
# WUNSCH

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The actors in the Pass 50 years after Jacques Lacan's Proposition

> Paris, Rio de Janiero, September 7, 23, 30 2017



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Susan Schwartz, co-ordinating editor

Forum of Melbourne

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#### **EDITORIAL**

Throughout 2017 we commemorated the 50 years since the publication of the Proposition of '67. This commemoration was realised in various School Spaces, and this number of *Wunsch* is a collection of the presentations from the Study Day of the School in Rio de Janeiro on September 7, 2017, entitled "The proof through the School and the School put to the test, 50 years after the Proposition", along with the presentations of colleagues from the ICG at the Intercartel Study Day, entitled: "From experience ....", held in Paris on September 23, and finally, those from the Study Day on the Pass in Paris on September 30 of the same year, entitled "Debate on the AMS and the Pass", and organised by the ICG. These texts make a good introduction for our reflections on the School in terms of the concerns of the fourth Symposium on the functioning of the Pass that will be held in Barcelona on September 12, 2018.

Wunsch 19 will collect the texts of the presentations on the School, its functioning, its *dispositifs* and on the guarantee, which will take place in Barcelona.

## SECOND STUDY DAY OF THE SCHOOL, SECOND INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM OF THE FORUMS OF THE LACANIAN FIELD, SEPTEMBER 7, 2017, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

#### Presentation: Marcelo Mazzuca

(Secretary of the ICG for Latin America)

In the wake of the initiative seized at the Symposium that took place in Buenos Aires (Argentina) in August 2015, the members of the ICG for Latin America (Sandra Berta, Clara Mesa and Marcelo Mazzuca) organised a Study Day of the School based on the framework of the IInd Interamerican Symposium of the Forums of the Lacanian Field which took place in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in September 2017. The aim was to see how far the practice of the *dispositif* of the Pass had come half a century after having been introduced by Lacan. Hence the title of the Study Day: "The proof by the School and the School put to the test, 50 years after the Proposition".

This is the reason why we put the accent there and the question mark on the "function" that each of the actors in the experience of the Pass must carry out. Different from the Cartel, the Pass is like the joke [*witz*]: it commences with a contingency (it might or might not happen), and then it is transmitted and retransmitted in ways more or less different. As an institutional *dispositif*, it is constituted from a series of elements and events that make its functioning something much more complex and multiple than the *dispositif* of the Cartel. This makes apprehending the experience difficult, since we do not have a

Panopticon that can be constructed to watch over and judge all that results from it. Lacan, its luthier, wished that it be so. And it is thus that we practice it in the School of the Lacanian Field, in adding difficulty to it but richness as well from the international and the plurilinguistic.

Following these strong lines we conceived our own *dispositif* for the Study Day of work: according to the modality of a round table, we gave the floor to Members of the School who participated effectively in aspects of the Pass. To this end we divided the day in four parts, each exploring a different function: the function of "teaching" (the AS); the function of "designation" (the AMS); the function of "transmission" (the passers), and the function of "nomination and elaboration" (the Cartel of the Pass). And added to this work, the function of "reception and admission" of the demands for the Pass to the Local Secretaries (for us, the CLGAL), its members participating in the coordination of each of the four tables. So, four functions plus one.

You will find below the substantial work that was realised.

#### Proof, time and act

#### Vera Iaconelli

The designation as Analyst of the School implies the proof, not of the end of an analysis, but of the transmission of the journey of an analysis up to its supposed end, whatever this might be, and of the assumption of the analyst's desire, manifested or not through the option of becoming a professional analyst. The designation implies a journey that culminates with a public talk and with another moment, when texts are published. Each of the listeners or readers of those words and texts does what he/she wants and what he/she is able to do with that. Many went to the trouble of transmitting to me what my words or writing caused in them. Those exchanges were unexpected, surprising, often very rich, and sometimes bizarre. But we are interested in bizarre expressions. Those moments were challenging and gratifying. I include among them, of course, the present one, of producing and communicating what I am saying now.

However, talking about the end of our analyses is not a prerogative of the Analysts of the School, as it may be done by any of us in the sessions of an encounter like the present one, for example. Nothing prevents any of us from writing a paper concerning the formalization of the end of his/her own analysis. That is desirable and perfectly possible, provided that the testimony involves a contribution to the formalization of the analytic journey and its results, not limited, of course, to being a testimony with itself as its aim, but a text from which something analytic with a reference to our work could be extracted. We proceed in this way when presenting other cases of our clinical work.

Yet of the Analyst of the School there is the specific expectation that he/she speak further about the experience. But, what experience? Is it the experience of the end of an analysis or is it the experience of the appointment of an Analyst of the School? Is this question possible?

The designation of an Analyst of the School is supposed to last for three years (the number is peculiar), but of a narrative of the type I am discussing we cannot possibly know *a priori* the temporal length of its vigour and efficacy. Otherwise it would be an imposture. The wager concerns desire, and as we know, desire is obstinate.

In this sense I propose that the Analysts of the School (now I attempt to make a contribution to 'the question Analyst of the School') de-authorize themselves [*se auto desautoricen*] of that function. We must be patient if the person really believes that his/her discourse on the journey of an analysis has a value for life, on the one hand; and on the other hand, if there is a supposition of consistency in the position of the Analyst of the School. It will be our responsibility not to invite that person to speak, if we do not agree with his/her own judgement. I make this proposal on the basis of my experience as Analyst of the School, and also of my experience as analysand and as analyst facing the end of analyses. I make this proposal on the basis of the time of entry into a position and the time to leave it. I appeal to elegance. Why not? We know about the aesthetic nature of our work.

The journey of an analysis is my longstanding theme of work, study and supervision. It is the great *leitmotiv* in my approach to everyday clinic. It would be convenient that I continued to produce texts on this theme, but you must bear in mind that 'convenience' is a word that does not agree with psychoanalysis. I would even say that psychoanalysis retains its value for remaining inconvenient – the plague.

This year, in a seminar in which I worked on *Hamlet*, I suggested that the procrastination of the protagonist could be compared with the procrastination of a moment at the end of the analysis when the patient wonders what else to do there, when everything has already been said. Then the only thing that remains is that the analyst points to the way to the exit door once again, until the analysand realizes that *he/she lacks something*. At that time there is no more precise interpretation than the exit door. This wait for an act – initiated by the analyst in his/her position as desiring, namely, on the basis of the analyst's desire, but that only the analysand may conclude – may be exasperating. We then wait and show the door. In the scene of the last act of assumption of his desire, Hamlet does not act for the sake of elegance, the scene of the confrontation with Laertes in the grave being among the most unusual in Shakespeare.

I am thus making the exit of the Analyst of the School and the exit from analysis equivalent. Not bad! Since it is part of the wager for an Analyst of the School that it is a matter of him/her knowing something about the moment of leaving. This is a response that can only be obtained one by one.

Why then would the designation of the AS be worthy, once we get to know the challenges of formalization, of the public presentation and of the inevitable missed encounters? Perhaps for these very reasons.

In creating something new, the transmission is not different from the challenge of an analysis, in relation to which we become split when attempting to transmit what inexorably escapes us, be it *qua* analysands or *qua* analysts; yet in doing so we create new ways of supporting our vile and insignificant existence. Formalization, when it is not pure

'verbiage', is produced with the same threads of an analysis, whatever they might be, *words that become embodied* [*palabras que hacen cuerpo*].

As to the public presentation: the public concerns us as subjects in the social link and as subjected to the social link. To suppose that my history is better or worse than that of the others is to believe in histories, thus elevating fiction to the place of truth from which the analysis attempts to move us. This is only another version of a history, which never coincides with itself.

Let us remind ourselves, however, that transferences are created as a result of this presentation, and that we are elevated to places that are inevitably fragile and unstable. Yet, is this not precisely what our work is about? Let the other suppose, so that the other uses this supposition as much as necessary until he/she does not need it anymore? We must be aware that the question concerns what *we* suppose. That is to say, the other's supposition should not provide us with an excuse to become impostors – and this would be of our entire responsibility.

As for the missed encounters, for me the challenge was more difficult, because I like being a participating member of the Forum, and I was really happy in that position, so much so that I did not know how to be an 'outsider'. I insist upon this point, as I felt I belonged to that ex-centric place of significant exchanges. But the position of AS, in addition to the question of the 'statutory time', made me face another question, as I became a member of the School when I became AS. This was to avoid the paradox, of which I had no knowledge, of having an AS who is not a member of the School. I accepted it. According to the theory this appears to be simple and coherent; but it might be dangerously convenient. Convenience, as I pointed out earlier, can be anti-analytic, as I continue to have serious limitations in contributing as a member of a school, which is one of the reasons why I went through the Pass. I know that this is paradoxical, but this passage is part of my testimony. In my testimony, I said – in response to a question about being a member of the Forum, and finding myself unable to contribute from my place – that I desired that the narrative of my analysis were a contribution to the School.

I take this opportunity to propose that the self de-authorization of the position of AS reverse the position of member of the School, and that the elections be renewed, if this were applicable. I know that it is only in very few cases that the paradox is present, but it is salutary that they may enable us to work on the logic within which the function involved is supposed to operate. As always, this is with the intention that the singular makes us work.

Having said this, I renew my wager for the Forum, I am ready to continue our conversations if there is something else to be transmitted, and I declare publicly my desire to remain as a member of the School, even with the limitations to which I referred earlier.

I end this discourse, therefore, de-authorizing myself from the position of AS, and ceasing to be an Analyst of the School as from this act. I hope that I have made a contribution with this reflection, as has been my desire from the beginning.

#### POSTSCRIPT

#### There was transmission, there was AS

On the experience as AS, I can only give my own testimony. I move from the testimony of the journey and end of my analysis to the testimony of the journey as AS within the School, with the purpose of contributing to the question of the AS, that is to say, for the School once the AS is referred to the School.

From the beginning, the designation had an effect of recognition of the existence of a transmission of the unsayable in an analysis, and this event was accompanied by great joy. The first impression was that of having been part of a procedure that fulfilled its function when it said: something was transmitted of the end of an analysis and the consequent desire of the analyst. I am particularly glad that through this procedure something of what we produce everyday in our consulting rooms and in our analyses can be collected. The enthusiasm derives from the possibility of establishing a border to what is unsayable of the analytic act and its consequences. I understand that this refers to the acknowledgement of the functioning of a procedure composed of Analysts Members of the School, passers appointed by the AMSs, the secretaries that interview the candidates to become passands, the passand, and the Cartel of the Pass. Finally, if there has been designation, the passand is invited to re-transmit to the School what he/she was able to transmit to the secretaries and passers, and these, in turn, to the cartel of the pass.

This passage to the public plane is a return to the School in what the School itself advocates by promoting the encounter between psychoanalysis in intension and psychoanalysis in extension. This is in fact a moving event in which we recognize our own analyses and analysts through the word of our colleagues. This is what happened when I had the privilege of listening to Pedro Arévalo, Camila Vidal and, more recently, Elizabeth Thamer. This is also what I learnt from some people who listened to my testimony.

It is pertinent to highlight an affirmation by Colette Soler that I heard on the occasion of making a communication on the Pass: 'There was transmission'. What I am attempting to capture here is the sequence of events that results in the return to the School of the transmission that has been produced. There was transmission, and the School is the final destination of this transmission.

I would say 'There was AS', in so far as a cycle closes itself on the School and its effects become singularly open to those who listen to and read the testimonies and do with it what they are able and desire to do.

In addition, in relation with the time that I called 'statutory', the period during which there has been agreement that it is desirable that the AS exercises his/her function – first established as two years and then three years – I make my proposal and base it on my own participation as AS, and not on that of others, who will have to speak in their own name.

I propose that there be AS at the moment to conclude, and not as a pre-established period; and that the other words, apart from the testimony that returns to the School the effect of the procedure, be contingent and based upon the desire of the member of the School that passed through the pass, but also of the passers and members of the cartel – the desire to continue speaking and of the School to continue listening.

We should not lose the power of the procedure to the inertia that the designation may mask. In my singular case, I have sought to recover the power that **there was transmission** and **there was AS**, and therefore, there were AMSs, passers, secretaries of the procedure, Cartel and School.

The time when it was my turn to be AS, the time when there was enthusiasm in speaking as AS is this one, and has no correspondence with the previously stipulated time. I think that some colleagues would not be happy with a period of three years either. But I believe that that is not the point. *We were AS, when we returned to the School with the effects of the chain of events that we set in motion and which are its components.* We continue as members with our singular contributions since then, for an indefinite time, once the event has passed. I was AS in 2016 and thank the School for it. Since then, when invited, I have spoken on the crucial questions of psychoanalysis, as a member that went through this moving experience.

Thank you.

Translated by Leonardo S. Rodríguez

#### On the limits of knowledge<sup>1</sup>

Elisabete Thamer

Before approaching the function of the AS [Analyst of the School], I would like to tell you about something essential that I learned from my experience of analysis, for in my opinion there is some correlation between the two. In affirming "didactic psychoanalysis",<sup>2</sup> Lacan postulated that fundamentally all analysis is training analysis and it teaches us something that goes beyond just being a treatment.

The person who begins an analysis has many hopes. However, as he continues it becomes more and more obvious for the subject that an analysis is not everything. It might get rid of several of his symptoms, but it can't eradicate all of them; it will allow him to gain some knowledge about himself, but not "all" the knowledge. It is for this reason that I consider that one of the crucial problems of psychoanalysis is, rightly, what the analysand will do with this hiatus that exists between what he has gained from the analytic *dispositif* and what has been impossible for him to obtain.

<sup>1</sup> This presentation given in September in Rio de Janiero, takes up an important part of the argument already published in an article, "It is not that!! Some reflections on knowledge and the end of analysis". <sup>2</sup> Lacan, J., On my antecedents. *Écrits:* The *First Complete Edition in English.* Trans. B. Fink. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, pp. 56-57

From this angle, the perspective might appear discouraging or unpredictable, but this is not the case. It is not discouraging, and Lacan insisted on the positive affects that mark an analysis taken to its end, evoking first "enthusiasm", in the "Italian note",<sup>3</sup> and then, "satisfaction" in "Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI".<sup>4</sup> These affects are no less unpredictable, but signs that indicate the results of a singular logic that traces the parameter of a conclusion. How then to obtain an end of analysis where satisfaction is the trademark, yet many of the expectations about the end are frustrated?

The limits of psychoanalysis are various and some are revealed by its own instrument, speech. It is not only unfit for apprehending the real, from where a large part of the subject's afflictions come, but exercising it also involves a good portion of jouissance.

There are other intrinsic impasses in the analytic dispositif that are added to those of speech. In my opinion, two of the fundamental concepts condense a crucial impasse for the dénouement of an analysis, namely, the concepts of the unconscious and the transference. In 1969, in "The Psychoanalytic Act", Lacan redefined the unconscious in affirming that "That there is an unconscious means that there is knowledge without a subject".<sup>5</sup> In 1973, speaking about the transference, he gives us this simple enough formula: "it is love addressed to knowledge".<sup>6</sup> This rapprochement shows us that the transferential hypothesis - the hope to obtain knowledge without which there is no analysis – is destined for frustration because of the very nature of the unconscious. Not only does this definition put unconscious knowledge outside the scope of the analysand by putting the "subject of the unconscious" in an awkward position, but Lacan also once insists on another point: the unconscious is a "knowledge that doesn't think, calculate, or judge",<sup>7</sup> and moreover, it is the Arbeiter, the ideal worker who is never on strike. This means that there is no end to an analysis in which the solution comes from the unconscious. If the end, by definition, cannot come from the unconscious, from where does it come if not from the subject himself? More precisely, from the way in which he remains hooked or not to his own unconscious? That is the reason why I think that the key to a completed analysis is in the radical turning away from the position of the subject in relation to knowledge, knowledge that is the common denominator between the two definitions I have drawn attention to and that are seemingly contradictory to each other.

We must now pose the following question: is the "knowledge" at stake in the two definitions the same? According to Lacan, it required the creation of psychoanalysis for the question of "knowledge" to be renewed, since psychoanalysis shows that there is knowledge that does not know. It is obvious then that "knowledge" in psychoanalysis is not univocal, for we have, on one side, articulated, expressible knowledge in linguistic terms: "For the speaking being", says Lacan in Seminar XX, *Encore*, "knowledge is that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Lacan, J., « Note italienne » dans Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 309

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacan, J., The Preface to the English-Language Edition. In *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,* London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lacan, J., « L'acte psychanalytique » [Compte rendu], dans Autres écrits, op. cit., p. 376.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Lacan, J., « Introduction à l'édition allemande d'un premier volume des Écrits », dans Autres écrits, op. cit., p. 558.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lacan, J., Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment. Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A.

Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 14.

which is articulated".<sup>8</sup> On the other side, we have unconscious knowledge, the effect of *lalangue*, which goes beyond what the subject can state in terms of language. Articulated knowledge, which goes from one signifier to another, necessarily produces a lack-in-knowledge that keeps the subject in a constant quest to complete knowledge. I think I can affirm that the analysand's hoped-for knowledge, in any case before the moment of the pass overturns all of that, is the expectation of an enunciated knowledge that is causal in the classic sense of the term; that is, the idea that in knowing the cause, the symptoms will disappear. The analysis shows that this is indeed the case for some symptoms, but not for all.

The effects of deciphering, linked to the benefits of speech under transference, assures therapeutic effects that are not negligible. So much the better! Besides, a good number of analysands are happy with this gain, and that is not necessarily a problem if they do not intend to become analysts. Therapeutic effects are, however, double edged with regard to the conclusion of the analysis because for the analysand, they can nourish the hope of obtaining a major therapeutic effect one day, one that is definitive and radical, and which will free him from the destiny that his unconscious has imposed on him. As Lacan said, also in Seminar *Encore:* "because of what gets included in those words as a consequence", an analysis does not always reach the point of making a saying exist upon which its end quite rightly depends.<sup>9</sup>

#### Ends

We know that Lacan did not cease to elaborate the question of the end of analysis, and that he gradually put forward criteria for circumscribing it, like the fall of identifications, passing through the traversal of the fantasy, and then to identification with the symptom, which is united with his elaborations on the real unconscious. What seems to me to be important to emphasise is not only that any succeeding elaborations do not invalidate the preceding ones, but rather, complete them. We note that analytic communities sometimes elide one or other of these elaborations, and transform them into a type of orthodoxy, thus shaping the prospects in relation to the Pass. From time to time, a concept becomes algamatic, making it difficult for us to learn from the singularity of each analysis.

