

WUNSCH 21

INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE
FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

March 2021

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
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Number 21, March 2021



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MEETING WITH ANALYSTS OF THE SCHOOL

22nd November 2020, by videoconference

SPECIAL FILE: “PRELUDES”

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY

KNOWLEDGES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN
OF THE SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

EDITORIAL

This issue of *Wunsch*, produced by the 2018-2020 CIOS/ICG, bears the mark of this very particular pandemic period that we have been going through since March 2020.

Ordinarily, *Wunsch* publishes the texts presented during the International Meeting of the School. This in accordance with our mandate – *Orthodoxy and Heresy. Knowledges in Psychoanalysis* – that had been planned for the 9th July 2020 at Buenos Aires, but which did not take place. In spite of this, the ICG chose to organise by videoconference the sequence scheduled in the program with Analysts of the School around the question “Is knowledge invented?” Their texts open this issue and it closes with the preludes that had been written with the view to the Meeting that did not occur.

Here you will also find the contributions from the work of the permanent cartels of the ICG, elaborations on the experience in the *dispositif* of the pass, including about its disruption with the usage of telecommunications during this period.

We would like to particularly and warmly thank all the translators who, in their different languages, have worked intensively so that *Wunsch* could continue to transmit the work of the School that is at the heart of our international and plurilingual community.

Beatriz Maya and Elisabete Thamer

Per/CIOS 2018-2020

Translated by Esther Faye

IS KNOWLEDGE INVENTED?

MEETING WITH ANALYSTS OF THE SCHOOL

FOREWORD

Elisabete Thamer
Paris, France

The International Meeting of the School, initially planned for the 9th July 2020 at Buenos Aires, was not able to take place due to the health crisis that we are going through. This meeting is always the opportunity for our entire international community to listen to the contributions of the new Analysts of the School (AS).

The ICG nevertheless insisted that, before the end of its mandate, we could make a time to listen to and have exchanges with the current Analysts of the School, for some of them will no longer have this function at the next International Meeting in 2022.

The theme that we chose was “Orthodoxy and Heresy. Knowledges in Psychoanalysis”. Knowledges in the plural, the sub-title announced. Why in the plural? Because the term knowledge in psychoanalysis, and especially in Lacan’s teaching, is not unequivocal. There is the articulated knowledge emerging from deciphering, “knowledge without a subject” which is a definition of the unconscious, the “subject supposed to knowledge”, the pivot of the transference, without indeed also counting the so-called “theoretical” knowledge, derived from the texts that orient us.

To the question “what can I know?”, Lacan replied: “nothing that does not have the structure of language¹”. The term invention, present in today’s question, is located on a ridge, namely between what is transmissible in a linguistic testimony and what, from being real, remains out of reach. In his speech to the Congress of the Freudian School of Paris on “Transmission” (1978), Lacan said that “psychoanalysis is untransmissible²”, which obliges each psychoanalyst to reinvent it.

An Analyst of the School is one who has dared to testify to what he has learned from his analysis and has succeeded in passing it on. But what knowledge does he testify to?

This is what the AS colleagues who have responded with enthusiasm to our invitation will address in the texts that follow. We would warmly like to thank them for their contributions.

Translated by Esther Faye

¹ J. Lacan, *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, New York & London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990; p. 36; *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 536.

² J. Lacan, “9e Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris sur *La transmission*”, *Lettres de l’École*, 1979, n.25, vol. II, p. 219-220.

IS KNOWLEDGE INVENTED?

Andréa Franco Milagres
Belo Horizonte, Brazil

It was with joy, after my nomination in April 2019, that I began my transmission in the Brazilian Forums. In March of this year, however, we were confronted with an imponderable event that has changed our lives, posing questions for the clinic and the School, and preventing our International Rencontre in Buenos Aires, where the testimonies of the new Analysts of the School to the IF community would have taken place. Knowing then that the Pass is what makes the heart of the School beat, I will take today's meeting, proposed by the ICG, as an opportunity to put forward my testimony, since a nomination only takes place in a School, even if links can be produced outside it. I think too that, a testimony of the Pass having a certain freshness, to postpone it until we do not know when – when will the pandemic be over? – can make it dull and less alive, without possibility of having an effect. The Pass does affect and knots all those who participate in it. Afterwards, that passes. The function of the AS does not last a lifetime, perhaps much less than the pandemic. So, even though many colleagues have already listened to me – some more than once – I would ask your permission to take up some of the points again, without even being able to assure you of bringing something new.

The question I asked myself, prompted by the invitation of the ICG, was what knowledge does the end of the analysis give access to. Because there is a knowledge that we seek to gain when we start an analysis. However, the knowledge obtained at the end does not correspond exactly to what was expected. It is that this knowledge to which one does have access, in the end, turns out to be a limited knowledge, which does not mean that it is less. So be it! This is what is surprising, that with these crumbs of knowledge, one can satisfy oneself and say that that is enough.

An analysis implies a work of deciphering that we put on the account of the symbolic, allowing the unveiling of many things. But relying on this process can only lead to an infinite analysis, because chatter has no end for this tireless worker that is the unconscious. However, analytic experience, as we conceive it after Lacan, must take into account the knowledge that is elsewhere: a knowledge that takes account of the real. So it's no longer a question of deciphering but of ciphering, of reducing to a figure. As he says in the "Italian Note": "Naturally this knowledge is not cut and dried. Because it is necessary to invent it. Neither more nor less; not to discover it, since truth is nothing more than firewood, I say: truth in so far as it proceeds from *f...trerie*. (Spelling to be commented on, there is no *f...terie*¹."

I believe that it is possible to identify three stages of analysis and to articulate them with the moment of seeing, the time for comprehending and the moment of concluding.

¹ J. Lacan, "Italian Note", trans. Susan Schwartz, p. 4, *champlacanian.net*. The translator's comment is useful here: "Lacan is saying that truth proceeds from *foutrerie*, that is from the fact of fucking and not from *fouterie*, the fact of saying stupidities."

Inhibition, symptom and anxiety

Anxiety and inhibition were predominant since childhood. The father's gaze became a voice of warning. His desire was for his daughter to follow in his footsteps by working in a bank in order to have some security.

The mother bears the mark of distress. She lost her own mother in the first year of her life. The hole of this disappearance will leave its marks. It will resonate in the mother as a constant call to the other and a weak desire with regard to knowledge. In the subject, it will resonate as a spike of sadness and the feeling that it was up to her to compensate for this distress.

There was also an issue that threaded through life, imposing an exhausting work: the difficulty of living in the clinic.

The moment of seeing: capture

The choice of analyst was based on a scene that concerned him, and framed by two objects very dear to the subject: the gaze and money.

It was the end of a crowded seminar: participants left their payment on the table. Cash and cheques. I am captivated by the scene: the person who would henceforth be chosen as analyst, would pick up all of it and put it in a folder, without counting or checking it. Without shame, without ceremony: "this man knows how to handle money", which confronted the subject with her symptom.

A dream of authorisation: time for understanding

I'm in the analyst's empty consulting room. I find a necklace of precious stones under the couch. It is broken. I pick up the stones that have fallen on the floor. The more I want to put them in a little bag, the more they slip out of my hands. I wonder for whom this object was so precious. Nobody answers. I think of writing to the analyst's secretary: she must know who it belongs to. The stones are fascinating: I want them to belong to me. But I hesitate. Could I be the real owner of the stones?

I am overwhelmed with joy when, in the long work of elaboration that follows this dream, I was able to conclude that the stones were mine. But the dream also indicated a fall: the stones were the colour of my father's eyes – which were scary in my childhood – but they were also the colour of the analyst's eyes. How can what falls still have value? How could it function as a cause for me? It was surprising to be confronted with this.

My interpretation of the dream allowed me to get out of the hesitation in which I found myself. On one hand, on the scopic side, there was the fall of the object that petrified and constrained: the gaze of the Other, metaphorised by the stones of a broken necklace. On the other hand, on the anal side, the little bag in which I kept the stones was associated with the colostomy bag used by my father a few years earlier. "Money is dirty". It was a phrase heard in childhood that resonated as warning and prohibition. Is this what could not be touched? The drive objects that bind the subject to the Other must fall/be separated from in order to operate from the place of cause and no longer be bound to the fantasy that imprisons.

It is a dream of separation, but at that time I called it a dream of authorisation. It occurred in a moment of great turbulence in the School at the national level. There has been a (in)tense debate on the regulation for work already underway between CLEAG (the Brazilian *dispositif* of the School), North and South Latin America concerning the guarantee. At the time, I was very involved in the issue because I held a position in the School. The course of events horrified me. I found myself in the situation of having to take a position and respond to unthinkable things.

A veiled side of the Other had revealed itself. On the one hand, I didn't expect to encounter this, and on the other hand, having encountered it, how could I step back?

I would say that going through this was an ordeal. Even if I could count on a few others, there was something of the most intimate solitude in this experience. In any case, I felt absolutely concerned about it and that allowed me to continue. I lost the fear of those eyes that frightened me.

However, between getting a glimpse of the separation announced in this dream and reaching the moment of concluding, there was a step to be taken. But what was it? It continually eluded me and prevented my deciding, even if I knew something about the proximity of the end.

I was preoccupied by the question of what is the end of an analysis. There was an emptying at that moment. But I didn't know how to bring it to a close.

A real event may have precipitated something: a stroke suffered by the mother. She will never be able to walk again. It shakes the foundations. My body is affected. Everything seemed to work, but there the real intervenes. How can I take a step after that? I remained paralysed.

At this point in the analysis, I was often overcome by a strong emotion. I was confronted with finitude and fragility, the fear of the disappearance of the Other, the confrontation with a trait of the mother that made me feel dazed. The return of something that was perhaps known, but avoided. The end of the road. The end of analysis, the necessary and painful separation from the analyst, from the body of the analyst; separation from the mother, from the body of the mother; alive but no longer the same, and yet the same as always. A mourning was at hand. I was disheartened. Ending an analysis is not a progressive line, linear and ascending. There are stops, discontinuities, curves, backward steps. Could I retreat from where I found myself?

If at the beginning of the analysis the predominant affect was anxiety, it is depressive affect I found myself with at the end. On this subject, I found at least two well-known references in Lacan. The first can be found in the "Proposition of 9 October 1967": "[...] at the end of the transference relation – that is, once desire resolved who it was that sustained the psychoanalyst and in his operation, at the end he no longer wants to take up the option [...]"² This expression "to take up the option" is not widely used in Portuguese. Perhaps it can be said that the subject does not renew the fantasmatic arguments addressed to the Other, brandished in defence of his neurosis supported until then by the transference. It is possible that there may have been another option, but in my experience I have not looked back. I went there.

Lacan called this subjective destitution: the determining remainder of his division makes him fall from his fantasy and destitutes him as a subject. From then on, he knows how to be a piece of refuse: this is what the analysis should at least have made him feel. This will be experienced by the analysand as mourning. This is what the passers must be sensitive to in order to gather it in the passand's testimony, and not dishonour their function. Lacan says: "Who would be better able than this psychoanalyst in the pass to authenticate therein what it contains of the depressive position?"³

The second reference can be found in the "Italian Note" (1973), where Lacan again makes use of a similar term. The analyst, by the end of his journey, must have identified the cause of his horror: horror of knowledge. Only then will he know that he is refuse. But it doesn't stop there. If he is not spurred to enthusiasm, it is quite possible that there has been analysis, but as to there

² J. Lacan, "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis*, n.6, 1995, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10

being an analyst, no chance. “As the analyst is only authorised by himself, his failing passes to the passers, and the session continues happily overall, however tinged with depression⁴.”

Luis Izcovich, in the book *The Marks of a Psychoanalysis*⁵, writes that at the end of an analysis one finds a depression linked to the inexistence of the Other and the conclusion implies the mourning of the *object a* embodied by the analyst. According to Izcovich, it is a depression under transference which occurs when the motor which feeds the transference, that is, the subject supposed to know, reaches its extinction.

He goes on to say that depression is not the signal of the end. It is the clue to the passage, but it doesn't indicate that the experience is over. This is the reason that, two years later, in 1976, Lacan mentions the satisfaction of the end of the analysis in the experience of the Pass, as the extra step the analysand will need to make. This is a satisfaction different from the one derived from the symptom. Thus, a satisfaction that is not a substitute.

How can one know what an end is without having experienced it before?

Something was lingering in a distressing way. I am wondering today what was it that enabled me to get out of the depressive affect of subjective destitution, the de-supposition of knowledge and the irrevocable recognition of castration.

This is not entirely clear to me. In addition to this stumbling – the mother will no longer walk – there was something that, I suppose, pushed me: having been selected as a passer. The designation and participation in the *dispositif* provided an impetus. It took me out of a symptomatic indeterminacy, a vacillation often felt, an expectation of the Other that never eventuated.

The moment to conclude: the saint made of hollow wood [o santo do pau oco oco⁶]

A dream. *I am in a sexual embrace with the analyst. At the last moment, he withdraws. Then he unscrews his organ, a hollow tube that was probably keeping him in this state of erection. I look at this, surprised: “So, that was it?”* After the sudden interruption of the act, more than irritation, the affect I feel is not exactly disappointment, but something closer to a witticism: “So – that's what you've been deceiving me with all this time?”

I had finally discovered the artifice. It made me laugh.

The dream allowed me to conclude through duplicity. It's how I had always deceived myself: with the supposed knowledge, with the phallus, that I had put there myself. A mirage.

It was an illusion to suppose that the analyst knew how to manage money, the pivot of the transference that allowed the analysis to begin. The tube was hollow. The tube was always hollow. But then there is no tube that is not hollow. But how long did it take to find that out! The spell was finally broken. That's how you speak when you come out of a hypnotic state.

⁴ J. Lacan, “Italian Note”, trans. Susan Schwartz, p. 3, *champlacanian.net*

⁵ L. Izcovich, *The Marks of a Psychoanalysis*, trans. Esther Faye and Susam Schwartz, London, Karnac Books, 2017.

⁶ “O santo do pau oco” is a popular expression used in Brazil to refer to an individual of dubious character, who appears to be what he is not, deceiving those around him. The origin of the expression is historical and has to do with the place where I was born, Minas Gerais. It all began when Brazil was a colony of Portugal. In the 17th and 18th centuries, all the gold extracted from Brazilian territory had to go through customs. There it was weighed, measured, its gold content was tested and then melted down. One fifth of the gold was retained to be sent to the Portuguese crown. Failure to comply with these regulations had serious consequences. Many explorers, in order to escape the heavy taxes of Portugal, had statues of saints made of completely hollow wood. The saint was then filled with gold and precious stones, passing unnoticed, thus deceiving the tax authorities. Hollow wooden saints were thus not images of devotion, but rather hiding-places to transport wealth. See <https://www.significadoscom.br>

Hypnosis of the transference, hypnosis of alienation to the signifiers of the Other, narcosis of jouissance. The symptom that used to be so serious and forbidding, now seemed increasingly silly and insignificant, without sense.

What was at stake in the situation was the position of the father in the family romance and in the fantasy. There was a recurring complaint about what was expected of the father and, by extension, of the Other. The interpretation of the analyst, there on the doorstep, resonates: “So the saint is made of hollow wood and the domestic saint does not perform a miracle” [*Então o santo é do pau oco e santo de casa, não faz milagre*⁷].

The interpretation “the saint is thus made of hollow wood and the patron saint of the hearth does not perform miracle” resonates because it is about the link with jouissance. As Lacan reminds us, “[...] not one interpretation ever means anything else, but in the end an analytic interpretation is always that. Whether the benefit is secondary or primary, the benefit is one of jouissance⁸”.

It is thus in the mode of the witticism that this interpretation suddenly illuminates a jouissance opaque to the signifier: like a lightning bolt tearing through the sky in the dark night. The dream (or its interpretation) enabled me to escape from the spell under which I had been all my life: “the apple of the father’s eye”.

I let go of the somnolent hope that something of the symptom would dissipate by itself or that the Other could get me out of it. But then it is only an act that can make of impotence an impossibility.

The last dream: the falling breasts [*os peitos caídos*]

As the lights dimmed, one last dream occurred which can be summed up in a single image. I am in front of a mirror, my chest naked. I see breasts, sagging terribly. A horror. I don’t see a face, but I know it’s me, even though those breasts are those of the mother.

Just like in the dream of the stone necklace, I wonder if the sagging breasts were mine. Again I hesitate. Were they mine or the mother’s?

Now, in this dream of sagging breasts, a dream so simple and reduced to almost nothing, I am facing the double and the horror of what I see. There is the oral object, the breast, but also the body of the mother, who was once so beautiful and who now meets up with old age and the fall. It’s necessary also to mourn this, to separate myself from adhesions and identifications. It is necessary to do this while alive. Now. There is no more time. Is there any time left? It was always urgent. I couldn’t wait any longer.

The analyst makes a final interpretation:

“Now you can go forward” [*Agora você pode meter os peitos*⁹].

⁷ “*Santo de casa não faz milagre*” (the domestic saint does not perform miracles) is another popular Brazilian saying. It means that those who are close, such as family members, do not solve problems with the same efficiency as a stranger. See <https://dictionaryinformal.com.br>. It should be added that the interpretation also plays with the patronymic inherited from the father (*milagre/milagres*).

⁸ J. Lacan, *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2017, p. 20.

⁹ “*Meter os peitos*” – literally “to put the chest/chest forward” – is a popular expression for “deciding to do something with determination and commitment”. <https://michaelis.uol.com.br/moderno-portugues/busca/portugues-brasileiro/peito>

There was nothing more to say. I was sure that this was enough and that the experience was concluded. The mother can no longer walk. I need to go on. This realization led me to take the step and get myself out of a hesitation that had lasted too long.

So I come back to the question: what do we know after the end? Certainly much more than at the beginning. However, we must ask ourselves what is the place of this knowledge and what is its relation to the truth. Lacan teaches us that “If truth can only ever be half-said – this is the kernel, the essential part of the analyst’s knowledge – then S_2 knowledge, stands in the place of truth. It is a knowledge which is always to be put in question. On the other hand, there is one thing that is to be claimed of analysis, which is that there is a knowledge that is drawn out from the subject himself. At the place of the pole of jouissance, the analytic discourse positions the barred S . It is from the stumbling, the bungled action, the dreams, and the work of the analysand that this knowledge results. As far as this knowledge is concerned, it is not supposed, it is a deciduous knowledge – scrap of knowledge upon scrap of knowledge. That is the unconscious. I take this knowledge on board and I define it as only being able to be posited – a newly emerging term – on the basis of the subject’s jouissance.¹⁰”

To conclude, I take up a poem that Lacan says he found in an almanac, whose author, according to him, was not without talent¹¹.

“Between man and woman,
There is love.
Between man and love,
There is a world.
Between man and the world,
There is a wall.”

“When one says *there is a world*, it means, *as for you, you’ll never get there*. Even so, at the start it says, *Between man and woman, there is love*. This means that it bonds. A world, meanwhile, floats. Yet when it comes to *there is a wall*, you will have understood that *between* means interposition...¹²”

In the end, what we encounter in this extinguishing of the lights of the experience is always a wall. Moreover, as Lacan reminds us, this wall is everywhere. According to him, a poet says that it is a wall, but it isn’t a wall, it is simply the place of castration. This means that knowledge leaves intact the field of truth.

However, to find oneself facing the wall leaves no other way out than to invent. Hence my taste for narrow little streets, the places I always find when I venture out. I invented something I had never been in my life: an ordinary woman [*mulherzinha*]¹³.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Book XIX, ...or Worse*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018, p. 64.

¹¹ Translator’s note: Poem by Antoine Tual, published in the almanac *Paris en l’an 2000*.

¹² J. Lacan, *Talking to Brick Walls*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹³ In Portuguese, “*mulherzinha*” literally means “little woman”. However, the term also refers to “ordinary woman”. But a “*mulherzinha*” can still be the opposite of a “*mulherão*” (big woman), who carries the phallic insignia, the sense of which probably points to a paternal identification.

IS KNOWLEDGE INVENTED?

Alejandro Rostagnotto
Córdoba, Argentina

*My body was a like a harp and her words and gestures
were like fingers running upon the wires.*
James Joyce (1914), “Dubliners”

I

The beginning of analytic experience leads to a supposition of knowledge that will allow access to the unconscious defined as unknown knowledge. The analytic elaboration, while both questioning and unveiling blocked meanings, produces, provokes, stirs up a new knowledge. A path which leads us to a partial appropriation and to the elaboration of a knowledge that is not-all.

The subversion that analysis proposes consists in freeing knowledge from the reign of identifications and from the object position in the phantasy. It is an operation of deconstructing alienations linked:

- to the experience of imaginary narcissism
- to the substantialist alienation of the established symbolism

The analytic elaboration ultimately isolates a problematic axis, the bone of the real, the *Kern unserer Wesens* where the relation of knowledge to the real is fastened.

We know from experience that the phantasy becomes drive – as Lacan expresses it. Drive grammar is experienced on the one hand as *subjectivation* of what causes the contingency of speech, as insistent combinatory of signs of satisfaction, as morphology of desire and of the individual logic of the phantasy’s masochistic functioning. On the other hand, we find the limit of the lucubration of knowledge, the not-all unconscious...what provokes an *objectivation* of the self. An event that occurs outside the Other while being located in the Lacanian field of jouissance. This is how I understand the authorization of oneself, whether for sex or for being an analyst; in both cases authorizing oneself excludes authorizing oneself from the other, from another.

Going through this experience produces a not-all knowledge. Within the framework of the subjective experience, one grasps oneself, objectively, in connection with the initial circumstances of the birth of the Other. Versions of the phantasy include both the intimate and personal interpretation of the desire of the Other, as well as the capture of the *it* that was in this desire. These versions are a way of making otherness exist *via* the jouissance, motor or cause of not wanting to know anything about this.

The path of knowledge which can occupy the place of truth is distinct; as Lacan teaches, it implies a type of organization of knowledge where the object, in the position of cause and because of lack, makes of this knowledge a knowledge about the limit of subjective experience. Knowledge about the limit of knowledge, knowledge about the *irreducible* of the *Urverdrängung*, about the primary repression and I insist on this irreducible knowledge insofar as it is not reduced. There will always be a remainder that is not recuperable, that cannot be elaborated, even if I knew how to represent this impossible.

Knowing that there is nothing more to say, knowing which knows only when it is known. Perhaps after a... *I don't know, that's the way it is* or even *finally that was it, now I know it*. But the matter does not end there, it is from there that possibilities exist, *a new knowledge, a know-how there*. This knowledge, with no guarantee, is a *responsible* knowledge which supports acts of decision. An *I know*, not all, which has made the drive and castration its friends.

Faced with the real, only language and the semblant remain, as well as a new institution of the subject, freed from the imposed symptom and from anguish.

The *I know* to which I refer is not a conscious knowledge; it is a pragmatic knowledge in the face of the drive. Instead of pulling the alarm of the anxiety coming from the constitutive drives – which leads to the symptom or to inhibition – it knows how to read the bodily signs of this signal and, according to circumstances, this *I know* acts, makes semblant, modifies the body or certain non-subsidary strategies of the phantasy.

If there is any kind of know-how concerning the drive, it begins with knowing that this knowledge – instead of opposing the drive by not wanting to know anything about the jouissance that is attached to it – is a knowing... after the traversal of the phantasy... how to read the signs of the *Drang*, a knowing how to translate the internal tension into a *driving* force about existence (no longer about the symptom nor the phantasy). Strategy of an analysand, of an *analysand* of the *Trieb*. This knowledge is invented but we can also call it *style*, which is indeed personal insofar as it does not come from the other. I thus detach a pragmatic know-how which does not come from the symbolic unconscious, which does not proceed from any old lucubration of knowledge, which is not of the order of the I think but rather, as Lacan says, a know-how present in the body.

II

Asking himself the Kantian question “what can I know?”, Lacan quickly marked the difference between philosophy’s teleological perspective and that of psychoanalysis which begins with the subject supposed of knowledge. Knowledge is not a goal to be attained, something one seeks to find; it is instead given. The beginning of analysis marks the subjective point of departure (beginning and division, fissure) from which the opening of the unconscious permits development of the logical threads that weave the symptom.

Unraveling the formal envelope of the symptom allows one to advance by weaving another web thanks to transference love. But this love which is addressed to knowledge will find that making a partner of knowledge is destined to disillusion, failure, impasse. We must then arm ourselves with patience, since a new love is necessary so that the libido would have other circuits than those predetermined by the phallic destiny of the Oedipal signification. A change in the status of knowledge is necessary, as well as a change from *Subject Supposed to Know* to the *error of knowing*.

The error of the subject supposed to know can be understood as a failure, a lack [*un manque*]. This last term refers to the symptomatic acts that Freud called the “bungled act”, *Vergreifen Akt*, which displays the success of an unconscious desire. The supposition of knowledge articulated with transference love, because of the semblant, veils the cause of desire.

Mistaking the supposition of knowledge can mean profiting from failure (lack), from the opening and closing of the unconscious, the way in which each one proceeds with unconscious knowledge, in order to indicate that meaning (its jouissance and its signification) simultaneously loved or rejected... is a semblant, all the more as we resist ceasing to worship it... it is a semblant... and this meaning produced by the elaboration of unconscious knowledge does not finish.

Confusing the subject supposed to know will inexorably provoke the emergence of a real at the limit of the symbolic, he speaks softly...and always says the same thing. Double revelation: the existence of a knowledge without subject and that the subject is, *in initio*, an answer to the real.

The experience of the subject of the unconscious is no longer that of an unknown knowledge but rather that of *what is said* without the subject being represented or said to be there. With our body, we verify that the link to a discourse does not exclude our being removed from it as a subject, but in spite of everything... this discourse continues to subsist. Our attachment to meaning, to meaning as semblant – which can sometimes be tied to the experienced symptom and to unconscious knowledge – once it is unveiled, shows with sufficient clarity that libidinal economy (which includes narcissism) was secured through love for paternal guarantees. This libidinal current which served at the beginning of the analysis to *make jouissance condescend to desire* must find another path.

III

It is necessary for us to appropriate a new knowledge, one no longer supposed, unknown, or total lucubration linked to the experienced symptom; a new knowledge of another kind is necessary.

