.org/lacan/9congresefp.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. (1995). Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. *Analysis* 6, pp. 1-13.

IV European Convention of the IF-EPFCL 13 - 14 July 2025. Venice, Italy 'The symptom in psychoanalysis'

Study Day of the School 'The pass: experience and testimonies' 12 July 2025 in Venice



#### THE PASS: EXPERIENCE AND TESTIMONIES

#### STUDY DAY OF THE SCHOOL OF

#### THE IVth EUROPEAN CONVENTION

12 July 2025 - Venice

#### Experience:

Philosophy has always endeavoured to determine the relationship between experience and knowledge: what precedes it or even conditions it, what is deposited in it and what can be transmitted from it. The debates and polemics have bounced back and forth from century to century, without ever concluding that one takes precedence over the other. Any mediation that provides access to the experience will remain on the side of the semblant, and nothing will exhaust its real.

Science, in establishing experimentation as a possible measure of truth, has not been able to establish a discourse that is not one of semblance.

'Experience' is a polysemous term, and its German translation reflects its different values: '*Erlebnis*' refers to lived experience and its contingency, '*Erfahrung*' indicates its value as a process, and '*Experiment*' denotes experimentation.

The psychoanalytic experience involves these different dimensions.

The event that Freud introduced into the world was that of a new knowledge, the unconscious, based on an experience he conceived as an experience of speech. He developed an "experimental" dispositive ordered by the process that Lacan would call the "Freudian process", one which involves the structural effects discovered in transference. The operation "of the analyst" can lead to a subversion of the relation to knowledge and to the jouissance that this transference displaces.

Lacan's teaching, which seeks to bear witness to what he emphatically calls "the experience of analysis", specifies its conditions, formalises its structure, implies its effects, and deduces from it the matheme of the Discourse that establishes it. From this he draws out what the experience can produce as an end, from which he distinguishes the "experience of the pass", the passage from psychoanalysand to psychoanalyst, the condition for the future of the analytic act. The proposal of the dispositive of the Pass wagers that this experience will not be ineffable and that the School will be able to gather testimonies about it.

#### **Testimony:**

The Latin 'testimonium' has given rise to 'testament', 'attest, 'contest', 'protest, etc. All these derivatives clearly indicate a performative impact that is found in the Saying [*Dire*] of the testimony, an act of enunciation that has the value of proof. To witness is to transmit the ''knowledge [*savoir*] of experience'' of a lived experience by one person alone, summoned to affirm the value of this unique experience before another who is supposed to validate, or not, this real.

Justice and history have placed the function of testimony at the heart of their trials, while underlining its paradoxical aspect: how can one person's experience establish certainty?

Wars, the Holocaust and trauma in general give rise to another dilemma for testimony: that between the impossibility and the urgency of saying.

#### The pass:

In proposing the pass as a clinical event and as a dispositive for 'guaranteeing' the analyst, Lacan proposes a knot between experience and testimony, trial and proof. The unheard-of experience of the passand is suddenly presented as the urgency of a testimony that takes the School as its witness. Passers are also surprised by this knot between testimony and experience. The Cartel in turn, although called "jury" by Lacan, does not emerge untouched by the experience it witnesses, and for which it must give an account.

The European Convention of the SPFLF in Venice offers us another opportunity to put our community of experience to the test of our testimonies.

European members of the ICG 2023-2024

Translation: Susan Schwartz

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#### HOMAGE

Ricardo Rojas, member of the ICG 2023-2024, died on 27 September 2024. We regret 'su querida presencia' and publish one of his texts: *'Mourning and satisfaction, at the end?'* 40

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