#### The traversal of the fantasy

It is for this reason that I would like to tackle a point that today is perhaps considered to be old-fashioned if one compares it with the later elaborations of Lacan, namely the traversal of the fantasy. You could ask me, and quite rightly, why look at such a wellworn question? Rightly, since any analysis oriented by Lacan's elaborations on the end of analysis, including the identification with the symptom, cannot do without this passage

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lacan, J., The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973. Ed. J-A Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 137.
<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

where, precisely, the assurance that the subject takes from his fantasy is overturned.<sup>10</sup> Why is the said "traversal of the fantasy" essential to the conclusion of an analysis? Because it is that which shows the basis of the truth-symptoms that throughout a life have knotted the subject to a hypothetical Other. A short time after the publication of this "Proposition" Lacan affirmed that, "the value of a psychoanalysis is to operate on the fantasy".<sup>11</sup> Now, the expression "value of a psychoanalysis" is an appreciation, Lacan's judgement on the import of analysis. Indeed, there is no analysis that can be considered finished without the jouissance that is taken in the fantasy having been touched, for it is only in losing all signification that the fantasy "touches the real".<sup>12</sup> The fall of this "fiction" could, possibly, allow the subject to perceive, finally, the real dimension of his unconscious. I will come back to this point.

Notice that it is a matter of what the analysis can obtain, a field in which it proves its efficacy. In spite of the insufficiency of deciphering and the leaking of sense, something of deciphering does exist in that the analysis writes and it writes it because it insists: this is the sense of the fantasy. This is the only sense that insists throughout the analysis, in certain symptoms, in complaints, in the lexicon of the analysand, in some signifiers and condensed scenarios of jouissance. The fantasy "is not permeable to every meaning".<sup>13</sup>

To traverse the fantasy is obviously not to get rid of it once and for all but to "realise" its fictional dimension, forged and contingent, of which the author is the subject himself; the scenario of jouissance that he imputed until then to an Other that doesn't exist.

Just as in the dream from which the structure of my fantasy emerged, a neologism introduced the oneiric contents of which the scenario was, of course, extremely familiar to me. An expression, "It is not that!" marked the conclusion. The word that introduced it was a mixture of *bête* which, besides the fact that it is the way I am referred to by those close to me in Brazil (my country of origin), also evokes the adjective "*bête*" [stupid] in French (the language of the country in which I have lived for a long time), with the Greek verb *semainein*, which means "signifier". The latter was at that time an important term in the thesis in philosophy that I was preparing. I concluded then, that this dreamed neologism meant simply "*une signification bête*". The scenario of the fantasy, serious until then, was unveiled from that moment as a sort of equivocation of which the final expression – "It is not that!" – denoted the separation. There was nothing more to draw from this dream; it did not have to be interpreted now to produce associations. These are of course the changes in life that can testify that something is undone there.

To "realise" that the fantasy is a fiction of which one is the author already implies an effect of separation and, necessarily, a change of affect, for in experiencing the inconsistency of the Other, the relations of the subject to others are definitively modified, as is the relation to knowledge also. This overturning necessarily modifies the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Cf. Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Lacan, J., « Discours de clôture des Journées sur la psychose (21 et 22 octobre 1967) », in *Recherches, 8*, Enfance aliénée II. L'enfant, la psychose et l'institution. Paris: CERFI, dezembro de 1968, p. 148.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Lacan, J., « L'étourdit », dans Autres écrits, op. cit., p. 487.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Lacan, J., Le Séminaire, Livre XVIII, « D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant », Paris, Seuil, 2006, p. 28.

libidinal investments, for the imaginary and symbolic restrictions are considerably alleviated. The jouissance seized in the fantasy loses its power, leaving only the subsistence of the drive, or even a style; tastes that are not foreign to what were once the grooves by which the subject tried to couple his desire to an Other that does not exist. As long as the subject takes the fiction of the fantasy for the real, he will absolutely not have traversed that which allows him to enter the end of the analysis.

#### Towards the real unconscious or the mourning for articulated knowledge

Without any doubt, the traversal of the fantasy is a fundamental step at the end of analysis, but is it sufficient? Is it the index that there has been a change in the subject's relation to knowledge? It seems to me that it is a necessary passage, but not sufficient for the modification of the relation of the subject to knowledge, which is essential for the practice of the analytic function.

It is not sufficient because the knowledge bound to the fantasy is a fictional knowledge, but it can be stated and one can testify to this "lying truth". Despite this, the problem is that the unconscious will not stop ciphering jouissance, and there is jouissance that is not secured in the fantasy. Is traversing it sufficient assurance that the subject has detached himself from the jouissance that binds him to deciphering, that is, to his unconscious? Can one stay in love with one's unconscious, with its formations, even though the fantasy has been traversed?

I think that analysis can lead the analysand a bit further, free him from his passion for deciphering, and that cannot come in any way from his own unconscious. There are no providential dreams or lapsus that determine the end, delivering exceptional material to the subject, a *grand cru* dream that would allow him to conclude. That is the analysand's dream, and even that of some analysts. The analysis does not modify the unconscious but rather the subject, for it modifies the way in which he reads the formations of his unconscious, even getting to the point of disconnecting from it. If the testimonies of the Pass are rich with examples of dreams or unforgettable lapsus, these are not because they are exceptional in themselves, but because the subject no longer reads them as he did before. I think it is that which marks the turning point, and not the inverse.

When Lacan writes "when the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*."<sup>14</sup> One could wonder: for whom would the lapsus no longer carry any meaning if not for the subject? It is the subject who no longer imputes sense to his lapsus, and not the inverse. It is the subject who no longer looks for meaning to represent himself in relation to a signifier or the signifiers of his lapsus, who no longer reads it, able at last to relegate it to the real outside sense. I would locate there the completion of the mourning for a lack in knowledge. One knows one knows enough to conclude.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Lacan, J., The Preface to the English-Language Edition, in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii.

That re-organises the metabolism of jouissances, allowing the subject to conclude that there is an opaque jouissance that the analysis cannot eliminate. Notwithstanding the opacity of a part of the jouissance that is refractory to deciphering, the analysed knows that this unconscious, forever beyond grasping, is well and truly "his", because this unconscious knowledge that goes beyond it affects his body, a body that is not the subject. He will know what to do with that.

The satisfaction that marks the end is a sign that the subject has been modified by his analysis, in the way in which he bears his incurable division. The affect of satisfaction, through the fact of effecting the body indicates something there where the signifier fails, an expectation that the relation of the subject to a certain real has been touched, at least this real which, having come to light is from then on impossible, thereby alleviating the subject from his powerlessness. But certainly this point goes well beyond what one can testify to as articulated knowledge, this "false truth" that is neither more nor less than a "*signification bête*".

At the end of his seminar "Les non-dupes errent" Lacan says this: For the first time in history, it is possible for you to err, that is, to refuse to love your unconscious, since in the end you know what this is: a knowledge. An annoying [emmerdant] knowledge".<sup>15</sup>

#### The function of the AS

With the invention of the *dispositif* of the Pass, Lacan forged a way of questioning the knowledge of the psychoanalyst. He installed a procedure that removed the complacency of those who claimed to be analysts, inciting them constantly to question this "thick shadow" that lay over the passage of analysand to analyst. For the tendency, even among the "best" analysts, is to rest upon knowledge already acquired, thereby running the risk of weakening the desire to know that must lead our practice. The least one can say about the Pass is that it produces a certain discomfort in the whole community, a discomfort of which the objective is to push us to work, preventing the routine to be crystallised in certitudes that distance us from the new knowledge that the singularity of each case always brings. Within the School, the function of the AS is to try to maintain this hole in knowledge at the centre, which can be disturbing. All those who participate in the dispositif contribute to this movement: AMS, passers and passands, nominated or not. This concerns a collective wager that does not let us forget that there is "a real at stake in the very training of psychoanalysts" and that this real as Lacan warns us, "provokes its own miscognition, indeed produces its systematic negation".<sup>16</sup> The existence of a hole in knowledge does not signify that one should embark on an apology about "nonknowledge", against which Lacan is, moreover, indignant. Rather, it is a matter of what we have to know, try to know.

The worst thing that could happen to a School is that it stops thinking about its function as a School, that is, of its *telos*: the training of analysts. The responsibility is immense, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Lacan, J., Le Séminaire XXI, « Les non-dupes errent », leçon du 11 juin 1974, inédit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. p. 2

it is not an academic type of training. A School of psychoanalysis cannot function only by co-optation either – friendship relations or meritocracy – for if this were the case, what would differentiate us from the university or other groups? The Cartel and the Pass are Lacan's two inventions that help us to maintain a distinct collective experience in relation to knowledge and its limits.

The function of the AS is to contribute a little bit to this wager of the School for a time. It is certainly not the case of posing as an example of a model-analyst for, as Freud said, "'Handbooks to life' soon grow out of date".<sup>17</sup> All that is without doubt precarious, but it is precisely on this precariousness that Lacan expects the Analyst of the School to be sustained.<sup>18</sup>

Translated by Susan Schwartz

# The test through the School and the School put to the test 50 years after the Proposition

Sonia Alberti

I thank you for the invitation and I'll try to add a little bit of depth to the mail sent by Colette Soler on April 8 this year on the question of the AMS. As a member of the International College of the Guarantee in the last biennium - 2014-2016 - I was co-signatory of our School's decision to halt, for that period, the nomination of new AMS, Analysts Members of the School. Fundamentally, this decision was based on:

1) The way in which the suggestions for AMS have been made. That is, often based on group effects – since they exist in our School as they do elsewhere. However it is the function of the School – that upon which the School depends in order to be a School – to oppose them;

2) The difficulties faced by the Cartels of the Pass with some of the passers who are, as we know, referred by AMSs. As Lacan used to say, the passer is the Pass, and if this passer is not up to the task, the Pass, necessarily, is compromised. Then follows the question which is posed by the International College of the Guarantee (ICG), the College that constitutes the Cartels of the Pass and whose members are the members of this College: how to transmit, in the School, the subtlety of nominating a passer? If this is the function of the AMS, who are the AMS in our School responsible for it?

3) The commitment of the AMS to the international School. The true commitment of the majority of the AMS in representing our School in the world – which is one of the functions of the AMS – is notable. On the other hand, some of the AMS of our School stay in their work places, sometimes in their regions, without connecting with the international function of our School: they neither attend the International Meetings, nor activities in other countries, they do not know their colleagues, and are often not even aware of their publications through the School.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Freud, S., Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d [1925]). SE XX, p. 96.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Cf. Lacan, J., « Discours à l'École freudienne de Paris », dans Autres écrits, op. cit., p. 271.

Well, how would the International School work if those analysts who are responsible for representing it – including the doctrine that it sustains – do not move around, do not know the work that has been done in different countries, do not sustain an exchange with their peers? Wouldn't the risk be, first of all, that this doctrine could then be anything at all, without the necessary exchange in order for us to put our "cultural and national entities" (Soler, April 8th email) in tune and, why not say it, to take into account the diversity of our languages? When the ICG 2014-16 published *Echoes 4*, it included the following paragraph on this question: "Lacan gave us a definition in the Foundation Act, according to which the title would guarantee the reliability of a practice from an external perspective. However, the Proposition on the pass changes something, namely that the role of AMS in psychoanalysis in intention and in our international School, including their clinical capacity as well, must be of utmost importance for the grounds upon which the nomination is based, with a particular emphasis on the regular participation in the activities of the School not only locally, but nationally and internationally."

In her April 8th mail, Colette Soler notes that, as regards the initial requirement, that is, the one stated in the *Act of Foundation*, with rare exceptions – there are always some – our AMSs deserve compliments! As "all have what became increasingly rare: all had had an analysis, in many cases a long one, many supervisions, and all sustain a worthy practice, as far as we know; some have analysands going through the Pass, and sometimes nominated, which indicates that there is, in them, no demerit before the act, and concretely, that they were capable, at least, of not posing an obstacle to the analysis of this or that analysand, maybe they were even capable of facilitating it". In this regard, therefore, as Colette Soler says: we are doing well!

We are not doing so well with regard to the function of the AMS within the School: "inertia, deficient participation, nominations that follow the regime of opinions, always comparative, insufficient and vague criteria etc." And she concludes: "all this needs fresh air, in the sense of being revitalized, and improved in the best way possible".

A small step towards refreshing the "AMS question" was already given in the General Assembly of the School in Medellín last year [2016]: there was a vote in favor of a change in the Guiding Principles for our School in regard to who can nominate an AMS: up until July 2016, only the AMSs could suggest new AMSs, but now any member of the School can do that. This proposal was taken by the ICG 2014-2016 to the GA. What is it based on? Beyond a democratic perspective, the proposal emerges from the verification of the way we used to nominate AMSs: revisiting the words of Colette Soler's mail: "nominations that follow the regime of opinions, always comparative, insufficient and vague criteria etc." Well, if that's the way we were doing then, any member of the School can do that, being the responsibility of those who assist the ICG locally – in the case of Brazil, the Local Committee of Welcome, Epistemology, and Guarantee (CLEAG) – in examining these suggestions first, after which the ICG will have its turn. That is, from the moment when all members of the School are able to suggest an AMS, the CLEAG

and the ICG can be very strict in the act of validating a nomination, avoiding the simple "regime of opinion, always comparative..."

Then there's the second question mentioned in the April 8th email: on the "insufficient and vague criteria." Well, insufficient criteria ... wouldn't that be necessary in order not to turn the AMS into sufficiencies? Those to which Lacan was referring already in 1956 when he asked himself about "valid training"[in "The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956"] and he spoke of the tight little shoes? (p. 384)?

So, insufficient, yes! But vague? Vague criteria? Wouldn't it be here that we could examine more deeply the said "criteria"? When Lacan, in 1956, asked himself about "valid training", as I have already said, he phrased it like this: "For if I have ironically defined psychoanalysis as the treatment one expects from a psychoanalyst, it is nevertheless certainly psychoanalysis that determines the quality of the psychoanalyst" (p. 385). That is, there is no quality in the psychoanalytic treatment if there's no psychoanalysis. This, notes Lacan in this text, is built upon – Freud's legacy, his concepts, and *powerful* articulations, which, in their turn, "do not correspond to anything that is immediately given to our intuition" (Lacan, 1956, p. 386). In psychoanalysis the concepts are significant and as such one teaches and researches them -knowing that, since always or since Freud, research in psychoanalysis is clinical. But the value of a is of another materiality – I developed that in another context (Alberti, 2015). If a is the place of the analyst, the Analyst Member of the School needs to be able to be it, therefore, almost always he or she is already an analyst. He or she needs to be able to be it because it is from his or her practice that passers arise and, eventually, a passand. Maybe that is why often a former Analyst of the School (AS) becomes an AMS! He or she has offered proof that he or she can be it. But how can one verify the AMS? Lacan proposed that every analyst who produces an AS would become, ipso facto, an AMS - he or she would have offered proof. Beyond that, what to propose?

Let's go back to what Colette Soler said in her email: "all [our AMS] did an analysis, in many cases a long one, many supervisions, and all sustain a worthy practice, as far as we know; some have analysands going through the Pass, sometimes nominated, which indicates that [...] they were capable, at least, of not posing an obstacle to the analysis of this or that analysand, maybe they were even capable of facilitating it". That's why she says they deserve compliments. The first question is: are these items part of our criteria? In order that the ICG's local secretariat verifies it, it is necessary to contact the analyst and supervisors. As long as only AMSs can suggest passers, the name of an analyst indicated for AMS in the list of the analysts of the passers will never be found, but it is possible, for example, to verify if the indicated analyst was passer or even passand, to verify in this case what the Cartels of the Pass identified as regards the practice of the function of this passer or as regards his or her position as a passand. It becomes easier today as the ICG 2014-16 reinstated a Notebook of the Pass, with short notes on each Pass, the passers who participated in it and the discussions that took place. This Notebook of the Pass is the exclusive property the ICG, and it finally allowed us to leave a legacy that makes it possible to historicize the Pass in our School. The Committee of the Guarantee, which either ratifies the candidates for AMS or does not, is part of the ICG and can access this Notebook. So would a person, in order to be named AMS, have to have been a passer or passand at some point so that in this way the ICG would know something about the position of this analyst in relation to what is at the heart of our School, the pass? This is a question to which we could, maybe, give some attention at least. The fact is that, we, as participants in the ICG, verified that strangely there were several people who were nominated to become AMS who had no previous experience with the Pass. As the movement for our School will turn twenty next year in the next International Meeting, which will take place in Barcelona, and the General Assembly of the School will vote on the proposals on this AMS question, why don't we consider that the School has existed for long enough to allow that the next nominations of AMEs be of people who could be tested in relation to the Pass? The Pass, in our School, was instituted in 2001! From that time then, we have already had many passends!

Finally, I would like to highlight that our School, particularly in Brazil, offers many possibilities for analysts to present their papers nationally and internationally. The Symposium that will begin tomorrow is only one more example of this. In presenting their papers, the analysts can present their relationship with the clinic. Of course there is always the question of the extent to which an author was helped out by a colleague to write his paper ... again, a supervisor or even an analyst can be questioned about that. I insist on the importance of paper presentations in our School. It follows one of the first guidelines proposed by Lacan in 1964: "Those who will enter this School will engage in a work subjected to both internal and external control. In exchange, they have the assurance that nothing will be overlooked in order that every valid thing that they do resonates as it deserves to and occupies its proper place." (Lacan, 1964/2001)

Once again the word "valid"! On the one hand, the "insufficient and vague criteria," on the other hand, what is valid! But if valid is what makes equivalence – as Lacan would elaborate more than ten years later, in "Seminar XXIV" – being constituted by a materiality different from that of the object a - the latter being closer of the *moterialité* than the *materialité* then maybe the criteria would have to take into account both materialities. On the one hand, the equivalence that allows the AMS to represent the whole of our School in the world – one of its functions – on the other hand, that which has no equivalence, only *une bévue*...

On the one hand, the School recognizes the AMS as a psychoanalyst who has offered his proof, that is, one who supports its whole guarantee (Lacan, 1967/2001). But if the whole of the School is what is measured by the notion of a common value, which one exchanges, and if its difference is given by the materiality (Lacan develops it in the same Seminar), then, as it cannot be measurable – and, therefore, it cannot be equivalent to clear criteria – "a stumbling [*une bévue*] is a fake 'whole''' (idem), a punctured cauldron. Each AMS should also be able to be this stumbling, despite the fact that it represents the whole of the School there where it is as "every man who thinks":

"What has value in man is that he thinks, only this has value, but this that values submits the use value to the exchange value" (Lacan, 1976-77, seminar of 12/14/1976). What the

man says when he thinks or because he thinks would indicate the use he can make of the signifying battery, to which he is subjected as it constitutes the Other, is exclusively subjected to exchange value because there, one signifier is equivalent to another.

The unit of value, the abstraction that allows us to measure and compare commodities, depends on the entire calculation that Marx analyses in his *Capital* and which takes into account not only the cost of making the commodity from the raw material to the labor, but also what Marx conceptualizes as the surplus value.

But this "it" - which in another context Lacan identifies with the nothing (*un rien*) of Pascal (Lacan, 1968-69/2006) – is not properly controlable; it is this stumbling, *une bevue*, slip up – it evokes the School and its work. References:

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LACAN, J. (1956/1966). Situation de la psychanalyse en 1956. In: *Écrits*. Paris, Seuil. Pp. 459-492. Translator's note: The pages in this version correspond to the Spanish version of the text.