- Knowledge that the signifier does not answer to the unknown of being nor to sex which springs from the causal gap.
- Knowledge that jouissance fails to say being. Nor does its voluptuousness give any guarantee for affixing itself to being. A fairly well-known problematic with regard to phantasy's masochistic gamble, insufficient will to maintain erect the body-phallus.

In the short term or in the long term, castration is always required and the references that could protect subjectivity prove themselves insufficient... what has weight here is the chance encounter with a saying, which is the saying of the drive, a *dieure*. A saying that could occupy the empty place of God, of the beloved/detested father?

The problematic of guarantees (individual?) is a crucial problem for psychoanalysis. Lacan insisted on showing with Descartes that there is a subject of knowledge which founds its being in thinking and leaves the ultimate guarantee in the hands of God, the guarantor of all knowledge. This modality is not very different from that of the Freudian neurotic who makes of the father the one *from-whose-name* his existence takes meaning.

When the paternal guarantees, identificatory and symptomatic, are deconstructed, this place of the paternal semblant which gives sexual meaning remains for a time emptied of what it offered to the laboring slave in terms of security or resigned tranquility. Through its imposition and its re-petition, Destiny forsakes the face of the Freudian God with his ironclad laws which had left no room for desire except as the negative of prohibition... another destiny is thus necessary. A destiny with a small “d” (the difference is in the writing), just like Einstein's god who plays dice. I emphasize here the value of contingency, of chance, of what is newfound, a saying that we finally discover as a source of truth, a god, a *dieure*, or even a possible atheism insofar as the place of reference is no longer transcendent but immanent in *lalangue*.

IV

The beginning of analysis, by activating the sexualized reality of the unconscious, mobilizes the guarantee of the subject supposed to know, putting there a *fixion*, a rather mythical subjective anchor, which will bring about a libidinal rearrangement. Little by little, the analytic process

allows for an elaboration and an appropriation of the knowledge which reveals this semblant and prepares the conditions for arranging the structural void. When the semblants of love-desire-jouissance have been revealed, we find ourselves faced with the silence of the drives, the *parlêtre* does not always speak. As long as it lives, the body is traversed by the thrust of the drive; in other words, the deconstruction of the knowing-unconscious puts us on the path of the real unconscious and its effects. Knowledge in the real, if made present thanks to the subjective knot, can indeed manifest itself as the ex-sistence of the morbid symptom correlated to unconscious knowledge, no more than that.

What interests me is demonstrating another type of knowledge, that which is tied to the semblant of meaning, a knowledge put in the vacant, empty place of prior guarantees. Of course, this invention of knowledge is a knowledge without guarantees, not-all, partial and situated in a singular way. This is not an assured knowledge, but it can be mobilized. It can be transmitted, demonstrated, recounted, witnessed, but never universalized.

Knowledge that is invented in analysis (I believe there are equivalent inventions outside analysis) is not constituted on the basis of any guarantee but on the basis of a lack and will be found at the place of the deconstructed *fixion*. It is an invention that accompanies the *Drang* (thrust) of the *Trieb* (drive), it is a knowledge which, at the same time that it is deconstructed, gives rise to its own metamorphosis. This knowledge is neither assumed nor based on an error. It has to do with a know-how specially constituted starting from its own constitutive drives. The presence of the analyst is thus very important to allow the analysand to himself construct this knowledge. Likely during two decisive moments of the treatment, in addition to the entry into analysis.

A – One of these moments is produced when the analysand becomes the analyst of his own case and knows what it is about, his case is an analyzed case, the basic coordinates which solve the enigma of his being, cause of his symptoms... are objectivized. But even so, the analysand continues...pursues the path that will separate him from the place that had lodged him, organized him, allowed him a certain emancipation, as well as the redefinition of his social links and consolidation of a new Ego.

B – The other moment is the moment of concluding the analysis, a moment of consolidating a know-how freed from the program of the Other. This concluding moment must hold, we know something about it once we have gone through it, it has to do with *Drang*, chance, *Witz*. This moment is outside any program... a certain contingency precipitates it and it occurs only when the body is ready to inscribe it and to act accordingly: it closes the act.

In my case, after having traversed this moment, it sent me towards the institution, toward my institution and towards the institution from which I would request the Pass (later on). Another fecund moment: knowing-how-to-say to one who knows-how-to-listen, to a school of psychoanalysts analyzing their own experience. The experience which passed, which passes and that I am going to construct with you. I would like to emphasize that the knowledge invented in the course of an analysis ultimately leads to know-how *during* contingencies and *with* them.

V

All this movement of elements that the analytic excavation produced, all this modification of the subjective cartography, results in a distinct landscape which must be inhabited in another way. New libidinal circuits for the drive, new links, new meeting places. Living the drive in another way requires a know-how, above all with the body. A renewed, elastic, changed pragmatics is necessary, as well as a practical knowledge, a body... sensitive to the kaleidoscope of luck, luck that does fall from the sky (*sic*), which is not ready-made ahead of time.

In the same way that god plays dice, a feeling body takes advantage of it for its own benefit. To make use of is different from being the servant of it.

Emphasizing this *pragmatic knowledge*, an invention of psychoanalysis, has as its goal to show or to indicate that the solution through the symptom does not in itself offer a lasting stabilization of the subjective knot. No new guarantees come in place of lost guarantees. There is a body available to make the *Drang* of the *Trieb* pass through the hole at the center of structure. As long as there is life, the drive energy does not cease; for this reason, as long as there is life, invention is permanent and a resolute position is necessary provided it does not transform its results into rules, since nothing is guaranteed.

I would like to emphasize that it is the action, the act (*Akt*) which turns the material offered by chance into the stuff where RSI knotted, first one time, then another. At the end of analysis, we do not find new attire for jouissance, we provoke... new performative bodies. Know-how with the body implies its reinvention. Know-how with the signal of anguish, with the preconscious and affliction which are the indices that require a different bodily response and *not* deployment of inhibition, symptom, or anguish; it is a necessary bodily condition so that the quantity of the drive can invest other desires beyond neurosis. Besides, wouldn't this be the minimum required for the desire of the analyst?

VI

The desire of the analyst requires know-how with the body. It implies reconciliation with the drive by giving it a new path. The desire of the analyst, like all desire, is the manifestability, the representable, and the irreducible of the drive. It is a way of living the drive. The *Wunsch* (possibly of the analyst, could be something else) is a destiny of the drive¹.

We can call this invention of know-how with the body (invention produced thanks to the effect of the analysis) *corpsanalyste* (*bodyanalyste*), a knowledge which starts from the availability of a feeling body ready for psychoanalytic practice. Through the effect of its organization, this so-called practice produces a discourse which will in turn trigger a specific social link where, during an analysis, the semblant that regulates the destiny of separation is commanded by the semblant of the object that the analysand has been in the desire of the Other.

This *corpsanalyste* (*bodyanalyste*) must know how to aestheticize the aforementioned object on condition of knowing how to deprive himself of it, to abstain from being a subject. I am not saying to style, but to frame the juncture where there is an affinity between ethics-aesthetics, including its thetic aspect, that is to say, the manifestability of bodily being (which although it is thetic also includes the idea of a world inhabited by facts and not only by sayings... I am equally interested in emphasizing the musical significance of the word “thetic”, which means that a musical theme begins on time, when the first stroke of the measure coincides with the first musical note...). Underlying these metaphors is the idea that a *corpsanalyste* (*bodyanalyste*) is a body available for the analysand, a topography where *das Ding* (which is not demonstrable either by rationality or knowledge) shows itself, gives itself to be seen or heard, is captured in act and is not a representation.

If we think about this bodily disposition with the metaphor of the Borromean knot, we find it to the extent that the knot is aestheticized. That is to say an ethical, aesthetic, thetic modification. In other terms, as Lacan called it: the *désêtre* (the *unbeing*), that is, to become the support thanks to which the analysand will engage in an interpretative saying.

¹ Cf. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, unpublished.

To go further with what I have explained, I propose that the *corpsanalyste sait-désêtre* (the bodyanalyst knows-unbeing).

VII

The imperative of analysis “that one say” corresponds to this know-how, to this bodily disposition that consists in eliciting what one says in search of the saying of saids. This availability for listening supposes *knowing one’s own determinants that conditioned the choice of analytic practice*. The desire of the analyst depends little or not at all on the epistemophilic drive or on infantile history, but rather on the history of the drive and we find it... after having objectivized one’s own unconscious causality. It is a contingent desire that could well not have been. It is there...by chance.

Once the drive has freed itself from the destinies put on the program by the Other through alienation, there are possibilities for other channels, such that the encounter with oneself in terms of the drive could allow a pragmatic know-how ready to channel the libido and its satisfaction.

The *corpsanalyste sait-désêtre* (bodyanalyst knows-unbeing). What one hears and what one says in the analytic context implies a know-how with one’s own subjective knot, with the strings of RSI, such that it allows for knotting and fine tuning in act the strings of the bodily instrument, in order that the echoes of the saying resonate, not only in oneself but also in others.

The analyst is content with being the musical instrument...where each can perform his own score, producing all the variations necessary for knowing how to finally bring the *Akt* to a close.

The *corpsanalyste* (bodyanalyst) knows how to weave his own threads to make emerge from them a supplementary, pragmatic, artisanal element...that we can call the semblant. As Lacan states², being is separated from its semblant, this separation is used here in the service of the treatment. It is not about the being of the analyst as we said. The bodily disposition that permits the use of the semblant belongs to another register of experience. Lacan warns us that the analyst is not a semblant, he occupies the place of the semblant, the position of the semblant in the analytic experience, cleaning up truth for the analysand, interpellating the jouissance. But none of this is possible without a body.

A body, among other bodies. Body that takes shape. Body that makes body. Body and I want you body. An everyday body. *Corpsanalyste*. Analyzing body. Changing body. Grafted body. Body and I want you body. Body to body. Foreign body. Insurgent body. Body with no soul. Seed body. Body and I want you body. Living body. Body that makes body.

Translated from the French by Devra Simiu

² J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, livre 11, *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*. Paris, Seuil, 1973, p. 98.

KNOWLEDGE, ONE INVENTS IT TO “DISTRACT ONESELF”¹

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We can talk on TV or on the radio, in Geneva, Caracas or Rome, put on the appearance of a travelling salesman, from Oiapoca to Chuí², we can talk about psychoanalysis everywhere, through many routes, from the most torturous of the mountains of Teresópolis right up to today, from home, online; but to talk about the ex-sistence of the unconscious depends on a discourse that listens to it. Psychoanalysis is a discourse, and moreover, the Real appears to us from there, from the analytic discourse.

It's in the analytic discourse that the true saying emerges – “it is in the *true saying* (that is, the nonsense, the nonsense that comes to us, that jumps out at us), that we get to open the path towards something, something completely contingent, so that sometimes and even by mistake *it ceases not being written*, as I have defined *the contingent*, that is, this leads to establishing something between two subjects that has *the air* of being written³”.

In this way too, via the error, the love letter - playing with the resonance of *amour* [love] and *a(mur)* [a wall]. Letter⁴, which carries something towards a destination. By chance – since it does not always arrive, and if it does arrive, it arrives by way of the signifiers, thus carrying the mark of the impossible encounter of two, of two speaking beings, divided by the wall (mur) of language. That's where the big question is.

It is present in the course of becoming an analyst, different to other paths of formation. Those with the title, the masters, those who are important regulators for indicating the conclusion of a path, say little - for the one who can say something about this passage is the analysand himself. He is also responsible for the transmission of what he has come to know from his experience of analysis. It is a proposition at once instigating and impossible, as Freud already said, referring to the difficult task of professions like educating, governing and psychoanalysing.

It's a matter of the Real, that which is opposed to sense, as this “what does not cease not being written”. So, how to transmit this Real? Taking into account that there is transmission precisely when something is heard that is written, as the effect of discourse. It is a paradox posed from the outset: how to listen to the impossible of the transmission?

The work of the Pass writes something, not without the work of the School nor of the Forum. They are intertwined to a certain extent. The Pass does not make sense elsewhere, outside this triad, we will see why.

The one does not go without the other. The Forums, which are not the School, but are oriented by it, are the entry portal and the space for the work to take place. However over time, each Forum would become empty if not for the desire sustained by the analyst in this collective, so that there is formation, and in this particularity, on which each analyst reflects every day in his own clinic, constantly asking himself, “what is it to be an analyst?”

¹ Translator's note: The Portuguese verb “se distrair” has two significations: to “distract oneself”, and to “amuse oneself”.

² *Do Iapoca ao Chuí*: It is a reference to two territorial extremes of Brazil (from the north to the south), which can signify cultural diversity, national scope and even exaggeration or overreach.

³ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent*, unpublished, lesson of 12th February, 1974 (see a draft translation by Cormac Gallagher on lacaninireland.com)

⁴ In the original text, the author underlines the double signification of the word *letter* (as in English).

In his solitude, he asks himself about his knowledge and, in the collective, he can say with Lacan, “in short, the reason so many of you are listening to me, which I’m griping about, is that what I convey is what emerges from the analytic discourse. In the analytic discourse, things proceed differently and that is why you are there: to the extent that here, I extend it. It is this that makes the *body* of what I am saying⁵”.

Thus, Lacan proposes that there is not need of a long list, but of determined workers, as he authorizes himself to say in the Act of Foundation regarding the School, nine years earlier. On the other hand, he produces the equivocal, when he says "which I’m griping about", putting the body in play, different to a simple said. It’s what makes the others open their ears to listen to him. From this *true saying*, real knowledge.

It would then be three, never two. Lacan insists the whole time on three. Is it possible to think about the work of the Forum and of the School without the third being there, that is, the analyst? The work of the analyst (the work of the Pass), the one who is the agent of a transmission in the School and consequently also in the Forum, not repeating the teaching (*ensenhança*⁶), but bringing *tyche* to the dance, making the three dance and undoing there the encounter of the two; the three ex-sist, the real is three, says Lacan. It is the saying of mathematics that reigns here, that of Cantor, of the real that takes body in anguish. Anguish or horror that serves to wake the other, it’s necessary to remember it.

Why does this worker, the AS, Analyst of the School, sometimes disappear, letting it look like two or a collective, better known as colleges? Would it, as a hole, be plugged?

It is clear, with the writing of the knot, “not two, at least three, and what I mean is that, even if you are only three, that will give four...”⁷ So this is what the writing of the knot shows: to do with the inclusion of the “plus one”, to do with the hole that constitutes the cause, named *object a*, that is, the desire of the analyst, which supplements this inaugural hole.

We mis-recognise the hole, often for a while in an analysis and often for a while in a formation, of this: to come!

Contingency taken into account in the School, which only has sense there, in the “body” of a Forum, where people meet to listen, speak, form, criticize, pass; they can pass while ignoring it; sometimes it (ça) passes, as if in error. An errant...

The cartel and the Pass are *dispositifs* of the School, works of the School which orient the work of the Forum, because they make the hole obvious. They put the analyst in the circuit, making a network and a continuous formation, interminable, but *tychic*, stumblings which disconcert in the sense of the advent of becoming an analyst there too, faced either with the contingency of the text to transmit in clinical formations, or with the contingency of the random draw in the passage as passer or for the Pass.

Avoiding the “glueing” in the School is important, with the cartel declaring itself as a “come together and dissolve the bonds”. The Pass also speaks of an end, of a transference bond that lasts a little longer and loosens, when the analysand authorises himself as analyst. They separate. End of a bond. However, the work of the Pass seems to bring something more from this, from the contingency itself, analysts who have proved themselves, who have passed on to transmission, of this and what else? An end once more.

The AS falls, he does not leave the School, he falls when his time is finished.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Translator’s note: The author creates a translinguistic neologism (*ensenhança*), formed on the basis of the Spanish word “*enseñanza*” (teaching) and “*dança*” (dance), in Portuguese.

⁷ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXII, RSI*, trans. Cormac Gallagher, lesson of 15th April, 1975, p. 167 on lacanireland.com

The work of the Pass is written in a moment, it is contingency itself, in a solitary relation with the impossible.

“How could we not consider that contingency, or what ceases not being written, is not the way by which impossibility, or what does not cease not being written, is demonstrated? And that a Real is attested to there that, for not being better grounded, can be transmitted by the flight to which all discourse responds⁸”.

Could we write: work of the Forum and work of the School knotted by the contingency-impossibility of doing it? What bonds for solitude?

*“What we don’t have we invent.
 Our love, we invent it
 To distract ourselves
 And when it draws to a close we think
 That it has never existed.”
 (Cazuza⁹)*

Knowledge, is it invented?

We speak in the Forums, which are organized as a space to receive those who are interested in hearing something beyond the saids, we do a lot of this without knowing it; but in a certain manner, those who hear open their ears, as soon as these sayings are traversed by transmission.

The AS transmits starting from a forgetting in the body, he needs to get up on the stool in order to tell, a power to tell, of a non-knowledge, for it is all the time forgotten, erased, but in getting up on the stool he can tell it. The story goes that anyone who arrives in London to Hyde Park (*Speakers’ Corner*) can get up on the soap-box, which puts him in suspension in relation to the ground, and from there he can speak, he can even speak ill of the queen.

What a find of Lacan’s: One dupe of the unconscious, who errs, utilised for that end. To work for the School, driven by desire.

That One of chance, who has finished his analysis and is touched by the recent discovery of the unconscious, real, incurable; that he exits with his stool under his arm, having as pretext the recounting of his analysis. It is interesting that I spoke about that in my first intervention as AS. I soon saw that it is not history that’s involved in transmitting a psychoanalysis that is still alive, like a new experience, to come. Brilliant!

Onward ... don’t do what Freud did in trying to make this discourse of the analyst adequate to the discourse of science, that was his *errance*.

Les Non-dupes errent, that’s the Pass, it begins like this: “I’m starting again. I’m starting again, since I thought I could finish... I’m even starting again, *because* I thought I could finish. This is what I call elsewhere *the Pass*: I thought it had passed¹⁰”. One writes ‘Les non-dupes errent’, or makes something with ‘Les Noms du père’, that is, “that which I promised never to speak of again”, says Lacan¹¹. The ex-communication, his own, that made him stop, how to transmit this history without recounting it? Infinite are the separations.

With “don’t imitate me”, Lacan gave the letter. Do as I do, but don’t imitate me, he says, perhaps referring to the doxa of *fixion*.

⁸ J. Lacan, “Introduction à l’édition allemande d’un premier volume des *Écrits*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 559.

⁹ Agenor de Miranda Araújo Neto, also known as Cazuza (1958-1990) was a Brazilian singer, composer, poet and songwriter.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent*, unpublished, lesson of 13th November, 1973.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

In her book, *Jacques the Sophist: Lacan, logos and psychoanalysis*, Barbara Cassin works on this issue of doxa, since doxography is ‘the writing of opinion’: “It is easy to see how it is formed. *Graphy* is inscribing or putting down in writing: doxography is a matter of going from the oral to the written, from one modality of transmission to another, from one modality of memory to another. Going more precisely from enthusiasm to a kind of scratching¹².”

Passing directly to the question of knowing how to transmit, she responds, after having spoken beautifully about doxography “it is: by fixation”. I quote: “Such is the doxographico-linguistic moment of Lacanian transmission that cannot be scraped clean. The normal fate of mathemes, which we have no idea what they mean, is that they need language in order to be transmitted... ‘and that’s what makes the whole thing shaky’. Why should mathematical formalization, the only kind that can be transmitted integrally, (still) be our goal, our ideal, when in order to be transmitted and to keep going it needs ‘the language I use’? The ‘objection’ (no formalization of language is transmissible without the use of language itself) is in any case, an invitation to turn to the use of the language itself. So let us relegate the truth as it deserves¹³.”

In order to relegate the truth as it deserves, it’s necessary to be entered in the analytic discourse.

And to conclude, the end of an analysis can be enough, and can be enough for the subject, but for the School, what interests it is that you can give proof of this, in the sense of formation, of transmission. It’s for this reason that the Pass does not make sense elsewhere than in a School of psychoanalysis, it does not serve to demonstrate anything else. There is also the idea of putting to the test the *hystorisation* of analysis, as Izcovich underlines, “The term refers to hysteria, in the sense that an analysis is determined by the question of wanting to know from it what animates me... and trying to demonstrate this experience to others. This putting it to the test means that it is not enough to say: ‘as for me, I have finished’. This putting to the test, it’s: ‘prove it to me’¹⁴”. This is why it’s not something that imposes itself on everyone, but rather on the “scattered and assorted”, which refers to what constitutes the support of the analyst’s desire. Desire not marked by the all, there is no “all”, only the singular, for each, singular as mark of trauma.

Let us recall that the “scattered and assorted” also carries the tone of separation. For an analysis to come to an end there is a separation, the falls that leave the subject in solitude and emptiness, anguish. On the other hand, the desire of the analyst which is lurking there puts him to work, the desire to transmit an experience that has made a difference. And it leads him to testify to the “lying truth”, and to create a style for doing so. Do something with it. In order to distract oneself.

In order to know that the “access of the speaking being to something that presents itself, exactly, as touching the Real at a certain point, there, at that point. At that point is justified the fact that I define the Real by the impossible, because here precisely it never happens – it is the nature of language – it never happens that the sexual relation can be inscribed¹⁵.”

And what can we write? From the collective “There are some on the list” [*Há na lista*] to “there is an analyst” [*Há analista*]¹⁶] in the singular. Something that someone wrote while listening to me.

¹² B. Cassin, *Jacques the Sophist. Lacan, logos, and psychoanalysis*, trans. Michael Syrotinski, NY, Fordham University Press, 2019, p. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 22, translation modified.

¹⁴ L. Izcovich, *Le Choix des identifications*, Cours du Collège de clinique psychanalytique de Paris, 2011-2012, p. 171.

¹⁵ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent*, unpublished, lesson of 20th November, 1973.

¹⁶ Translator’s note: “Há na lista” to “Há analista” is a homophonic play on words in Portuguese.

We can ask ourselves why events happen, “and, after all, why the contingent, what’s going to happen tomorrow, can we not predict it?”¹⁷

What to do with it? Mere contingency.

“How does a man love a woman?

By chance¹⁸.”

That says everything,

about the encounters.

That said, in order to say farewell to this function that is both a dupe and erratic, “well” lived.

What else to say on the subject? A body that has quietened, that has grown tired of working, I have said that .. but, since the end of the analysis, from that avalanche of anguish that remained in the body and incited this being of speech to say more and to demand the Pass, since then I have been surprised by the pathways; I have appeared and disappeared several times. What to do with that? What will happen tomorrow, no-one can predict. Mere contingency.

Infinite analysis, not interminable, but infinite, continues to cause the analyst. “There is the good hour [*bon heur*]. That’s all there is to it: the chance of a little good fortune [*bonheur*]¹⁹!

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

THE KNOWLEDGES OF THE ANALYSIS IN THE BECOMING OF THE ANALYST

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The expectation of progress of knowledge [*saber*] in the School

I find myself finalising the time of my transmission as an AE (analyst of the School, here onwards AE). A question accompanies me since the beginning, that of which are the problems of psychoanalysis that we consider crucial in our current times. I have brought the question to each place where I’ve been invited for this transmission, but at the end of the itinerary I have not been able to capture really these crucial problems, I haven’t been able to go beyond the formation of the analyst as a crucial problem or the obstacles that emerge among analysts when dedicated to working in common¹. Without a doubt, these pandemic times have brought about new questions regarding the beginning of online analysis, for example, and also others regarding

¹⁷ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent*, lesson of 20th November, 1973.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, lesson of 18th December, 1973.

¹⁹ J. Lacan, “Introduction à l’édition allemande d’un premier volume des *Écrits*”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 556.

¹ I believe that an excessive tendency to the escabelization of the analysts in the school may be considered as a crucial problem for the transmission of psychoanalysis. The eagerness to obtain recognition of the work in their own name may function as a major resistance to the work of analysts with others. Understanding that a cartelized School, -more than “escabelized”- would contribute better to the work of elaboration of the analytic experience. Of course, a possible objection would be that this is too “purist” of a position, in any case, I believe it deserves discussion the treatment that is given to conflicts “of cartel” – of marquee – that often arise, and that the cartel - because of its disposition- could treat.

the survival of psychoanalysis as a discourse in the current state of capitalism to which our civilisation has arrived.

The crucial problems, which ones? The forever ones? Which would “the forever ones” be? do we have any awareness of any new ones? From Lacan’s time to ours, nothing changed? or is it, perhaps, that the question for the crucial problems has demonstrated its expiration? It was Lacan’s expectation that those nominated analysts of the School would be able to give testimony of the crucial problems of the analyses, it was also expected that they would contribute to the progress of the School². The testimonies of the AEs have attempted to transmit something of the crucial moments of an analysis, each one in their style: the beginning, the establishment of transference, the interpretation of dreams, the traversing of phantasy, the end of analysis, the falling of the subject supposed to transference, the mourning, subjective destitution. In so many words, those have been the wanderings of the transmission. Yet, are the crucial moments of an analysis its very crucial problems?

Such as it appears, the thick shadow that covers over the passage from analyzand to analyst has not been dissipated by the lightning of the pass. This crucial problem persists, the unresolved. These 20 years of effective exercise of the pass allows us to attest to the fact that the analyses may finish without that passage taking place, they may even not end, and yet the passage have taken place regardless, or the passage may have been produced and however, not be accompanied of the “wanting what is desired”³. In short, no guarantees regarding the opportunity that there be an analyst.

On the other hand, nothing guarantees that the nomination of an AE will result in the function of the AE, it is not certain that noting something of the emergence of the desire of the analyst would result in a desire of transmission that would cause the work of the School. I understand the function AE as a subliminal function⁴, which should be distinguished from the performance that might have led to the nomination. This subliminal function is much less noisy and visible than the performance of transmission; it operates subterraneously -also extra-territorially-, causing the work of the analyzand in the School. Calling the AEs to the stand for them to give their reasons seems to me a congruent politic, the AE has been a passant well disposed to take the stand, but their function is not just about that. They are also expected to participate in the progress of the School. Now then, what do we understand of this progress? What progress has there been regarding the crucial problems?

This 20 year journey of the School of the Forums leaves us with the common feeling that the School has progressed⁵, yet when trying to be a bit more precise about what this progress would be, the grains of sand escape me and capturing which was the grain of sand contributed by the AEs becomes an even harder task. In the assembly of Barcelona, in 2018, the discussion turned around keeping a possible trace of the AEs and then the debates quickly came about: whether taking this route could contribute or not to forming a caste.

Evidently it’s not an easy matter: this School expects something of the AE and what I hear is that the expectation tends to the production of a knowledge. Sometimes it seems the expectation is of a “remainder of knowledge” that would make the theorisation advance, others knowledge is supposed to the AE. On occasion, questions that aim to corroborate the theory in the transmission of the AE arise. It seems the AE is expected to produce some effect in knowledge,

² J. Lacan, “Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de ‘École’” (1967), *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

³ J. Lacan, “Remarque sur le rapport de Daniel Lagache: ‘Psychanalyse et structure de la personnalité’” (1960), *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966.

⁴ I develop this idea in “From the cartel to the nomination of AE: What does the School guarantee?”, *Publication of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field of Latin America South, SIC*, n° 3.

⁵ It has progressed in its expansion, yet has psychoanalysis in intension contributed to that expansion?

some progress in knowledge, one that -at the same time- would keep the knowledge produced from crystallising in a doxa that would hinder the functioning of the pass. But, what is this expectation about? Is the production of a new articulation what is expected, the effects of a know-how-to-do, that a knowledge be invented? Or is it rather about questioning what is believed to be known, piercing what is getting coagulated as common knowledge?

This is the time, for me, to pick up the glove of the debates that took place on 2020, both by the initiative of the Council of Orientation of the EPFCL-France in the Journée they organised around “The effects of the pass in the School, seen by the AE”, as well as in the Meeting with the AEs organised by the International College of the Guarantee titled “Is knowledge invented?” In both opportunities there was a tendency to delineate what the contributions of the AEs have been regarding the reflection on analytic experience. The effects of the presence of the AEs seem without doubt, in the saying of Sonia Alberti: “value the *desêtre* [un-being] of the analyst⁶”. However, the question regarding the remainder of knowledge that the transmission of the AEs could produce insists, furthermore, as I already mentioned, the matter seems to have taken the form of a question for the conservation (or not) of a trace of the AEs.

The knowledges of the analysis and afterwards...

I take this road opened by the international debate in our School, which leans towards the question about the knowledges at play in the analysis and their effects in the School. To begin, I understand that there is no direct relation between the knowledges that are extracted from analysis and the analytic act, although it is not possible to think that act without referring to those knowledges. The knowledges extracted from an analysis do not guarantee the analytic act, neither can that act be thought of outside the work on knowledge produced in the analysis. Then, which could the conditions be, the potential disposition so that there is an opportunity for the analytic act, that is for there to be chances for that elective moment in which the analyzand passes to analyst to take place? The analyzands could pass to other things also, they may pass and remain in the sadness of the end or employ their *savoir faire* in sustaining an *escabeau* with recognition aims for their own person or their work. They may pass to be an analysed or perhaps, a functionary analyst. It's not enough with analysis nor with its end for the desire of the analyst.

To start, I can identify at least three sources or statues of knowledge: the unknown knowledge of the unconscious (S_1 - S_2), the knowing-how-to-do and knowing how to be a deject, a refuse. The last one especially interests me, in as much as Lacan proposes, in 1973, this “knowing how to be a deject” as a condition of possibility for the emergence of the desire of the analyst⁷. For Lacan this is about knowing how to be a deject parting from having sifted one's own cause of the horror to knowledge, and in addition, with a note of enthusiasm. He makes this the “mark”, the condition, that will be recognised in the analyst that runs the risk of requesting the pass and not only for the functionary analyst that is authorised from himself. “To authorise oneself, that may even work, but being, that is something else⁸”. I say “condition of possibility”, for it doesn't simply follow that knowing how to be a deject be coloured by enthusiasm. Lacan evokes the possibility of depression and, in fact, it would be useful to differentiate between knowing how to be a deject and identifying to the deject melancholically.

⁶ Intervention in the School Space of the XXII Journée of the Clinical Formations of the Lacanian Field-RJ (FCCL-RJ), VIII Journées of the Forum of the Lacanian Field-RJ (FCL-RJ), “The Lacanian clinic and the sexual moral civilised”, 4 and 5 of December of 2020.

⁷ J. Lacan, “Note italienne” (1973), *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 307-311.

⁸ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Les non-dupes errent ou les noms du père* (1973-1974), inédito, 09/04/1974.

In 1975, Lacan reinforces this idea of the deject analyst, although he works on the idea of the knowing-how-to-do, he leaves this rather on the side of the artist, and for the analyst he renames the doing semblance of object *a* as “*Ordure décidée*”. *Ordure* is filth, scum, trash, it would be something like a decided and enthusiastic filth or scum. Lacan adds that it is necessary to go through that to re-find something of the real. The emergence of the desire of the analyst has as a condition this *sicut palea*, that is not extracted from melancholisation, nor from masochism. Between the knowledges of the chains of the dreams, the know-how of art and that of the dejects some chance is at stake for there to be desire of the analyst, possibility of analytic act, potential disposition to it.

I will not examine the unknown knowledge of the unconscious. It is enough with saying that the analytic *dispositif* capitalises it parting from the hysterisation of discourse up until sifting its hole. The itinerary offered by the discourse of the analyst does not lead to the production of more knowledge, to a plus in knowledge, but rather decants in those S_1 that left their resonant mark in the body. And, in addition, that itinerary of the unknown knowledge in which an analysis consists does not necessarily open the doors of the analytic act. The potential to the act is not only extracted from that work on knowledge and its dismantling. There is no direct relation between this itinerary of knowledge and the act. And I don't mean just the analytic act, but the act as such, the one that Lacan defines by a saying that changes the subject¹⁰. To unentangle the unknown knowledge by way of the symptom and the formations of the unconscious does not secure that an act take place. The analysis may conduce someone to the doors of the act, but it doesn't push him to trespass that threshold.

An analysis may dismount the tragic and defensive destiny of repression, may dismount the love for truth, the versions of the father, transference and even some sublimatory destiny of the drive¹¹. But those dismantlings of the unknown knowledge powered by the supposition of knowledge, are not enough to becoming an analyst. As I understand it the transmission of the AEs accounts sufficiently for the invention of a knowledge, in the words of Lacan: “[...] we all know for we all invent something to plug the hole [*trou*] in the Real. Where there is no sexual rapport, this produces ‘troumatism’ [*troumatisme*], one invents. One invents what one can, of course¹²”. That unknown knowledge of the unconscious is an invention that each one produces. Freud called that knowledge “Unconscious” and ever since naming it such, gave it another existence and invented a *dispositif* to listen to it. “The knowledge of the unconscious, designated such by Freud is what invents the human humus for its perenniality from one generation to the next, and now that it has been inventoried, we know that it gives proof of a frenetic lack of imagination¹³.”

On the other hand, then, it is important to distinguish between the knowledge that each one invents before the *troumatisme* and the genius Freudian invention that names it “unconscious” and conceives the analytic *dispositif* to untangle it. Lacan also invents, recognising as his only invention the object *a*. He also invents the *dispositif* of the pass. The invention goes hand in hand with what might become written: “Although Aristotle wouldn't have invented his first opening, had he not made it pass from the saying to that hammering of the being thanks to which it makes syllogisms, of course syllogisms would have happen before, only that it wasn't known that they were syllogisms. To realise, it is necessary to invent it: to see where the hole is, it is

⁹ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, Le sinthome* (1974-1975), Paris, Seuil, 2005, p. 124.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, “L'acte psychanalytique. Compte rendu du séminaire 1967-1968”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 375.

¹¹ Developed further in the following article: J. De Battista, “The heretic aberration of becoming an analyst”, *Pliegues. Revista de la Federación de los Foros del Campo Lacaniano España*, n° 10, 2019, p. 207-230.

¹² J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XXI, Les non-dupes errent ou les noms du père* (1973-1974), *op. cit.*, 19/02/1974.

¹³ J. Lacan, “Note italienne” (1973), *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 311. The translation is mine.

necessary to see the edge of the Real¹⁴.” The chance of the act and of the invention resides in those edges of knowledge, in those littorals of the hole of knowledge.

It sounds pretty ambitious to expect that the AEs invent something that would be written, at least in the sense that Lacan gives the invention. And on the other hand, are those genius inventions explained by the analysis of Freud or Lacan?

Let's continue with the different sources of knowledge. If we look now at the side of the *savoir-faire* we find that, since 1969 Lacan differentiates it from the unknown knowledge of the unconscious chain. Furthermore, in 1976, Lacan defines the end of analysis by that knowing-how-to-do-there with the symptom: “knowing how to unentangle, manipulate it¹⁵”. In the *Seminar XXIII*, that knowing-how-to-do appears defined as “the art, the artifice, what gives the art that one is capable of a notable value¹⁶”. In fact, Lacan says of Joyce that he's a man of *savoir faire*, that is, an artist¹⁷. But Joyce didn't get there by way of analysis¹⁸. Therefore, this knowing how to do with the symptom is not something that allows us to recognise the analyst, we also find it in the artist. And it still to be noticed that this knowledge conjugates art and notoriety. Is the analyst an artist, a man of notable know how? Partly yes, but not all artist, inasmuch as he gives up the recognition of his practice, it is a know how that renounces notoriety, which does not await for the applause or expect gratitude. Now then, is this *knowing-how-to-do-there-with* a condition of possibility for the analytic act? To start I could say that it is a form of the end of analysis, yet this doesn't exhaust the question of desire of the analyst. There may be ends of analysis that arrive at a knowing how to do there with the symptom, furthermore those, who, like Joyce, get there without analysis. But this knowing how doesn't necessarily lead to the analytic act, it may result in an artistic act.

In the itinerary of my analysis I can situate a difference between the knowing how and knowing how to be a deject, its possible relations are still food for thought. Is the knowledge [*conocimiento*] of the symptom involved in the *savoir y faire avec* a condition of knowing how to be a deject? Is there one without the other? or may there be the *savoir faire* with the symptom without it implying the knowing how to be an enthusiastic deject?

I could summarise like this what in my analysis can be extracted from the unknown knowledge of the unconscious¹⁹: the symptomatic remainder concerns the respiratory erogency – the childhood symptom in the maternal saying as “*tener la voz tomada*²⁰”. This symptom kept a contingent mark of my origin – the fire that burned the theatre of the city the day I was born – , transforming it in a necessary riverbed of jouissance and tying it to the love-hate I had for my smoking father, dead due to a respiratory illness. Puberty added other symptoms, inhibitions and anguishes linked to the awakening of the feminine corporeity.

¹⁴ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Les non-dupes errent ou les noms du père* (1973-1974), *op. cit.*, 19/02/1974.

¹⁵ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre* (1975-1976), unpublished, 16/11/1976.

¹⁶ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, Le sinthome* (1974-1975), *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁸ “No hablaré de Joyce, en lo que estoy este año, más que para decir que Joyce es la consecuencia más simple de un rechazo en cuanto mental de un psicoanálisis, de lo que ha resultado que lo ilustra en su obra. Aun no he hecho más que hacer emerger eso, dada mi dificultad con el arte, en el que Freud se bañaba con desgracia.” J. Lacan, “Préface à l'édition anglaise du *Séminaire XP*” (1976), *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 573. The translation is mine.

¹⁹ I developed this in the publication *Pliegues*, of the Federation of the Forums of the Lacanian Field Spain. Here other references: J. De Battista, “Quehaceres de lo real”, *Pliegues. Revista de la Federación de los Foros del Campo Lacaniano España*, n.9, 2018, p. 95-104; J. De Battista, “La aberración herética del devenir analista”, *Pliegues. Revista de la Federación de los Foros del Campo Lacaniano España*, n.10, 2019, p. 207-230 y J. De Battista, “Los duelos en el análisis y su final”, *Pliegues. Revista de la Federación de los Foros del Campo Lacaniano España*, n.12, 2020, in press.

²⁰ Translator's note: This expression is used to refer to the changes experienced in the voice when a person is congested, qualifying the sound. Yet it also plays with the fact that the voice is taken, “*tomada*” is translated into English as taken.

The first consultation is not motorised by the symptoms, but by a loss, that of an aunt with whom I identified, who does off timing, ill with cancer. The work of the analysis dismantled the fantasy frame in which I was captive- the curse of the second daughters, doomed to madness, death and lack of love- on which background a fundamental axiom palpitated: a child is asphyxiating, a child is drowning. This itinerary of the fantasy leaves me at the doors of the act which, in my case, I thought linked to an option more decided towards acting. That was my first vocational love in adolescence. I studied psychology as a sort of compromise with the ideals of my parents, who wanted me to study a university career, and that I would just take on acting as a hobby.

I remember a phrase of my father that resonated in my analysis for quite some time, when I told him that I was going to study psychology: “What a waste, 90 per cent of the body is water”. In his mind, full of chemical calculus the possibility of the chemistry of the souls didn’t quite fit. I studied psychology, and meanwhile, I acted in theatre plays, I trained, I was in formation as an actress on the stages. I graduated as a psychologist and begun working, oriented by psychoanalysis, in the way of a functionary analyst: I functioned as an analyst, but I wasn’t sure that the analyses should go much further beyond the therapeutic effects. The conviction on the enunciation of the fundamental rule of those days was quite different from the conviction I found at the end of analysis. One thing is to say it supporting that saying with some supposition of theoretic knowledge in the fathers of psychoanalysis and another quite different thing animates that enunciation after the end.

I expected of the end of my analysis to conduce me to a more decided act towards acting, with which I had continued, but I was no longer acting in public. After the end of analysis there was a time in which the consequences of the analytic work were put to the test in the acts. That test was for me to give yet another step regarding acting. Precisely in that moment the invitation of Antonio Quinet turned to be quite tempting: acting again in a play about psychoanalysis, *Hilda & Freud*. Of course, I accepted! There I was before the surprising fact that something of that libidinal tie to acting did not have the same pull anymore, nor the same flow for me. Once my tragic fantasy was dismantled, I could no longer find the same satisfaction in staging it. The know how was still there, untouched, but the satisfaction and the pull at play had been transformed. Something that seemed new to me begun to emerge: I didn’t want to be on stage, I wanted to be in the office. I wanted to listen, to dismantle fictions, instead of staging them at the theatre.

In the following occasions where I had the opportunity to speak with others regarding this experience of the pass, there was a question that insisted: what of the formation of the actress contributed to the formation of the analyst? how much of clinic and how much of art is in that formation²¹? Some dreams of those times stage the fall of the actress. And effectively, I believe that there was a necessary mourning which was added to the mourning of the end: that which I thought I would be at the end of the analysis, the mourning for remainder supposed at/to the end. This became more readable for me in a dream of one of my passeurs, just before delivering the testimony before the cartel of the pass: she had to cross a bridge which connected two neighbourhoods of her city. She was in a neighbourhood that carried the name of her patronymic and had to traverse the bridge to get to another neighbourhood: *Suramericana*. On that bridge a noisy street theatre group gets on the way and, in the dream, she wonders: how am I going to find a way to pass amidst such a hubbub? response: “I gotta pass” and she finds a way. Something of the passant touches the body and it gets into the dreams of the passeur.

²¹ Agradezco los intercambios que tuvimos al respecto tanto en el Foro analítico del Río de La Plata, como en el Foro patagónico y el mediterráneo, también en los Foros de Madrid, Melbourne, San Pablo, Petrópolis, Fortaleza, Río de Janeiro y Puerto Rico. En todos ellos surgió la cuestión de la actriz. La insistencia en este aspecto de mi transmisión me llevó a revisar mi posición respecto a este asunto del saber hacer del artista y el saber ser desecho.

The theatre hubbub persists as an obstacle, however, as a question in some members of the School, what did the actress contribute to the analyst?

Perhaps something of the the analytic know-how was extracted from my formation as an actress: listening to the bodies, of the breaths, of the variations in the enunciations, the instant of the opportunity to the act, loosing the fear of ridicule in acting, run some risks. Nevertheless, I continue to think that the work an analyst causes is, in a certain way, opposite to the work of the actor: the analyst dismounts, analyses, decomposes; the actor mounts scenes, composes characters, follows a script, is directed.

I conclude that the analyst not only depends on knowing how to do with the symptom, he's not all artist. The "knowing how to be a deject" is a knowledge properly invented by the analysis' work. In a decanting of the itinerary of the analysis and not merely a epiphanic product of the end. The silent transformations of the analysis confront the analyzand time and time again with the experience of the deject. The analyzand has experienced the dejects that fall from the deciphering of the unconscious, what falls of the supposition of knowledge... of the love for truth, of the transferential dismounting, it is forewarned of the need for the lying truth and its limits. He has also experienced what is to pass beyond the father, the fall of the belief in religious versions – be it Oedipal or psychoanalytic – and he may have even experienced the fall in social value, of recognition that a sublimatory practice could bring. I would say that, in my *history*, I suffered for quite a long time being a "lost case": I wasn't born with the expected sex, I was not feminine enough for my mother, I didn't study what my father wished, I would fall in love with man that would not choose me, I studied a career which was a waste for my father, I liked working with the marginal people and the dejects that society piles up in asylums. I wanted to be an actress (sort of an attack to family moral). The not expected woman, the not chosen woman, the dejected woman, the wasted woman, the carrion woman, *carrion, carry on*²².

Final

I could not say that during my analyses I hadn't talked about the experience of being the deject, of the suffering of not being to par with the expectations of the others that mattered for me: this was ciphered time and again in my dreams. Without a doubt the analysis transformed this irrevocably and the being a deject that was suffered passed to an other knowledge, the knowing how to be a deject that causes the work of the analysand. It's not merely a salvation by the dejects, it's a *knowing how to do else with the dejects*, with the filth that comes off the analysis, definition par excellence of the work of the analyst.

Even then, the itinerary of analysis does not suffice to secure if the analysand at the end will be disposed to finding enthusiasm in becoming that decided deject, a shit – although not always the same one - or what Colette Soler names as "enthusiastic deject in repetition"²³. The hystorisation of my analysis in the pass could be the hystory of those falls. In that hystory there are some written traces of the transformation regarding the deject that can mutate in that "knowing how to be a deject".

The analyst is, in part a fallen one, an indigent and I believe that the itinerary of the analysis has put to the test how much of that knowing himself a deject can he bear. It could so happen that an end of analysis would leave the anlysand lamenting what was lost, in a depressive position, attesting to the falls, in a certain moral cowardice before what he found. Perhaps we may find

²² Thankful for the emergence of this new sonority in the exchange on the pass that took place in the Colorado Analytic Forum-LF (USA).

²³ C. Soler, *Comentario a la 'Nota italiana' de Jacques Lacan (2007-2008)*, Medellín, Asociación Foro del Campo Lacaniano de Medellín, 2018, p. 107.

here a crucial problem: the one of the mourning of the end in its value as act or its possible depressive slant, which may tinge the testimony of the passeurs²⁴. What exits to the sadness of the end can we find in the transmission of the Analysts of the School²⁵?

It could also happen that the desire of the analyst turns into one more destiny of the drive: a desire sustained in the analytic act and in the links with some odd loose ones of the School, a desire sustained in a praxis that can become a way of life. At the end there may be the chance to give that step, but, will the analysed want what he desires? How hard does he want to turn those dejects into analytic cause? Will he want to contribute to the progress of the School or does he only aspire to gain notoriety among his peers?

In the itinerary of analysis, the knowing how to be a deject emerges from the erosion of the drives' riverbeds which mark that singular invention of the unconscious of each one. That erosion traces a litoral, an edge, it is knowledge invented when edging the hole. It is a litoral knowledge, not-all, enigmatic, fragmentary, remainders of knowledge. How legible is this invention of knowing how to be a deject in the pass? What would the effects of this knowledge be in the School? The matter wouldn't be then to know what one knows, but after what one knows. And here there will be differential effects of knowledge that result from the articulation of the know-how and of the knowing how to be a deject. On the other hand, does this knowing to be a deject allow us to think how the formation of the analyst results from the not-all? What of sex remains in the desire of the analyst? Is it an a-sexual desire? What mutation regarding sex and death is produced in desire when becoming desire of the analyst? The desire of the analyst has ridden itself from the indestructibility that the forged destiny of the unconscious had given it, has given up its immortality, has untangled itself from the phallus, from the father too. Also of sex? Lacan supposed in women a freer relationship to the desire of the Other, more simplified, less entangled in the phallic, more propitious for the analytic work²⁶. Is each analyst met with the opportunity to invent themselves not-all?

I conclude with a proposal: that of calling to the work in international and polyphonic cartels those who have passed through the experience of the pass. The call includes AEs and also *passants* who were not nominated, as well as *passeurs*. I believe it could be an opportunity to work with others around the crucial problems and the 'after the pass', but also for there to be a chance of "other doing" with the thing that is left merely uncertain with the depression of the end, with the saviour like push to the School or with the vindication of the malaise around the nominations or lack there of. A call to resist the cast, and give in to the cartel.

Translated by Gabriela Zorzutti

²⁴ "The analyst that is only authorised by himself, passes its lack to the passeurs, and the session continues for the general good fortune [*bon heur*], tinged however of depression". J. Lacan, "Note italienne" (1973), *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 309. The translation is mine.

²⁵ The work of Andréa Milagres accounts for this problem and Vanina Muraro, in her work in the ICG, has situated how the School may appear for some as an option for "salvation" before the vacuum effect, potentially depressive, that the end opens.

²⁶ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre X, L'angoisse* (1962-1963), Paris, Seuil, 2004, p. 214.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE CARTELS OF THE ICG

THE PASS BETWEEN LINES

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Any functioning jury therefore cannot abstain from working on the doctrine, over and above its function of selection¹.

Lacan's call is sufficient reason so that the cartel of the pass works on what can be taken from the experience. To that end it is necessary not to expect beyond what is delivered in the exchange between the passers and the Cartel – it is with that material that something of a doctrine can be built.

The pass sets in motion the machinery that links an analyst, the passand, the passers and the Cartel, all of them traversed by a writing that comes from the speaking being (*parlêtre*). I am addressing the function of the passers – the witnesses, as Lacan calls them². Each of them may have a different version after the listening, which implies an election, and not a voluntary one, which is determined by the singular effect produced in each one, tied up with the moment of his/her own analysis.

In a pass it is possible to hear two presentations of the same testimony that show completely different perspectives – sometimes complementary, other times supplementary or divergent. In one of the experiences we listened to two versions of the imaginary that moved towards the real side of an infinitely repeated jouissance which the analytic experience allowed to modify: divergence in the form and convergence in the result.

The real that does not cease to be not written may in a contingent way emerge as writing in the pass, so that it can be read. When this happens it is a matter of reading in what is heard, which is the only way of gaining access to the real “in which one is entangled³”, and which the analysis makes possible to unveil a knowledge [*saber*] of the real. That is why Lacan states that analysis “does not consist in being freed from one's *sinthomes*, since that is how I write symptom. Analysis consists in knowing why one is entangled in them. This happens because there is the Symbolic⁴.”

So, it is a question of reading. Who reads, and what is read? First, the unconscious writes, and then the analyst reads the traces of the object that causes desire and which arrives as surplus-jouissance to make the body speak⁵, the material with which he is able to interpret the real unconscious. The passand returns to what is read and hystorizes it for the cartel. But the cartel can also read the act of the passer, who does not only delivers a narrative but also makes up his version, and sometimes the material with which he constructs his version may present his own

¹ J. Lacan, “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School” (1995 [1967]), *Analysis* 6, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ J. Lacan, *The Seminar, The Moment to Conclude* (1977-1978), session of 10 January 1978. English translation of an unpublished transcript available at lacaninireland.com.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ C. Soler, *Retorno a la “función de la palabra”*, Ediciones Hispanohablantes, Foro de Medellín, 2020, p. 244.

dreams and the symptoms that the testimony makes him produce, as well as lapses and witticisms that can be read by the members of the cartel. Lacan says that “the lapsus and even the witticism are defined by the readable⁶” It is then possible – only possible – that in the experience of the pass these formations appear. In the same way as the dream and the lapsus, as well as the witticism, are read retroactively, as Lacan poses it – in so far as they have to do with the economy of writing, which is in relation with speech⁷ – their presence in the experience may enable the cartel to produce a reading of what is said via the passer.

In one of the passes we heard, a passer produced a lapsus that became the *via regia* to the cartel’s reading and clarification of the knot of jouissance. The lapsus produced the emergence of the saying [*decir*] present in between the lines of the testimony. A dream was told, and in the middle of the narrative a signifier replaced another, which had the effect of throwing light upon the logic of what had been exposed – the saying underlying what was said. The word in question concerned with precision the side of the transference and the solution that enabled the exit from the analysis. The effect of the lapsus affected the members of the cartel, placing them in a moment of seeing that produced an approving silence. This was followed by a time for understanding during which the discussion precipitated the moment to conclude with a “Yes” that had already been anticipated. We, the members of the cartel, got in before the passer in the enunciation of an interpretation by the analyst: all at once, like the prisoners⁸, something happened, something that could not be enunciated and which was not enunciated by the passers. After the surprising hilarious effect occurred, the structure of the pass as *Witz* became evident.

The switching over of a signifier made possible the discovery that what was apparently played in the order of imaginary reality was in fact played in the other scene. Therein it is a saying that truly “counts” and does the counting, and there is where the accounting of jouissance is registered.

As a reading, the interpretation of dreams enables the detachment from sense and the cutting off of what falls in order to produce a re-accommodation in the economy of jouissance. Although a signifying chain that shaped the symptom and the fantasy could be verified, thus locating the phallic side, what remained of the erosion (*ravinement*) that the analysis made possible was an “arrangement” with its own accounts – the accounts of jouissance that the path of the dream unveiled. Authorizing oneself emerges as a possibility that traverses being, struck down by the gaze.

Unbeknown to them, the passers received from the passand the singular jouissance value that some words have for the passand. When Lacan speaks of *lalangue* he refers not only to the maternal language, the babbling or lallation⁹, but also to the language commonly spoken. Thus, an unconscious expresses itself as what “one has allowed [...] to be suggested to one by language¹⁰.” Those are words that mark the body, and the milestones in the treatment allow for the verification of the resolution by analytic means of the knotting of jouissance. That is how I understand what Lacan proposes about the analytic experience: “To undo by speech what has been made by speech¹¹.”