LACAN, J. (1964/2001). Acte de fondation. In: Autres Écrits. Paris, Seuil. Pp. 459-492.

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LACAN, J. (1968-69/2006). Le Séminaire, livre XVI, D'un Autre à l'autre. Paris, Seuil,

LACAN, J. (1976-77). Le Séminaire, livre XXIV, L'Insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre. Inédito.

SOLER, C. L'A.M.E. de l'EPFCL. Internal electronic correspondence, April 8, 2017.

Translated by Gabriel Costardi

### f(x) AMS Sandra Berta

In the newsletter *Echoes*, numbers 5, 7, 9, and 10<sup>19</sup>, you can find information about the decisions made, and updates on the continuing debate on the *function* of the AMS (Analyst Member of the School) of the SPFLF (School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field). The current ICG (International College of the Guarantee) counts on both this study day, as well as the one that will take place in France in the coming September, to contribute to the work of our community.

The former ICG (2014-2016) made two decisions: 1) to suspend, temporarily, the nominations for AMS and 2) to declare null and void the list of nominated AMS received in the 2014-2016 term. Moreover, it was taking into account the decision of the Assembly of the School (Medellín, July of 2016), that Members of the School will be able to make suggestions for AMS nominations. In March 2017 the current ICG opened up a debate through the list for Members of the School, stating that the decision of the former ICG was an index of what Jacques Lacan had pointed out in 1967, when the AMS *function* was located in the Graph of Desire in the matheme s(A), in other words, in the place of the symptom.

We must revisit the questions that come out of that experience. It is an ethical question, as well as putting the School to the test.

When we started the debate I wrote to my colleagues, the members of the IGC, that we should keep in mind that "AMS" is a *function*. In 1967 Lacan stated that there is no predicate *of* the analyst, that being true for both the AMS and the AS. It is through this partitive "of" that we can orient this debate as regards the function, and differentiate structure from conjuncture.

In proposing the *dispositif* of the Pass, and asking about what of the psychoanalyst operates in an analysis, Lacan went back to logic. Let's revisit Frege's function.<sup>20</sup> The notation f(x), in order to represent the value of a function, is composed from the function's name followed by the argument's name. If f is a function and x is in the domain of f, the expression f(x) denotes the value of f for the argument x. In our own terms: what of the analyst operates ("x" as argument) and verifies the analyst's function.

Therefore, it is in this "of" the analyst that it is decided if there is a function that is named AS or AMS, considering the differences between what is expected of each one of these functions for a School. This structure of the Fregean function, present in the analytic act, is what is put to test in the Pass. The value of this function in the *dispositif* of the Pass has the formalization of the analytic act as its ultimate goal, its consequences for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> http://www.champlacanien.net

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Frege, G., *Conceptografia. Los Fundamentos de Aritmética. Otros estudios filosóficos.* Trad. Padilla, H. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, 1972.

a School and for psychoanalysis. AMS, passer, passand, Cartel of the Pass, AS, *the School put to test and the test through the School* are extracted from this logical principle of the function - f(x). As regards the guarantee and the *gradus* (different from hierarchy), the real is "forbidden for cheaters".<sup>21</sup> It is an ethical interdiction inherent to psychoanalysis and, certainly, to the *dispositif* of the Pass.

Taking as reference the function f(x), we can follow the debate launched and gather the current situation of the SPFLF as to the questions and findings of what functions in the function of the AMS. I recall that this ICG opened up the debate with three questions:

- 1- What does the School expect from its AMSs?
- 2- What guarantees the nomination of an AMS?
- 3- Why make a nomination?

The former ICG pointed out that the nomination of the AMSs was a question and a problem, since they designate passers and compose, in their majority, the Cartels of the Pass. On this occasion, the function of the AMS was highlighted, but we know that the real at play in the structure calls into question each one of the actors in the *dispositif*.

Then, we have two fundamental aspects of the function of AMS: to designate passers and to take part in the Cartels of the Pass. For this Study Day I chose to approach briefly each one. However, there are other questions about this function that refer to *extension* in its Moebian relationship with *intension*. Nominating an AMS requires that we think about this Moebian relationship.

#### The designation of the passer

It is important to remember that this has been debated for a longtime in our community. And the debate has been published in different numbers of Wunsch.<sup>22</sup> If in the last months it has been said that it is important to revisit the question of the passer, it is because the structure will be put into question on the basis of what we get from the experience. We know and understand what the *passer function* means. Is it forgotten when we designate a passer? *Each case is a unique case*, however, if we have problems with the designation of passers – and this is a fact – I believe that the accent should be on the understanding of the structure in order to analyze the conjuncture. For this reason we resume the debates... knowing they are not new.

The designation of a passer is both a wager and a test for the analysand who is designated for the *dispositif* of the Pass and for the School. The one who designates is put to the test with regard to the School and its function. Designating a passer will not lead to the creation of a series as it is about a singular experience. The question at stake is the outcome of the analysis, particularly and foremost the logical temporality (the instant of seeing, the time to understand, the moment to conclude) which affects the transference,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Lacan, J., Preâmbulo. Setembro de 1970. In: Outros Escritos. Jorge Zahar, Ed., 2003, p. 590. // Scilicet n° 2/3, Paris, Seuil, 1970, pp. 3-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Thesaurus sobre o Passador, edited by Ricardo Rojas and Dominique Fingermann. In: *Wunsch 11*, October, 2011. http://www.champlacanien.net

the production of a real that does not rely on the fantasy, the drive at the end and the production of a holed knowledge.

Let's remember that the psychoanalytic act is defined through an operation: the passage from psychoanalysand to psychoanalyst. The paradox of the act poses the question about who performs this act? "The psychoanalyst is made from the object *a*: with the object *a*. "Is made", that is to be understood. He is produced from the object *a*: with the object *a*."<sup>23</sup> A passer's testimony aims to transmit the efficacy of the operation of the analytic act that has produced the object *a*, name of the non-relation, index of the psychoanalyst's desire, of his enunciation "which can only happen in the case that he comes into in the position of *x*."<sup>24</sup>

In designating a passer, an AMS in assuming his function will consider that it is in the manner in which the testimony of the passand is taken that it will be evident if the passer does occupy his function of *being the Pass*.

What is expected from a passer exercising his or her function? It is expected that someone who is in the *passer function* can place himself or herself on the threshold, in the narrow doorway of the end, "on the threshold where there is nothing else to uncover other than to break open the doors.<sup>25</sup> It is expected that he or she knows something about the artifice of the transference, of the mistake [*méprise*] of the subject supposed to know that the analyst assumes, that at this point is an effect of unconscious knowledge. "The passer is still experiencing it, oscillating between hope and failure, acquired knowledge and holed knowledge," writes Colette Soler,<sup>26</sup> evoking Lacan in his Seminar 24, *L'insu que sait*.

Then it is expected from a passer in his/her function that he/she is in "the long time of the act",<sup>27</sup> but that his/her position is still in a tension, which I propose to think of as "it should not be" [*il ne faudrait pas que ce soit*] ... that of the passand. Lacan reminds us in L'Etourdit that if there is a possible calculation of the end, it is not in terms of a decision or a definition about what would produce that act of the end, the passage from analysand to analyst, the production of the object *a*, of enthusiasm and satisfaction. Here is the undecidable point that is produced in the designation of the passer. On the other hand, the coordinates that refer to the structure are not undecidable. I ask myself: what does the *passer function* mean in the matheme of the demand and the drive in the Graph of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Lacan, J., O ato psicanalítico. Resumo do Seminário de 1967-1968. In: *Outros Escritos*. São Paulo: Jorge Zahar, Ed. 2003, p. 375.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p.7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Fingermann, D., A presença do passador: atualidade da Escola. In: *Wunsch 11*, outubro de 2011, p. 16. http://www.champlacanien.net

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Soler, C., O Passador. In: *Wunsch 12*, junho de 2012, p.4. http://www.champlacanien.net

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Soler, C., O tempo Longo. In: *Wunsch 11*, outubro de 2011, pp. 3-7. http://www.champlacanien.net

Desire?<sup>28</sup> This debate is old and this question has already been raised by our colleague, Rithée Cevasco.

It is expected from someone in the function of passer that he/she knows about what the repetition of the demand is, and thus its function with regard to the drive – opaque, acephalic, in act – organized in the grammatical logic of the phantasy. It is expected that there is a *not-all* elaboration of knowledge about the versions with which he/she has responded to the enigma of his/her own desire. Therefore, we expect a knowledge about this circuit, which, by hollowing, produces the hole in knowledge. It shall be someone affected by the question about the end, although he/she may not have spoken about it as such. Someone who asks: where does that lead? Thus, someone who questions himself/herself about the "this is not that" [*ce n'est pas ça*] and who knows what defines the drive: it is the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying. It is this question that can give him/her the understanding of what, potentially, can operate of the "*knowledge of the psychoanalyst*" and of the analytic act.

Thus, it is expected that a passer in his/her function who is between the object a in the place of truth, and the object a in the place of the semblant/agent (analytic discourse). Precisely, in the passage between the production of a knowledge which is powerless to say the truth (the knowledge as product of the discourse of the analysand) and the production of a letter which is the matheme of the act, unsayable, but transmittable.

These coordinates make possible the designation of someone who is able to fill the function of passer for which "*it should not be*" [*il ne faudrait pas que ce soit*] ... namely, be the function in which the "x" of the argument could write the "*it should not*" [*il ne faudrait* pas]. It should not be that [*il ne faudrait pas que ce soit celle-la*] in order to be at the disposal of *it speaks, it speaks*<sup>29</sup> (*que ça cause, que ça cause*) which provokes and evokes what is transmitted of another dit-mension, because a saying ex-sists. It is this dit-mention, that "contains the knowledge that the analysis of the complaint only utilizes the truth", "in order to make this singular truth come to the court".<sup>30</sup> A truth which, as I pointed out earlier, does not refer to a place (the analyst's discourse) where knowledge is articulated, but to what is produced, it is written when the agent of discourse is the object *a* as "x".

Going back to what Colette Soler wrote: "rather than being evident, the time of the act is something to be interrogated"<sup>31</sup> in the passage from the belief in the transferential postulate to the interrogation of surplus jouissance. Designating a passer is to cause him/her to affect this interrogation. The effects are incalculable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Lacan, J., Primeira versão da Proposição de 9 de outubro de 1967 sobre o psicanalista da Escola. In: *Outros Escritos.* São Paulo: Jorge Zahar, Ed. 2003, p. 585.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Lacan, J., Nota que Jacques Lacan encaminhou pessoalmente àqueles que eram susceptíveis de designar os passadores (1974). In: *Wunsch 11*, outubro de 2011, p. 79. <u>http://www.champlacanien.net</u> Editor's note: in French the third person singular of the verb "*causer*", to chat, talk, is homophonic with the word "cause" (the same in French and English).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Strauss, M., Corte com a verdade! In: *Wunsch 11*, outubro de 2011, p. 26. http://www.champlacanien.net <sup>31</sup> Soler, C., O tempo longo. In: *Wunsch 11*, outubro 2011. http://www.champlacanien.net

Last but not least it is important to be aware that the *passer function* was proposed for the *dispositif* of the Pass and therefore, when one designates a passer it is necessary to consider if there is some transference of work to the School. I remember Antonio Quinet's proposal that the supervision of the moment of the pass can decide on a designation, a frequent, although not mandatory, practice in Brazil.

#### About the function of the AMS in the ICG

An AMS exercising his/her function in the ICG has to know about the experience of the cartel, know about the ins and outs of the work of the cartels.

The experience of working in cartels – the work of the School – affects the formation of the analyst because the cartels cause the production of both a textual and a referential knowledge, the latter being written as S (barred A). And that's why the cartel's plus-one can be anyone but must be someone.

Some years ago I proposed that the work of the cartel can lead to impasses in the sense of inhibition, anxiety and symptom as a formation of compromise. However, if there was a product of the cartel, a product proper to each one, it is because it was possible to know how to do with that which knotted this work, and based on what was expected, by the product, its cut. Doing the work of the School, sustaining the Borromean work transference is a different trait that can be transmitted in extension. This condition can create the trust in the Borromean that is expected from an AMS in his/her function in the Cartel of the Pass. We get the knowing-how-to-do-with the Borromean from the clinic, from conducting analysis until the end, and from the work with the cartels. Thus, from this Borromean practice, in the clinic and in the cartels, it is expected that an AMS in function is motivated by the desire to participate in the Cartels of the Pass and in the cartels of the ICG.

I would like to point out something that I have researched and that orients me, as it affects my understanding of the nomination of AS made by the Cartels of the Pass. An observation by Michel Bousseyroux attracted my attention when he addressed what Lacan stated in the Seminar *L'insu<sup>32</sup>* about the writing of the knot: it is not to be read since there we are in the dark. The quotation, which he is addressing, refers to the "string which is also the body-of"<sup>33</sup> [*la corde, c'est le corps-de*]. "this body-of is parasitized by the signifier" and "this body-of that we can only deal with in the dark. "How do we recognize what a Borromean knot is in the dark?"<sup>34</sup> With these questions, Lacan proposes the Pass as recognizing oneself amongst oneself,<sup>35</sup> ["*se reconnaissant entre soir*" (sic)] resonating in this formula: *soi* (oneself), *soir* (night), and *savoir* (knowledge).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Lacan, J., O Seminário, livro 24: L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre. 15 de fevereiro de 1977. Staferla.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> « La corde, c'est aussi le *corps-de »*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> « Comment reconnaîtrions-nous, dans le noir, que c'est un naud borroméen ? »

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> « se reconnaître entre s(av)oir ».

Bousseyroux's elaborations send us to the cut and not to the reading of the productions of *lalangue* once "one recognizes the Borromean knot in the chiaroscuro [*éclair obscure*] of its cut". The Pass, then, is the cut of the real Borromean entirely, which, for one instant, *l'esp d' un laps*, comes undone (but that the saying of the interpretation sutures, fill out).<sup>36</sup> The effects of this cut that are recognized in the dark (effects of sense, *jouissance*, sexual non relation) in the space of the *laps* of its unknotting, fade, disappear.<sup>37</sup>

I believe that if the cartel produces this cut, it verifies what becomes of the drive: the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying. *String, cut, corps-de* gain a differential value in this mode of conceiving the Pass and the nomination. Cutting is not deducing a construction, but only verifying and naming this Borromean structure of the speaking being [*parlêtre*]. Only with the nomination does the Cartel transmit the effect of the real at play in the psychoanalytic act. This is a hope of formalization to be transmitted by the Cartels of the Pass.

#### "... or worse"

The Fregean function guides us in this debate. It is a way of saying that the "x" that operates as argument for the function is not given from the beginning. And if from this debate we make some decisions, we'll have to be careful that they do not become aporia. I choose to bet on the paradox of what opens up to ex-sistence and to keep questioning ourselves if we can answer for *our function of psychoanalyst*.

Finally, I ask myself if the AMS function, symptom of the School, can become the sinthome. That is, knowing-how-to-do-with what operates in order that a School ex-sist (and does not consist) with the paradoxes that are produced in it. I remember that in 1975 the letter of the symptom was formalized by this notation f(x).<sup>38</sup> It makes me wonder if the operation of extension (to which each AMS is summoned), considering the intension proper to the structure – Moebian and Borromean – and in which is produced the expansion of the act, could affect the dominant discourses of the epoch so that the effects of the real, effects of the non-relation, are neither denied nor extinguished since they make the structure, write it and decide it.

Thank you.

Translated by Gabriela Costardi

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Bousseyroux, M., O passe pelo borromeano. In: Wunsch 14. Dezembro 2014, pp. 68-71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Lacan, J., O Seminário, livro 22: RSI. 21 de Janeiro de 1975.

# THE A.M.S: Guarantee of what? Ricardo Rojas

Fifty years ago Lacan began his "Proposition of 9 October" presenting two types of guarantee granted by his School by pointing out that we shall be concerned with "structures maintained in psychoanalysis and with guaranteeing their effectiveness for the psychoanalyst"<sup>39</sup> through the introduction of "a novelty"<sup>40</sup> in their functioning in order to produce the solution to the problem of the Psychoanalytic Society, which is located in the distinction between hierarchy and gradus. Structures of functioning that will be more substantiated in analytic principles and that revert in the effectuation or in the fact that there is an analyst. With the first of these principles: "an analyst derives his authorisation only from himself<sup>41</sup>, we understand that this correct form of translation makes clear that psychoanalysts in a Committee only could authorise themselves if that principle is respected. Equally, when he points out this doesn't exclude the fact that the School guarantees that a psychoanalyst depends on its training. It is necessary to apply the question of my title: guarantee, of what? Therefore, it's about guaranteeing the effectuation of some structures that are insured in analytic principles and that at the same time guarantee the fact that it is possible that there would be an analyst as a result of a formation offered by the School following these structures being established: "that the School can guarantee the analyst's relationship to the training that it provides".<sup>42</sup> That means that what is guaranteed is not a person but the formation upon which s/he depends.

But there are two types of guarantee, that which emerges from the one who has given his proof of being an analyst where there is a relation between the fact of being one and the formation offered by the School, to give the proof, as Lacan says of a wanting, a becoming, through his/her desire for psychoanalysis and of the psychoanalyst "responsible for the progress of the School".<sup>43</sup> It is a fact fulfilled and therefore verifiable and for that reason it is a guarantee that is given to someone for what has happened; it is not asked for, nor, since it is a fact, can it be withdrawn, for it is impossible to renounce the structure, and even less to cancel it as a result of a repeated test by a Committee that would end up becoming an inquisitory "weighing of people",<sup>44</sup> a practice excluded by Lacan for the guarantee (see the Letter written on January 25th, 1969, as part of the Jury of Welcome to the Assembly before the vote). Besides, there are verified consequences laid down by the act that occurred one day and not the work in the School. That is the reason why he postulated from the beginning this guarantee as perennial, with a dimension of "non-reversibility.<sup>45</sup> It's the juncture between the psychoanalytic act that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Lacan, J., Comunicación del jurado de acogida a la Asamblea antes de su voto (el 25 de enero de 1969) En Scilicet 2/3, Seuil, Paris, 1970, p. 30-33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Lacan, J., Discurso en la Escuela Freudiana de Paris, En Otros Escritos, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 2012, p. 283.

was, and which falls into oblivion, and the instituting act of the analyst who reinvents him/herself in each new "*pase-paso*" (pass-step). I think it's for that reason that Lacan, in his proposition of counter-experience of 1980, didn't apply any change to this guarantee in its duration, like he did with that of the AS.

If there is an AS, the second type of guarantee is for the possibility that there was an analyst formed in the Act. It can be asked, since part of the desire is to prove it through the testimony about that crucial moment of psychoanalysis, those living points that are found in the moment of the pass from analysand to analyst, willing to give testimony about it – as Lacan says, "as they themselves are working on it, or at least on the way to solving it"<sup>46</sup> – to examine the inaugural act/pass [acto/paso] of any formation of the analyst, at the moment it occurs and before the personal amnesia that falls on the Act ensues. Lacan with his Proposition establishes then two types of guarantee - not one without the other - that was a choice in our School after extensive discussions that even led to several colleagues not continuing to accompany us in the venture. It was decided to take up Lacan's flag of the counter-experience of the Freudian Cause of 1980, and to make us supportive of the approaches and of the modifications raised by him, after examining the ways it had functioned during the 11 years since 1969 when the Proposition A<sup>47</sup> was approved and went into operation, voted by the majority on January 26, 1969. This, however, had intrinsic structural changes in relation to the original proposal of 1967, and in my opinion they involved serious consequences that led to the Dissolution. We should learn from this experience; it would be necessary to reflect on possible structural changes and the rigorous argumentation that sustains the need for change.

In a statement of 22-02-1969, the Jury of Accreditation informs us that amongst the conclusions of a first statutory meeting with the Board of Directors, Lacan pointed out that: "the fact of being qualified as A.S. in the School does not qualify anyone to authorise himself to be an A.M.E. of the School, the two titles are not in anyway incompatible, which proves their independence".<sup>48</sup> It is clear that one title has nothing to do with the other, its functions in the School, its structure and what is examined for the designation of each, are different. Thus, automatic promotions as well as the question even arose in the first Symposium of the Pass, about whether the A.M.E. should not be presented to the *dispositif*, it would be an attempt against his independence.

Returning to formation that depends on the School. If the A.M.E. is its guarantee, I ask myself what is the formation, proposed by Lacan, that the School dispenses and in what way is it determined that this has been the case. In Proposition A proposed on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 1968, by the Jury of Reception and the Board of Directors, of which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Lacan J., Proposición del 9 de octubre de 1967 Sobre el psicoanalista de la Escuela, Ibid., p. 262.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Jurado de Acogida y Directorio de la E.F.P. 19-12-1968, *Principios concernientes al acceso al título de psicoanalista en la Escuela Freudiana de Paris*, En Scilicet 2/3, Ibid., Texto llamado después *Proposición A*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Jurado de acogida de la E.F.P. 09-02-1969, *Comunicación del Jurado de acreditación a todos los miembros de la Escuela*, en *Pas-tout Lacan de la E.L.P.* Ver <u>http://ecole-lacanienne.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/1969-02-09.pdf</u>

Lacan was part, for the EFP General Assembly of January 11 and 12, 1969, it is pointed out that "the Jury of Reception's decision is made based on what is known about the effective practice of the interested party" and what is more important, in my opinion, is some "concordant testimonies"<sup>49</sup> about it, which can come from many parts of the process of formation, beyond the analyst or analysts of the candidate. A single swallow doesn't make a summer.

To take much into account means that an effective practice and the formation of analysts are the same thing, as there is no formation without practice and without the dispositives and other forms of operation established by the School for the latter (analysis-supervision-cartel, etc...). The introduction of some interested people without a practice (amongst them the non-analysts of the School) can lead to their helping to detach the logical demands and the structural references, for Lacan's interest went beyond these, "to the expansion of the analytic act".<sup>50</sup>

There is a principle in the School that you don't start a practice until after you have started an analysis. On the other hand, unlike the IPA, the School, since the Founding Act, does not pretend to ignore that "it is a constant that psychoanalysis has effects in every practice of the subject committed to it .... How can one not see that [supervision] is required at the very moment of these effects, and first of all in order that he who comes to these effects in the position of a patient be protected from them?"<sup>51</sup> For that reason, from the beginning of the analysis, and in all cases, qualified supervision is offered by the School, according to each one's situation. Supervision in the Lacanian School, seeks to protect the patients against the effects of the analysis, effects of which the officiating analyst is unaware. It is supervision with some special elements that make it different from post-Freudian supervision. Moreover, we are in a School where there are not those already analysed and those in formation, or teachers and those taught; we are in the School of permanent formation, the effective practice from which knowledge is taken and which will also include the exchange of places as a possibility, being a supervisor or sharing what is known and which is not the exclusive province of some socalled didacts.

According to Proposition A, the Accreditation Committee must take into account: "the effective participation of the interested party in the various working groups of the E.F.P. (seminars, cartels...), this participation may eventually lead to a written work".<sup>52</sup> That means someone impacted by the transference of work to the School and who has been taken over by the "whirlwind" of the School, rather than someone in a hierarchy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Jurado de Acogida y Directorio de la E.F.P. 19-12-1968, Principios concernientes al acceso al título de psicoanalista en la Escuela Freudiana de Paris, Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Lacan, J., Discurso en la Escuela Freudiana de Paris, Ibid., p.286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Lacan J., "Founding Act" in *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment.* Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Jurado de Acogida y Directorio de la E.F.P. 19-12-1968, Principios concernientes al acceso al título de psicoanalista en la Escuela Freudiana de Paris, Ibid.

responsible for the management of sense.53 That is why I am not clear about the proposal of a meeting with an AMS when it is supposed that someone has been appointed, rather than being committed. This whirlwind implies that Lacan also employs the term supervision in order to express a form of operation in the School, one subject to an internal and external Supervision, where we find the importance of a dialectic at the level of the various sections and subsections, where what is put into play is a series of actions enunciated in the Founding Act:<sup>54</sup> to criticise, denounce, test, confront, question, critically censor, clarify, comment, articulate, judge, submit to discussion, examine, put into question, revise. Lacan counts also, he says in 1980, "on the doctrine's resources accumulated in his teachings"55 and that are tested in the various dispositives of the School. Lacan enunciated the importance of having clear concepts; in Seminar XI, referring to the transference, he says that this concept is determined by the function it has in a praxis. This concept governs the way to treat patients. Conversely, the way to treat them governs the concept.<sup>56</sup> In psychoanalysis it is not a question of authorising oneself from an a-theoretic, an 'I don't think', supposedly non-intuitive, but rather from a learned ignorance, in order "to maintain an effect of desire to sustain the ethics of the act".<sup>57</sup> The learned ignorance demands rigour so as not to fall into the psychoanalytic babel where both 'this' and the opposite may be possible. Behind the a-theoricism there is always, as Colette Soler says, a "clandestine theory that is concealed there",<sup>58</sup> concepts and absolutely misused notions that do not lead to a coherent formalization, and a need to discredit the theory with terms such as rigorousness that constrains freedom, or rhetoric, to justify the scope that does not capture the supposedly pure clinician. Lacan's teaching, on the contrary, presents us with novel elements, but all of them argued with the most absolute rigor, with a necessary formalization so as not to fall into delirium or rogue cynicism, where everything is allowed. Lacan taught us that all his theory is deduced from his clinical experience, and he always encouraged us to do it, which does not mean that psychoanalysis becomes an application of concepts that are fastened to cases. The non-articulable and unnatural knowledge that is the textual knowledge of the real unconscious is not without referential knowledge, not without the deposited knowledge of psychoanalysis, the one deposited in the texts, and the end of analysis should leave, as a consequence, not only a new relation to unconscious knowledge [saber], but a new relation to referential knowledge [saber].

The nomination A.E. is not exempt from formation or from the theory of Freud, Lacan and others in formalising the practice; the A.E. cannot be thought of as exempt from the supervision of the School and from the necessity of argued formulations; s/he is not guaranteed for life and needs to cultivate her/his analyst's desire with the formation of the School. We would believe that everything the A.E. says is guaranteed as the ultimate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Lacan J., El Señor A, en Escansión Nueva Serie No. 1, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Lacan J. Founding Act, op. cit. .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Lacan J., El Señor A, Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Lacan J., *El Seminario Libro XI: Los cuatro conceptos fundamentales del psicoanálisis*, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Soler, C., Lo que el psicoanálisis enseña, publicado inicialmente en la Lettre Mensuelle No. 44 y traducido en el libro Florilegio del Mensual, EPFCL-Foro de Medellín, Editorial Vieco, Medellín, 2010, p. 150.
<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 147.

truth, and that A.E. surpass the Act as subjects and not that they are surpassed by the Act. And when one is surpassed there is nothing left but to try to formalize it, and one cannot believe that their nomination guarantees that any action is an act with a stamp of reinvention. It will always be necessary to control it, to argue for it, for it is clear that in order to assume the unconscious, the analytic discourse has to be given way; Freud and Lacan transmitted it through its great formalization. Therefore for the designation of an A.E. as A.M.E. requires a formation plus, and at that level we know that there are amongst them A.M.E. who are already nominated and that there are those who barely authorize themselves in a clinical practice. There will also be those who would never be interested in the clinic, therefore, it is impossible for them to designate passers, and in addition to making them permanent would be to ignore the warnings of the caste. The danger of hierarchical collectives, when what he intended was a *gradus*. More than worrying about modifying the forms, we should be concerned about the functioning of the School, since from that ultimately depends the production of A.M.E. and A.E.

Translated by Ofelia Brozky

#### From Passer to AMS

Beatriz Elena Maya

With the expression "the passer's function" I cannot but evoke Frege,<sup>59</sup> that logician, source of inspiration for Lacan on many matters like those of writing, of the real and of the symptom, to name a few. If the passers are analysands who "…are in that pass or who for what they have become there – in short, still bound to the outcome of their personal experience",<sup>60</sup> we depart from this hypothesis: with the later teachings of Lacan, we would have to think that this pass is through the real; that the passer glimpses something of the real.

In the *Proposition of 9 October* Lacan says that the passers have an "office". "This is what I will shortly propose to you as the [office] to be conferred, for the demand to become Analyst of the School, upon certain people whom we will therein call passers."<sup>61</sup> How can this be understood without entering into contradiction with Lacan himself? Or is it that office and function are one and the same thing? For an office is something simple, one would believe, and there wouldn't be a need to complicate things with any sort of logic. Yet, given the dimensions of this office, that is, what is at play there, the matter is not so simple. So let's think the function in logical terms. When we speak of function we refer to what is written f(x), f being the function or what is common in various expressions or operations, and the x, the argument for such a function, that is, what

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Frege, G., *Estudios sobre semántica*, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 1984

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 10. Editor's note: the English translation, unlike the Spanish and the original French text, does not make a consistent distinction between "office" and "function". The distinction between these terms is important for Maya's argument.

makes it operate to obtain a certain value. In this way, the passer function implies that those designated by the AMS have something in common in order to be able to get a result in the operation of the Pass. What the passers have in common would be the variables to be taken into account by the AMS for their designation and for their office to be effective, albeit, without guarantees.

What are the variables at play in such an operation on the side of the passers? Starting from what Lacan has transmitted to us, the following come to mind:

1. Being in a moment of pass or step<sup>62</sup>

2. To be still linked to the experience.

3. That the moment of their experience allowed a particular listening that could gather certain information regarding the pass and transmit it. What I have called elsewhere the belonging, taken from a reflection of Heraclitus in Heidegger, a belonging to the real, the only way to be able to listen to the lightning that pierces the passand and touches the passer.

4. A last point as a variable for the function passer: a negative variable, given that it is about going with no pre-established theoretical prejudice that would allow listening to what the moment of the end "should" be, and much less what the desire of the analyst "should" be.

About the moment of the pass we can say that it is at the discretion of the one designating, that is of the analyst AMS, to know that their passer is approaching the field of the real. About the second point, let us recall what I already cited: "still bound to the outcome of their personal experience". Regarding the third point, the analyst who listens will have to bet, in turn, on the listening to what happened to another that the one he has designated may have, given that he knows somehow that his analysand is also going through it.

What is this Heideggerian belonging that I am bringing to bear? I am trying to summarize what I mentioned in another paper<sup>63</sup> presented in Caracas. In the magazine *Ornicar?* No.1 in Spanish, there is an article by Lacan entitled: "*About the experience of the pass*" with a subtitle: "About the experience of the pass, and *of its transmission*". Lacan says in this text that "the pass is something like lightning", an expression that occurred to him from the testimony of someone's experience. This expression takes Lacan to a phrase of Heraclitus, "The thunder rules *ta hanta*"<sup>64</sup>, and to the commentary that Heidegger makes on this. With this reference Lacan is outlining that the pass points to the heterogeneity of the passand, that is, to his singularity. Going to Heidegger's text will take us to a *Logos* where the itinerary of what listening is, will lead him to differentiate it from mere hearing, because, I quote: "regarding what it is to properly listen, perhaps only a little can

<sup>62</sup> Translator's note: in Spanish pass and step allow a homophonic play: pase (pass) paso (step)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Maya, B., *El tiempo del final.* En: Lo que pasa en el pase No.1, editado por Asociación América Latina Norte, Medellín, 2010, p. 23-33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Heráclito, *Fragmentos probablemente auténticos*, En Filósofos presocráticos, vol. 2, Madrid, Editorial Planeta, Madrid, 1998, pág. 88

be said that concerns each man in an immediate way".<sup>65</sup> So listening has to do with the particularity, it is about "paying attention to the simple", it is not about investigating it. For this listening to unfold it is necessary to belong to what has been told to us. What is this belonging?

First, to belong in some way to an analytic community that calls, and to which the passer responds affirmatively - I am not referring to an institutional membership; this belonging also implies participating in that which orients the listening to A saying (*Un decir*), something that is only possible if one has the experience of coming close to the real, the place to which this A saying belongs, the space inhabited by the letter of the *sinthome*.

That being said, how can we think of the office of passer in its relation with the argument of a function? How to practice this office in such a way so that it can reach its objective, for the one who demands our listening? Office has many meanings, among them that of providing a service or carrying out a task. Providing a service, in this case, to the School via listening and the work of transmission of the testimony. Perhaps if the argument for the function is to be the officiant, that is, to fulfill the office of the passer, the expected value will be reached.

The analyst and the passer listen to the same person at different moments and in different offices. The analyst, during the course of the analysis performs his act, the one of the interpretation, which will allow the analyzand to make a new knotting with his *sinthome;* and the passer who listens after the end of the passand's journey, to let what he has extracted pass, that which in fact allowed for a renewed knotting. Analyst and passer depend on this listening, to make of the analytic discourse not something official, but rather officiating,<sup>66</sup> that is, not being functionaries of an experience, but rather putting into play the logical function that sustains the office.

Regarding the fourth variable mentioned, I consider that no theoretical indication should be determining of that listening. It is the experience of passing through one's own real, the one that will enable the echo of that which could pass. If I, as passer, would have been searching, as I listened, for a clinical case to give an account of to the Cartel, isolating matters of the passand such as the submission to and the detachment from the Other, the conquest of the feminine, the construction of fantasy, the presence of anguish in the end – to be received by all of those present at the testimony – perhaps I would have not listened to that which, after transmitting it, seemed to me the most important part of that experience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Heidegger, M., *Logos* (Heráclito, fragmentos), en Conferencias y artículos, Ediciones del Serbal, Barcelona, 1994, p. 185

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore* 1972-1973. Ed. J-A Miller. Trans. B. Fink. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998.

Once again I speak of an experience that is already distant in time, but nonetheless, always current. To listen to the one who was the passand, then, was not predetermined by any search, it was rather going after the encounter with something. I still remember the affect that flooded me when a member of the Cartel asked both passers, in a joint meeting, if we could isolate the fantasy of this person. I didn't know how to answer, perhaps because she – the passand – was never for me a clinical case. I could only account, in addition to many hystorized pieces of information, for the decantation of a signifier that was a limit to her discourse. That encounter, in a certain way, oriented my request for the Pass, for something of my own experience was given back to me, as if the discovered logic in what I was listening to was the departure point for the end of my own analysis.

It was evident that something *Moebian* was at play: what was intimate for her passed to the exterior, which, when gathered by me, was coming back to another interior, another intimacy. It was impossible to make a cut there where the hole in knowledge was evident. That signifier, now I can say it, allowed her a fundamental relation to her own body via being; being a bag was the way her fantasy linked with the world, a fallen bag from the analytic experience, which allowed her to take on herself in a different way, and why not say it, take it on as the *escabean* with which she would make her world from there on.

The *une-bévue* is present just there where one is expected to render what has been given to us, inasmuch as it is not about doing the task well in terms of repetition without the consequences of what was said, but rather a saying that touches the most intimate real of the one who, at the time, is ready to listen to it without knowing it. Precisely another signifier of the many given by the passand touches the real of the one listening and this one is kept, kept quiet, hidden from myself, perhaps in order to continue enjoying it, to continue dreaming. It is the Cartel that awakens me. "Is there something important that you forgot?" A hesitating "no", gives room to remembering it and rendering it that is not without consequences for me.

I cannot say that I knew what it was that I had to listen for in order to be able to take to the Cartel a ciphered message, neither did I know how to form the opportune question that would produce the awaited answer. I don't know either if what I took to the Cartel was decisive in producing the nomination, or if this was on account of what my partner in the experience gave. I can only speak of the effect that the experience had on me. One of them, perhaps the most important one, has been to put in motion the desire for psychoanalysis. In my first interventions I would underline the passage from passer to passand, now I can think the passage from passer to AMS.

When, as an AMS, I wonder which of my patients can be a passer, my own experience does not cease to count, knowing that each one is different, singular. Perhaps what I heard and passed will not be what one of them may do. It will be your own real that is mobilized by what you may be able to listen to, and which will allow or not, the transmission that is most singular to the one who was able to make the journey, that which the passand was able to make into a new knotting and which has made of the passand a renewed *parlêtre* in its link to *jouissance*. I am still worried, perhaps as it happened to the one who designated me passer once upon a time, about whether or not those designated by me will or will not be able to keep up with a *dispositif* created to articulate the axes of the School. This is a bet where each one plays heads or tails. The AMS is the one who puts his "giving proof" in evidence, there where it has only been the pure supposition of those who nominated him. For also here there is an ethics at play, the one recalled by Lacan in which the person of the analyst and his supposed prestige are erased in order to set the *dispositif* of the pass in motion.

The pass is a wager made by many. First, that of the School which mobilizes an international *dispositif* with the requirements this has; that of the passand who bets on an end and on the demonstration of a desire, the one of the analyst, perhaps inhabiting him already; that of the AMS who designates his passers with the conviction that they "belong" to the experience of the real; that of the passer himself, who almost always is surprised to receive a demand to listen to something that perhaps is consonant with what he himself hears in his own analysis. Listening which is not without consequences then, at least in my case, for what would be the unlinking of the end, unlinking which will require some time still for the construction of a knowing-how-to-do-there with one's own *sinthome*.

If it is a wager, it implies that narcissism, which could account for a good analyst who has designated his passer well, will be erased to give rise to a nomination.

Translation by Gabriela Zorzutti

# Passer... an experience sustained in desire Alejandra Noguera

Content and thankful for the invitation to participate in this Study Day of the School "The proof by the School and School to the test, 50 years since the Proposition", and impressed...with what circulates in the Pass and with the genius of the *dispositif* invented by Lacan.