⁶ J. Lacan, *The Seminar, The Moment to Conclude*, *op. cit.*, session of 10 January 1978

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ J. Lacan, “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty” [1945], *Écrits*, New York & London, Norton, 2006, pp.161-175.

⁹ J. Lacan, *Alla Scuola Freudiana*, Milan, 30 March 1974. Bilingual (French/Spanish) transcript available at ecole-lacanienne.net

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Seminar, The Moment to Conclude*, unpublished, session of 10 January 1978.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, session of 15 November 1977.

It is not the fascination with the formations of the unconscious and their deciphering what enables the step-act [*paso-acto*]. It is rather what can be detached as a cut. Thus, one could conclude in relation to someone: to have a good time in that empty place, not so heavy, without weight, with “lightness”.

It is striking to notice the simplicity of the fragments of knowledge that a passand discovers as that which determines his/her jouissance and which may produce laughter. The recognition in the hystorization of what psychoanalysis makes possible for a subject is a cause of work. Whoever goes through the pass gives something to the school and contributes to our formation and to what Lacan expected from this experience beyond the verification of the analyst’s desire: that psychoanalysis may advance. Thus, a pass may show the way in which a forever asemantic signifier is the mark of a body that enjoys; it shows the arrangements between the imaginary and the symbolic so as to explain the traumatic derived from the real; it shows the work done through the analytic word towards the knotting that a real father allows, in a new arrangement with jouissance, up to the point that we could situate as One father-saying [*Un decir padre*].

Now, the divergence in the versions of the passers enables us to contrast and read, for instance, that a paradoxical signifier can involve the inside and the outside in a Moebian continuity that represents a repeated jouissance, and which in a simple manner shows what Lacan invented with the word *extimacy*, a centre of jouissance, a vacuole, as he called it, “this prohibition at the centre that constitutes, in short, what is nearest to us, while at the same time being outside us¹².” It is also possible to see the work done around that centre until finding a solution. The divergence in the versions of the passers makes possible as well the verification of the elaboration of the presence of the objects voice and gaze, rendered to the service of the surplus-jouissance. This enables the verification of the modality of detachment of the fantasy at play in a grammatical change entre being and not needing to be “the gaze” at the end.

What is it that makes the passers produce different testimonies? The same thing that makes each member of the cartel do his own reading of what is heard. Yet in some cases amid the heterogeneity of the reading a common element passes that has nothing to do with sense or with what is possibly expected. The members of the cartel, constituted by Analysts Members of the School, Analysts of the School or former passers may be tempted of searching into what their previous experience has provided them; but we should not forget that each testimony is different and that each writing is singular. What is written to be read is in between lines, far from being left without opacity and in an explicit manner so as to be read by all. For that reason the way of reading is consonant with the point at which those who listen have arrived¹³. It is there where the pass of each one is tested in its consequences, and where the need to be docile for those who are a bit behind arises.

Now then, those who are nominated and those who are not have what their analysis has been tested again: where the Analyst of the School “it does not touch on being itself¹⁴”, as Colette Soler says, it is a question of verifying “its effects¹⁵”.

Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez

¹² J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XVI, D’un Autre à l’autre*. Paris, Seuil, 2006, p. 224 [Session of 12/3/1969. English version in lacaninireland.com].

¹³ A. Nguyễn, “La passe, sinon rien”, *Champ lacanien. Revue de psychanalyse*, n.4, Paris, November 2006, p. 137-145. <https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-champ-lacanien-2006-2-page-137.htm>

¹⁴ C. Soler, “With Regards to the Cartels of the Pass”, *Wunsch* n.16, p. 63.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 66

THE WAGER OF PLURILINGUALISM IN THE PASS

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The pass is at the heart of our School insofar as it takes up points connected to the end of the analysis, to the transition from analysand to analyst, points which are intrinsically linked to the analytic discourse and to the presence of psychoanalysis in the world. In this way, the pass concerns issues that are crucial for the theory of the psychoanalytic clinic and for the training of the analyst.

Our School is plurilingual. In my work in the ICG, this plurilingual dimension has progressively expanded, and this is what I intend to address in this text¹.

Even before becoming a member of the ICG, the question of languages interpellated me. Since I spoke Portuguese and French, I thought I would be invited to the work of simultaneous translation in the ICG. It is precisely with the translation for the passers that I started in a Cartel of the pass. It was a translation without notes, in the course of which I felt passed through by the Portuguese spoken by the passers and by the French that I tried to pass on to the members of the cartel who spoke this language. I was bridging two languages. A pass without writing but which, nevertheless, determined crucial points about *lalangue*.

With the COVID-19 pandemic, I had the experience of listening to a pass via Zoom and I again had to do the simultaneous translation from Portuguese to French. It was a very lively experience. Despite the virtual medium, the language was able to animate the speaking body, through the gaze and the voice.

Between these two experiences, two years of work in the ICG have passed. In addition to the cartels to listen to the passes – temporary cartels, for once the passes have been heard, they dissolved – we also worked on permanent epistemic cartels that lasted two years.

The question to which I devoted myself in this epistemic cartel concerned the change in the position of the symptom between the Borromean knot of “The Third” (1974) and the lesson of January 21st 1975 of the RSI Seminar. I wondered what this change could help clarify in the treatment of phallic *jouissance* at the end of analysis.

In an analysis, phallic *jouissance* consumes the analysand² in order to nourish the sense of the symptom, giving it greater consistency each time, which leads the analysand to an infinite search for meaning in the *blablà*. This is illustrated in the knot that Lacan presents in “The Third” (1974). The symptom is situated as an overflow of the real onto the symbolic, leaving a hope of reordering the real by the symbolic³.

I examined to what extent the handling of phallic *jouissance* in the treatment could contribute to understanding how the analysand can reach the end of the analysis through sense outside sense. This would testify to a necessary path so that the analysand can get to savoir-faire with the real unconscious, made up of *lalangue* and from which language is delineated as an elucubration of knowledge about *lalangue*.

¹ This text was presented to the Seminar of the School of the EPFCL-Brazil, 31st October 2020.

² J. Lacan, “D’Écolage”, 11th March 1980.

³ C. Soler, “*La Troisième* de Jacques Lacan”, Reading Seminar 2005-2006, Clinical Formations of the Lacanian Field of Paris, May 2010, *our translation*.

Let us return to the question of languages in the ICG. In the epistemic cartel the members spoke three languages: Portuguese, Spanish, French. Plurilingualism also showed up when presenting a production of this cartel in French, since I was the only one who spoke Portuguese. On the contrary, the French colleague worked on his Spanish, wrote messages in that language and at the same time spoke in French. I also participated in a preparatory meeting for the Symposium on the pass, in which everyone present spoke Spanish and I used French to communicate with them, for though I understand Spanish I don't speak it. It was a truly plurilingual experience.

It is therefore worth remembering that in the clinic, as in the cartel of the pass, "it has become clear, thanks to analytic discourse, that language is not simply communication."⁴ In other words, "the unconscious [...] can only be structured like a language, a language that is always hypothetical with respect to what supports it, namely, *lalangue*⁵."

Thus, experience shows that the plurality of the languages in the ICG is knotted, in a Moebian way, in having *lalangue* as support.

Often the testimonies of the AS begin with an allusion to *lalangue* and to all sorts of enigmatic effects that led the subject in an analysis to reposition himself in front of the Other of language. If we consider that the One incarnated in language is tied to "an accidental encounter between the word and *jouissance*, produced according to the contingencies of the first years of life"⁶, we can therefore agree that for the cartel of the pass "it is not essentially a question of languages but of the *lalangue* of each member. This is the School's strength and it makes of the cartel a particularly sensitive receptor for both the discourse of the *passand* and what passes beyond that discourse⁷." In my opinion, the translation carried out by a member of the ICG takes charge of this aspect.

We see that the doxa is present in the elaborations that are formalized starting from the *dispositif* of the pass. Not infrequently "the *passands* speak in the *lalangue* of that Other that the community as a group constitutes"⁸, which is an effect of structure. Among the people involved in the *dispositif*, as well as in the School community as a whole, there are judgments on the nominations. A vote of confidence is required and necessary for the ICG and the cartels of the pass, since its members are responsible for appointing or not a *passand* as AS. I say "vote", but we know that the members of the ICG are elected through a democratic choice.

In the event of discrepancies regarding the nominations, it is important that the School community devotes itself to work, especially in the cartels, on the crucial issues raised by the pass. The cartels registered in the School do not distinguish between Forum members or School members, and also with non-members. So much the better. We therefore understand the reason that led Lacan to declare the cartel a privileged place for the transmission of psychoanalysis. The cartel summons each *cartelland* to occupy the position of analysand who questions the master-signifiers of psychoanalysis, as shown by the hysteric's discourse.

In addition to the epistemic cartel of the ICG, I had the experience, in the School-Space of the Forum of the Lacanian Field of Salvador (FCLS), of participating in a reading cartel of the text "The Third" (1974), another link between the work of the Forum and the work of the School. In this other cartel I devoted myself to the theme of phallic *jouissance* and the end of analysis,

⁴ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, Encore*, 1972-73, translated by Bruce Fink, London, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996, p. 139.

⁵ *Ibid.* Amended translation.

⁶ C. Soler, *Lacan, The Unconscious Reinvented*, London, Karnac Books, 2014, p. 37.

⁷ S. Schwartz, "Poetry and the Languages of the Pass", *Wunsch*, n.16, February 2017, p. 60.

⁸ C. Soler, "With Regard to the Cartels of the Pass", *Wunsch*, n.16, February 2017, p. 61.

through the examination of the treatment reserved for *lalangue* in the testimonies of the pass published in *Wunsch*.

On some occasions, my texts were written half in Portuguese and half in French, proof of a continuous work of elaboration and perhaps also of lack of time to write them in a single language. But I also attribute this to the fact that, in my early childhood, I received the echoes of *lalangue* in Portuguese and in French, since the maternal Other hummed and told children's stories in these two languages.

The work with the ICG illuminated for me the fact that the sexual non-relation is already inscribed in *lalangue*, for even in word-for-word translations there is always an untranslatable point of real. As Lacan pointed out, the effects of *lalangue* “go well beyond anything the being who speaks is capable of enunciating⁹.” The cartel of the pass must therefore be able to listen to the passes on the basis of the resonances of each subject's relation with his own *lalangue*.

It's a challenge for psychoanalysis and for the cartel of the pass to take the *lalangue* of each subject into account. On this, in “The Third” (1974), Lacan states that “it's *lalangue* by which interpretation occurs, which doesn't prevent the unconscious being structured like a language¹⁰”. And he adds that interpretation “is not interpretation in terms of meaning, but a play of equivocation¹¹.” This fact has all its importance for the direction of the treatment, because, still in the same text, he will say that since the analytic interpretation works on the signifiers “that something is able to drop from the field of the symptom.¹²”

As the intervention of the analyst, interpretation can operate to treat phallic *jouissance* and the *jouissance* of meaning, given that, since there is a coalescence between them in the analysis, they consume the analysand in an infinite search for meaning. In the treatment, interpretation operating by equivocation means that “the symbolic inasmuch as it's *lalangue* that supports it, and that the knowledge inscribed from *lalangue*, which strictly speaking constitutes the unconscious, is elaborated¹³” shows that deciphering returns to the cipher and that the symptom is not reduced to phallic *jouissance*.

In the cartels of the ICG and the School-Space of the FCLS, I found that in some testimonies of the pass, the *passands* spoke of the importance of an equivocal interpretation by the analyst at the end of the treatment. This interpretation opened the space for what remained to be concluded for analysands. Mark of an analytical act that had the effect of a clinical pass and also, in some testimonies, a pass which resulted in a nomination as AS.

The interpretation manages to identify something of *lalangue* and thus lead the analysand to the destitution of any hope for the symbolic reordering of the real of the symptom. Faced with the awakening effect of the interpretation operating by the equivocation characteristic of the lapsus and wit, affirms that “when the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows¹⁴.” And this leads the analysand to take the step towards requesting the pass in the School.

This prompted Lacan to change the position of the symptom in the Borromean knot in the *Seminar RSI* (1975). The symptom is situated there as an overflow of the symbolic, of the letters of *lalangue*, onto the real. To treat the symptom, the interpretation through equivocation does

⁹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, Encore, op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Third [La Troisième]* (1974), trans. by Yolande Szczech, p. 33.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307210365_Lacan%27s_La_Troisieme_English_Translation

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ J. Lacan, “The Preface to the English-Language Edition”, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii.

not aim to feed the sense of the symptom. It has as its objective the *jouissance* of the symptom, thus being able to tame what does not cease to be written of the real. In this way, ground is gained on what “separates the symptom from phallic *jouissance*¹⁵”.

In conclusion, our School is plurilingual and as a result “it is dedicated to cultivating analytic discourse¹⁶”, while taking into account the knowledge inscribed from *lalangue* which properly speaking constitutes the unconscious. This work is effected in plurilingual cartels with members of different Forums, from different countries, who maintain a transfer to the work directed to the School.

Translated by Susanna Ascarelli

Revised by Esther Faye

THE NOT-ALL OF THE CARTEL

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The cartel’s decision must be unanimous. On some occasions, this unanimity is there from the outset: at the end of the interviews with the passers, the cartel as a whole is in accord, there is a nomination or no nomination. In these cases, the cartel has the task of explaining the elements that have led to this or that conclusion, and of extracting the teachings of the Passes that have been listened to, in order eventually to establish the “work of doctrine” to which Lacan impels us.

But sometimes this unanimity is not there at the outset, intuition or subjective certainty therefore no longer suffice, and there has to be a discussion. There is then an intense and interesting work of elaboration amongst all members of the cartel in order to be able to come to a decision.

We know that there is no one criterion to justify a nomination. We find here the principle of the Lacanian logic of the not-all in all its validity, supported by the knowledge about non-knowledge on which psychoanalytic theory is founded and which is at the basis of the whole *dispositif* of the Pass.

So where do we start from in this discussion?

In my opinion, it’s a matter of the following.

The knowledge of psychoanalysis is a particular knowledge which, unlike scientific knowledge, cannot be transmitted.

This is why Lacan tells us that there is no formation of the analyst and that each one has to invent this knowledge each time, with each analysand, at each session. It’s very annoying, he says, but that’s what we have to face and this is the reason it’s not a knowledge that is very coveted.

Scientific knowledge, once invented, is useful to anyone who wants to reproduce it. It is not the same with psychoanalytic knowledge, which is always particular, made out of bits and pieces.

¹⁵ C. Soler, “*La Troisième de Jacques Lacan*”, *op. cit.*, p. 144, *our translation*.

¹⁶ Charter of the IF-SPFLF: <http://www.champlacanian.net/public/docu/2/epPrincipes2020.pdf>

The end of the analysis permits verification of a hole in knowledge. Something has been lost with the intrusion of language and can in no way be approached. This knowledge is lacking, and it is this verification that allows the subject to authorise himself; it is the basis of all possible invention: where there isn't knowledge, it has to be invented. This invention is, of course, private and only serves the person who produced it, it cannot be transmitted, it cannot be used by anyone else. Each one will have to make his own way.

The Pass is Lacan's wager for putting this particular "not knowing" at the service of psychoanalysis itself.

Thus, we have, on one hand, the treatment linked to the transference and its vicissitudes through to its end, the end of the treatment, and on the other hand, the Pass. In the Pass, it's a matter of something else. What is recognised in the Pass is not the treatment of the passand but a knowledge that the analysand has acquired beyond it, a particular knowledge acquired that has nothing to do with the treatment but with transmission. This is what is brought to the Pass, an articulation between the particular of a knowledge, not of a treatment, and a possible transmission.

This transit between, on the one hand, the traversing of the fantasy, symptomatic resolution and the fall of the SSK and what enables the Pass; the AS, analysing the path alone, knows how to transmit something, a version of the real which has nothing to do with the treatment.

This distinction is fundamental, treatment cannot be confused with transmission; it's often what generates a lot of discomfort because it isn't possible to be sure that the treatment has concluded. If one thing is confused with the other – and if in the end the nomination does not happen – it generates uneasiness and frustration.

It's this transmission that the School must generate. Transmission of a knowledge of a saying that is different on a concrete point of the transmission of psychoanalysis, or of a knowledge on the register of the real about the non-knowledge of psychoanalytic theory.

The transmission of both unprecedented knowledge and gaps in knowledge which are revealed in the saying of the passand.

When knowledge is genuinely invented (in its very *rawness*, Lacan tells us), by definition, it cannot be re-recognised.

The School recognises the AMS, "as a psychoanalyst who has proved himself"¹, but it cannot recognise an invented knowledge; this can only be transmitted by the one who produced it. Hence the Lacanian invention of the Pass.

Throughout his teaching, Lacan endeavoured to shape, to identify what cannot be known, to find a means of transmission.

An impossible transmission, let's not forget, but this does not exempt us from trying.

It is the real that's at stake in the formation of a psychoanalyst, and the invention of the *dispositif* of the Pass is Lacan's attempt to respond to this impasse.

Freud's invention of the analytic process was not recognised by the scientific community of his time, it could only be transmitted by him through an arduous work of elaboration intended for those who wanted to hear it. However, for some of these, the invention of the death drive provoked a radical non-recognition, producing a rupture in their own ranks.

¹ J. Lacan, "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis*, n.6, 1995, p. 1.

Lacan's invention of the short session produced his expulsion from the bosom of the IPA and also involved an intense work of elaboration on his part in order to demonstrate that it was neither a whim nor a madness, but a more precise way of being able to capture the real at stake in analytic practice and to get closer to its structure to enable us to make it operational in the practice of each one of us.

All things considered - because I think we have to distinguish between the knowledge invented by individual genius, which is something outside of all psychoanalysis, and the invented knowledge that psychoanalysis can produce as articulation – as I was saying, all things considered, this is what the Pass is, this is why Lacan said that each time he conducted his seminar, he was making the Pass.

In the Pass, it is a question of verifying whether the particular knowledge that the passand has obtained in his analysis can be transmitted in such a way that it can be put at the service of the analytic cause, whether this particular knowledge which serves only the person who has acquired it can, in a certain fashion, serve the whole, and this cannot be done without a work of elaboration.

“Putting the hystorization of analysis to the test²”, Lacan tells us, adding that “this knowledge is not all cut and dried. For it is necessary to invent it.³”

“...to say something about how it happened⁴”, “to shed light on the why and the how...⁵”, explains Colette Soler.

“What it learns (the cartel) is about knowledge and how the passand sets out what he was able to *invent-ory* [...] what he was able to *invent*”, Albert Nguyễn reminds us.

One should not think that this need for verification, to provide proof, should cause the cartel to lose one iota of the freshness or surprise that the encounter should generate in the cartel, which, of course, the cartel must have the capacity to hear. It must be there, and it is up to the passand to produce it so that we can truly talk about transmission.

Because this invented knowledge is the counterpart of the hole in knowledge on which psychoanalytic theory is based, as was said above. This hole in knowledge which radically separates psychoanalysis from science but which does not exempt us from trying to identify it.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

² J. Lacan, “Preface to the English-Language Edition”, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, Norton, 1998, p. ix.

³ J. Lacan, “Italian Note”, trans. Susan Schwartz, *champlacanian.net*, p. 4.

⁴ C. Soler “L'offre de la passe”, *Wunsch*, n.7, November 2007, p. 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ A. Nguyễn “La passe, sinon rien”, *Champ Lacanien, Revue de psychanalyse*, n.4, Paris, November 2006, p. 145.

DISPOSITIF OF THE PASS AND THE HEALTH CRISIS

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The experience of work of the 2018-2020 ICG, affected as it was by the health crisis of COVID-19, was unusual in more than one respect: the suspension of the cartels of the Pass, cancellation of the International Rencontre of the School of Buenos Aires in July 2020, setting up meetings by videoconference in a systematic way. Perhaps it's only the rhythm of the work of permanent cartels that has not been affected. In what can only be called an upheaval, it is the decision to suspend the cartels of the Pass and the registration of demands for the Pass that has raised the most questions, both within the ICG and in our School community. Many of these were able to be addressed, notably during the Symposium on the Pass, held by videoconference on the afternoon of 5 September 2020. This meeting made it possible to examine a large number of points concerning the modalities and organisation of the guarantee the School aims to provide, including the suspensions already mentioned - at that time, this concerned ten Passes. In light of the complete uncertainty about the future of the health crisis, the question arose with some urgency about how long it was possible to wait, given that some passands had made their testimony almost nine months earlier.

The Pass by video-conference?

All this was not without recalling for each member of the ICG his responsibility with regard to the School; and gradually the necessity for, and indeed the interest in, the Passes that were in process being finalised by videoconference became clear to a majority of us. One of the challenges then was how to bring this experience-to-come within a reflection that would allow us to confirm its interest from an analytic point of view, without doubt the only one able to extract diverse representations and impressions. But what does it encompass, this analytic interest in video-conference modalities concerning the Pass – the testimony of the passand, listening to the passers, the deliberation of the cartel members? How to evaluate it? With what criteria? If it seemed clear enough that all of these steps, once the agreement of the people concerned had been obtained, were perfectly feasible via digital technology, what about the effects on each of the actors, and ultimately on the cartel's decision for each of the Passes listened to? At a time when these new necessities were becoming apparent on the ICG, there was uncertainty about coming up with a response that would win everyone's support. As we can see, what Lacan wished for the Pass remained fully relevant, that is, the fact that we had to go through “[...] a cumulation of experience, its compilation and elaboration, an ordering of its varieties, a notation of its degrees¹.” While this was a regular task within the School, this particular one would involve a hitherto unprecedented, or almost unprecedented, reflective component, as we will see.

The rest of my talk aims to lay out some perspectives, most certainly partial since not sufficiently developed, and without taking account of a knowledge still to be produced on the questions raised by the Pass. It will be apparent that they are inscribed in the probably inevitable necessity of returning to the definition of fundamental aspects of our experience of the Pass, well known to all of us. They take up two points which, when thinking about such a new experience, are

¹ J. Lacan, “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* N. 6, 1995, p. 10

necessary to specify. In fact they outline, with regard to the experience of the School, the room for manoeuvre to be included in work for the long-term.

On one hand, the very nature of the *dispositif* of the Pass, that of the cartel's work and its modalities, suspends any possible evaluation, if we think that an evaluation is based on observable, measurable indicators which must be standardised, that is to say, that can be understood by all in the same way. The absence of such indicators is not a defect. It complies with a real which concerns the desire at stake, here that of the analyst. As such, it is inaccessible to evaluation and moreover it is not, logically, the purpose of the cartel of the Pass to evaluate it. Colette Soler maintains on this point that in the Pass, "All that can be evaluated are the advances that one supposes have created the conditions of possibility for the passage to the desire of the psychoanalyst and to the analytic act²." It is therefore a matter of knowing whether the essential of the advances to be picked up can pass over in videoconferencing as well as they can in person. This should be verified by the sole fact that the cartel is able to make a decision concerning the nomination of the passand.

On the other hand, to implement an experience of the Pass via digital means, and to take it through to the end of the process, certainly with the responsibility of discussing it amongst ourselves, of transmitting it to the future ICG, and to others, etc., amounts to installing it as a modality that has become possible at the EPFCL. Not by force, but because the cartel's decision cannot be called into question without the *raison d'être* of the Pass - a *raison* which rests on the desire of those who engage in it - being called into question at the same time. What's at stake here is not the authority of the ICG and the cartel, but the very nature of its work. It is not the result of a standardised approach for which a series of boxes have to be ticked - and one can see that if one or more boxes could not be ticked, it would be easy to say that the videoconferencing arrangements make the experience impossible. The work of the cartel is quite different, and to use Lacan's expression in his seminar on the act, let's remember that it is the *fruit of the act*; it's what is gathered as a whole from the steps taken by each of the members of the cartel at the moment of making a decision. Thus the experiment initiated and finalised by the ICG in this autumn 2020 ends up ratifying a variation of the implementation of the Pass. From then on, the question is of knowing whether this implementation affects the dynamic of work within the School, and more precisely the transference to work that drives this dynamic - a perspective that will require a much greater degree of retrospection than the ten Passes involved in this first phase allows us.

The Symposium on the Pass

But let's return to this important moment of the debate held during the Symposium on 5 September 2020. First of all, it is in this period in the life of the School that the questions raised in the ICG were resolved sufficiently that a decision could be made to begin the finalisation of the current Passes by videoconference³. This decision was accompanied by another: to receive new demands for Passes only after this first series and a period of discussion on the subject by all members of the ICG, who would soon be handing over to the ICG 2020-2022. It seemed necessary, in fact, to reaffirm to our whole community the terms of a function of the School,

² C. Soler, "La passe réinventée", *Mensuel*, n.54, Intervention at the seminar of the School, EPFCL-France, Paris, 6 May 2010.

³ Eight Passes were involved. The cartels of the pass listened to the passers by videoconference for all these Passes. The passers had met the passands in person, except for two Passes: one for which the testimony was given by videoconference and in person, and another for which the testimony was given entirely by videoconference.

that of its International College of the Guarantee, which must be able to maintain a rhythm of work that allows, even in this period of crisis, *a time for understanding*.

After the opening of the Symposium, and the interventions of four colleagues from the ICG whose aim was to problematise the issues of the moment, what was said during the debate on the issue at hand? Many important things, even if this may have been accompanied by the affirmation of an urgency to act which was sometimes difficult not to identify with a certain precipitousness. If there was an urgency, the essential one, and undoubtedly the most widely shared, was that the School maintain its function of supporting the place of psychoanalysis in the social bond and that of its ethics. But the suspension of the Pass, its function of guarantee, as well as its inducements for work within the School, constituted in this respect a stopping point that could not be tolerated for very long, at the risk of affecting the coherence of the School. All the more so as it seemed to many that working by videoconference was entirely compatible with the expectations of the *dispositif* of the Pass; that, in reflecting on it, there was no argument against it; that instead of suspending the *dispositif*, it would be a matter of experimenting with it in this new context and then drawing all the conclusions; even if, as was also stressed, it might be difficult to go back. As well, the Symposium was an opportunity for everyone to know that testimonies on-line had already taken place for two passands – with the agreement of the ICG. Whether in mixed modalities or only at a distance, they have been experienced in a satisfying manner.