To say that the Pass is the heart of the School is to say that something beats...pulses, energizes, makes you vibrate... It's something alive that causes and has effects and affects in all the participants of the *dispositif* and in the analytic community.

"The subject is called, only he, then, can be chosen."<sup>67</sup> This quote from Seminar 11, summoned me from the first time I read it many years ago. It alludes to a parable from the gospel of Saint Matthew, the last verse of which says: "many are called but few are chosen".<sup>68</sup> The one calling the subject is the signifying network Lacan affirms. In this seminar he is trying to formalize the unconscious. If the analysts are not calling the subject, for it to

<sup>67</sup> Lacan, J., Seminario 11 "Los Cuatro Conceptos Fundamentales del Psicoanálisis", pg.55

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Gospel according to Saint Matthew 22,14.

come back to itself, to the unconscious, if the analysts do not divide the subject and cause its desire... then who?

In the beginnings of an analysis the analyst's interpretation produces signification effects, the new associations mobilize the signifiers, the interpretation propels the analysis, but in time this would lead to an interminable analysis. Colette Soler gives us another clue to "the desire of the Analyst" when speaking about Lacan's text *L'etourdit*. She tells us that he is not only referring to the push of analysis, but to the real effect that conditions an end, that "topological subversion" that produces a subject secure in knowing the impossible.

The analyst has the responsibility of producing, with his saying, real structural effects in the analyzand, who wouldn't otherwise finish by himself. The designation of a passer by an AMS is an intervention in the analysis. The analyst designates the analyzand as passer and does not ask for his opinion; the analyzand should not be informed of this, Lacan emphasized.

The passer has a hinge function in the *dispositif* of the Pass; there is no knowing-how to be a passer, there are no indications regarding how to carry out the task, it is without a guide or a plan. You don't choose the moment, there is no being ready for it, it is done in solitude, and it is the time of separation from the analyst....

His responsibility is to make a fair transmission without having his presence contaminate the *dispositif*, finding the way to make do in the face of what is transmissible and what is not transmissible. To operate from the not knowing...with his *unknown knowledge*, *knowledge without a subject*.

'It is to them that a psychoanalyzand, in order to have himself authorized as an analyst of the School, will speak about his analysis, and the testimony that they will be able to receive from the very heart of their own pass will be of a kind that no jury of agreement will ever collect.'<sup>69</sup>

I will try to transmit the impact and the consequences that being a passer had for me four years ago, and of the passand's nomination as an AS (2014-2017).

Going to my analysis I receive a call, a masculine voice with a Caribbean accent. He tells me that he drew me as passer, that he had requested the Pass. There is a **response in act**, not without surprise!!! A signal that the unconscious has been caused...I enter my session, asking the analyst what he has to do with this.

This INTERVENTION into my analysis had real effects in the direction of the treatment. It was a milestone marking a before and an after, by which the Pass enters the horizon, and with it the School and its reason to be. All of a sudden a possible, tangible, close ending to the itinerary appeared, a place that one could arrive at. Not only because the Pass was, until then, something really distant and for others, but because I considered that I had arrived at the analysis "too late". I was not a member of the School, nor did I know what the Pass consisted of, much less the function of the passer.

"This can be the case for anyone who occupies a position in the school, or for someone who does not belong to the school, and by that very fact gains access to it." A procedure for the pass (1967)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>Lacan, J., "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School" trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, p. 10.

To feel concern not only for psychoanalysis but also for the School was, for me, the way of making a bond, of being part of the "*scattered, ill-assorted*" of the analytic community. I had gone to the Forum for many years as a listener, and I had formed a cartel to work on Seminar 20. I was able to read the desire after the call to the function of passer, because of what it caused in me: it was revitalizing! "To want what is desired; here is the first confrontation where it is resolved by the passer in taking up his position in the Pass."<sup>70</sup>

In his book *La libertad en psicoanálisis* [Freedom in Psychoanalysis], Gabriel Lombardi interrogates, through the ethics of psychoanalysis, what it means for the analyst that in addition to "paying with his words" and "paying with his own person" in the transference, he also "pays with his intimate judgment". "The wager of the analyst consists in causing the analytic work without knowing where it is going, when or in what way the analyzed will take advantage of the plus of freedom that he will gather from it". "To 'direct' the treatment, one has to follow desire to the letter" and bear the consequences of the unfolding of an unconscious knowledge to which he has no access other than in second term. "It is a not-knowing inherent to the *act of permitting an incalculable subject to emerge*, whose being is supported in the freedom of the one who enjoys thanks to the structure, which is the structure of a failure in knowledge".<sup>71</sup> In this sense the designation of a passer is an act of the analyst.

The function of the passer

The opportunity to be able to gather that testimony was "a treasure". "That" which is heard from the passand, the object he has been for the Other, a lapsus/equivoque which de-articulates the jouissance condensed in the fantasy, dreams, remainders of object a, master signifiers, "raw points", new articulations, "precious ones" that precipitate something of that real so difficult to catch in the texts.

To listen to the hystorization of a life, what psychoanalysis did within it, and that singular remainder that keeps on teaching. To become analyst as the product of an itinerary, given that his profession was foreign to our field, allowed me to have another ditmension of analysis... All of a sudden the theory became tangible, as if it had gained body, and the saying of the *passand* **passed through** me.

As Dominique Fingermann describes in Wunsch 11: "The passand would awaken in the passer an access to an unchained unconscious knowledge (outside the chain of language), resonant to the dimension of a new love which Lacan speaks about starting in Seminar 20".

I requested membership to the Forum and to the School prior to the travels in which I would bring the testimony of the passant. I felt honored by the task, and felt the strong impact of the way in which it had put me into action. I was overflowing with enthusiasm! In the transmission there is a very strange sensation when hearing yourself say the saying of someone else... Subjective destitution is what makes the function. As soon as I said the first phrase they asked me who said that, I looked at them stunned.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>Leray, P., A.E. (2008-2011) "La prueba del pasador" Lo que pasa en el pase No 2 pag.125

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Lombardi, G., "La libertad en psicoanálisis" pag. 177/180

They asked me to go very slowly, and in turn, this provoked in me the hyper-acute register of what was coming out of my mouth: it was my voice which was incarnating an other saying or was it a saying other, which was sonorously embodied in my voice?

The Cartel made up by members with different languages *ex profeso* [deliberately], was trimming the signifiers of the testimony, translating into French, into Italian, resonating again in Spanish. I remember thinking: what is going on here?<sup>72</sup>

Only then did I understand something of the *dispositif*, something of the *to the letter*, something about the real that ex-sisted to the sayings, something of that impossible to be said.

A real that was sneaking *en-corps* in three times:

- Interview passand passer
   The passand tells of a dream in which he saw some empty shoeboxes with the
   letters "EMERADAS" on the outside.
   The passer hears and writes: M RADAS
- In the transmission a member of the Cartel hears and asks if in Spanish this word means anything, then he writes M (I) RADAS,
   the (i) in fading represents the subject

the (i) in fading represents the subject.

3) In one of his testimonies as an AS, the one who was the passand writes: "i of i-legitimate, master signifier of jouissance discovered or revealed by the analysis", "the gaze was the object of jouissance and it was articulated in the fantasy: "being the shame of my mother".

"The analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire that intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in the position to subject himself to it. There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live."<sup>73</sup>

To condense a life into an hour, a passer is essential. This actor remains blind to the discussion of the Cartel regarding whether there was a pass or not. If it results in a nomination of an AS he/she will find out through the announcement of the ICG.

A member of the Cartel, to whom I transmitted the testimony I gathered, writes: "here it is not about a calculated, thought-out decision, much less a voluntary one. There is no act of will there, it is rather a certainty that comes over the Cartel in a moment where there is the unanimous conviction that something really did *pass, go through* and produced in each one and in the body of the Cartel, the surprise effect, for something *comes over* the Cartel, without it coming necessarily in *the hearing* of the testimony, sometimes not even in the signifiers designated by the passer, nor in the notes that he might have prepared, but however, it surprises the Cartel as a unique *writing*, singular, like the effect "*text*" of what cannot be inscribed in words."<sup>74</sup>

#### A saying that ex-sists...passes

Translated by Gabriela Zorzutti

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Translator's note: "qué está pasando aquí?" "Pasando is resonant of pase in Spanish, as if in English we could ask, "What is passing here?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup>Lacan, J., Seminario 11 p. 276.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup>Beatriz Zuluaga (Colombia) Wunsch 14 p. 67

# The function of the passer: to give a voice to the text of the passand? Samantha Abuleac Steinberg

## To begin with, a witticism

A witticism worked on by Lacan in 1957, 10 years prior to his proposition about the psychoanalyst of the School:

A potential young lady to whom we can accord all the qualities of having had a good education, that which consists in not using dirty words but in knowing them all the same, is asked to dance at her first surprise party by a lout who tells her after some moments of boredom and silence, during a far from perfect dance, "You must have noticed, mademoiselle, that I am a count." ("je suis compte") - "Ah-t" she simply replies. [As Lacan then explains a 't' is added to the exclamation "Ah" which, when subtracted from the phonetics of the word "compte", leaves the sound of a vulgar word meaning fool, lout, idiot].<sup>75</sup>

Detail: For those who don't speak French the word *comte* sounds identical to the coarse term alluded to when a 't' is added. In this simple exclamation, "Aht", Lacan hears the incarnation of the saying, a presence of the subject. He says: "*Nothing is more exemplary of the presence of the saying than the pure and simple exclamation*". And later in the same seminar:

What is the witticism doing there? It indicates nothing more than the very dimension, the step properly speaking as such, the step I might say in its form, the step emptied of every kind of need that here would all the same express that which, in the witticism, can manifest what is latent in me of my desire, which is something that may find an echo in the Other, though not necessarily. The important thing is that this dimension of the "pas-de-sens" [step-of-sense] should be taken up, authenticated.

The witticism is the Pass in its form, it being necessary that desire finds its echo in the Other. A "t" to be read, subtracted, in the case of "Ah-t"!

I will leave the witticism as a backdrop to enter into the experience of the Pass and in particular into the function of the passer. This is not without the input of various other colleagues who have attempted to address this experience.

Let's go to the beginning. The beginning as always is a bewilderment, a shock. A message or call from the passand. Would you agree to be a passer? Pardon? The invitation is really a rather strange thing. In my case I knew of the existence of the function of passer because of my previous relationship with the School, but I imagined that I might not know. However, knowing or not knowing, the "thing" stunned, dazed. What would it be like? How to transmit something of the other, and what's more, in another language as it was in my case? This was my first preoccupation. But the response of the passand calmed me somewhat. They replied in their language, Spanish, "it will be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Translator's note. The quotation is from Seminar 5, lesson of November 20 1957, from Cormac Gallagher's unpublished manuscript. All other quotations are my own translations. Included below is the bibliography from the original text.

something simple, sensitive, that I have to transmit." A reply that already indicated a certain position of the passand: fairly calm and orientated by the School.

The difference in language, in this experience, didn't seem like an obstacle to me but rather the opposite. I will say more about this henceforth.

With the intention of saying more about this function I will divide the account into time periods.

## First period – pre-testimony

A time of waiting and expectation, but also of investigation. A period in which the passer can get closer to this *sui generis* invention of Lacan and of its function in the experience. What would be the wager, the desire of Lacan in the Pass?

Today I think that Lacan created this *dispositif* because he had a question that guided him. And not just any question: "How is a psychoanalyst formed?"<sup>76</sup>

A question that is open in its structure as it speaks of the singular of each analysis, a question that causes. But if it were "only" a *dispositif* with respect to this question, what is the passer doing there? Wouldn't it be more logical to have an account, without mediation, by the passand to the Cartel of the Pass? Perhaps. Doesn't it seem bewildering? Yes. Therefore Lacan's question created a *dispositif* that transpires, that breathes in the air of transmission.

Lacan supposes that the act of authorising oneself is not only the act of becoming a psychoanalyst; it is also one full of transmissibility. Which is to say that the act can be subtracted from the ineffable and be transmitted to third parties. (A Didier Weill, 1998, p.71)

Inspired by the Freudian joke, the radical wager is that something passes from one subject to another without him knowing, without him intending it, without our even knowing who is its author. And that that doesn't matter. But something is passed and the indication of this is laughter. In the Pass, Lacan wagers that "the desire of the analyst" can pass. Starting from each passand, who passes his testimony to a passer, who passes it in turn to the Cartel of the Pass.

What then is the function of the passer? Following Picasso's perceptiveness, might it be that we can say that our function is truly that of "catching desire by the tail",<sup>77</sup> the passand's "desire of the analyst". Yes. And no! Isn't the saying precisely what is left forgotten behind what is said, in what is heard? It is about something impossible: to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> "In other words, we can make treatments, moreover valid ones, with the most aberrant ideas about what analysis is. But there is another time that is this: to be a psychoanalyst is a different question; to be a psychoanalyst it is to make psychoanalysis by knowing what one is doing. There is, in any case, a time when it is absolutely indispensible that this location is strict, that is, in making a psychoanalyst. You see the times: making a psychoanalysis, being a psychoanalyst, or *making a psychoanalyst*, are not the same thing, for the theoretical exigencies are at different levels". (Lacan, J., Seminar, Book XIII, The Object of Psychoanalysis, lesson of June 22, 1966.) Editor's addition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Nombre de la primera aventura literaria de Pablo Picasso, escrita en 1941. "Le désir attrapé par le queue"O "El deseo atrapado por la cola"

grasp the saying of the passand. But we can gather the statements, the said of the analysed life, from the suffering in the beginning to the pass at the end, with all its ups and downs. In the end it is through the consequences of the said that the saying is judged, the subject being the effect of the said.<sup>78</sup>

Another particularity of the *dispositif* is that it is necessary that the passer has already traversed a certain threshold in their analysis, but that they may still well find themselves in periods of great turbulence. This is different to the passand who has found an exit. What can we say of this threshold?<sup>79</sup> I will try to tackle it from the dimension of the subject with the help of Godino Cabas's text. For Lacan the subject springs from a substance of nothing, articulated with the drive and the object a, and:

Curiously, it is the contact with this nothingness which neurosis tries to avoid at all costs. Up until the point when this encounter occurs and the residue is summarized in a series of clinical effects which evoke a clearing. A fall of identifications and a loss of the corresponding ideals; a fading of imaginary satisfactions; a partial dissolution of the related ineffable jouissance, etcetera. A series of clinical effects which effects which we group under the heading "subjective destitution" and which correspond to the encounter of the analysand with the absence of support for their truth, the emptiness of their discourse is discovered even more decisively to be based on nothing but a gap in the real, a nothingness-of-substance.

We can say that both the passand and the passer have already encountered this absence of support for their truth. With this gap in the real that causes them, and perhaps only because of this, the passer can hear this real dimension contained in the text of the passand. To quote Dominique Fingermann:

The passer – "passoire"(colander) – is a leaky utensil conducive to gathering the findings. The passer is, says Lacan, this "runner, this flaw where I wanted to make my name pass". This is the other "ditmension" of the passer, another place of the saying. "To collect (the testimony) of the other, another "ditmension" is necessary: that which entails that the knowledge that the analyst has of the complaint, does nothing more than use its truth." The passer is therefore alerted by his experience that the truth, which makes sense of the complaint, is hardly used to limit unconscious (real) knowledge. The passer is not covered by truth; he comes up against it.

Let's now go to the time and place of this encounter.

#### 2nd Period - Gathering a testimony

A time to listen to the other, the one who wants to speak of his analysis and of his singular position. Other, but as difference, not as equal.

The difference in language in my experience only amplifies this dimension of separation and absolute otherness. Perhaps because in this experience it was the desire of this passand to transmit his testimony in another language, one that said nothing to him and with which he wasn't familiar.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Lacan, J., "El Atolondradicho" En Otros Escritos. pp. 473-522

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Soler, C., (2011). "El pasador". En: Wunsch 12. IF-EFCL, 2012, pp.3-5

But still, at this time I experienced a great sense of responsibility: that of gathering, holding on to and transmitting the text of the other. And not just of any text but that which was deduced from his analysis.

I made many notes in a small notebook in the course of these meetings and also asked questions with regard to the differences in language. I also made notes of moments which seemed to me might be of interest to the cartel of the pass. Sonia Alberti warns us:

It is not unusual, for example, that the gaps in the accounts might even inhibit the hystorization of the analysand's life – that which is constructed in analysis – in such a way that the testimony indicates that there were changes but not the way in which the analysis was responsible for this transformation. If this isn't possible, how are we to hystoricize an analysis?

It is still necessary to say that in these meetings with the passand I was touched,<sup>80</sup> moved by his singular and ethical position and what I most desired was to be able to transmit this to the Cartel of the Pass.

It was strange that I left the small notebook untouched in the months prior to the meeting with the Cartel. I didn't manage to re-work that written text. Perhaps I had a certain distrust that I might corrupt or lose it, as if some rare notes that didn't belong to me were in my care and that it was necessary to deliver them to a certain destination.

#### Third Period – Putting something of oneself into the text.

The time in Paris: In the days prior to the meeting with the Cartel I read and re-read the text of the passand, attempting to discern what was repeated, what touched me, or what seemed essential to transmit. But I didn't write another text to present to the cartel. I just had the passand's text to hand, with my scribbles, under-linings and notes in the margins of the pages. After that, the encounter with the Cartel of the Pass.

#### Fourth Period – Transmission of a testimony

The moment of transmission is the time of the meeting with the Cartel. A babble of languages with the presence, in my case, of a translator who wasn't a member of the Cartel, and with many commentaries about the singularity of the subject and in particular about the question of how a psychoanalyst is formed. At this time I felt myself to be absolutely separate from the passand's text and imbued with the desire to pass on that which I supposed he wanted to pass on through my voice. Without **giving voice to the text of the other**: my understanding of the function of the passer. And finally, satisfaction and relief at having delivered the letter to its destination in the way in which it had been possible.

We might say that what the Pass manages to gather is something of the depth of the desire and presence of the subject. The presence of a subject who has assumed and gone beyond his substance of nothing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Izcovich, A,. Efectos del corte en Wunsch #12. El pasador puede ser afectado por lo real del testimonio del pasante.

#### Following Godino Cabas, I ask:

...what is the subject if not a position? What is he but a term of responsibility in the face of the demands of the drive? What is he but the point where responsibility is taken for jouissance and for the cause of desire? What is he other than a decision to assume – or not – that which clamours, and to which there is no proper response? And what is that decision to assume – or not – the pressures of existence, other than the exercise of a responsibility (2009, p. 227)

#### A dream to conclude

A dream from the time of constructing this text:

"I was in a rather uncomfortable place, in a service stairwell of some building, but it was my analysis. I was uncomfortably seated at a point lower down the stairs than my analyst who was above me. Then I saw something in a slim, dusty crack between the stairs and the wall: some coins and a key. I pass the key and the coins to my analyst and I say: if I had anything of mine I'd grab it later. As if I wasn't clear at that moment what was mine and what was hers." On waking I realize that it was the key to my consulting room and I think: I shouldn't have passed on my consulting room key to my analyst! But then afterwards I think about the question of transmission and of the pass, the passage from analysand to analyst. The consulting room key of each one is in question, in this more than unusual procedure. How is an analyst formed?

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Translated by Richard Barrett

# The impudence if the saying: how does it pass?

# Dominique Fingermann

In seminar 21, "Les non-dupes errent", Lacan emphasises the link between feminine jouissance – not-all phallic – and what he calls "the impudence of the saying."<sup>81</sup> Thus the impudence could qualify the saying, which by definition is not qualifiable, not predictable.

"Impudent", "outside the series", "audacious", "irreverent" etc., these do not qualify the Saying of the One, but indicate its presence *en-corps* [in-body], and its position of exception.

The saying, by definition, is not qualified but it can be qualified: as not-all inscribed in the phallic function? As the empty set?

It ex-sists from the outset since, as an empty set it begins the series of ones from the very fact of being named, and can be counted as belonging to every signifier, that is, to the whole set.

The impertinent Saying that does not belong in any way to the said [*dit*], but draws attention to itself through its absence, could logically be deduced from the series of saids. However, this demonstration could only bring out its vacancy and its extravagance, and not realise any singular value like the "identity of separation", like absolute difference which distinguishes absolutely and not relatively and "makes a difference" as one says in English, while in French one would say, "now that is somebody!".

How does the Saying of the One pass beyond what each passand demonstrates and then be applied to what each of the passers produces? The separation of the Saying, its exception, its "insurrection", which subverts the subject, is certainly demonstrated, but above all it is shown when the impudence of the Saying responds to the powerlessness of the saids: *respons-ability* of the Saying.

Putting aside the pitfalls and other stumbling points that are always possible in the *dispositif*, what makes the difference between a passand who is not nominated, and an AS [Analyst of the School]? What makes the difference is not the complexity of the meanderings of the traversals of his identification and of his fantasmatic constraints, or the mourning for the object, or even the loss of the Other that this object completed.

When the letter reaches its destination, when the letter is destined for the Saying, what makes the difference is when the passand's analysis is didactic. An analysis is didactic when it teaches the Cartel (and the School) something that is unheard of, unlikely, since it is singular and not just a particular attribute of universal castration.

The didactic effect is proven when it is experienced by, and affects, the Cartel.

The Saying of the One does not make sense, but it makes a sign and it can affect: frighten like the *Unheimlich*, touch like music, produce laughter like a joke, satisfy like a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Lacan, J., (1973-74) Le séminaire livre 21, Les non-dupes errent, inédit. Leçon de 11/06/74.

sudden breeze, surprise like an act, suspend reason with *réson*, make the ab-sense resonate and throw out concepts, precepts and other prejudices. The Saying of the One does not make sense, but it makes a sign of the real for other Ones, scattered and ill-assorted, and when that passes, what a relief!

"The lightness of the Pass" was the first elaboration of my first participation in a Cartel of the Pass, where satisfaction took us by surprise at the moment of the nomination. The Cartel had to transmit the testimony of its work only a few hours after its conclusion, in the course of a Study Day of the AFCL in Rio de Janiero, and our delight had annoyed the meeting.

But it is unforgettable; and when a Saying passes and one can conclude, "now this is somebody!" it produces certain types of links between unconsciouses that are unforeseen and ephemeral (contingency). We did not go to the point of saying that the affect that had been provoked was of the order of love, but that did not stop us from evoking the poem by Rimbaud, "*A une raison*" [to a reason]. (Lacan wrote "*raison*" as "*réson*", as did Francis Ponge.)

"Your finger strikes the drum releasing all the sounds and starting a new harmony. Your step is the raising of new men and their moving [*en-marche*]..."

It is about something subtle although unforgettable, opposite to "that one may say remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard".<sup>82</sup> This is the effect of the lightness of a Saying, suddenly unforgettable, superimposed on the saids, a Saying that does not leak sense but escapes, and goes beyond the testimony. "It is unheard of" [*C'est inonii*?", we say in French for something both unexpected [*inattendu*] and not understood/heard [*in-entendu*].

In all the Passes that I have had the opportunity to hear, up until the last minute of the meeting with the passers there was a shared disposition to see the production of the conspicuous detail, the surprise, the unexpected, the unheard of, "antonymic to likelihood [*vraisembance*]".<sup>83</sup>

Up until the last moments, there was a common attempt to make a dent in the demonstration in order that "the radical change in the relation to knowledge and to jouissance" could be verified, an extravagance, an "advent of the real", a radical change in the modality of jouissance, another logical modality: not-all.

The radical change consists in showing that knowledge and jouissance cease running after their tails, that is, they cease to believe that lack can be filled, or else that it ceases to irresistibly motivate all the grace in life and the disgrace of the lack-in-being.

The demonstration of the Pass displays how the fictions (the mirages of the truth) try to cover the tracks of the fixion that they produce at the outset.

<sup>82</sup> Lacan, J., (1972). "L'Etourdit" In: Autres Ecrits. Paris, Seuil, Ed., 2001, p. 448

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Lacan, J., (1976-77). Le Séminaire Livre 24: L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre inédit (Leçon du 11/01/1977).

The showing [monstration] of the Pass exhibits how the real as "plug", "lack of lack", through its fundamental opacity, holds back the leaking of sense in the waning of the fictions, and gives evidence of the ex-istence of the One Saying outside the series.

The repetition of the symptom, advent of the real, which the experience of psychoanalysis brings out for consideration and adoption as the emergence of one's own real, can participate in the demonstration necessary for the nomination of an AS. But it is also necessary to know how to give proof of the good use of this real at stake in the Borromean structure based on effects, on what follows and where it leads, affects and inventions that this ex-sistence promotes, produces and prolongs. It is thus that an Analyst of the School is shown to be capable of the act, which by definition dispenses with the subject supposed to know and summons his exceptional existence that does not make a link with good sense or other *joui-sens* of common neurosis and makes possible the invention of knowledge.

Sometimes in the Pass, one grasps the invention of knowledge, something that exceeds the discoveries of truth, and indicates the real at stake. Sometimes, in the testimonies, something is transmitted that echoes the effects of the letter; sometimes it is dispensed with in the course of the adventures of the subject who, in the game of deciphering, muddles his cipher and makes it essentially pass from the sign (of jouissance) to the enjoyment in meaning (*joui-sens*).

The letter reaches its destination when it no longer has anything to say (devalorising of *joui-sens*) but carries, due to the body, an "I do not know what and next to nothing" [*je ne sais quoi et un presque rien*] which one could make use of for many other things (making a poem, a link beyond alterity, and why not, love).

The passand can be named AE when the letter arrives at its destination and has an effect on the Cartel, which, touched by a certain grace – once sense is suspended – can finally suspect "what invisibly holds the body".

In his "Homage to Marguerite Duras" Lacan affirms that "the practice of the letter converges with the use of the unconscious – it is about that which I would give testimony".<sup>84</sup> In the Cartel of the Pass when the use that the subject makes of his unconscious converges with the letter (his symptom) and with what he effectively makes of it (his behaviour), based on this (his poem), and no more with meaning, it is then we can say: Pass!

Translated by Susan Schwartz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Lacan, J., (1965). "Homenagem à Marguerite Duras" In: *Outros Escritos*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2003, p. 200

# Prelude for a critique of analytic judgment

## Gabriel Lombardi

The experience of the Pass reaches its half a century anniversary since Lacan proposed it, a little less since its actual practice as the nuclear operation of a School of psychoanalysis. The Freudian *dispositif* of the treatment also demanded many practitioners, and a longer lapse of time for its results to be clarified; the changes that it implied at the level of the clinic – the conceptions of the positions of being, and of the real ex-sistence of the *parlêtre*, as well as its "only conceivable object" (Lacan, 1976, p. 573), the one that causes desire – had to wait about 60 or 70 years to be revealed.

I would like to testify to some personal impressions and some questions that were left open for me after a second period in the International College of the Guarantee (ICG) of our School.

1) A different perspective on analysis, by way of a method of approach to what emerges from an analysis that is different from other evaluations. The elaboration, the questions, and the decision of the Cartel of the Pass are centered on the transmission, not on the clinic. Thus the Pass was conceived by Lacan to explore, towards the end of the treatment, the transmission of the desire of the analyst to his analyzand, if it happens that the latter is interested in that desire which is not always the case; the desire for psychoanalysis is not always followed by the desire of the analyst. I found, and not without contributing to this being so, that the questions about what is at play in the termination of an analysis and in the access to the desire of the analyst are not answered by fashionable criteria, (traversing the fantasy, identification with the symptom, determination of the "name of jouissance" or some other crystalized formulae). On the contrary, these questions are answered more from what the Cartel-Jury experiences and judges has passed (or not) through one or both passers, from the testimony of the experience of the passand's analysis, and occasionally from his elective pass from analyzand to analyst.

2) A reasoned absence of valid criteria "for all" cases of the Pass, which confirms the radical insufficiency of any predications about the position of the analyst. Nothing, nobody, can be predicated analyst, Lacan explained, and the nomination of Analyst of the School (AS) recalls the *forcing* through which some questions of collective logic are solved ("Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty" that Lacan speaks about) as well as mathematical logic (the axiom of choice or the continuous hypothesis by Cohen). The time that the Cartel has to reflect is brief - a few hours, a couple of days yet its decision implies a finite temporal limit; it is realized in the temporality of haste, constricted by its international composition and the peremptoriness of the return flights: the plane leaves.

The strength of the functioning of the Pass is perceptible but its results are 3) notably different from those of the treatment. The Pass lateralizes the matters of the classical clinic of psychoanalysis. The essential questions are currently around the aptitude of the "sensitive plate" of the passer, around his suitability to transmit to the Cartel a new desire that sometimes produces enthusiasm, or around the obstacles interposed by the passer in the transmission, including the passer's aversion to or identification with the passand. The dictum of Lacan comes to mind: "the passer is the essence of the Pass". What passes or not of a desire's acquisition and motion has to pass through him, or it won't pass. An experience of risk and contingency. Thrilling, for it brings an outline of what the analysis is about in its phase of resolution for those who choose the analyst's desire, inasmuch as it should pass through an indirect testimony. It would be useful to go back to the question: why did Lacan prefer an indirect testimony? And what consequences does this have in the divergent policies of the IPA, of the WAP and of the SPFLF. In the first there are no testimonies, in the second there is a push to the direct testimony of the ASs, and in ours we tend to go by the indirect testimony, so that the ASs can be dedicated in their years of their function to the "crucial questions of psychoanalysis".

4) In the ICG I verified a notorious and surprising disconnection, at least at the level of the statements, between the Pass and the "*ancienne clinique*" of Freud and Lacan. The particularities, which are always of great weight in the clinic (neurosis, psychosis, perversion, man, woman, hetero or homosexual), are barely present in the debates of the Cartels of the Pass in which I participated, even if they produced four nominations of AS. This purity of the moment of the Pass, freed from the clinical particularities, has been meticulously safeguarded in the Cartels of the Pass and also in the ICG, which forms them and registers their results. In any serious clinical conception we cannot spare the typification of the symptom that allows us to situate ourselves in the transference and orient the treatment. On the contrary, in the Pass, the stress falls on the singularity of the access to the desire of the analyst.

5) Another surprise, connected with the previous one: the precariousness, in the internal debates of the ICG, of the reflections on *hystorization* – the term introduced by Lacan in the Preface of 1976. However, such as I understand it, this neological concept invites us to go back over the traces of the experience, to situate the support that the desire of the analyst finds in the hysterization of the symptom as the analyzand's response. Lacan pointed out, especially in his seminar The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, that in the analytic treatment there is a push to pass through the hysterical position; a position specified by constituting the only type of symptom that interrogates the Other from within the social bond (and not from outside the social bond, as does the irony of the schizophrenic for example). Yet, the passage through this discourse is not restricted to female analysands alone; it also includes men, and subjects from other clinical types will also traverse this place in making an experience of analysis. In this way, the obsessive analysand who begins to perceive her body, or the paranoid who unexpectedly cries one day, and in a different way, begins to experience his body and his history, going from hypochondriac dissociation to the symptom that produces association. In this way also,

the day of anguish in which the pervert leaves aside his tendency to reproduce secret interventions which impact on the taste or distaste of the one who listens to him, to tell of the complex and changing pains that have inhabited him since childhood or puberty. In this way, the moment in which the schizophrenic, whose iron body is immune to the cigarette that burns his fingers, immune to the inclement weather, to thirst and hunger, catches a cold, begins to feel little discomforts, and some moral pebble in his consciousness.

Obsessional neurosis does not exclude hysteria, but neither do the other clinical types of the analysand-subject, if they are effectively allowed to enter the analytic *dispositif*. That hysterization allows the analysand to respond from another discourse that is not the analytic one, and reminds us that we treat the subject of science, of a universal singularity - an oxymoron with which the particularity of pure hysteria is to be overcome. The kinship of the hysteric's discourse with the discourse of science, pointed out by Lacan, is also revealed in the condition of the analysis: that "any analysand" has to traverse that mode of social bond which involves the symptom in the place of the agent. Anyway, for me at least, the question that is outlined is that of the *hystorization* of one's own analysis: shouldn't it include the support found by the passer in the revolutionary value of the fundamental symptom, the one that preceded and underlies its hysterical form? If that was the case, it is not something explicit, much less elaborated upon, in the elaborations in the Pass that I was able to hear.

On the contrary, the results harvested until now in the Pass echo the expression "épars desassortis" ("scattered, ill-assorted") of the Preface of 1976. All singular, which is not wrong, but is insufficient respecting a "hystorization" that would require going back to the symptom, which, no matter how singular, can only be captured from the particularity. The proof is that the results of the Pass barely connect with the fact that not all ASs proceed from the same clinical type, from the same sex, from the same position in reference to the mythical real which the father incarnates, nor from the same type of object relation, heterosexual or homosexual - information that seems to remain concealed in the testimonies for now.

The "hystorization" required by Lacan proceeds from this idea of the hysterization {*hystérisation*} during the analysis, with that "y" {úpsilon} of Greek and uterine provenance that French usually employs for hysteria {*hystérie*} but not for history – *histoire* in Greek is written with iota and not úpsilon. Whatever the clinical type of the symptom of origin, whatever the fundamental symptom may be, the analysand must have traversed, in his analytic experience as such, not only the analytic discourse, which puts him to work from his subjective division  $a \rightarrow$ , but also his reaction as analysand from another social bond, and particularly from the hysteric's discourse ( $\$ \rightarrow$ S1, "the discourse effectively sustained by the analysand", (second lesson of the seminar, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*).

In both periods of the ICG in which I participated, I have only heard of psychoses in the case of some requests for the Pass that were not admitted to the *dispositif*. The ones that

were, were explicitly or tacitly considered cases of neurosis, as if the passage through the analyzing discourse excluded other options. Even in the cases of nomination, where there is a little transmission in the testimony of the kind "unconscious  $\hat{a}$  *ciel ouvert*", this is without any objection to the conditions for AE. But the question that could methodically be outlined regarding the subjective position with respect to the father as a real reference, in general, is not a preoccupation for the participants of the ICG. Perversion in men was not mentioned in any case.

Is it that diagnosis regarding the clinical type represents a classificatory knowledge that implies, in our context, a judgment of value? If analytic diagnosis doesn't render a neurosis, is it offensive or derogatory? Perhaps this may be the case in other places, but not in my surroundings, where we study not only the deficits but also the benefits regarding the social link that other clinical types such as psychoses or perversion can bring – particularly remarkable in art or in scientific disciplines like mathematical logic, and more generally, in any works that imply a creative freedom usually inaccessible to the neurotic.

A critique of analytic judgment becomes imperative for me in order to avoid the current perspective according to which we owe everything to neurosis, understanding implicitly that this is the best provenance for an analyst, if not the only one. It would be interesting to go back to that slant from which Freud and Lacan were able to weave the heuristics which guided them with their own hystorization, and not only from neurosis. Fliess and Aimée were involved there, with the non-neurotic possibilities of each of them: "if I were more psychotic, I would probably be a better analyst" Lacan used to say, and this was no joke. But this is not yet a topic of debate in our Schools. This critique would not only require that, as in the treatment, one pays with one's own intimate judgment, but also with one's oral judgment; that it be clearly explicit at least in the internal debates of bodies like the Cartels of the Pass and in the frame of the ICG. One is met rather with sanctimonious objections of the type: "I don't want to know about unnecessary intimacies of the life of a colleague".

Of course there are schools more or less open to the matter. An analyst affirmed not too long ago at the University that she is not in agreement with having the AS's publications about their own pass as material for working on. In this way the risk of obscenity or discrimination is combated with obscurantism, forgetting Lacan's suggestion according to which between public and private life, there is the analysand-life, which is not something to be spooked about; especially if instead of dwelling on the fantasies – inexhaustible source of obscenity that paralyzes desire – we take the pathological subjective division as the essential referent of the clinic, that is, the symptom, inasmuch as at some point it becomes impossible to bear, hopeless, like mortal illness {*Sygdommen til Døden*} was for Kierkegaard.

It can be argued that the subjective destitution of the analyzed finishes in act with the division of the subject. Then why bother to work on the hystorization recommended by Lacan for the experience of the Pass? Why go back to the connection with the

coordinates at the beginning of the treatment and to the complex referents in which the dimension of the symptom was originally constituted? A possible explanation, already mentioned: what is at play in the Pass is not so much of the order of the hystorization of *pathos*, but of subjective destitution, condition of the act to which analysis yields access.

Another possible explanation: the inadequacy of the passers. But it could also involve the state of the matter among the members of the Cartel of the Pass who make a decisive and responsible intervention in the analytic community of which they are a part.

Let us remember that subjective destitution is not a permanent state but rather a structural condition of the act, after which, the division, the existential condition of the subject, returns. Any analyst knows this, and they can deal with it. Lacan himself felt guilty, *reus*, of his symptom that came back from the real, and about which he affirmed that he had to pass the Pass over and over again. The articulation between one and the other position, destitution and symptom, would be interesting, it would also be important. The cipher of the articulation between the analysis and the clinic lies there, as well as the key to the articulation of its methods.

In sum, my impression is that in psychoanalysis we are still employing diagnoses accompanied by judgments of value, as either deficit or excess, except in the case of neurosis; the prejudice being that analysts come from the neuroses but not from other clinical types. For sure, the neurotic is less unruly, but as the good patient he can be a danger for the dispositifs. It is a mistake to block the question about the analysand's symptom of origin: are there any AS that come from other clinical types? It is not so sure, but either they are not nominated, or the question is not outlined. Psychosis is then the index of no-pass. Perversion does not exist, or at least we don't talk about it, there being only "traces of perversion", according to what we learned in the "clinic under transference" imposed by the World Association of Psychoanalysis in the 90s. If now the clinic is diluted, or kept "under transference", which means, "under the subject supposed to know", then it is burdensome for its scientific quality as well as for its ethics. Psychoanalysis must differentiate its perspective from that of the master of antiquity who keeps knowledge "under transference", and from the capitalist dilution of the clinic, which proletarianizes our radical references. One can go beyond the father, on condition of making use of him.