There was also a number of interventions that could be said to have a common denominator: that of reminding everyone of the duty imposed on the School to support a full inscription of psychoanalysis in its time – communicating, networking, etc. In this respect, might not the difficulties encountered in doing so be a matter of generational differences, particularly between passands/passers and members of the ICG? And then, as some people argued, it is also possibly our era which is to be questioned here, particularly in its excesses in the use of the virtual. The debate was lively, driven by an undeniable, and often convincing, desire for our School and its future.

A loss?

And so, in order to deepen the reflection, how do we respond to the question often posed in these terms: with regard to the Pass made in person, what might be lost through making it at a distance? The formulation of this question is based on the idea that the encounter in the presence of passand and passers, and then in that of passers and members of the cartel of the Pass, has effects that favour that experience. From that point of view, the encounter, via videoconference, would be marked by a loss, a lack, affecting the *dispositif* itself. Of course it is true that what happens between people in the room isn't the same, the encounter is different, there's less closeness, less intimacy, even less pleasure in the shared moment - and that is a lot less. But does this difference ultimately concern the work of the Pass itself? Does the fact of giving a testimony and receiving it, the fact that the cartel listens to it, the fact that it deliberates, stem from the physical proximity of the protagonists, or even from the pleasure they have, one and all, in meeting each other in person?

The arguments brought to bear on this question are often, and implicitly, constructed by taking as a reference point the situation of treatment and the encounter of bodies that takes place there. On this point, the outcomes of work carried out under the constraints that the pandemic has imposed on analysts should contribute to the debate.⁴ They should allow us to restore to its

⁴ Cf. for example, C. Soler, "Le corps à nouveau en question", Lecture given on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Forum of Medellin, Colombia, 26 September 2020, <http://forolacanmed.com>

right place this issue of the analyst's presence, which Lacan did in addressing the audience of his seminar in terms that are interesting to recall: “Am I, am I present when I am speaking to you? It's necessary that the thing I'm addressing you about should be there. Now, it is enough to say that the thing (*la chose*) can only be written as *l'a chose* as I have just written it on the board, which means that it is absent there where it holds its place⁵”. But that said, and to get to the point, it is difficult to maintain that the passand's testimony to the two passers, and the cartel's listening to the passers, are ordered like the sequences of analysis. Everything suggests that these two stages are not part of the discourse of the analyst, even if they eminently concern the analysis of one and resonate in those of the others. Perhaps it's possible to confirm this by taking into account the transferential dimension at stake here.

From the point of view of the cartel of the Pass, if there is transference, let's agree that it's the one that Lacan named, admittedly without developing it, “transference to the work⁶”. In these terms, it's a matter of the orientation of the desire of a subject (whether a passand, a passer, or a member of the cartel) and the concrete means with which he tries to hold it, which becomes apparent at the moment when psychoanalysis counts for him beyond his own treatment, and even *more* than it; which amounts to saying that what counts is what psychoanalysis is, its place in the world, as a social bond, with all its ethical, political, and clinical consequences. The term “work” clearly states what the stakes are: this transference is not a matter of affects, of sending each person back to the task of thinking about psychoanalysis despite, or beyond, the *horror of knowing* approached at the end of the process. It's a transference separate from the subject supposed to know, very different in this respect from the one who operates in the treatment. On this point, it could be countered that some of the actors are still in analysis - the passers very often are - and that this must be taken into account. In fact, there are testimonies which maintain that having been a passer, and having been able to experience an encounter in the presence of the passand has changed the course of the analysis. But this is undoubtedly more to be seen as a contingency of the *dispositif* of the Pass than as an aim. Moreover, there is nothing to say that a similar effect could not occur in videoconferencing.

We recall that Lacan maintains, with regard to the concept of the unconscious, that he was unable to “separate (it) from the presence of the analyst⁷”. And he specifies that “The presence of the analyst is itself a manifestation of the unconscious⁸”, which obviously has great importance in orienting and supporting the work of the analysand in the sense of deciphering a knowledge supposed, and principally without doubt at the time of the beginning of the work – which in its logical dimension can present itself several times in a treatment. It is not the same, as is well understood, for the experience in the cartel of the Pass, which bases its action on the possibility of locating, from the words of the passers, the mark of the passage to the desire of the analyst realised by the passand. So, what about the place reserved for the encounter of bodies and the related affects? Not the same as in the treatment, that is, a place of secondary importance and probably without effect on the process of the Pass itself.

“It's very annoying...”

There would be other hypotheses to make, other points to examine, certainly. In the meantime, even if *we* won't be satisfied, the satisfaction gathered from the mouths of passands, from those

⁵ J. Lacan, *Seminar XVIII, On a discourse that might not be a semblance*, (trans. C. Gallagher), lesson 5, 10/3/71.

⁶ J. Lacan, “Acte de Fondation”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 236 (trans. C. Gallagher in “Adjunct to Founding Act” p. 3 <http://lacaninireland.com>)

⁷ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, Norton, 1998, p. 125.

⁸ *Ibid.*

of the passers on the occasion of the cartels in November and December 2020, the decisions taken by the cartels – which it should be noted were taken without any particular impediment attributable to the use of videoconferencing – all this therefore, as echo of the experience, is a positive sign which suggests that this different *dispositif* will facilitate the work we want for the School and psychoanalysis. But why not be satisfied... with this satisfaction? First of all because, as I said, everything leads us to believe that it is second best. But perhaps also because that satisfaction could be even greater if these Passes had been carried out entirely in person, an assumption which was shared between us, many of us saying that we prefer a collective experience to be shared in this way. With regard to the dynamics of the transference to the work of the School, this will certainly be something to take into consideration. This could lead the ICG to do its utmost to give priority to the *dispositif* in person once the health crisis is over - before new constraints, more ecological ones, such as the carbon footprint, or even economic ones, are imposed on us...

In thinking about this work and the responsibilities of the ICG in this context that is so unusual, it seems to me that it is arguable that this experience of the Pass conducted at a distance – or in a mixed manner – has been constructed for everyone in the logic of a forced choice. Being of this nature, it will result in a loss. It is now a question of ascertaining whether this loss concerns something other than the efficacy of the *dispositif* of the Pass. In addition, because in this there is a certain discomfort to be endured, these words of Lacan, spoken in 1979 at the conclusion of the EFP Congress devoted to the transmission of psychoanalysis, an occasion for him to maintain that it is in-transmissible: “It is quite annoying that every psychoanalyst is forced – for it must be that he is forced – to reinvent psychoanalysis. If I said in Lille that the Pass had disappointed me, it is for this, for the fact that each psychoanalyst has to reinvent, according to what he has managed to take away from having been a psychoanalyst for a time, that each analyst has to reinvent the way in which psychoanalysis can go on⁹.”

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

WHAT TRANSMISSION? FROM “FATHER-FORMED” TO PERFORMANCE

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The father’s muddle

Anyone who has been able to listen to Passes does not fail to notice that the function of the father comes out of a muddle, a fog that analysis often dispels only poorly: the result of “stembrouille” (this muddle) is the installation of a neurosis illustrated by the transference modality and whose output is not always explicit.

In the course of his seminars, Lacan made the function of the father evolve, parallel to the function of the Other, up to the point of making of it a symptom. As we know, this is the passage from the Name-of-the-father to the “Wandering-Non-dupes”. The consequences which Lacan drew from this have revealed the knowledge without a subject and, in the Preface,

⁹ J. Lacan, “9e Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris sur *La transmission*”, *Lettres de l’École*, 1979, n.25, vol. II, p. 219-220.

they brought on a final end to meaning with “the esp of a laps”... which no longer carries any meaning, a door which is then opened onto the “*One knows*” [*on le sait, soi*]. This muddle, tossed off!

So, the ensuing question could be formulated as follows: since this “*One knows*” does not amount to a “So be it”, what is to be done with it? Doing comes from saying, and as in the Pass, this saying can sometimes be heard, be read since the cartel is indeed a cartel of reading; in what is heard, a particular attention is paid to what is real, the effects of which have to be read, to be interpreted under the terms: “That one might be saying”... is not forgotten, it is precisely in that regard that the cartel has a task to fulfill.

What does experience show? Could I say that it “*de-self*”, that it operates this passage from the “self” to the other members of the cartel or would I rather say that it *de-çoit* (disappoints), by not letting the saying pass? What about the real, sex, love when testimony rather states the construction of an history, a historical articulation. What about the consequences of this logical ordering of crucial moments?

Does the School participate in this disappointment? In the School, epistemic, theoretical developments occupy a central place, a place where everyone tries to pass on what he grasps from the different deciphered Lacan’s. Would there be a discrepancy between what is read and what the cures exposed in the Pass refer to?

In his time, Lacan uttered the failure of the Pass. What did he mean by this obvious fact? Not so much a questioning of the modalities of the procedure as the lack of an elaboration on the part of those he expected to produce such an elaboration, those he expected to bring up some elements on the passage from the analysing to the analyst: in vain.

Where did this silence come from? Forty years later, has this hole been at least partially filled on the precise point of the passage to the analyst?

The passage to the analyst, the analyst’s desire, the analytical act, are so many sharp points which most often remain in the shadow of the testimonies. Let’s not generalize, the rare nominations of the AE are still a sign that it happens, that “it passes”, even if a nomination cannot presage what an analyst will be in his practice. Since the scarcity of nominations cannot be attributed solely to the “deafness” of cartels, there remains the problem of the testimonies that do not carry the conviction.

Lacan always supported and wrote about the Pass: he proposed it in order to catch this moment of passage, we could say this instant, this flash, this switch that makes it possible for someone to occupy his place in the analytical discourse. It is this passage that remains hidden in many testimonies, and yet it is from this point that the end of an analysis can be deduced. That is why, beyond the fall of the subject supposed to know, the separation from the analyst should enlighten the testimony of those who present “their pass”.

The end of an analysis does not consist in the development of a philosophy of life, it allows one to enter into the field of an “annoying knowledge” which nevertheless determines what each one can do into the rest of his life: not so much widen a knowing as consent to the void from which this knowledge emerges. Once the place is open to this acquisition of analytical knowledge, as Celan says in his beautiful poem, there remaining joy... and the duty to dig, dig, dig, not without taking the measure (we should say “be the measure”) of the fact that no digging is identical to another: the unexpected, the surprise, the blunder which are always at the “rendezvous” modify the self in the encounter with the Other as the Other always Other.

There is always something to be done when the step is crossed from “one’s own” analysis, from “self-analysis”, to psychoanalysis.

Self-analysis ends with such a “*One knows*” which is not an «I know it myself», as there is knowledge without subject (the scandal of analysis), the transition to psychoanalysis as an inaugural experience does not occur without a “de-self”. Should we recall in this place the barred subject? If the dimension of a singularity is met with the upheavals that it generates, it is from leaving behind the “as for oneself”, which is why I say “de-self”, that the relationship to what psychoanalysis is, what the unconscious is, begins to be developed – a new relationship which is no longer that of one’s entry into analysis, but one of which has made of psychoanalysis a cause, the cause which therefore orients and determines the life of an analyst (who can then strive to transmit).

Building on what one’s analysis has revealed for oneself and going, via de-self, towards the Other $S(A)$, creates the possibility – and only the possibility – by contingency, of reinventing psychoanalysis in each cure, in an echo of Lacan’s “constantly restarting the Pass”.

To re-invent is each time to tell about an encounter with a new path, a new case, a new end of the experience... and a new relationship to the unconscious whose real dimension has been touched.

In the permanent cartel, I have had the opportunity to raise the question of the discrepancy between the testimony of the passeurs who make the effort to transmit as accurately as possible what the passant tells them and the knowledge established from the teaching of Lacan; is the experience of the Pass being used to show a subjective history is consistent with the developments of Lacan? That it is compatible with the epistemic advances of the School? Would it be a verification of the validity of this teaching?

Hasn’t the Lacanian developments on language, and on “lalangue” made the logical unfolding of a cure fade into the background at the same time as the effects of lalangue (materialism) are to be assessed at the level of the sinthome?

The performance of the Pass

An analysis is a speech experience, as we keep repeating. But it is still necessary to distinguish several states of this “speak”, including the “speaking to” and the “speaking of” in the neurosis continuity, and the “speak in order to speak”, opening up to free association. Once free, it opens the door to the end of one’s experience and especially to the emergence of the knowledge without a subject.

The work of Barbara Cassin on Austin’s speech-act has shed light on this dimension of speech; she opens access to the word-thing, and if she doesn’t say it herself, psychoanalysis highlights the following fact: when it comes to its end, an analysis touches this precise point: if, at first, the word kills the thing, in psychoanalysis a word resonates into the body - a word that has determined an unknown knowledge of the subject, which resonates through the intermediary of the body. From now on, this word can be heard differently: the “parlêtre” can re-name this word-thing that becomes incarnate. The “new” word connects to jouissance, it evokes the trait that initially erased the subject, in order to make reappear the operation which indexes the real unconscious.

Such a passage through the body is essential: incarnation (it’s necessary to remember that Lacan advanced castration as embodied and not just formalized in his Seminar on the Act of the psychoanalyst). The incarnation of the word-thing, word-jouissance definitely separates the subject from the Other. This speaking, this saying is a doing in the sense that Lacan gave to it: the knot must be done. Such is the performance that psychoanalysis carries out. The shift from

father-formed [*père-formé*] to performance, which an analysis constitutes, but just as much as the experience of the Pass, thus point to a transmission, the transmission of psychoanalysis.

We can indeed think that the Pass is the operation initiated by a *parlêtre* animated by a desire to transmit, with the concern to “pass” on the transformation that separated him/her from the parental imbroglio (the Other) to open access to the “Without-Other” but not-without the *jouissance* which has marked the body: passage to the possible blunder.

In 77-78, Lacan points out the inevitable tendency to a relatedness in what the analysants say, even though to finish an analysis it’s necessary to find out the solution that has been invented to undo the knot of the neurosis... and the transference neurosis as well. Because in the end, even if being able to elucidate the family coordinates which produced a neurosis a good is a step, and even if it is possible to separate from them, the solution of the transfer remains to be found: separation from the analyst and the shift towards psychoanalysis.

Can we not expect of a Pass that it shows how it is possible to discover the singularity that the cartel must be able to hear (it presupposes the rigorous work of an analysant elaborating on his own cure). The singularity of a passage to unlike any other, a solution detached from the self.

This is the express condition that allows us to question what is this knowledge that we call unconscious, this knowledge which is not historical at all and whose characteristic of being hollowed relegates and displaces the self towards the interrogation: *qu’Œ-ce?* (what’s?)

This resonance “kes” (in french) can make the experience of the Pass a unique experience, and the vector of a «*dire-rection*» (saying-direction) to be preserved so that the event of the saying becomes connoted with the “without mistakes” [*sans bavures*] that Lacan advances in the *Wandering-Non-dupes*. Irrefutable! and a way of avoiding bad habits in the more or less convoluted constructions that point to the opportunity or even the need to continue an analysis.

At the level of the School, Lacan’s question on the “mismatched and scattered” [*les éparés des assortis*] can be elaborated and treated in relation to the passage from the self to the de-self which can then be written, knotted: from the de-self to “the selves”. One knows for sure that there is a knowledge without a subject, that knowledge answers the impossible, “there is no sexual relation” and there will never be sexual relation (we must insist on the “never” as much as neurosis is able to invent the detours that escape structure).

On this point we could hear a testimony indicating that there is a recurrent difficulty there. Yet Lacan insisted heavily: the sexual relationship can never be written (whatever the most modern attempts of objecting to it): undoubtedly an analysis shows to an analysant how he had responded to this through his symptom and fantasy. No doubt this discovery has probably had a positive effect on the *jouissance* which they concealed, but what about the very difference that the real thus establishes in every relationship? The 2 of the couple is no better than the parental 2, and there is no access to this 2 without first passing through the 3 of the real. This is the 3 of a difference – of absolute difference says Lacan.

In an analysis, is there not the risk of continuing to «*feed*» the couple, of passing from the parental couple to the analysand-analyst couple, while it is a matter of undoing the knot of the couples which multiplies the fantasmatic activity tenfold, in order to make way for the 3 of the non-relationship?

What effects on the relationship? That’s what a cartel might want to hear, whether it be about love or sex in testimonies. The 2 of the couple is actually a triple affair (passage from love to *amour*). This passage through the 3 of the real would attest to the effectiveness of an analysis, the analysand producing a saying supported by what the analysis had written (or the writing which it had highlighted) and which led to a subjective mutation, which the reduction of

jouissance to the letter of the sinthome testifies to? It must be possible to extract the evidence of a saying as the signature of an end of analysis.

Accepting singularities is a choice. The choice can be made according to the mode of an identification (at the price of levelling out differences and it is then a reduction of psychoanalysis to the rank of the right mindedness, an orthodoxy of thought) or according to the mode of the inter-sinthomatic, preserving the place of the real by posing as Lacan does in 1978 that there is a sinthome “he” and a sinthome “she”, which differ. The operation is then written (1+1+between): in the first case (identification), the hierarchy is imposed, in the second, (that of the between): the gradus is what governs.

It remains sensitive that the question of transmission, which ties in with the selection of analysts through the Pass, which Lacan said was the first step towards a new mode of recruitment, falls within the elaboration of the passage, of the encounter of the singularity in its relation to the community: how to make live the mismatching and incomplete set? Is this how we could hear the “d’Écoler” of Lacan? To un-glué” [*décoller*] in order to make the School.

Translated by the author

Revised by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

ZOOM ON THE PASS, PLURILINGUALISM AND THE UNTRANSLATED

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In *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan defines the unconscious as a “lost cause¹” because its essence is to be evanescent. The *dispositif* of the Pass is his response for dealing with this effect. One only has to read his “Italian Note” to be convinced of this. He advises those who would be tempted to authorise themselves as analyst not to go down this path if they do not have “the time to contribute to knowledge, otherwise there is no chance that analysis will continue to rise in the market²”. The Pass is Lacan’s response to the lost cause of the unconscious to the extent that, as he puts it in his address on transmission, it responds to the necessity “that each analyst reinvent the way in which psychoanalysis can endure³”. These are the objectives of the Pass: to contribute to knowledge, to reinvent psychoanalysis so that it continues to rise in the market.

His expectations are very clear in this same speech: “I must say that in the Pass, nothing shows that the subject knows how to cure a neurosis. I’m still waiting for something to shed some light on this⁴.” Contributing to knowledge and reinventing psychoanalysis passes by way of the knowledge acquired through one’s own analysis about how to cure a neurosis. It seems that this emphasis sometimes get lost in the reasons that push towards the Pass. Too often, the *passand* presents himself for the *dispositif* of the Pass in order to validate his analytic path and its

¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1998, p. 128.

² J. Lacan, “Italian Note”, trans. Susan Schwartz, at champlacmien.net

³ J. Lacan, “9e Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris sur *La transmission*”, *Lettres de l’École*, 1979, n° 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*

conclusion, less to try and bear witness to the knowledge acquired on how to cure a neurosis, which is fundamental if we want psychoanalysis to go on existing.

My recent experience on the ICG has led me to appreciate how much the *dispositif* of the Pass is a response to an urgency. There is a constant urgency in the face of oblivion. The health circumstances that we know about at the moment have only reinforced this aspect. This is what the Symposium on the Pass of 5 September 2020 was tackling when it chose as its title “The functioning of the Pass in the current conditions”, that is to say, without the presence of bodies.

Two opposing and well-argued positions were laid out. On one side, the position that the absence of bodies is an obstacle, in this case the absence of the bodies of the passers and those of the cartel members. On the other side, the position is that we have to go ahead at all costs. One of the reasons for the “have to go ahead” lies in the observation that analyses by phone were able to work during the lockdown and, on the other hand, I also believe, because it seems impossible to do otherwise, that we are in the “whorl⁵” of our time. It may be that the pandemic is suddenly over, making travel possible again, but this wouldn’t take account of the changes arising from the financial and ecological crises. My view is that our travel from one continent to another, even from one country to another, will become less frequent. The debate at the Symposium led our ICG, after consultation, to conclude that we must indeed “go ahead”. So we made the choice to listen to passers who had been waiting to testify, for months for the most part. I would like to explain this choice, which I am sharing for specific reasons.

The formula “*L’inconscient, ça parle*” [“*the unconscious, it speaks*”], which is found throughout Lacan’s teaching, seems to reduce the scope of what can be grasped to the single means of speech, thus eliminating the importance that one would like to give to the presence of bodies. And yet the notion of speaking-being, which re-doubles that of subject, brings the body back into the question.

This is an opportunity to recall what Lacan was able to bring to bear on the Cartesian dualism of body and mind through revolutionising his own concepts, starting from the seminar *Encore*. There, he maintains that “the signifier is situated at the level of the jouissance substance⁶” since it is the “cause of jouissance⁷”. He continues along this line in the seminar *Les non-dupes errent*, by speaking of the body that “enjoys itself” because it is “jouissance substance⁸”. Without denying the idea that the body and the subject (the subject by definition being only supposed), belong to two different registers, he introduces a knot through jouissance tied to speech. We don’t stop emphasising this, that knots come under writing. What is written in a treatment, at its end, is writing which is not made from the sexual relation. Or the saying that there is “something of the one”.

With regard to interpretation according to Freud, Lacan says the following during an interview in 1973: “What he replaces with interpretation is, I would say, of the order of translation, and translation, everyone knows what it is, [...] it’s always a reduction and there’s always a loss in translation; and indeed, this is what it’s about, that one loses; what we’re touching on here, isn’t it, is that this loss is the real itself of the unconscious, the real, in a nutshell. The real for the

⁵ J. Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2006, p. 264.

⁶ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, Encore*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., p. 24

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Les Non-dupes Errent*, lesson of 12/03/1974, trans. Cormac Gallagher, www.lacaninireland.com

speaking being is that it is lost somewhere, and where? It's there that Freud put his emphasis, it is lost in the sexual relation⁹."

The real of the unconscious is what of unconscious thoughts cannot be translated, every translation produces a loss. This loss is what the real unconscious consists of, which in the last instance is the result of the sexual relation, impossible to write as has never ceased being hammered since the seminar *Encore*. It is this real which serves as a compass in the orientation of the Lacanian treatment in our field.

I'll end with a concrete example based on Elisabete Thamer's intervention during the Study Day organised by the EPFCL-France on 12 September 2020 (once again by zoom) on "The effects of the Pass on the School, as seen by the AS". She argued for the role of plurilingualism in the cartels of the Pass, proposing that the effort of translation that is demanded of those in the cartel who do not speak the language of the passer helps to detach from the "saids" of the passer and from the account of the testimony of the passand, which can often lead to effects of fascination.

This explanation clarified for me an experience I had in a cartel of the Pass that concluded with the nomination of an AS. I did not know how to explain the reasons for my impression – as clear-cut as it was disturbing – that there was something from the end of the first passer's testimony, something puzzling. It seemed the more enigmatic to me because, of all the cartel members, I was the least familiar with the language of the passer. My linguistic incompetence led the other members of the cartel to try and translate in order to help me follow as soon as I lost my footing. Sometimes, one person's translation was complemented or contradicted by the version of another, and this gave rise to a mini debate. To extend Elisabete Thamer's thesis, I would say, in retrospect, that the effort to understand, on the part of one who does not have mastery of the language of the passer, allows a distance from what it's a question of hearing, which is the untranslatable of the unconscious. To understand is not to hear. This is undoubtedly the reason why Lacan introduced the passer, between the passand and the cartel of the Pass, to create a screen! The shaping of the passand's narrative by the passer already includes a virtual dimension. The necessity to translate, in order to help a member of the cartel in linguistic difficulty to hear what he does not understand, makes it possible to free oneself from the fascinating effect of the saids of the passer, especially when the latter has tried to give it a structured, convincing form, not to say doctrinal. For what must attest to the approach of the real unconscious touches on jouissance outside sense, and this is neither history nor the words actually said that can testify to it, but precisely the saying, what escapes it and what is perfectly there and responds to the "untranslated" of the unconscious. However this central dimension, the untranslated of the unconscious, or that which escapes comprehension, no longer has anything to do with the presence of bodies. Lacan said it repeatedly, from the beginning of his teaching to the end, the body always exerts a fascination. A body is no less likely to fascinate than a narrative, whether it is that of a life, a treatment or a vocation, it doesn't matter, just as the way in which this narrative is recounted can exert a charm on those who listen to it. All by itself, a body already tells a whole story. That the body of the passand is not present works against the effects of fascination, which inevitably engender effects of understanding. It is the presence of the passand that acts as a screen for fascination, to which we can add the plurilingual character of the cartels of the Pass. In this context, the presence of a computer screen is no longer a real obstacle.

Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, one might then ask whether the presence of the passer might not be another obstacle to get rid of. I mentioned the fact that a passer may be

⁹ J. Lacan, "Interview on *France Culture*", July 1973, on the occasion of the 28th International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Paris", published by *Le coq-Héron*, n°46-47, Paris, 1974 (version on Patrick Valas' website)

tempted to give a constructed and therefore more seductive account of the testimony collected. Following this logic, one might say that it would be better to eliminate any kind of encounter with the passers and deal only with a written document. A written testimony demands to be read, but it is not the purpose of the cartel of the Pass to read, on the contrary. Indeed, the path of the cartel's work goes from what is understood, i.e. recognised, towards what remains untranslated, i.e. no longer to be read. There, for sure, a body is needed to experience it, the body of a cartel.

I'll finish with another experience, two sessions of the cartel of the Pass which were held by zoom. In these cases, the presence of the bodies of cartel members was lacking, without this preventing the cartel from functioning. The situation seemed to me not so comfortable since I was once again confronted with the same problem of language: (it should be noted that there is a certain hegemony of the Spanish language in the ICG!) However, the body of the cartel was not lacking completely since the secretaries of the ICG suggested, for this unique assignment by zoom, that the cartels of the Pass be constituted by the permanent cartels of the current ICG, so for almost two years. This proposal, which won the unanimous support of the members of the ICG, made it possible to hear six of the eight Passes that were pending. This was a good idea and much appreciated, in that it compensated for the absence of the *bodies* of the cartel members and made room for the presence of the *body* of the cartel.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

WHAT KNOTTING, WHAT SAYING?

Vicky Estevez
Paris, France

Like the cure and like the Pass, a School is written with the Real.