Buenos Aires, August 5th, 2018

Translated by Gabriela Zorzutti

## "The mark that one's fellows must 'know' how to find"<sup>85</sup>

## Clara Cecelia Mesa

Dear colleagues, we are getting ready to conclude our intense Study Day of work on the experience of the School put to the test, fifty years after Lacan presented his Proposition on the *dispositif* of the Pass. Like Spinoza, four years after what Lacan called his "excommunication", he undertook a project that aspired to the "reform of understanding". Four years later Lacan takes up Spinoza's formula in his text "*Raison d'un échec*" [Reason for a failure], also aged 67, where he speaks of having been "devoted to the reform of understanding, that imposes a task which is an act of engaging others".<sup>86</sup> This project was announced in the form of a Proposition addressed to the analytic community, the fundamental pillars of which are to renew the status of the unconscious and to question practice. Its program involves establishing a new form through which the psychoanalyst will find in his own analysis the grounds for his act. Thus the Proposition goes further than putting the *dispositif* of the Pass into action in order to clear away the heavy shadow that covers the passage of analysand to analyst. It is for this reason that Lacan proposes steady structures in psychoanalysis and guarantees their realisation by the analyst.<sup>87</sup>

We know that the analytic community did not receive the project willingly, but Lacan did not step back. Thus, on November 15, he inaugurates his seminar 15, "The Analytic Act"; on December 14, he gives a lecture, "*La méprise du sujet supposé savoir*" ["The mistake of the subject supposed to know"], and 18 hours later, on December 15, "*Raison d'un échee*". The reform of understanding met with resistance from analysts, the same as Freud had experienced. "The mistake of the subject supposed to know" begins with "What is the unconscious? The thing has not yet been understood. The effort of psychoanalysts over the decades having been to give reassurance about this discovery, the most revolutionary that ever was...".<sup>88</sup>

So we commemorate fifty years of a quadripod: the Proposition of the School, the project of reform, the assessment of a failure and the unprecedented analytic act. As Lacan writes it in the summary of seminar 15: "The analytic act, neither seen nor known outside of ourselves, that is, never located and questioned even less, now we suppose it to be the elective moment where psychoanalysand passes to psychoanalyst."<sup>89</sup>

Lacan decides to start from what is: "the psychoanalyst derives his authorisation only from himself.... This does not exclude the possibility that the School provide a guarantee that an analyst has come out of its training .... the analyst may want this guarantee ... to become responsible for the progress of the School...".<sup>90</sup> Thus Lacan's project involves a guarantee for the School, but this guarantee does not come from the Other, this is not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Text presented in Rio de Janiero, September 7, 2017.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Lacan, J., « Raison d'un échec » dans Autres écrits. Édition du Seuil, Paris. 2001 p. 346

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School. Trans. Russell Grigg. *Analysis* 6, 1995, « Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste d'Ecole » dans *Autres écrits*. Œuvre citée, p. 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Lacan, J., « La méprise du sujet supposé savoir » dans les Autres écrits. Œuvre citée, p. 241.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Lacan, J., « Compte rendu du séminaire L'acte psychanalytique » dans les *Autres écrits*. Œuvre citée, p. 375
 <sup>90</sup> Lacan J. Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 1.

the guarantee of knowing everything possible; paradoxically, it is a guarantee that comes from the real, from the impossible, from the not-all and this guarantee produces novelty with regard to some previous problems in psychoanalysis. Firstly, the analysis has an end; it is not the drifting of the unconscious structured like a language, always subject to a new lucubration. Secondly, although the not-all possible of the saying pushes its roots into the knot of the navel of the dream, this is not, however, ineffable. Thirdly, the production of the analyst is not automaton but contingency, event. It is thus that we find it in the "Note italienne" [Italian Note]. Lacan changes his idea and no longer says that the analyst is the product of an analysis; yes, he is that, but not as automaton, and he says in a categorical way that it is not enough to have finished an analysis in order that there be an analyst.<sup>91</sup> And fourthly, the analyst is not authorised by the institutional hierarchy according to the preceding IPA model. He authorises himself from himself, that is, from that which has been circumscribed once the horror of knowledge has been traversed; his own, separated from the clamour of humanity. With that, he will know how to be the refuse of humanity.<sup>92</sup> I am citing Lacan in the "Italian Note" where he does not leave any doubt about the way in which analysts should be recruited. To authorise himself from himself; that is, from the object *a* that he has been able to circumscribe, for it is the remainder of his own analysis taken to its final consequences, and not from his distraction, nor from his division, nor from his fantasy, nor from his castration.<sup>93</sup>

Now, the *dispositif* of the Pass is a procedure that puts to the test the emergence of the Analyst of the School, and on the basis of this fact, of the School itself. This *dispositif* links the AMS, the passers, the Cartel of the Pass, and finally the AS [Analyst of the School], a contingent nomination for it may or may not be made.

I am interested to see in what manner and by what means the Cartel of the Pass can make use of this complex procedure for the nomination of an AS. By some means, for in this *dispositif* what is at stake - like the water that makes the mill turn - is the fault in knowledge that introduces the real, and which is manifested at each step of the procedure. The analysand who decides to testify about the crucial problems of his analysis - that is, the passand - and who knows more than what he knows he knows, without knowledge. Like the prisoner of the sophism, he reaches a logical deduction about the mark on his shoulders that indicates to him who he is, without being able to see, and to present himself at the door to show how he has reached the conclusion about his being. The two passers, who are themselves at the moment of the construction of traversing their end of analysis, and who find themselves in a relation determined by a certain "desire to know", as Lacan says in the little "Note sur la designation des passeurs" [On the designation of passers] (1974) in order that they can hear the intention of the transmission of the passand, the transmission of the clearing up of what happened in the shadow that covers the passage of analysand to analyst. At the same time they are particularly sensitive to the moment, the horror of knowledge.... We need the passer, Lacan concludes in his note, no matter what he knows about questioning the other, no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Voir Conférence de Colette Soler à Madrid : « A propos du désir ». Le 16 avril 2016. <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13DQJBddO40</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Lacan, J., « Note italienne » dans Autres écrits. Œuvre citée.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Soler, C., « L'embrouille du discours » dans *Hétérité* # 3. P. 94-95.

matter what he does not know about what the knowledge he carries is, for, as Colette Soler signals, "the passer still lacks the answer". However, it is because of this same difficulty that "he will possibly be sensitive to the answer of that the other, his passand, believes he has found and that he [the passer] will be able to transmit it to the Cartel".<sup>94</sup>

We see here the field in which the Cartel of the Pass receives the generally heterogeneous testimonies of passers, and it is on these that there will be deliberation and finally a decision of nomination or not. But how, without the knowledge of doctrine that allows for the elaborating of a sort of checklist with which to verify the application of criteria for determining an end of analysis?

Nevertheless, after my experience in a Cartel of the Pass which had the occasion to name an AS, I reached the point of constructing the hypothesis that the point where the transmission touches the epistemic foundation of the School is in the ephemeral discovery, like lightning appearing between the members of the Cartel of the Pass, itself ephemeral, and each of the two passers, who are ephemeral also. Like a blind date, this discovery allows different forms of misrecognition to produce a rising in the calm waters of a supposed knowledge of doctrine in psychoanalysis, which leaves as a consequence a fertile space for surprise. "Everyone – it is lightning that rules them," says Lacan in 1973, in making reference to a quotation from Heraclitus "the lightning directs *pa tanta*, everyone, everyone, as diverse, as radically distinct". This reference leads to the following:

If (...) indeed this Pass can be something that suddenly puts into relief, for the one who offers himself to it (...), just as lightning can do, that is, in a way that suddenly brings a completely different light to some obscure part of his analysis; if, in this lightning, something can be perceived of this experience, it is a thing that concerns the passand. (...) I can affirm to you that that has been for some an absolutely disturbing experience.<sup>95</sup>

I am reflecting a fragment of experience from the Cartel of the Pass and I am starting from the particular richness of this Pass for it has allowed for the comparison of two distinct subjective moments and the extracting of the consequences for transmission.

Some years before, the passand in question had considered that his analysis was finished and he had thought about presenting himself for the Pass. At that time, for various reasons, he had rejected the decision. In the mean time, he continued to write about his experience of analysis in notes that he kept hidden apparently for the moment when this decision would be taken. Time passed, and faced with some contingencies or encounters in life, some certainties bound to the ideals and emblems of his paternal family and of his father collapsed. It is after this reaction that he decided to take up his analysis for a final time. As a consequence, and after having elaborated the remainder that the previous periods of analysis had not succeeded in treating, he decided finally to present himself for the Pass. Note however that before taking up the last period of analysis, amongst the contingencies, there was one that resulted in the loss of all the lucubration and all the

<sup>94</sup> Soler, C., « Le passeur » dans Wunsch 12. IF-EFCL. 2012. P.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Lacan, J., Intervention dans la séance de travail « Sur la passe » du samedi 3 novembre (après midi), parue dans les Lettres de l'École freudienne, 1975, n° 15, pp. 185-193

hystorisation of his experience of analysis that he had kept so carefully. Deprived then of all this lying truth, the passand presented himself for the Pass in very different condition. Two times then: the first moment, that the passers allowed us to perceive, was that where, in spite of important therapeutic effects, the weight of paternal ideals would have probably made of the nomination the conquest of prestige in a series with the ideals of the elite. But the second period of analysis and his final demand for the Pass allowed us to think that the movement from the first to the second time was a movement where one could weigh the fall of both narcissistic and phallic support, leaving him facing a remainder. So the question was whether it was possible, based on what the passers said, to discern if the passand, now without his emblems, could transform this object into object cause of the analytic experience, that is, know-how to make this remainder the cause.

I can go no further with this experience, but what the Cartel discerned as the passage is the movement between the two times. Following Colette Soler in *The Unconscious Reinvented*, we can say that the passand's passage from analysand to analyst is only possible to the extent that the analysand has been able to circumscribe his place in the real unconscious, which is the condition for being able to pass to the analytic act.<sup>96</sup>

I am returning to the testimony in order to underline an important moment when a member of the Cartel of the Pass, someone who did not know the language in which the passers had transmitted the testimony, caught the signifier of the name, the mark of the subject, which was revealed in a dream as if it were only a part of the scene and seemingly banal. This signifier that jumped out, and which was caught by the tail like a fish, allowed us to understand that this mark of the real subject is the singular vestige of incarnated lalangue; however, it is to a certain extent, trans-lingual or a-lingual. What Lacan said of the real unconscious: The signifiers S1 and S2 do not make a chain. Certainly this does not exclude the unconscious as conditioned by language by the very fact of the speaking being, but the RUCS is not a language that is "making sentences, making "propositions". It is rather langue, that is, the inconsistent multiplicity of differential elements that do not fix meaning." It must be said that in spite of the fact that passers have stated it, they hadn't caught it either. That is, this fish that jumped refers to the variant of the signifier in the real outside the chain that fixes "the proper name as the unforgeable signature" of the subject.97 The analysis has thus no other product than Y'a d'l'Un.

This mark evokes Lacan's logical wager with the assertion of anticipated certainty: the prisoner could infer the mark that he carried on his shoulder ... and he will complete it in the "Italian note", where he indicates: "A ses congénères de 'savoir' la trouver » [For his fellows in 'knowledge' to find it.<sup>98</sup>

Coming back to the function of the Cartel of the Pass, which Lacan called the Jury of Approval [*jury d'agrément*]. If we situate it as a place of fellows, this is because we suppose, legitimately, that Cartels of the Pass have a knowledge derived from their own experience

<sup>96</sup> Soler, C., Lacan, the Unconscious Reinvented, London, Karnac Books Ltd, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>98</sup> Lacan, J., « Note italienne» dans Autres écrits. Œuvre citée.

and a knowledge of the theory, but for analysts, this knowledge does not diminish the function of the Freudian teaching: take each case as if it were the first, that is, to make sure that each case demonstrates singularity, and that experience does not prevent the surprise of the emergence of the unconscious. I have many questions about this function that I cannot resolve here but I can pose: On what basis does one decide? Was there an end of analysis or not? Was there the possibility of determining if there was a passage from analysand to analyst? What is the place of theory in the discernment of the Cartel? What does a passer transmit? How is the most singular element of the case transmitted? At what point in the *dispositif* is the transmission made? The experience allowed me to realize that theory, while being necessary, is no longer a navigation map and that is verified, for although each member of the Cartel has a precise conception of psychoanalysis, all theory is put into question. From the conception of the entry into analysis to the conception of the end of analysis, passing through the transference, the fantasy, the symptom, subjective destitution, the therapeutics at stake, the emergence of the desire of the analyst and its consequences. Obviously this movement gives to the testimony a fundamental epistemic function but it is not theory that is applied to a case. It is a case that questions theory. Yet that is still not enough. The only expectation possible for the Cartel is to try to find an answer to the question of how and why the passand made the step that put him in the place of the analyst.

The procedure of the Cartel is a judgment in the sense of discernment; it is not a verdict. It is a judgment in the sense that it succeeds in circumscribing, catching, between the said and the saying, a signifier that jumps out from the chain. Certainly, not just any chain, for the intrusive signifier that jumped is not however too far from those that are articulated in the chain of generations, of familiar successions, of the successions S1 S2, but which jump in order to signal the remainder that positions the subject as falling from the symbolic chain.

It is evident that what the Cartel of the Pass must identify is not the well-analysed analyst, who, thanks to his way of hystorising his own analysis would have brought the proof that his analysis had finished. This would have been the first time for the passand (...). What the Cartel must verify – I cite Michel Bousseyroux – that this is an analyst who is willing to respond to the real that makes a plug for the said hystorisation (...) That he has the experience, or does not have it, does not make the analyst. What makes the analyst is that he draws the plug of the lack of lack that plugs the gurgling of the lying truth.<sup>99</sup>

To finish, I can only say that each nomination is always a logical wager to which every new AS must respond. Being responsible for the progress of the School, they have the task of continuing the project undertaken by Lacan: to reform understanding.

> Translation from Spanish to French by Maricela Sulbaran Translation from French to English by Susan Schwartz

<sup>99</sup> Bousseyroux, M., Lacan le Borroméen. Ed Erès, Point Hors Ligne, 2014, p. 36.

# "FROM EXPERIENCE"...THIS IS THE TITLE OF THE AFTERNOON OF CARTELS THAT TOOK PLACE IN PARIS ON SEPTEMBER 23, 2017

During the Afternoon of Cartels Cathy Barnier and Anne-Marie Combres also took part. You can read their presentations in *Mensuel* 121, February 2018.

We are publishing here the texts of two members of the ICG who presented their interrogations and elaborations based on the theory of their experience in the *dispositif* of the Pass. Both belong to one of the cartels of the ICG which as the theme for their work: "To sustain the act: the passand, the passer and their roles in the *dispositif*."

# Reflections on the passer Roser Casalprim

I am going to develop three points regarding the topic I have chosen for this intercartel:

- 1) The context in which I am approaching these reflections
- 2) The role and position of the passer
- 3) The experience in the ICG

## Regarding the context

To begin, I am noting that in our ICG, we decided on the modality—already initiated for the constitution of two types of cartels: a permanent cartel for elaboration and a Cartel of the Pass, ephemeral, which is constituted when the one passing has finished transmission of his/her experience in the *dispositif* and dissolved when the Cartel has rendered its judgment.

The permanent cartel, of which I am a part, had as its theme for work: *To support the act: the one passing, the passer and his role in the dispositif.*<sup>100</sup> I chose as the topic for my individual work the question of the passer: *What is the role and position of the passer?* Even if *function* and *position* are not equivalent or synonymous terms, they are intrinsically linked. This relates to a question I have been asking myself for a long time. First, when I was designated for this function, later when I was the one passing, due to "difficulties in meeting," if I may say so, which happened to me with one of the passers. Currently the question concerns me because, as an AMS, there is always the possibility of designating passers and also because I am part of the ICG. These are, of course, different experiences and come from different places, although all are linked to the *dispositif* of the Pass, about which I learned and learn something in every case and about which there remain gray areas for me.

I also want to add that when the current ICG took over from the previous one, the topic of designating passers was one of the issues that came to the fore with the temporary suspension of AMS appointments; this is also why I chose to again take up this question.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Members of the Cartel: Jean-Pierre Drapier, Clara Cecilia Mesa, Agnes Metton, Roser Casalprim and Patrick Barillot (Plus-one).

#### Regarding the role and position of the passer

With respect to the theory, we acknowledge that there is no definitive formulation regarding the function of the passer, and also that the said function cannot be completely formalized. Nevertheless, there are several texts of Lacan where he provides some indications on this subject. Some of them, very precise, illuminate the question and others are not immediately so clear. Thus I reread several of Lacan's texts which address the question of the passer: "Proposition of 9 October 1967" second version, "À propos de l'expérience de la passe" (1973), "Intervention de Lacan au Congrès de l'EFP à la Grande-Motte" (1974), "Note sur la désignation de passeurs" (1973), "Note italienne" (1974), etc.

First point of my reflection: with the term "passer," an analyst designates a function. If we take into account the central place that the passer has in the *dispositif*, as a third ("*tiers*") says Lacan, between the one passing and the Cartel of the Pass, we could say that the passers are the messengers of the one passing, orally, although they can make use of notes or writings, as often happens, when they make their transmission to the Cartel of the Pass.

I recently saw a film about Spaniards persecuted by the Franco regime who joined the French Resistance in order to fight back-at the time of the occupation of France. They managed to cross the border thanks to passers (smugglers), a comparison already evoked for P. Leray-to whom this mission was entrusted. A noble mission, it must be said. There was a high degree of confidence in his expertise. With all due respect for the differences, it seems to me that, when an analysand is designated as a passer he, too, is entrusted with a noble task in the *dispositif*. This is not at all a promotion and, furthermore, through his designation for this function, he is invited "to serve the School," as B. Nominé has said.<sup>101</sup> This puts the accent on a question of interest to me, which I had not much dwelt on before, namely: the dispositif of the Pass is not made to serve either the passer, or the one passing, or the Cartel of the Pass-even though the experience can serve all of these, as shown by the many writings or commentaries on this topic. On the contrary, it is a question of bringing something to the School. In the case of the passer-even the passers say this in their writings-with one's designation, one is pushed to the encounter with questions fundamental to psychoanalysis and to the analytic community. So then, what can the passer contribute? Is it possible to shed some light on these shadowy areas?

Second reflection/interrogation: I am asking myself, what do we, in the current context of the School, hope passers are able to grasp and to transmit? Vis-à-vis passers, do we hope for the same things Lacan did?