It slips out because we don't know what this writing is made of, "this writing that is said in the Real...who does not trace the signifier"¹.

It is a knowledge that is an effect of language, made of pieces, pieces of...of many things, of silence first, of rhythms, of bribes of sentences, of words, of bribes of words, even of words made of words stuck and/or cut in an incongruous way, all of this seized in the body and the language of those subjects that are part of this School.

All of this circulates. The real of the cures and what they teach. What each analysand, what each analyst, one by one, inscribes on it.

Cartels, seminars, writings...something of a saying is woven in the not-known² of everyone which has effects. A resonance. Sometimes, effects of transmission. Sometimes.

Founding a School

¹ J. Lacan, "Lituraterre", *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p.17, trans. Jack W. Stone, available online: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d52d51fc078720001362276/t/5e7f56cfe8e5be5d58a32e5d/1585403600056/19710101+Lacan+Lituraterre+Stone.pdf>

² Translator's note: *Insu* in French

Daring to do it.

Under its own name³.

And then there is also the real of the doing with others, with others so different, others so distant, others so bewildering.

The wager of a desire, the wager of a trust⁴. The real that is being written in a school of psychoanalysis is an *appensée*⁵, that saying of the psychoanalysis that walks the path, “that amounts to falling in with the step by which the question is produced⁶”, a saying at the present tense, always at the present tense.

A saying that only clings to a knowledge in action. The *appensée* can't be anticipated, because it in itself does not follow anything.

This is quite an improbable space-time. And yet... An orienting thread of your own. As we say, “One knows⁷”.

The psychoanalysis, you do it yourself, you've done it yourself and made it yours.

It knows.

It is underneath.

In a School, I can hope that we trust the “it knows” as a hole, more than the knowledge as a *semblant*.

And through the opening of the object *a* made by the *dispositif* of the Pass at the center of this School, even more.

When it knows, one can hear it, it's here, that's it, knows it.

A separate knowledge, without Other.

This is where there may be an encounter.

Rarely.

An impossible from the beginning? Undoubtedly. The impossible is written. The relation which does not cease not to be written.

And something of the possible? Yes, some possible that sometimes, through contingency, ceases not to be written.

³ Just like the cartel: “The cartel, with its particular structure, was elaborated by Jacques Lacan as a tool of work that links individual production and collective work, and which wagers on desire, a desire for work that engages the responsibility of each person in the collective elaboration of knowledge, even if it remains singular”. EPFCL-France website: <https://www.champlacanianfrance.net/node/119>

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Cf. “These are a few observations that I wanted to tell you for this last session. One ponders *contra* a signifier. This is the meaning that I have given to the word *l'appensée*, appondering. One props oneself *contra* to a signifier in order to think.” Lacan, J. 1976. “Seminar of 11 May 1976” in J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016, p. 134. For a further discussion, please go to this website: <https://www.acheronta.org/acheronta19/zentner.htm>

⁶ J. Lacan, “Lituraterre”, 1971, translated by Beatrice Khiara-Foxton & Adrian Price, Hurly-Burly, Issue 9, May 2013, p. 29-38.

⁷ J. Lacan, 1998 “Preface”, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. A. Sheridan., New York, WW Norton & Company, 1998, p. vii.

What conditions can support the conditions of this contingency of the – sometimes – possible?

A School, a wager.

Support with some others, with little pieces of possible being invented, with the “it stumbles”, the “it fails”, on the edge, so fragile...

Because this is the place where something new, alive, arises.

Count on the Unconscious, the real Unconscious, count on the cut, the space of a lapsus⁸, the living.

Isn't this what our analyses, guided by Lacan, teach us?

...Crossing-out of no trace that is prior⁹.

One might believe that one leaves the trace of a word from before, from Lacan, for example.

But each time one comments/says/writes some Lacan, that is not Lacan; eventually one can even un-write Lacan, and even *post-efface* it¹⁰?

No choice: the writing of the trace has to be continued, not without Freud, not without Lacan, but at every turn, it won't ever be quite the same. Each time, it is something of the only-ONE.

Crossing-out of no trace that is prior, of the erasure of the stroke whom we only see the crossing-out.

Yet the crossing-out is not the trace of the erased stroke but the trace of the subject. When Lacan says *the signifier represents the subject for another signifier*, the subject has vanished before it could appear. The trace, the movement, the letter. This literal...¹¹

“To produce the erasure is reproducing this half without complement of which the subject subsists [...] Just produce the erasure, the final one...”¹²

This radical breath, this living will be materialized in the stroke.

The more the saying digs around the object, the more the subject is effaced – Lacan says the “*effaçon*¹³” –, and the more this saying arises as singular. Isn't this what an analysis leads to?

This trace of the only-ONE. “Nothing is more separate from the vacuum carved by the writing than the *semblant*.”¹⁴

This is what the saying writes.

And, through this movement, it forms a knotting

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ J. Lacan, “Leçon sur Lituraterre”, *Le Séminaire, livre XVIII, D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant*, leçon du 12 mai 1971. Paris, Seuil, 2007, p. 121, our own translation.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, “Postface au Séminaire XP”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p503, our own translation. *Post-effacer* is a Lacan's neologism that condenses “*postface*” – afterword – and “*effacer*” – to efface.

¹¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII, On a Discourse that Might not be a Semblance*, translated by C Gallagher from unedited French Manuscripts.

¹² J. Lacan, “Leçon sur Lituraterre”, *Le Séminaire, livre XVIII, D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant*, leçon du 12 mai 1971. *op. cit.*, p121, author's translation.

¹³ J. Lacan, “Radiophonie”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 434.

¹⁴ J. Lacan, “Lituraterre”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 19, our own translation.

And why not the *sinthome*?

And this is only from this position, from each one as a *sinthome*, through the *intersinthomatic* operation, that a School is possible¹⁵. There a School can be founded.

Stay open.

Count on the crossing-out.¹⁶

Translated by Elodie Valette & Nicol Thomas

Final work interlaced by Elodie Valette, Nicol Thomas and Vicky Estevez

WITH WINDOWS OPEN ON THE PASS

Ana Laura Prates
São Paulo, Brazil

1. Doxa and the colonisation of knowledge in the School

In this work, I set out some questions that I have thought about from my experience in some of the cartels of the Pass, questions that I have tried to elaborate in the permanent cartel in which I participated with Albert Nguyễn, Dominique Marin, Elisabete Thamer, Rosa Escapa and Vicky Estevez as plus-one. The theme for our cartel work was: “What can we say about ‘our’ experience of the Pass?” We were very sensitive to the effects of doxa on the Pass. How could one avoid being dominated by this phenomenon, while being sufficiently aware that “anti-doxa” is not a solution either. This problem prompted the ICG’s proposal that the 2020 Rencontre of the School – unfortunately postponed because of the pandemic – have as its theme: “Orthodoxy and heresy. Knowledge in psychoanalysis”.

In some testimonies, the effects of doxa can be heard beyond an intentional strategy of transmission, in something that we could call, surprisingly, a certain “unconscious calculation”, which appears in dreams and other formations of the unconscious. This question led me to interrogate the original relation between knowledge and truth sustained by psychoanalysis and formalised by Lacan from the 1970s onwards with the four discourses. The signifying articulation or, in other words, unconscious knowledge, implies the repetition which produces a surplus-jouissance, which tries in vain to reach the truth because it encounters a barrier, a structural impossibility. Thus, knowledge and truth are not complementary, they do not form a whole. It’s a version of “there is no sexual relation”, which, however, each discourse will try to write in its own way.

¹⁵ J. Lacan, “9^e Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris sur *La transmission*”, *Lettres de l’École*, 1979, n.25, vol. II, p. 219-220. The sinthome, “It’s all that’s left of what we call sexual relation. Sexual relation is an intersinthomatic relationship. That’s why the signifier, which is also of the order of the sinthome, that’s why the signifier operates. That’s why we have the suspicion of how it can operate: it’s through the sinthome”. Our own translation.

¹⁶ Text written within the permanent cartel of the CIG (2018-2020): “What to say of ‘our’ experience of the Pass?” Other members of the cartel: Rosa Escapa (Spain), Elisabete Thamer (France), Albert Nguyễn (France), Dominique Marin (France) and Ana Laura Prates (Brazil).

Historically, it can be argued that the master's discourse makes a distinction between doxa, opinion, and orthodoxy, true opinion. The modern master's discourse, or university discourse, in turn, produces a novel arrangement in the field of knowledge resulting in a change in power relations. Let us recall that if the discourse of the former master produces segregation, that of the modern master concentrates and objectifies: we are all objects of knowledge through which we are supposed to produce a subject. Hence its kinship with the modern imperative of education and with the imperialisms that replaced the Empire. It would then be a case of asking whether, in a School of psychoanalysis, we would be exempt from infantilising colonisation by the knowledge of the university discourse. A School is not transcendental and it is not outside the world, even if our objective is to support the discourse of the analyst in the city of discourses – the only one that allows the support of knowledge in the place of truth from the invention of a new signifier.

2. Heresy and knowledge in the place of truth

Starting from the unprecedented dimension of the discourse of the analyst, whose singular production is listened for in each case of the Pass, we ask ourselves how to support a School that is not colonised by the organisation of knowledge and without the push to the bureaucracy proper to university discourse. The School proposes to subvert exactly the relation between knowledge and truth, in a way that is coherent with the subversion of the subject of the unconscious, a notion which – although historically linked to monotheistic religions and, above all, to the discourse of science – is radically original in culture, denaturalizing the trivial conceptions of language and body and of the ratio between man and woman.

The transference attempts to write the relation between knowledge and truth in the demand for love that is addressed to knowledge. It is the equivocal of the subject supposed to know that the analyst must at once support and subvert. Moving quickly, I go directly to the question of knowing what change the analysis produces in relation to knowledge, and what the Pass receives of this passage. In the *Seminar “...or Worse”* (1971-1972), Lacan says the following: “On the other hand, there is one thing that is to be claimed of analysis, which is that there is a knowledge that is drawn out of the subject himself. [...] As far as this knowledge is concerned, it is not supposed, it is a deciduous knowledge – scrap of knowledge upon scrap of knowledge¹.” Curiously, in the “Italian Note” (1970), contemporaneous with this *Seminar*, Lacan speaks of a knowledge in the real that humanity does not desire. There is only an analyst, however, if desire comes from knowledge.

So this is the mark of the analyst: “to have discerned the cause of his horror [...] of knowledge²”. The knowledge that there is no sexual relation that can be written, in other words, that knowledge does not attain truth. The place of truth in the discourses derives from this, and the fact that the discourse of the analyst lodges this knowledge in the non-relation. However analysis, without doubt, provides access to a knowledge. This knowledge, however, is not of the order of the *philos sophia*. Or, as Lacan says: “It's still the case that the *philia* that is there in the *philo* that the word philosophy starts with can become fairly weighty. [...] I'm allowing myself to posit that writing changes the sense, the mode of what is at stake, namely the *philia* of wisdom³.” Here, we are closer to *L'insu que sait⁴*, or to lack of success, which has nothing to do with those

¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX, ... or Worse*, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018, p. 64.

² J. Lacan, “Italian Note”, trans. Susan Schwartz, p. 3, *champlacanian.net*

³ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome*, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016, p. 125.

⁴ Reference to *The Seminar, L'insu qui sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, trans. Cormac Gallagher, *www.lacaninireland.com*

who are ‘wrecked by success’ as described by Freud. The clinical Pass thus verifies the failure of the relation between knowledge and truth.

3. A listening which reads the resonances of the unpronounceable

The analyst therefore bears this mark and it is up to his fellow analysts to verify it. This is what concerns us as a cartel of the Pass: recognising the desire to know that has arisen after the subject has grasped the horror of knowledge. A series of logical paradoxes. It is obvious that we are dealing with another order of knowledge: a corporeal knowledge and not an intellectual one.

I am currently working on the listening to Passes, starting from what I have called “the ethics of listening well”, to paraphrase “the ethics of speaking well”. I started from a paradox presented by Primo Levi in *If This Is a Man*. “Why is the pain of each day translated into our dreams in such a constant manner through the ever-repeated scene of the story being told and never listened to?⁵” This paradox is important for psychoanalysts, because it indicates that if there is something impossible to say, there is, on the other hand, an obstacle to listening sustained by the passion of ignorance. This obstacle is challenged by the fundamental rule: to speak whatever comes to mind, which programs the hysterisation of discourse.

At the end of the analysis of the analysts, with the end of the im(possible) narration, a testimony is necessary, and something, of a contingent kind, can be transmitted. This is the wager of the Pass. But how to listen to it? With what ears? To illustrate my point, I bring a poem by Alberto Caeiro – one of Fernando Pessoa’s pseudonyms:

It is not enough to open the window

*It's not enough to open the window
To see the fields and the river.
It's also not enough to not be blind
To see the trees and the flowers.
It's also necessary to not have any philosophy at all.
With philosophy there are no trees, there are only ideas.
There's only each of us, like a wine-cellar.
There's only a shut window and the world outside it;
And a dream of what you could see if you opened the window,
Which is never what you see when you open the window.⁶*

Perhaps in order to listen to the inaudible that sustains the desire of the analyst, it is not enough not to be deaf, or to not fall asleep, but it is also necessary not to listen with prior knowledge, with doxa (an opinion that includes the prejudices of the listener), still less to suppose an orthodoxy. One must listen to the real hole through the resonances RSI (heresy). It's necessary to not love knowledge, to have no *philos sophia*, in order to open windows and ears for the Pass.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

⁵ P. Levi, *If This Is a Man*, trans. Stuart Woolf, London, Orion Press, 1959.

⁶ F. Pessoa, *The Collected Poems of Alberto Caeiro*, trans. Chris Daniels, Shearsman Books, 2007.

REDOUBLING OF KNOWLEDGE

Rosa Escapa
Barcelona, Spain

In the “Proposition of 9 October 1967”, his first formulation on the *dispositif* of the Pass, Lacan’s idea about the nomination of the Analysts of the School is that they should be able to testify “to crucial problems at the vital point they have come to, for analysis, especially insofar as they themselves are working on them, or at least working towards resolving them”. They are not alone in this task but it is expected of them insofar as the School guarantees their formation.

Various questions can arise from this formulation: what are the crucial problems for analysis, what is the time needed to testify about them, how much time to resolve them and what would be a resolution? The AS, like every subject, can only speak from his experience, and in this case, from the vital points of his analysis; at the same time he must make an act of transmission to the community of the School by responding to its demand to advance psychoanalysis, extracting from the particular those elements which shed some light on the step made from analysand to analyst, on this real which brings its own ignorance.

In the summary report of the seminar “The Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis” (1966), Lacan points out that the obstacle to conceiving a being of the psychoanalyst is to be found in the very being of the subject of the unconscious, sutured by a lack, which is the symptom. With the analytic work, the analysand will come to realise the irreducibility of the hiatus between the two edges of his being as a subject, the divergence between the being-of-knowledge and the being-of-truth. If the deciphering of the unconscious provides a knowledge about the symptom, this knowledge does not succeed in grasping the truth. Knowledge does not replace the symptom and has no other option than that of being solely a complement of the symptom, and “there it is, that which makes the horror, and that which elides it, play towards an indefinite adjournment of the status of psychoanalysis – as the scientist understands it¹.”

In other words, what an analysis produces, in particular on the mirage of truth and the horror of knowledge, has repercussions on the status of psychoanalysis in societies and either faces or avoids the relation of psychoanalysis to science, today at the service of the capitalist discourse. On the one hand, the more the subject is foreclosed by science, the greater the chances of psychoanalysis subsisting, but with the risk that it will be increasingly amalgamated with the alternatives offered by science, in particular that psychoanalysis will fall into what Freud called “the black mud of occultism.” So the question is not only one of offering, by means of the analytic discourse, a place that welcomes foreclosed subjectivities, but how to emphasize what analysis produces in a society that demands methods approved by science for the treatment of the discomforts that are inherent to it, which means more and more subject to statistical analysis as empirical proof of the truth.

To break with the doctrine of a university qualification of the analyst in order to put the weight on the self-authorisation that Lacan advocated is to expose the always current breach of this real at the heart of the formation of the analyst. This is where the School takes on its role by putting into circulation the *dispositif* of the Pass as an occasion for a demonstration of the analytic operation which, though not scientific, is not without logic. If it is in order to elide the cause of the horror of knowledge that the scientific status of psychoanalysis is seen to adjourn, that puts us on the track of the crucial point that would permit the articulation of the particularity of an experience to a knowledge that is possible to transmit and contribute to the realisation of the

¹ J. Lacan, “Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse” [Compte rendu du séminaire 1964-1965], *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 202.

analytic discourse. Thus it is not so much a question in the *dispositif* of the Pass of a verification that there is indeed something 'of the analyst' as of the fact that there has been a passage from analysand to analyst. Moreover, for whom would this verification be necessary, we might ask? It would be more a matter of verifying that there has been a transmission of the way it happened within the framework of possibilities and limitations of the *dispositif* of the Pass.

With regard to O. Mannoni's article on the analysis of Freud and its link with the origin of analytic discourse, Lacan points out the logical necessity of a scansion at the time of the repetition of the analytic act. If we can understand the analytic act starting from the fact that the subject passes from the position of analysand to that of semblant of object a, it is the repetition of the act that has allowed him this passage. In the *après-coup*, a time to understand what gave rise to this repetition will be necessary. By definition, the act can only be verified from its effects and the act which would be verified in the Pass is that of the analyst who has enabled the production of a new analyst, we can know nothing about the analysing of the passand apart from what he will eventually say about it. We then expect from the *dispositif* of the Pass that the passand - who could not have said anything about the moment of the act when it occurred - will have endeavoured to obtain some clarification about what happened at that moment and will be willing to transmit this knowledge.

Enthusiasm, the affect of the end of analysis, does not by itself say what it's giving an account of; one must be able to read the articulation of this affect to the experience of the horror of knowledge. For this, the time "after" is necessary, the time to understand, which allows us to reduce "the dimension of mirage in which the position of the analyst is installed"², which allows us to extract a knowledge about the particularity of the logic which led the analyst from the belief in the Other to the solitude of the "there is something of the one", from the love of transference to dis-being. But it is worth asking to what extent this type of knowledge is not something of the inarticulable. Occasionally, on the basis of the testimony of the passers, one can get a conviction about the passand regarding what of his elaboration of knowledge and the affects/effects of his analysis would have passed to the passers, without it having touched the cartel of the Pass. We can observe that the passage to the analyst is obscure when it has to be said, it does not become clearer with words that would have a tendency rather to confuse the subject. And yet, beyond or despite the words, it can happen that one recognises a saying of the analysis.

During the lesson of 15 February 1977 in the Seminar *L'insu que sait...* Lacan does not mention the saying, but the Borromean knot as what the cartel of the Pass could recognise in the shadows. How would we recognise a Borromean knot in the darkness? It's this that's in question in the Pass. "I know that he knows": what can that mean except to objectify the unconscious? Except that the objectification of the unconscious necessitates a redoubling, namely that "I know that he knows that I know that he knows" And he adds: "It is on this condition alone that analysis holds onto its status"³.

The redoubling of knowledge is not a knowledge of the true about the true, nor a repetition, the redoubling of knowledge rather puts an end to the drift of sense. During his analytic course, the subject will arrive at a certain objectification of the unconscious and thus a knowledge of the way the unconscious operates, but this does not necessarily imply leaving the field of belief in the power of the Other; this knowledge would be like a knowledge that has its own reasons. The 'I know that he knows' is the basis of occultism, Lacan says. This is why a second turn is

² As Lacan says in the "Proposition" regarding the "original analysis" of O. Mannoni, "Proposition of 9 October 1967", trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis*, n.6, 1995, p. 9.

³ J. Lacan, *Seminar XXIV L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, trans. Cormac Gallagher, lesson 15/02/77, p.88. lacanireland.com (translation modified).

necessary to go back over the traces of this objectified knowledge in order to obtain a new writing. It is not enough that analyses are a success at the individual level for psychoanalysis to maintain its status, nor is satisfaction at the end of an analysis sufficient. It is necessary that some are animated to make this second turn and that they are not satisfied with their personal benefit nor with the b.a.-ba in order to conduct analyses. In addition, it is necessary that some be animated to give an account of it. Even if every case does not succeed in making this necessity to give an account resonate all the way to the cartel, they are quite few in number, the others nevertheless contribute to updating the analytic discourse.

That they come alive..., isn't it precisely the fact of coming alive that makes a difference?

To be enlivened to go back there, when the semblants have fallen and separation from the Other has been accomplished ... does this not indicate the mark of a desire that the cartel could recognise in spite of the darkness, an evening between evenings, a knowledge between knowledges⁴?

The cartel does not receive the passand but his testimony from the mouth of the passers because it is important that the edges and the fantastic envelopes (unveiled during the analysis) of his appearance, his seeming, of what he proposes to pass on, give way – so that the essence of the operation can be transmitted; that the elaboration of the passand passes from the ones to the others, the elaboration on his supplementary knowledge concerning the product of the analysis, on the crucial problems of his analysis, on his articulation of the source of the transference. That he can pass on too what animated him to make this second turn, which is not in every case the consequence of the first; his motivation from the beginning and how it began, what animated him to be the hole of the object a which houses the cause of desire - a hole which gives consistency to the analytic discourse and which lends itself on the one hand to supporting the subject supposed to know for others and which, on the other hand, lends itself to work in a transference to a school which does not allow the formation of the psychoanalyst to be sidelined.

The redoubling of knowledge provides an account of an encounter with the real of the structure, a moment of separation from the Other, at the very limits of discourse. Along the way, the analysand-analyst will be able to extract from his own experience the logic of his journey, the response that his unconscious has produced in the face of the lack of sexual relation and what he has done with it. But he cannot know more than what the signifier has allowed him to articulate. And yet this knowledge on the real is there and makes itself felt, knowledge that is knotted to language and that sticks to the skin – as Lacan said during the “Yale Conference” in 1975 – and which has unpredictable effects, precisely those from which the subject cannot escape.

I do wonder to what extent the desire for psychoanalysis might be incited by the enigmatic nature of this impossible knowledge at the edge of the structure.

This text would not have been possible without the contributions of Vicky Estevez (plus-one), Dominique Marin, Albert Nguyễn, Ana Laura Prates and Elisabete Thamer, companions of the cartel, with whom I shared a work of elaboration that was intense and sustained. Nor would it have been the same without the listening to the Passes that stimulated us to collective debate and individual reflection. My thanks to them.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

⁴ The author notes that in the same lesson from *L'insu* that she has cited (15/2/77), Lacan plays on these words “soir” and “s(av)oir” – evening and knowledge – in a way that is untranslatable into English!

PASS, TESTIMONY, TRANSLATION¹

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Of the terms that run through Lacan's elaborations on the Pass, those of "testimony" and "testifying" are among the most constant. Used from the time of the "Proposition of 9 October 1967", they are still found in the "Preface to the English edition of *Seminar XI*", that is, until the end of his teaching.

We employ them naturally, as if it were self-evident that the *speaking* in question in the Pass would count as *testifying*. What is it to testify? *To testify* is not just any kind of speaking. It is not a dialogue, it is not a presentation or a report. It is a speaking that attests (< lat: *testimonium, testis*), that relates to evidence, that shows, that makes known, that demonstrates. One testifies to what one has seen, heard or known, *oneself*.

It is interesting to note that Lacan uses the terms testify/testimony/witness at all stages of the *dispositif* of the Pass, even in relation to its product, the analyst of the School (the AS). The passand is the one who risks "attesting at best to the lying truth²"; the passer "receives this *testimony*" and testifies in turn to the cartel of the Pass³; the members of the cartel are themselves "witnesses⁴"; the analyst of the School, the AS, is expected to be able to "*testify* to crucial problems, at the vital point they have come to, for analysis⁵", to cite just a few instances.

What, then, is the specificity of this speaking which is at stake in the *dispositif* of the Pass?

A strange rhetoric

The *dispositif* of the Pass proposed by Lacan is a *dispositif* of complex speech, notably in that it is both anti-rhetorical and performative (not exactly in the Austinian sense). Almost an oxymoron then. Let me explain. We have, on the one hand, a linguistic *dispositif* in which the one who testifies, the passand, aims to convince – in this case the cartel of the Pass – that an analysis has taken place and that an analyst has emerged from it. This describes exactly the action classically defined as rhetorical, that is, a speech that aims to secure the conviction of an audience/jury.

On the other hand, the mixing-in of two passers between the one who wants to persuade – the passand – and those who need to be persuaded – the members of the cartel – reduces or increases (incalculable!) the rhetorical power of the first telling. Someone who tells something to someone who tells it to someone else again... everything is in place for that to misfire. In any event, everything is in place to blur the communication, making another performance emerge⁶. We could say that this doubling of the telling by the passers is a kind of para-persuasion

¹ Work produced in the permanent cartel of the ICG (2018-2020): *What to say about "our" experience of the Pass?* Other members of the cartel included: Rosa Escapa (Spain), Vicky Estevez (France), Albert Nguyễn (France), Dominique Marin (France) and Ana Laura Prates (Brazil).

² J. Lacan, "Preface to the English-Language Edition", *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, NY, Norton, 1978, p. ix.

³ Cf. J. Lacan, "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis*, n.6, 1995, p.11.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶ In French, the term *performance* covers quite a broad semantic field. According to Émile Benveniste, this term simply "brings back into French a lexical family that English has taken from Old French: *perform* comes from the Old French *parformer* [to perfect]". See É. Benveniste, "La philosophie analytique et le langage", *Problèmes de*

of the formal saids of the testimony (not to mention the subtraction of the potential seduction of the image of the body of the witness/passand).

Thus, in the *dispositif* of the Pass, we have two sizeable “obstacles” to the transmission/demonstration that is expected there. On the one hand, there is the formal obstacle specific to the *dispositif* I have just described, which interposes two passers into the testimony that must convince the cartel. And, on the other, the structural impossibility of transmitting through articulated speech what is central to the analytic experience: “the aporia of its account”, as Lacan said⁷. Whether it is a question of desire (incompatible with speech⁸, including that of the analyst), of the object, of the act (in which the subject is subverted), of the opaque jouissance of the symptom, or of the saying (which exists in the saids)... In other words, everything that is at the heart of analysis remains fundamentally intransmissible and out of reach for the subject himself.

A different performance

In her intervention in Barcelona, entitled “What is not guaranteed”, Colette Soler spoke about *performance*, including performance in the Pass⁹. It is clear – in view of its anti-rhetorical nature – that a Pass that leads to a nomination is a performance of transmission. The question that arises from this is: what is it that is convincing in the testimonies of the Pass, what is it that *performs* in this performance? Is it a performance of the saids of the telling? Is it the way in which it is said? Or is it something else?

In my short experience in the cartels of the Pass (but also in my experience as a passer), two kinds of testimony seem to be forthcoming. There are testimonies that focus essentially on the life story of the passand and the therapeutic effects of the analysis (always precious!); and there are those that try to transmit an acquired knowledge about *how* their analysis worked to bring about the transformation they testify to. For the Pass, a testimony about transformations which give symptomatic relief does not suffice to nominate someone as analyst of the School, even if it is a sign of the efficacy of the analytic discourse.

What the Pass requires, it seems to me, is a testimony of *trans-formation*, that is to say, of a change which will also have been a formation for the one analysed. The testimony of this *trans-formation* brought about by the analysis is not limited to the described therapeutic effects, but attests to a radical reversal of the demand which supported the analytic process, that is, the fall of the knowledge supposed and expected from the analysis. This necessarily presupposes a change when faced with what the analysis has not been able to provide the subject, an awareness of what remains incurable and impossible to know. It is this transformation that can potentially *demonstrate* (gr. *epi-deixis*) that a part of the real has been glimpsed in an analysis. It can possibly

linguistique générale, 1, Paris, Gallimard, “Tel”, 1966, p. 270-271, n. 4. In its current use, *performance* can mean “result, exploit, event”; it is also used in the artistic, sporting and more technically linguistic fields (e.g. Noam Chomsky, who differentiates between *performance* and *competence*) and in the philosophy of language (e.g. the theory of *speech act*, developed by John Austin). I have chosen this term specifically in order to preserve this vast semantic field, including its ambiguity. I hear *performance* in the line that runs from the sophists to Austin, through Barbara Cassin’s reading. According to her, *performance* would be the correct translation for the Greek word *epideixis* (demonstration, what is shown there, in front). The term thus carries the notions of *event* and *success*, which, in these examples, are essentially linked to the word that produces event. Cf. B. Cassin, *Quand dire, c’est vraiment faire. Homer, Gorgias et le peuple arc-en-ciel*, Paris, Fayard, “Ouvertures”, 2018, p. 10 sq.

⁷ Cf. J. Lacan, “Discours à l’École freudienne de Paris”, *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 263.

⁸ Cf. J. Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power”, *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, NY, Norton, 2006, p. 535

⁹ C. Soler, “What is not guaranteed”, *Wunsch*, n.19, February 2019, p. 42-44.

testify – make appear (*apo-phanesthai*) – the ex-sistence of a new *Un-dire* (One-saying), that of *the analysis* and no longer that of the demand (see “L’*étourdit*¹⁰”).

Translation

In addition to the challenges of transmission described above, there is a particular feature in ‘our’ experience of the Pass: its translation. Since its creation, the cartels of the Pass in our School have been international. Is this an asset or a disadvantage for the Pass?

Contrary to those who think that our own little Babel is a handicap for the Pass and for its transmission, namely the fact that it is impossible for *all* members of the cartel to speak the same language as that of the passand and the passers, I tend to think that this is rather a virtue. In spite of some practical difficulties, because it means at least some members must not be strictly monolingual, two virtues seem to me to emerge from this international practice of the Pass.

Firstly, this method of forming cartels removes a dimension “in oneself”, i.e. it diminishes the ever-present risk of being influenced by a priori judgements, in a situation where one “knows” the local performance of a colleague who has become a passand. Of course, cartels are always set up in such a way as to avoid such “incompatibilities”, but it is a fact that international cartels contribute to a more neutral evaluation, less permeable to judgments other than those regarding the testimony that is gathered.

Secondly, it is certain that some of the saids can dazzle the one who hears them. They can dazzle as much by what is said as by the way it is said, and this depends largely on the singular capacities of handling a given language, which can, in the circumstance, seduce and persuade. All this has already been elaborated since the Greek thinkers, who understood very early on that a well-turned discourse can be persuasive without being even remotely encumbered with the truth.

The impression caused by the saids in a shared language could perhaps lead cartel members to conclude too quickly on the import of a testimony, while one knows that there is precisely an *aporia* in the account to do with an essential part of the analytic experience. On the other hand, the fact of having to pass on the testimonies through at least two languages other than their own would, in my opinion, have interesting effects for the Pass. Why? Because in passing the testimony through the sieve of the translation, one necessarily (again!) disrupts the power of the formal rhetoric of the saids, and this can contribute to the ability to follow the rails of another performance, that of the “Un-dire” ex-sistent to the saids of a discursive performance.

Of course, it’s not impossible to grasp this within the same language, but it seems to me that the reel of translation is rather an asset, not always easy for those who lend themselves to it, but an asset for the Pass. Even for the saids which reveal the fantasmatic position of the subject, more easily capable of being enunciated, one would gain more than one loses in the sieve of translation, because it allows the cartel to grasp more of the logic which governs the writing of the saids rather than their signification.

All this without mentioning the fact that the language of which the unconscious is made is always singular and neological. This means that to testify is already to translate, it is to pass on – *trans-mit* – what is strictly one’s own to a community. Here, the words to say offered by the current

¹⁰ “The saying of analysis in so far as it is effective, realises the apophantic which by its simple ex-sistence is distinguished from the proposition.” J. Lacan, “L’*étourdit*”, trans. Cormac Gallagher, “Second Turn”, p. 19 at lacaninireland.com

doxa often serve as an interpreter of the impossible to say. It is up to the cartels of the Pass to discern in them the sign of an analytic *trans-formation*.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

URGENT CASES

Nicole Bousseyroux
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The end of a psychoanalysis carries the mark of a satisfaction. That it “*satisfy*” is the urgency over which analysis presides, Lacan tells us in his “Preface to the English edition of *Seminar XI*”, the question being “how can someone devote himself to satisfying these urgent cases¹”. It’s a duty for the one who, having experienced this satisfaction at the end, has passed to the (position of) psychoanalyst. He must put this satisfaction obtained at the end *to the start of his practice*. In one of his manuscripts², Lacan writes: “I have learned in this job the urgency not of being of service *to* others, but of serving *others*”. It’s not about being of service *to* the jouissance of the other in the analytic discourse, the other who is the subject speaking there. It’s about serving that other, *servicing his cause*. Lacan says that he has learned the urgency of serving a cause that has nothing to do with service to a client or service at mass. He has learned to devote himself to the service of the urgent case, to “be on a level [*au pair*] with these cases”, to “make a pair with them³”. This is paradoxical, insofar as the psychoanalyst is neither an SOS Doctor nor an SOS Friend. The urgency in question is neither a medical nor a psychiatric emergency requiring immediate intervention. The risk is not of the same order, it is of the drive. It bears on what of Thanatos is satisfied in language and makes of the speaking analysand an urgent case.

To make a pair with these cases: the same urgency for analyst and psychoanalysand? No. We can say that there are two kinds of urgency in the psychoanalytic discourse, according to its place in the discourse. There is the urgency which concerns the right side of the quadripod of this discourse, where the barred S of the psychoanalysand subject is inscribed. There, it is the subjective urgency of the case which speaks in analysis, with which, to the listening of which, the analyst has to be ‘*au pair*’. And then there is the urgency which concerns the left side of this discourse. This is the urgency proper to the psychoanalyst in so far as he occupies the place of *object a*, the semblant of which the analyst incarnates by his silence. The urgency, for the analyst, is the urgency of the psychoanalytic act and the haste it implies so that his ‘I’m coming’ is verified in it. The cartel of the Pass has to be ‘*au pair*’ with this urgency of the act that occurs from the saying which ex-sists of the saids that the passers lodge. It has to devote itself to satisfying the urgency of the testimony of the passand who waits to hear back from the cartel, it has to satisfy in the way it responds to it, to declare itself on the reception of this testimony, with all the tact that its response requires when it is negative.

There is an urgency to satisfy in each analytic session. First of all, it stems from the requirement that the analyst has to put an end to the session which, by stopping the analysing speech, satisfies

¹ J. Lacan, “Preface to the English-Language Edition”, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York, Norton, 1988, p. ix.

² J. Lacan, *Œuvres graphiques et manuscrites*, Catalogue de la vente Artcurial n.01021, 2006, manuscrit 83, p. 8

³ J. Lacan, *op.cit.*, p. ix

the mirage of truth. It also requires, though it's more difficult to operate, a cut which produces an effect of the real, an effect of 'outside sense' for the analysand. This cut comes from the *object a* of which the analyst is the agent. It is through this that the analyst can devote himself to satisfying the subjective urgency of each analysand, there where speaking presses the one speaking to say more and more.

Cases of subjective urgency proceed from inhibition, from the symptom and from anxiety, of which the analyst must, as a matter of urgency, serve the cause. The analysand comes into analysis because of his inhibition, because of his symptom, because of his anxiety which, at a given moment, become unbearable to him, embarrassing, oppressive. The analyst has to learn the urgency of serving it, this cause, of bringing aid to it, aid against what is enjoyed there. But how to serve anxiety, how to devote oneself to its real? Lacan, at the beginning of the seminar *Anxiety*, speaks of the fact that analysts do not seem to be stifled by anxiety, at least when they are not beginners⁴. It's a regret, even a criticism on his part, because he considers this fact, the lack of anxiety in analysts, as a sort of vaccination against the real of which anxiety is the sign.

The analyst has above all to treat anxiety, its real. He doesn't have to stir up the anxiety, even if it happens that the session stirs up the desire of the Other and as such anxiety, but he doesn't have to stifle it either, put a gag on its real. At the end of this first lesson of *Anxiety*, Lacan says that this anxiety must be "taken under our wing⁵", that is, made a companion, as Samuel Beckett would say. The analyst, Lacan also says, has to stand on the edge of the anxiety, as the sign of desire. This edge concerns what happens in each session of analysis insofar as what is said there is motivated by an unconscious demand, the intricacies of which the analysand is unaware. So this is what the analyst has to satisfy, without for all that rushing to respond to it. For the analyst, as is well known, does not respond to the demand. He does not devote himself to satisfying the all-and-sundry of the demand.

Who does devote himself, apply himself to satisfying my demand? It's my baker, when I ask him for a crunchy baguette. He kindly devotes himself to it, a give and take – on condition that I pay him. The analyst is also paid, but it's not a give-and-take. We don't give him his due for the object that we demand of him when we speak and about which we know nothing, because it's the object that doesn't have a price and which makes up all the cost of a psychoanalysis. The object of psychoanalysis is worthless and priceless.

I come back to the baker I go to, on Rue des Filatiers, the shopping street of those who weave the linen thread of Demand.⁶ He's a witty baker, as witty as the beautiful butcher's wife, dear to Freud. When I ask him, not for a baguette, but when I come in the late afternoon to ask for a chokolatine or a croissant still warm from his last batch, he says to me, as he says every time and mischievously to his customers, those he supposes to be feeling a little peckish at this hour: "It's an emergency!" He says this to me while handing me a little paper napkin just in case I want to eat my snack on the way. My baker knows how to anticipate the desire of the other for a little snack, and what's more, he knows how to offer me what I need so that I don't get it all over me. He's very witty, my baker. He's Lacanian, he knows how to devote himself to satisfying the urgent case.

We know that Lacan has made the borromean knot with the trio of the demand with the refusal and the offer⁷. This is the knot which is suitable to show that *I demand that you refuse what I offer*

⁴ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, Anxiety*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014, p. 5

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 9

⁶ Translator's note: *Rue des Filatiers* is a street in the historic centre of Toulouse. In the Middle Ages, it was part of the Grand-rue, one of the main roads of the medieval town on which various textile craftsmen – such as the filatiers (thread makers) – had their workshops.

⁷ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX, ...or Worse*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018, p. 75.

you because it's not it. This formula “I demand that you refuse what I offer you because it's not it” is the fundamental demand on which the discourse of the analysand is based⁸. I, the “I” who speaks in analysis and whose speech is conditioned by what it says and what it doesn't say⁹, I demand the analyst refuse what I offer him because it's not it. This “it's not it” is what is tightened in the knot of analysing speech. It's a matter of the *object a* as reduced to a pure wedging between the demand, the offer and the refusal, the urgency of which the psychoanalyst devotes himself to satisfying, of primary necessity because it is an urgency of the drive that cannot wait.

It's necessary for us, in our School, in the cartels of the Pass, to have bakers kneaded in the real of this knot, baker-passers of the “emergency” of the psychoanalytic cause. My baker knows something of this, although he is a non-analyst. May we have non-analysts who are sufficiently bakers, sufficiently kneaded in the real in order to satisfy the emergency beyond the demand. Lacan tells us that the end of the analysis is marked by a satisfaction¹⁰. This satisfaction bears on the *sinthome*, which is what remains at the end of the symptom for which we came into analysis. At the end, it is a question of being satisfied with the *sinthome*, with its “anything, but not that¹¹”. The end of the analysis is when what tightens the knot of speaking becomes the singularity that objects to universals and the “but not that” satisfies.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

THE STRAW OR THE BEAM?

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As my term of office on the ICG draws to a close, it is the passands I think of first, those who have generously offered us their testimony, without us being able to issue them in return the title they perhaps coveted. I would like to thank them for having given us an irreplaceable viewpoint on the practice of psychoanalysis in our School today.

Treatments are long, even very long, but each time they have allowed the resolution of the symptoms which had motivated entry into them. What is striking is that the passand does not necessarily spot the logic of the lifting of his symptoms. But should the cartel wait for this demonstration? I'm not sure. What's important is that the treatment has had therapeutic effects and the cartel has no reason to doubt this resolving effect.

These effects are attributable to the transference and what is happening in treatments today does not contradict the classic Freudian dynamic in which the treatment induces the neurosis to produce transference and to cease producing symptoms. The question remains of knowing how the treatment can be concluded from this perspective in which the analyst has taken on the function of the symptom. This is where time plays its part in the long process of separation. Wear and tear is perhaps a more determining factor in this than haste; it's a bit of a pity, but that's the way it is.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77

⁹ J. Lacan, “Impromptu sur le discours analytique”, *Scilicet* n. 6/7, Paris, Seuil, 1976, p. 63.

¹⁰ J. Lacan, “Preface to the English-Language Edition”, *The Seminar, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

¹¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016, p. 6.

The separation from the analyst-symptom supposes that the analysand has invented an alternative solution in order to accommodate the economy of his jouissance. If the analysis has come to a close, we can therefore suppose that the passand has found this solution. But must we wait for him to demonstrate it? Certainly not! Such a demonstration could only be a *trompe-l'oeil*. It is above all through what the passand will have testified about his life, about his practice, that the cartel will be able to get an idea of this solution. Because if there is one thing that the experience of analysis and my participation in the cartels of the Pass has taught me – it's a little short, you might say – it is that *everyone remains structurally duped by his jouissance*. That could even be a definition of this famous concept of which we make so much in our circle; jouissance would be the angle from which one never sees oneself while one is constantly shuffling about there. Of course, it's easily perceived in the other person, it's the famous straw that one spots in his eye, while in one's own is the beam that makes one blind.

This is why the Pass remains at an impasse if we expect that the passand could denounce his jouissance. But then, is it up to the cartel to know how to detect what no one can detect for himself? Why not, but that would go in the direction of reinforcing the cartel in its function as jury, which personally I find difficult to assume. Who are we, indeed, to judge?

I have always been struck by the fact that Freud did not mention that judging is as impossible a task as governing, educating or psychoanalysing. Does the judge except himself from the human condition in order to be able to judge his counterparts? Anyone who would not make himself the dupe of this position would find it impossible to carry out his task.

In what concerns us, as jury of the Pass, do we except ourselves from the structure that makes jouissance resistant to knowledge? Certainly not, but nevertheless, it must be agreed that in taking on the function of expert with regard to ophthalmic straws there is nothing impossible or exceptional.

That being said, what do we do in the cartels of the Pass? With the material that has been transmitted to us, we try to find out what has enabled the one who presents himself in the *dispositif* to separate himself from his analyst-symptom in the best way, that is to say, without side-stepping the moment of encounter with the essential which is that point of the impossible to know, impossible to say, impossible even to think, that the transference conceals. When we believe that we have spotted the logic which may have led to this separation then we nominate, and this nomination is a wager on the fact that the person will be able to transmit to our community something of the desire of the analyst just as he or she has known how to transmit it to the passers and as the latter will have known how to pass it to us.

If I have thanked the passands, I would also like to thank the passers. Most of them fulfilled their function with enthusiasm and rose to the task. If the expression is appropriate, it does not really suit the passer who is not asked to raise himself up a few degrees in order to function. The primary quality is not a matter of height but rather of temporality. It is a matter of the passer being at the right moment for this rendezvous, that he has been designated, rightly so, by his analyst who will have recognized that he was at that moment. It should be added that this year, by reason of the pandemic, the passers had to wait a long time before they could meet the cartel. We feared that this would be an obstacle. It has not been the case. This significant lag-time did not prevent them from being 'on time' for their rendezvous.

Finally, a look at the balance sheet. Our ICG listened to twenty Passes and only succeeded in nominating two Analysts of the School. That is not many. As far as I know, it's a usual proportion. It's a bit disappointing. However, this does not seem to discourage candidates from presenting for the *dispositif*, nor colleagues from standing for the ICG.

It's a curious test, given that this Pass that we continue to operate generates quite a few disappointments: disappointment for the one who didn't get the jackpot, disappointment for the cartel which would have liked to be able to nominate but cannot do so, disappointment for those who have been nominated to whom the School is not very attentive, not to mention the disappointment of the School community which, after the enthusiasm for the first interventions, do not demonstrate much expectation for the work of its Analysts of the School.

And yet, in spite of these disappointed expectations, the *dispositif* functions. I believe that this can be explained by the fact that all those who have participated in the *dispositif*, in whatever capacity, are satisfied to have done so. The fact that the hoped-for outcome is, almost every time, not achieved does not discourage. This seems to indicate that, although the Pass offers but few guarantees to those who would like to obtain a title, although it aims at something for which no Other can stand guarantee, it remains a reference point in our School community. In other words, what counts is not the point one is aiming for but the path one is taking. The Pass offers the one who wishes to do so the opportunity to take the measure of the path he has travelled in his analysis.

I venture to offer you a *bon mot* that resonates with the title of my contribution, in order to conclude this rather serious text and to bring this not-very-funny year to an end. It's the height of economy according to Alphonse Allais: "To lie down on the straw that you see in your neighbour's eye and to warm yourself with the beam that you have in your own."

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

SPECIAL FILE: “PRELUDES”

ORTODOXY AND HERESY THE KNOWLEDGES IN THE PSYCHOANALYSIS

LACANIAN HERESY

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Heresy, etymologically, refers to choice. In some ancient texts, including the Bible, *hairesis* could also mean opinion (*doxa*), thus giving a margin for different interpretations. Its use was later stabilized and refers to those positions that are contrary to the doctrines and dogmas of the church, a dissident choice regarding what the true opinion would be (*orthos doxa*). But, why bring to the field of psychoanalysis a word from the religious field? In the seminar *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan, who had just cut institutional ties with the IPA – representative of the orthodoxy and of the dominating dogmatism in the analytic field- compared his position to that of Spinoza, when he was excommunicated from judaism and whose work, *Theological-political treatise*, was later prohibited as well by the christian theologians. At different times Lacan equated the IPA to the church in regards to the structure of the social bonds, exactly like Freud describes in his text *Mass Psychology and analysis of the ego*, a type of relation among peers sustained in the identification to the leader, in this case, parting from the relation to knowledge.

In 1964, Lacan proposes a new mode of formation for psychoanalysts, rescuing from the Greek, to baptize it, the sense of School: place of conferences, debates, and free thinking. The school subverts the relation between knowledge and truth, in coherence with the one traced by the subversion of the subject of the unconscious. Notion that, although historically linked to monotheist religions and, above all to the discourse of science, is at the same time radically original in culture, denaturalizing the trivial conceptions of language, body and the relation between man and woman. In the 70s, Lacan radicalizes this denaturalization using a topological object, the Borromean knot, which for its very peculiar particularities, allows to operate an homology with the space of the speaking being when remarking the equivalency with the registers Real, Symbolic and Imaginary: RSI, three lettres that sound in French like *HERESIE*. Two senses, but one same knowledge.

We came back to *Heresy*, therefore, not only by way of etymology, but also by way of homophony, more coherent with the predominance of the poetic function of language, for it is the primary matter with which an analyst operates under transference. Therefore, the *Lacanian Heresy* returns to the Trinity, not any more to make One parting from three, as does true religion; but to point to the impossibility of a One that would reach the Two of the relation, producing the Borromean Three. RSI: the *parlêtre* is cardinal: ex-sists in the living body that enjoys, insists in the word that kills the thing and produces the *Corp* (corpse), and consists in the image reflected by the mirror.

From Freud onwards, and still in the XXI century, it continues to be by way of the symptom however, whatever contemporary names it may acquire, that we can manipulate anything of the Real through the practice of the chatter. This is an *heresy* that implies a knowledge in the place

of the truth, tributary of an unpronounceable singularity of *whose* consequences, however, the Pass may gather the testimony. This is our choice.

Translated by Gabriela Zorzutti

THE HERESY OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

Camila Vidal
Vigo, Spain

I'll start by saying a Perogrullo's truth¹ ... *it's lost but it's there*; and we know it because it has effects.

Therefore, this is not exactly a lack.

There is no zero, but a disturbing invisible presence, nevertheless present.

After all, that's the path of an analysis: the passage from the idea that something is missing and that there is an other who could serve as a remedy to it (because in fact it is he who took it from me) as well as the experience of the impossible which allows us to cease unconditional demand requesting from the Other what we lack, as if it was about a good, and to transform this impossible into the engine of desire.

Desire, supported by this impossible, is thus always a bit heretical, especially if we compare it to unsatisfied desire - like the one of the witty butcher's wife who can only desire salmon, something fairly orthodox, or anything that someone else may be lacking or that can be taken away from him - or the obsessive desire that follows the same logic. In psychosis, what is missing comes back from the real, what had remained outside comes back, with an extreme and puzzled presence, clear proof that it is not something that is lacking. This return of the impossible also presupposes the appearance of heresy.

One might ask the question about what would be good in heresy compared to orthodoxy? Heresy is less segregative, which is why, very often, the possibilities of invention appear more "easily" in psychotic structures than in neuroses, which phallic orthodoxy undoubtedly makes difficult.

I thus take up "the shelter from the impossible" as a function to be maintained for the School, as Lacan clearly affirms. In the School - this or another - *protecting the impossible/sheltering from the impossible* may not be able to go without each other, which confronts us with a new impossible, which we will certainly not be able to get rid of, but which obliges us to a permanent work to do something with that.

As psychoanalysts, we also cannot face this impossible all the time, nor even from time to time, we must also protect ourselves, take shelter. It is essential to try to maintain this tension between the two questions. Permanent heresy is impossible, except perhaps for Joyce and certainly some others, without which the heresy ends up becoming orthodoxy herself; if not, let's ask Luther the question, right?

¹ Translator's note: In the original "una verdad de Perogrullo" which is an idiomatic expression meaning platitude, truism (cf. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english/perogrullo>). Etymology: from a medieval folkloric character named Pedro Grullo, also written as Pedrogrullo, Pero Grullo or Perogrullo of the unknown origin. [cf. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/verdad_de_perogrullo]

It is towards this small space that we must direct our gaze to expose ourselves and at the same time protect ourselves from the impossible of a School.

Translated by Anna Wojakowska-Skiba and Jan Tkaczow

TEMPTATIONS OF THE ANALYST

Julieta De Battista
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In our last International School Meeting I tried to advance into the question of the mis-recognition proper to the analytic practice: the systematic negation of the real at play in it. If the mis-recognition is the characteristic note of the analysis -mis-recognition of the symptoms, of the real, of the act- then we see in the fore the question about the defensive operations that this radioactive material of the analysis may provoke in the analysts.

An analysis begins by the “I don’t want to know” of the unconscious, and may conduce in some occasions to the horror of the act. The note persists, therefore, there is no cure of this real. It follows from it that this be not something “to stare at directly”, like the sun or death. However, this indomitably revolutive character seems to adopt at times politically correct costumes in the transmission, with their expected effects of seduction, fascination and sedation. The correct opinion – orthodoxy – is perhaps a melody that can be identified during certain moments in the schools of psychoanalysis. It is a contagious melody, that sticks, of the kind that cannot be but reproduced: a tempting and sticky hit. It can be recognised by its somniferous tones and the heaviness of its automatic and repetitive obedience. It does not wake up, it clams down, It doesn’t produce discomfort, it gives security.

Thus, paradoxically, orthodoxy could turn into another modality of the not wanting to know, in a defence against the anguish that the encounter with the heterity produces. Then, all heretics? This could yet be another way of the politically correct, extolling heresy as the correct way. The heresy of yesterday can be the orthodoxy of today. Probably the psychoanalytic orthodoxy that we recognise as such today proceeds from the elaboration, from the decanting of Freudian heresies, stripped away sufficiently from their uncomfortable elements. Perhaps we might be able to read in certain orthodoxy a defensive function, maybe it gives protection, refuge, and furthermore, this may be necessary at times. There may be then transmissions where this defensive piece weighs more than in others. I wonder then: what kind of a refuge is our School? What impact does this have in the *dispositif* of the pass? Wouldn’t the presence of conflict, of controversy, of the unexpected be the very thing that could pierce any confirmation of what is supposedly correct and expectable from an analyst?

Taking this grain, I believe that the debate regarding the possible convergence or identification between the end of analysis and the *pass* over-dimensions the question of the end and in turn brings us out of focus regarding the conditions that lead to the passage from analyzing to analyst. There could have been a pass before the end, or afterwards. There can be an end of analysis and that there be no pass. Therefore this relation that is thought of in such tight terms, tends to mis-recognise the gap between the end of analysis and the pass. I propose to demonstrate it with a distinction that we find in Lacan and that I would like to underline, regarding the knowing-how-to-do and knowing how to be a waste.

In 1976¹, Lacan defines the end of analysis as knowing how to do there with the symptom: “know how to untangle it, manipulate it”. But this knowing how to do concerns the end of analysis, not the advent of the desire of the analyst. Furthermore, that knowing how is not privative of analysis alone. In fact, in the XXIII seminar, the knowing how to do appears defined as “the art, the artifice, what gives the art of which one is capable a notable value²”. Lacan says of Joyce that he is a man of *savoir faire*, that is, an artist³, and sustains throughout the seminar the question of how did Joyce reach a notable status with his work, that is how did he manage to keep busy so many people? But Joyce didn’t get there by way of analysis. Therefore, this knowing how to do with the symptom is not something that would allow for the recognition of the analyst, we can also find it in the artist. There may be ends of analysis that would arrive at the knowing how to do there with the symptom, and even those who get there without analysis. That knowing how doesn’t necessarily lead to the analytic act, it may end up in an artistic act. On another note, there is the question of the “notable value” of that knowing how, which opens the question of whether this notable status is convenient for the analytic practice, even when in terms of the recognition that an analyst could expect from his/her work.

I venture further into the proposed distinction; in the same seminar where Lacan leaves on the artist’s side the matters of knowing-how-to-do and notability, he reserves for the analyst that knowledge that he had already characterised in 73: “knowing how to be a waste”⁴, necessary condition of possibility – although not sufficient- of the analyst’s desire’s emergence. I recall the terms in which he puts it: for Lacan it is about knowing how to be a waste parting from having sifted one’s own cause of the horror of knowledge, and in addition, a note of enthusiasm. He makes of this the ‘mark’, the condition, that will be recognised in the analyst that runs the risk of undergoing the pass, and this not only for the analyst functionary that is authorised by himself. I say condition of possibility because it is not given that this knowing how to be a waste be coloured by enthusiasm. Lacan evokes the possibility of depression and in fact a difference should be made between knowing how to be a waste and identifying to the waste melancholically.

That *sicut palea* is renamed in ’75 as “*ordure décidée*”⁵, convenient position for the analyst. On the side of the analyst then, knowing how to be a waste with decision and enthusiasm; parting from having been able to sift something of one’s own cause of horror of knowledge. No question that nobody embarks on such a long and costly formation to end up like this! This proposal then unmarks itself from the ‘ought to be’ or the ‘want to be’, it does not travel those roads. In the beginnings of an analysis certainly the aspects linked to the ideals and ‘the ought to be’ are shed. It is my understanding that at the end of an analysis there also takes place a mourning, this time about what was believed that one wanted to be and that this would be achieved in the end.

With this I want to emphasise that the desire of the analyst dislocates from the ‘wanting to be’, that emergence is disruptive, deviated, even aberrant, according to the term of Lacan in *The knowledge of psychoanalysis*⁶. It is an emergence that seems to be produced rather as an ignored encounter, a surprise that awakens. Horror and awakening. Each analysand counts on their own orthodoxy, the orthodoxy of their fantasy which gives them protection and safety. It is with regard to this authority principle of fantasy that a heretic deviation can come to happen

¹ J. Lacan, (1976-1977), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIV, L’insu que sait de l’une-bevue s’aile à mourre*. Inédito. Clase del 16/11/1976.

² J. Lacan, (1975-1976), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 61.

³ J. Lacan, (1975-1976). *Le séminaire. livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 118.

⁴ J. Lacan, (1973), “Note italienne”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

⁵ J. Lacan, (1975-1976), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII*, Paris, Seuil, p. 124.

⁶ J. Lacan, (1971-1972), *El saber del psicoanalista. Charlas en Sainte Anne*, inédito, clase del 1/06/72.

insidiously. I proposed the conception of the *clinamen* for that effort of apprehension that the *dispositif* of the pass constitutes. *Clinamen*, infinitesimal deviation that changes the course of events inadvertently and irremediably. Does the *dispositif* of the pass allow to capture these imperceptible deviations that produce unexpected emergencies, those little heresies? Can the deviations that lead to the aberration of the desire of the analyst be detected? By which ways the propensity of an analysis can lead someone into the propulsion of the analytic act?

In a way it seems that the analysis produces sort of an accumulation of experiences regarding the waste, from the beginning and not only at the end. It begins with the symptom and the formations of the unconscious -which are in themselves heretic wastes of consciousness-, advances in the shedding of the fantastic orthodoxy, in the fall of the subject supposed to knowledge, it undoes the religious beliefs in the fathers, it strips off the love for truth and jouissance of meaning. It is a journey of wastes, of remains. In each meander of the analysis something of this experience of the waste appears. Will that experience be able to result in a knowledge, will it lead to depression, to enthusiasm? Where will the refuge be found now?

Taking the question of the desire of the analyst in this way of knowing how to be a waste conduces to another point of great importance for the quotidian functioning of the school: the one of compensations or recognitions that the analyst can expect, given this is not something that his analytic practice would furnish him necessarily. There is no recognition for the analytic act, there is mis-recognition. But analysts are also human beings, thirsty of *escabeau*. How to bear the castration of the *escabeau* that the position of the analyst requires? By which ways are certain compensations sought after? What politics is propitious for a school that claims not to be trapped in the narcissistic pregnancy, in the trap of competition, in the *escabeau* like transmissions? What would a politics that would point to redirect towards elaboration before the temptation of the analysts look like?

We await you in Buenos Aires, in the desire of a school that will not cease to cause effervescence.

Translated by Gabriela Zorzutti

ON ORTHO-DOXA

Rithée Cevasco
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The question of knowledge is closely linked to the question of what can be taught and transmitted. The dialogue of Plato, “*Menon on Virtue*”, prompts us to reflect on a truth that cannot be taught¹. The *lexis* Ortho-Doxa (True Opinion) is therefore not to be confused with any *doxa*. This dialogue is the subject of Lacan’s comments on several occasions². I will confine myself here to “L’*étourdit*”³, where Lacan announces a “progress” because this OD “*has for us*

¹ For Socrates there is no *epistémè* of virtue. It cannot be taught because it escapes the expected coherence of all knowledge.

² See in particular: J. Lacan: The Ego in Freud’s theory and in the psychoanalytical technique, where Lacan already evoked the oblivion present in all knowledge: oblivion linked - at this moment of his teaching - to the creative function of truth.

³ “L’*étourdit*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, Paris, 2001.

nothing more than an ab-sence⁴ of meaning”, “emptying” of any meaning that points to the ab-sense of the ab-sex.

Lacan’s preoccupation is aimed at “*what can be taught about the real*”, he bets (again) to formulate a *mathema* of what cannot be taught – no doubt a paradox – concerning “*the impossibility of saying true of the real [which] is motivated by a mathema [...] in which the relation of the act of speaking [le dire] to the said [le dit] is situated*”.

However, the act of speaking forgotten behind the what is said finds rather a topological support, starting from a surface on which to trace the course of the wall of the impossible – of sex, sence and meaning.

The OD is located on the a-spherical surface of the cross-cap as a point (point-off-line) of *fixtion*, (*fiction/fixtation*) – any point but necessary- whose fall is produced by a cut between the act of speaking and the said. That this point of *fixtion* is named by an equivocation, refers to the act of interpretation as a cut. But there is cut and cut⁵. Only the cut of double turn, cut of the act of speaking, causes the fall of the “a” (the round of the cross-cap), as the object cause of desire and the verification of the subject as divided (Moebius a-spherical band). “*The point, then, is the opinion that can be said to be true of what the act of speaking that goes round it verifies it indeed, but only of what the act of speaking is what modifies it to introduce the δόξα as real*”.

The transformation is therefore a passage from the said (single turn cut) to the act of speaking (double turn cut), a passage from the *fixtion* -symbolic/imaginary- to something of the order of the real.

Could we situate these points of *fixtion* in history and in psychoanalytical doctrine and doing as it should be done the tour of them? For example, with regard to our myths as a point of fixation, of OD? In the first place the Freudian myths, no doubt: Oedipus and his reverse of *Totem and Taboo* (which are so dear to the hearts of psychoanalysts “well thinking” of the meaning and of ideology of the family). But also the myths of Lacan: that of the *lamelle*, that of Evie as the place of origin of « *lalangue* ». It is not a question of questioning them in the field of the true/false, but of going through them, tracing this double turn that allows us to empty them of all meaning, in order to... why not? eventually make use of them.

The approach of these OD points – it seems to me – could induce us to be more cautious at the time of our fervent clamour against any orthodoxy.

Shortly after “L’étourdit”, Lacan approaches his “nodal method”. The question persists: how to touch a real from a practice of the word? The orientation of the cure aims at the “*sinthome*” – the door of access, then, even if only to a fragment of the real of the singular knot of each “speaking being” [*parlêtre*]. A knot necessarily heretical in its singularity, but often an orthodox knot, rather cushy [*pépère*] (conforming and comfortable) and orthodox... and sometimes very heretical⁶.

This does not happen without the operation of deconstruction/transcending of the fantasy [*fantasme*] cutting around the point of the OD, a precondition for the satisfaction of the end [of analysis] by identification with the *sinthome*, involving the devaluation of symptomatic *jouissance* and its repetition.

⁴ Translator’s note: In French, there is a play on words here based on a homonymy: instead of absence meaning lack, Lacan uses a neologism *absens* to point out the lack of meaning.

⁵ Distinction between a cut of only one run and a cut of double run. For the topological development see: J. Chapuis with R. Cevasco, *Guide topologique de “l’Étourdit”. Un abus imaginaire et son au-delà*, Editions Nouvelles du Champ lacanien, Paris, 2019.

⁶ Suffice it here to evoke the heretic Joyce. See: Colette Soler, *Lacan, Lecteur de Joyce*, Paris, PUF, 2015 and 2019.

In the long run, will it be possible to locate these points of *fixtion* which would also be braided in the nodal elaborations?

Could we not speak in analytical knowledge of moments of “passing” concerning OD points? An example of this is the journey from the Freudian unconscious to the “ours” – as Lacan expresses it – as long as we write in the prolongation of his (Lacan’s) *sinthome*, which leads him to this extreme position of approaching a real outside of all meaning, but far from any conception of a “real in itself” where the Kantian *noumeno*⁷ leads us (*nous mène*).

Revised by Anna Wojakowska-Skiba and Jan Tkaczow

THE NOT-ALL AND THE HERESY

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We know that Freud attributes to women the lack of a superego, and consequently a poor contribution to the task of civilization. Freud’s statement allows Lacan to construct the notion of a different superego, of a nature other than the prohibition linked to classical morality, which is the push towards *jouissance*, a conception that will constitute the definitive Lacanian idea of the superego. In consonance with this, in “L’étourdit” he says that the not-all is not *superegoed* [*ne se surmoite pas*] as the universal conscience, that is to say the phallic whole, the superego of the prohibition, but that there is also a part, which he calls *surmoitié*, linked to the not-all phallic, which is a female voice that pushes towards *jouissance*. This reality of women, which derives from the double aspect of their *jouissance*, the phallic and the not-all, places them in a close proximity to the Real, to the hole that gives it interesting characteristics that deserve to be considered.

Thus, the hole with which they live is a push to sublimation, to invention, to heresy. Phallic orthodoxy segregates and creates difficulties, while heresy introduces the singular and different. The Real that makes a hole in the articulated truth, would be a push to sublimatory invention. Female mystics [*las místicas*] that make the other *jouissance* present in discourse offer a testimony of this.¹

After Freud, Lacan makes of femininity, not the signifier of a norm, but a place outside the norm, which can sometimes have a link with the death drive, especially if there an attempt to erase it by ignoring the difference. Femininity will have to be considered as what resists order, or orthodoxy, and is on that account close to heresy. In certain aspects women are always outside the norm, which is a form of madness, of heterodoxy that is specific to them.

In addition, as being not-all dupes of the phallus, women know about semblants, and therefore can resist the one as homogenizer, which has a beneficial role for civilization. This is the asocial capacity of the feminine: it breaks the bonds that tie the social with its preference for the

⁷ In french (*nous mène*) leads us homophonically to the Kantian “noumeno”.

¹ C. Soler, *Des hommes des femmes*, cours 2017-2018, Éditions du Champ lacanien, col. Études, p. 173.

particular. In its resistance to the one that generates the similar, the heresy of the not-all phallic is a revulsion against the denial of difference, of singularity.

This is what Freud did not understand about the beneficial role of women in culture, since the bond with the singular knotted by the female Eros avoids the fanatical orthodoxy of the one, whose deadly effects have been present throughout history.

It is indispensable to give rise to this singularity, to this social alterity of women, as the differences that do not pass onto the social bond automatically return in the different discriminatory practices.

It is not only in the social order that alterity must be accommodated. The support for the singularity, the difference of each analysand regardless of their sexual position, and the respect for singular jouissance without leading it to orthodoxy, is the task of the analyst and also of the School.

Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez

HERETICS OUTSIDE THE CLASS

Colette Soler
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Something strange happens within the analytical orthodoxy. One flatters oneself that one is a heretic in its regard, while where the true heresies had developed, one rather flattered oneself that one isn't one, protesting against the accusations of heresy. This was a time when heresies were still possible, since dogmas had their hold through diverse policing of the semblant, the Church and powers of the State leading the way in this policing – except when, by an accident of history, some institution such as the IPA, for example, set itself up as its keeper. Some vital consequences followed therefrom. But they are also no longer valid, and for a good reason: within the system of the subject's universalization by science, now there are solely heretics. Thus, in order to rebrand the analyzed heretic, all we can have recourse to is the distinction between the particular of good reason's global classifications (the particular and the class as understood in terms of logic) and the singularity which is impossible to classify, of the "*unariétés*" [*unariétés*] seen within psychoanalyses.

So, what to say of the heresy that Lacan imputes both to Joyce and to himself? Well, it isn't the same as the one of religions' great heretics, but it also isn't the widespread heresy of unique singularities. It is not the disparity with regard to the text of established truths, be it those established by the dogma or the common orthodoxy. It only concerns the choice of the path by which truth is to be approached.

The way of Joyce, which isn't my subject here, attempts this approach by the ungrateful, albeit diverse paths of what is outside meaning.

The way is something Lacan evoked very early on, with the Zen master, and many posed the question of what he was doing within psychoanalysis. Well, he was there precisely in order to show a way that would be different to the one that leads to meaning through free association. Thus, we ascertain to what degree intuition precedes construction, even for Lacan. At the outset

of his own way, there is the road sign of “I, the truth, speak”, which says nothing about the text of the truth, but which does already indicate that the way won’t go any further than where speech leads to. From one thing to another, if we advance on the way of speech to the structure of language, and then onto the effects of speech and of language, we could declare a “no through road¹”, because of the half-saying [*mi-dire*], if the real didn’t “manifest itself in language” by way of logic combined with the enjoyed *materiality* of *lalangue*. So it is heretical, this Lacanian way, going from truth to the real, to conceive of the pathways of an analysis that should follow the same way. No overcoming of dogma is necessary in order for this to take place, not even the overcoming of the orthodoxy of the School, but only that of “I don’t want to know anything about it”, a dogma a lot more tough to overcome than all the others, the “I don’t want to know anything about” that which has no guarantor of knowledge. This is the delicate matter. Caution would therefore command not to flatter oneself with heresy, since everything indicates that it is not something within everyone’s reach, and one also ought to really hope that the *dispositif* of the *passee* is wary of providing certificates in heresy.

There is also another funny factor in psychoanalysis: that of the undetectable heretic. I’m not saying a masked heretic, I’m saying undetectable. Indeed, the unprecedented desire it takes for an analysis, and the act that doesn’t make up a stepladder [*escalabeau*], are they not heresies with regard to the ordinary singularities that have no other law than that of their unarity of *jouissance*? Probably, but as Lacan said, who is... or where is... the analyst, this heretic? In order to be operative, his heresy is nonetheless as discreet as it is not possible to identify by a proper noun. It cannot be claimed for oneself any more than the title of analyst. No ring for the initiates. So we can just as easily assume it in the breaching traits of analysts of the stepladder who are multiplying today, as in all the positions they want to present in the world.

Translated by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

AN UNSAYABLE TRANSMISSION

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“[...] *That which is reduced solely to itself is destined to perish* [...]”¹

The encounter with the real, when analysis leads to it, is the very test of the treatment, the moment when the analysand comes up against the truth of castration. This is the place of meeting with the irreducible, with the gap within our very being of desire. As Lacan says, “No praxis is more oriented towards that which, at the heart of experience, is the kernel of the real than analysis”.² If the whole practice consists in approaching elements of the “real”, psychoanalysis has the specificity of being oriented by, directed to, the hole in the real. In order for that to happen there is all the work of the treatment: hollowing out the words [*mots*],

¹ Translator’s note: “*voie sans issue*” in the French, lit.: “way with no exit”.

¹ R. Juarroz, *Fragments verticaux*, translated from Spanish [to French] by S. Baron Supervielle, José Corti, 1994, p. 97.

² J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. 53.

exhausting sense to the point of a mere sketch (*épure*). At the end of the journey the passage by the real outside sense can lead the subject towards the few traces of his *lalangue*.

The paradox of a long and complicated trajectory strewn with turmoil and crucial moments that, at the end, are transformed into a miniscule reduction. Just a brief glimpse of a bit of real, of an untreatable remainder of jouissance. The emergence of the *duende*³, says the poet Federico Garcia Lorca, an untranslatable name lodged in the depths of being. A trace found and re-found through a point of coincidence with *lalangue*. A hole in the real as a point that is impossible to represent, a point of absence. Reaching there is the sign of the mark of the subject in its “absolute difference”. It is by starting from this difference and only from it that something of a transmission is possible. From a singular experience to an address to a community of experience, to a School... and beyond. It is from this perspective that the question of transmission can be understood. It is with this untranslatable remainder of the encounter with the real in the psychoanalytic experience “taken in intension” that movements are produced, invention, something new in the field of psychoanalysis “posited in extension”.

This echoes what Roberto Juarroz says in a poem about poetry, “[...] What [...] is reduced solely to itself is destined to perish [...]”⁴ We can wager that having acquired knowledge about the impossible there emerges some resonance of those bits of knowledge beyond experience. Each one with his own know-how, with his own way of locating the edge between the singular and the collective and of holding to it. To maintain the separation, “alongside”, stemming from the experience. At base, doesn't the analytic operation result in a place being left for heresy and a possible opening to heretical moments?

Maybe a passage from a poem can give a trace of resonance. “[...] Poetry believes it perceives these heretical moments. This is perhaps where its major destiny lies: to recognise these islands of the present that fall like a lucid plumb to the centre of being⁵.”

In order to continue to think about psychoanalysis and contribute to “broadening it”, doesn't the essential reside in maintaining the edge between the School and the style of each one?

Be wary of all heretics! Those who would slide, re-slide towards orthodoxy.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

³ The *duende*: an untranslatable word that has its roots in flamenco culture and the “*cante jondo*”, a profound singing from the depths of being/ *chant profond*. Cf: F. G. Lorca, *Jeu et théorie du duende*, L'arche, 2007.

⁴ R. Juarroz, *op.cit.*

⁵ R. Juarroz, *op.cit.* p. 111.

BEING HERETICAL IN THE RIGHT WAY

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“One has to choose the path by which to capture the truth¹.” Lacanian heresy?

It is necessary [*É preciso*²], not as a necessity, but as indicating the precise path from one place in order to arrive at an other, an other where one arrives without knowing it, because it is a matter of the impossible, of impossible knowledge. In this sense there is a choice, a body put into play in order to reach it. The choice is precise, we only know it after having advanced and voided the signifieds that clung to this ex-sistent body.

This path is not orthodox, neither rigorous nor exact, but heretical.

The term heresy was first used by Christians to designate ideas that were contrary to the accepted ones, ideas considered to be “false doctrines” It was used equally by the Catholic and Protestant Churches, both arguing that heresy was a doctrine contrary to the Truth as revealed by Jesus Christ, i.e. that it involved a “deformation, a distortion or misinterpretation” of the Bible, the Prophets and Jesus Christ.

Dislodging the truth from its established place, and in which one believes, is not an easy path, not learned, but lived and perhaps transmitted.

Some choose to try it in an analysis and decide to go to an end, a precise end, in the sense of the path by which the truth is captured. Once the choice has been made, says Lacan, “no-one is prevented from subjecting it to *confirmation*, that is, from being a heretic in the right way. The right way is the one which, when the *nature* of the sinthome has been recognized, doesn't shrink from using it logically, that is, from using it to the point of reaching its real, at the end of which it is sated.³”

It is not easy to follow the sayings of Lacan, which often sound like provocation: What is it to be heretical in the right way? This is perhaps why Lacan puts the emphasis both on who listens to him and on how one listens to him.

Submitting this choice to confirmation thus seems to evoke the testimony that someone is ready to give, not of just any old choice, but of the path chosen by which the truth is captured. It is an obvious distortion of the quality of orthodoxy, of the established systems. Because what has value is the “tell your unique finding”.

The idea would be to play with language, to spark listening, which is necessary in order to move forward on this path, which has nothing of the linear nor the necessity, leading from orthodoxy to heresy.

For us clinicians, a well-known false doctrine is called “fantasy”, that is, the fantastic montage that leads subjects to strictly follow norms and rules without even questioning them. A path *wholly* illusory, where it is easy to stumble over these truths without falling. That's part of it.

¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome*, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016, p. 7.

² Translator's note: Throughout her text, the author plays with the ambiguity of the term *preciso* (from the verb *precisar*), which in Portuguese is synonymous with “has to; to be necessary”, but which also means “precise”

³ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome, op. cit.*, p. 7.

Moreover, the analyst has only the equivocal “as weapon against the sinthome⁴.”

It is in this precise work, in the exercise of the transference, that he (the analyst) relaunches the subject, lost in the milieu of his repetitions, turn after turn, so that something of the act emerges and frees one from an other, one from two, even the voice, who may find himself free to be something other than substance, as Lacan indicates.

That being said, it is not enough. The analyst stumbles again in leaving behind this non-sensical object called “*a*”. Lacan gives us a clue to this, in “La Troisième” “This is what gets caught, wedged between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, as a knot. It’s by catching hold of it in the right way that you can answer for what your function is – to offer it to your analysand as the cause of his desire. This is what one must manage to do. But if you take it by the paw, it’s not terrible either. The important thing is that it takes place at your expense⁵.”

The work of the analyst is not simple; to point out the place of emptiness is not given to everyone. Perhaps it’s this that is the right way.

There is a precise point, that of the moment, of the clinic, of the encounter with the impossible to say, only said by the series (the seriousness) of analysts in a School that is not orthodox, where each time one asks oneself about ears wide open in order to listen and about bodies receptive to being emptied until the voice can be set free. Each time, it is a precise choice.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵ J. Lacan, *La Troisième*, trans. by Philip Dravers, 2019 (translation modified)
https://freud2lacan.b-cdn.net/LA_TROISIEME-bilingual-5cols-new.pdf pp. 20-21

FORTHCOMING EVENTS

2nd EUROPEAN CONVENTION
OF THE SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INTERNATIONAL
OF THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

Meeting of the School - 9 july
Language(s) and *pass*

Meetings of the IF - 10 / 11 july

**WHAT PASSES
THROUGH THE
GENERATIONS**


ROMA 9-10-11 JULY 2021

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LANGUAGE(S) AND PASS

9TH JULY 2021

<https://www.praxislacaniana.it/convegnoroma/>



IV INTERAMERICAN SCHOOL DAY
OF THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELDS

THE SCHOOL IN THE FACE OF URGENCY
ANSWERS, RESISTANCES?

Friday, November the 19th, 2021
14-18 Hs. Argentina-Brasil
13-17 Hs. Puerto Rico
12-16 Hs. Colombia
11-15 Hs. Colorado

Organizing Committee:
Sandra Berta - ICG Brasil
Julieta De Battista - ICG ALS
María de los Angeles Gómez - ICG ALN
Fernando Martínez - ICG ALS
Beatriz Oliveira - ICG Brasil

 VIRTUAL ACTIVITY
SIMULTANEOUS TRANSLATION
Spanish - English - Portuguese

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The School Day will be held on November 19 and will be under the responsibility of the members of the AL CIG (2020-2022): Maria de los Angeles Gomez (ALN) Sandra Berta and Beatriz Oliveira (EPFCL-Brazil) Fernando Martinez and Julieta de Battista (ALS).



SYMPOSIUM ON LINE
INTER-AMERICAN 2021
INTERNATIONAL OF THE FORUMS
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
OF THE LACANIAN FIELD

**TRANSFORMATIONS
OF THE ANALYSIS AND
THE CLINIC IN 2021**

TECHNOLOGY
TIME
TOPOLOGY

NOVEMBER 20, 2021

SIMULTANEOUS TRANSLATION
SPANISH ENGLISH PORTUGUESE



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The Fourth Inter-American Symposium of the IF-EPFCL will be held online on November 20, 2021.

Its title will be: **TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS AND THE CLINIC IN 2021.**

**Technology
Time
Topology**

Organizing Committee: Ana Laura Prates (EPFCL-Brazil), Matias Buttini (Latin America South), Ricardo Rojas (Latin America North).

Scientific Commission: The same Scientific Commission that was in charge of the Symposium in Puerto Rico is maintained. That is: Maria de los Ángeles Gomez, Dyhalma Ávila, Mailen Souchet (ALN- Puerto Rico) Mario Brito, Gloria Patricia Pelaez, Beatriz Maya (ALN) Antonio Quinet, Sonia Alberti, Sandra Berta (EPFCL- Brazil) Gabriel Lombardi, Alejandro Rostagnotto, Gabriela Zorzutti (ALS).

The Fifth Inter-American Symposium will be held in Puerto Rico on July 6, 7 and 8, 2023. Thus, Puerto Rico maintains the venue for the next Symposium. The title will also be “Segregation and Uniqueness”. The title of the School Day will be decided and will be under the responsibility of the members of the ICG of LA (2022-2024).



NEW DATE:
FROM 29 JUNE TO 3 JULY 2022

Wunsch 21 was published by the CIOS 2018-2020, composed by: Beatriz MAYA, Ana Laura PRATES, Elisabete THAMER and Camila VIDAL. In collaboration with Ana CANEDO, Maria Claudia DOMINGUEZ and Daniella FERRI.

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