Given that the Trinitarian ("*tripod*") articulation of the *dispositif* is inscribed in the logic of the discourse, shadows are preserved in each place, everything cannot be seen, but the passer can function as a hinge, sieve, intermediary between the rays of light and the shadows. The extent of his responsibility and his task is such that Lacan decided there should be two of them. I think this is why we often use the metaphor of the "*photographic*"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Nominé, B., "La passe: pour que ça serve." Sao Paulo, July 2008.

plate" ("plaque sensible"), but I have never found this expression in Lacan's texts. I believe it was Miller who introduced it. In any case, in my opinion, it is an interesting metaphor. The passer, without being a photographer, can be a photographic plate onto which the testimony is imprinted; but at the same time, in principle it is a reader who can grasp the "identité sinthomeale" of the one passing via the "hystorisation," along with the concluding satisfaction of the act. In what way? Only though the narration of the one passing?

Lacan believed that one could expect the production of a "an accurate testimony" ("un témoignage juste"), only from those who were in the process of traversing a particular moment, a "crucial moment of pass" ("un moment crucial de passe")-what was for a long time called the clinical moment of the pass-an expression little used today. He proposed this in the "Proposition of October 9 1967" and six years later, in 1973, he returned to it in the text "À propos de l'expérience de la passe et sa transmission." I recall some paragraphs from these two texts:

Proposition of October 9,1967: After having pointed out the mark of "naïvete" at the end of analysis, Lacan said:

" From where then could an accurate testimony on whoever crosses this pass be expected, if not from an other who, like him, is still in this pass (....) and the testimony they will be able to receive from the very heart of their own pass will be a kind that no jury of agreement will ever collect. "102

"À propos de l'expérience de la passe," 1973: "What we expect from them is a testimony, a transmission, the transmission of an experience."<sup>103</sup>

And what do we understand by "accurate testimony?"

I am going to tell you how I understand it: that the passer can transmit something about a singular experience related to how the passage from analysand to analyst is produced, on what it rests. I can also put it differently: to be able to transmit something about what happened between the instant of seeing and that of concluding, what solution or invention did the one passing find that allowed him this change of position. At one time, some colleagues emphasized letting the effects of the analysis of the one passing, of his change of position with respect to love and jouissance, be heard. C. Soler emphasized "(...) how a subject is affected by the manifestations of the real and how he responds at the end."<sup>104</sup>

I am not sure these different ways of saying it are equivalent. What I think happens is that the "application," if I may use this expression, the application of the theory to the dispositif of the Pass changes. For example, at certain moments, we put more emphasis on one question rather than another, so that the theory gets reformulated due to new contributions to the reading of Lacan's texts. On the one hand, because of what is extracted from his last teaching, but also based on the test of experience. Then, in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Lacan, J. "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. R. Grigg, Analysis 6, 1995, p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Lacan, J., "Sobre la experiencia del pase." Ornicar? 1. p. 39.
<sup>104</sup> Soler, C., *Wunsch 10*.

analytic community, there is also the "circulating *doxa*" and its effects. Finally, it seems to me that "the thing is alive!"

In the paragraph from the *Proposition* that I just recalled, Lacan suggests that "the passer is the pass" —a question that J.P. Drapier will specifically address. What I personally understand is that the passer, when he himself is at this "moment of pass," that is to say, on the path to resolution of his "problem," he is therefore sensitive precisely to the other's discovery. Put differently, the passer is in the pass, but it remains for him to cross this step/pass [*pas/passe*]. He has not yet traversed it. In brief, he has not yet finished his treatment.

Consequently, this is not something one can claim, "*if one is not there*" ("*si on n'y est pas*"). That is to say, one cannot act "as if" one were in the moment of the pass. It is not a matter any longer of knowing how to play the role but of being in this moment—to say it another way, the passer is in a moment of the end of the analytic treatment— and as a result in a position in the discourse. This is why there are no rules, nor guides, nor model, because no identification to another passer is possible and nor, therefore, to the function. I also believe that the transmission of the passer, this "making pass" and "letting pass," about which we often speak, happen beyond his will.

Going back to the "Proposition of October 9," Lacan spoke of the role of passer as an "office". He said the following: "This is what I will shortly propose to you as the office to be conferred, for the demand to become an analyst of the School, upon certain people whom we will therein call: "passers".<sup>105</sup>

One meaning of the term "office" is a "profession that is learned." But it also means "function" and "task." In this text, I think that Lacan, when he refers to "office", makes it equivalent to function/task. What then is the office/function of the passer? To produce an accurate testimony about the one passing.

Moving to the next to the question—What do we expect from the passer?—I would like to recall something that we often repeat based on what Lacan has said: "*Provided that he is up to his function*." But what does that mean? I connect it to what he also specifies in "Note to the Italians". There he mentions that the passers "*dishonor themselves in leaving the thing uncertain*"—this seemed "harsh" to me when I read it for the first time because it immediately resonated in me as a certain incapacity of the passer. After reflection, and with the support of a number of commentaries by colleagues who have worked on this text, it seems clear enough that Lacan is affirming that the passer cannot leave the Cartel of the Pass in doubt or indetermination as to his judgment regarding the passage of the analysand to analyst. This touches on, among other things, an ethical question.

C. Soler, in her commentary on « Note to the Italians", interprets it this way:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Lacan, J. Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 25. Translation modified, *Analysis*, p. 10.

"beyond all the material of the sayings, what must be aimed at, transmitted, is to know if, in the candidate, one has perceived the trait of enthusiastic rubbish." And she reminds us that for J. Lacan, there would be two failures: one belonging to the passer, the other belonging to the one passing. For the passer, it will be indetermination, for the one passing, lack of enthusiasm.

I quote: "(...) to not decide yes or no, this is the failure of the passer, and there is also the failure of the one passing: the failure of lack of enthusiasm, (...) this passes to the passers because, (...) what must pass in the Pass is the trait of enthusiasm."<sup>106</sup>

Now I am not going to develop this point further because I must still reflect a little more on the question of "*enthusiastic rubbish*" and also on the passer's accurate testimony regarding the "trait of enthusiasm" in the one passing, also in the written testimonies of those passing.

To end with what, in the School, we expect from passers, I will add that in the text "À *propos de l'expérience de la passe,*" there is a very clear indication about what is expected and not expected from the position of passer. I quote: "Those who are in the position of passers, in certain cases, position themselves as analysts. **This is not at all** (I emphasize this "not at all") what is expected from them: What we expect from them is a testimony, the transmission of an experience."<sup>107</sup>

## Regarding the experience:

My trajectory in the ICG is short: up until now, I have had the opportunity to participate in two Cartels of the Pass. Thus I have heard four passers, and in both cases, the ones passing have not been nominated as ASs. I think it is not yet time to draw any conclusions; it would be premature.

Nevertheless, I am taking the risk of saying something about listening to passers. Were they up to their function? I would say yes, for the most part. I believe their designation was judicious, except in one case. In general, the passers exercised their function with seriousness, each in his own style. Their position in receiving testimony from the one passing was not "*haughty*". Nor were they in the analyst's position, the subject supposed to know. For the most part, it seemed to me that they did not position themselves only in passive listening or as secretaries and a number were affected by the testimony of the one passing.

What can I say today about the passer who did not function? Quite simply, more than "transmitting the "living points" of the experience of the one passing, he got embroiled and tried to produce a series of theoretical lucubrations which showed his "dislocation" with respect to the function. In effect, when the passer finished his transmission, we were all unanimous in our reaction to this subject. Was this the failure of the passer?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Soler, C., "Commentaire Note Italienne." Ed. Praxis del Campo Lacaniano. Rome (2014), p. 2014. <sup>107</sup>Lacan, J., "Sobre la experiencia del pase." p. 39.

I believe that the strongest or most important point to consider in this case was the designation. Indeed, it is not always easy to find a concordance between the designation of analysand as passer and the actualization of a subjective turn that is decisive for him in his analysis in the sense we noted before.

Besides this, it was a matter of a passer who did not belong to the School. Regarding this point, I had already wondered whether it was appropriate to designate passers who did not belong to the School, since in my own clinical practice, I had been asked the question.<sup>108</sup>

To conclude, here are some other current topics for reflection:

Was it the passers who influenced the judgement handed down by the two cartels of the pass, the non-nominations of the two who were passing? Was it that the passers did not know, or were not able to discern something about the crucial turn? Or was it a botched reading of the saying [*dire*] of the one passing heard in the saids [*dits*]? I do not think this was the case, because in listening to the four passers, we did not hear the crucial turning points that would allow us to locate the passage from the position of analysand to that of analyst, something of the desire that pushes to the act. Nevertheless, in one case, there was controversy among us as to the nomination.

I will continue to work on these questions and others that emerge about the theme of my work.

Translated by Devra Simiu

## The Passer is the Pass

## Jean-Pierre Drapier

To start, I would like to quote Jean Oury in order to give a reason for, and to highlight, what gives resonance to my choice of theme in my work within this cartel of the ICG (International Committee of the Guarantee), and also in my work within this School. Jean Oury, then member of the EFP [Freudian School of Psychoanalysis], asked: "What did Lacan and his School bring that was indispensible, and why was he himself a member of that School?" This was not without evoking his famous methodological question: 'What the hell am I doing here?' [*Qu'est ce que je fous là?*] His answer was: "This School makes sense to us only if it is articulated with what we do every day, not as a ridiculous ornament to soothe our consciences, but rather, only if it applies concretely to each moment in which we practise what we might as well call our 'profession'".<sup>109</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup>In the *Thesaurus* on the passer there is a quotation from Lacan's 1967 article "Une procédure pour la passe" regarding the passer who is not a member of the School. This made me reflect on, for example, the function of the non-analyst in the School. On this subject, if I have understood correctly, he says: "It can happen that someone who occupies any position at all in the School or someone who does not belong to the School, for this reason, qualifies for it."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Oury, J., Petit discours critique sur une utilisation possible de l'EFP, in Scilicet 2/3 Le Seuil, Paris, 1970, p. 49.

First of all, I will speak briefly about the ICG, concerning what it ought not to be and also, about its mode of functioning.

The function of the ICG is to name the ASs (Analysts of the School) – that is, those who, at the end of an analysis, have the capacity to take part in critique with regard to the development of the formation<sup>110</sup> of analysts, of course – and to designate AMS who represent the School "to the social body to the extent that it guarantees their formation".<sup>111</sup> This exercise is not based on the logic of the "bathroom scales" [*pèse personne*] and it does not confuse the man [*bonhomme*] with the subject. To use the same signifiers as Lacan in his Discourse to the EFP in December 1967, it strives "to build on the spirit of psychoanalysis".<sup>112</sup>

This explains why, on the one hand, the AMSs are elected by all the members of the School. The ASs permutation every two years is in order to avoid making the jury into a caste. On the other hand, their function relies in a large part on the cartels. The cartels, after having been based on different modalities (permanent or not, drawn by lot or by co-optation, for the pass and for work) are now functioning according to the mode chosen by the previous ICG, and they are of two kinds:

- The Cartels of the Pass are formed case by case according to the different languages, incompatibilities and geographical locations and they last only for the time it takes for the examination of a pass and,
- The Cartels of the ICG: these are permanent and their aim is to make the doctrine progress, both the doctrine of the Pass and of formation and, therefore, as we can see with the present debate on the AMS (Analyst Member of the School), the doctrine of the School and of its functioning as well. As is the case with all other cartels, they have their own title and the members choose their own theme.

The title of the theme of the work in the cartel of the ICG that I am part of is: "The passer is the pass". This question already aroused my interest in the ICG 2011-2012. This was linked to my dissatisfaction with regard to certain passers who appeared to be inadequate with regard to their function. This did put into question their designation by the AMS. This question was re-activated with the decision by the previous ICG to freeze the nomination of AMS. On the other hand, this decision revived for me the question about the passers' trajectory in previous ICGs and the effect of one particular designation I made a few years ago. That is, what effect does the designation of passer have on the passage from passer to passand, and how is the passer questioned logically about the/his pass by the very fact of his nomination?

First of all, I would like to highlight an equivoque that appears in the use we make of the term "pass", an equivoque we must interrogate in order to be better understood. The term "pass" has two meanings depending on the two objects it is applied to. At times it is the object –"procedure": asking for the Pass, being a passer, being designated passer,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Lacan, J., Adresse du jury d'accueil à l'assemblée avant son vote (le 25 janvier 1969) op. cit. p. 50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Ibid.

with the corollary of the *dispositif* that ensues, such as the ICG and its cartels, the testimonies, etc. Sometimes though, the term "pass" points to a topological locus, or rather to certain moments, or to topological loci such as the pass at the end of an analysis, and the pass from analysand to analyst, knowing that the two do not coincide. Here is a term that has two sides that are diffracted, and that Lacan distinguished from one another and articulated in his "Proposition of 9 October 1967":

Thus the end of psychoanalysis harbours naivety, which raises the question whether it must be taken as a guarantee in the passage to the desire to be a psychoanalyst.

From where then could an accurate [*juste*] testimony on whoever crosses this pass be expected, if not from an other who like him, is still this pass, namely in whom at this moment is present the *disbeing* [*désêtre*] where his psychoanalyst harbours the essence of what has been passed on to him like a bereavement, knowing thereby, like any other in the role of training analyst, will pass onto them, too.

Who would better be able than this psychoanalysand in the pass to authenticate therein what it contains of the depressive position? We air there nothing about which, if one is not in it, one can take on airs.

This is what I will shortly propose to you as the function to be conferred, for the demand to become an analyst of the School, upon certain people who we will therein call "passers".

Each will have been chosen by an analyst of the School, he who can answer for what they are in that pass or for what they have become there – in short, still bound to the outcome of their personal experience.

It is to them that a psychoanalysand, in order to have himself authorised as an analyst of the School, will speak about his analysis, and the testimony that they will be able to receive from the very heart of their own pass will be of a kind that no jury of agreement will ever collect.<sup>113</sup>

Let's note the surprising use by Lacan of the term 'naivety': this quality does not constitute the guarantee of the passage from analysand to analyst. On the contrary, it is the mark of someone who is in the pass at the end of his analysis, a necessary mark in order that an *"accurate testimony"* can be expected from him. This is the mark of a passer who is able to authenticate what passes/what happens [*ce qui se passe*] for the passand, what he has passed through [*ce par quoi il est passe*]. This naivety is necessary, but so is a certain contemporaneity of the experience (*"is still this pass"*, *"still bound to the outcome of their personal experience"*). This is not what the jury members can boast about, those who are presumed to be more experienced and therefore, who have more or less forgotten their own passage to the analyst, that is who have forgotten their pass in a topological sense. Lacan did regularly go back to this opposition between the *"freshness of the passer and the passand" versus the "routine" of the AMS/jury, as for* example, in his address to the Belgian School of psychoanalysis: *"As expected, it was* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 10.

certainly not those who were more established who were in the position to bring a testimony that was still fresh from the experience that had led them there".<sup>114</sup>

Similarly, he said in Deauville in 1978: "This is the reason why the AMS, the AMS's testimony, does not especially interest me, the AMS does that through habit".<sup>115</sup>

This is an experience I have shared with other members of the Cartels of the Pass: the question of the passer who is up to the task versus the passer who has passed his use-by date [*passeur périmé*]. The latter knows. He believes that the knowledge he has about his unconscious, which he has painstakingly accumulated over hundreds of sessions, allows him to locate the passand's knowledge. However, what he should know is that there is a subject supposed to know only within a knowledge supposed to the subject, and that the subject of the pass is not himself. He is the means for it, the hub, that is, what makes the *dispositif* go round [*celui qui fait tourner le dispositif*]. The adequate passer, the one who, "like him, is still this pass" has a different relationship to knowledge, founded upon the same embarrassment as the one which leads the passand to ask for the Pass. Not just anyone can know how to interrogate the other about it, let alone be grabbed by it. He perhaps enters this function without even recognising what brings him to it.

There is one risk though, that the passer will have to construct this knowledge with his own unconscious, that is, the knowledge he has discovered for himself, and that has matured by itself, and which is perhaps unsuitable for locating other kinds of knowledge. Whence the suspicion that may come to the subject in that moment, that perhaps, in his own analysis, his own truth has not yet come on the stand [*venu à la barre*]. One requires a passer to hear that."<sup>116</sup>

There are many things in these three sentences: first of all, what embarrasses the analysand in the pass, the particular moment of his analysis, his impasse and the suspicion that his own truth has not yet come on the stand, and has not barred him as a subject. He will make of it the motor of his demand for the Pass-procedure. Therefore, the passand comes to ask something and, in order to hear this demand, it is required that someone - the passer - be in that function, and the condition for it is that he is able to share the question of his own truth. Lacan said a bit earlier in the same text that the passer is also engaged at the service of a desire to know. However, his own truth or his own constructed knowledge, does not guarantee that he is able to locate the passand's knowledge. It is rather his 'non-knowledge' that will be a guarantee, his "being grabbed" by the same embarrassment as the passand's - however without making his own embarrassment the passand's. Each to his own, and things will be well heard! Hence the malaise at times in the Cartel of the Pass when we see a passer who does not transmit the passand's signifying or even circumstantial coordinates (marriage, children, etc.), but throws himself instead into the passand's analysis. We can be sure then that we are in a sort of veneering [placage]: we hear about the passer and not the passand. While we are waiting to hear the presence of a real, that which is almost outside knowledge in the passage to the analyst, we can only hear words (paroles) instead. It is there, in that knot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Pas-tout Lacan: J. Lacan à l'école Belge de Psychanalyse, 14/10/72

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Id., Intervention conclusive aux assises de l'EFP à Deauville, 08/01/78

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Lacan J., Note sur le choix des passeurs, 1974, <u>www.valas.fr</u>

that the whole difficulty of the *dispositif* of the Pass resides: "the aporia of the account", to quote Lacan,<sup>117</sup> in a replication of the difficulty of the moment of the pass for the analyst, and in which lies a paradox:

So, in the end, there must be a door, whether it is opened or closed; in that we are either in the psychoanalysing way or in the analytic act. One can make the two alternate, as with a swinging door, however the "psychoanalysand's way" does not apply to the analytic act whose logic is in what follows.<sup>118</sup>

How to account for that exit – not persisting on the way of analysis but being in the analytic act instead? Perhaps by considering the *dispositif* of the Pass as the procedure of the analysis of one's own analysis, by taking this overhanging position, the one the analyst used to occupy. And this is where the passer intervenes, as 'non-analyst' (whatever his professional status might be): someone who can hear, in a fraternity of experience but not in the position of a prosthetic subject supposed to know. If the passer believes he is in it [*s'il s'y croit*], he gets lost in it [*il se fourvoit*].

There exists another difficulty: although it is about a truth that we know ourselves [*que l'on sait soi*], of a real that imposes itself, of a short circuit that is reminiscent of the *Witz*, the moment in which the subject accepts "wearing the hat", and really wants "to be shit…/...the moment in which the subject accepts making himself the straw man of the subject supposed to know".<sup>119</sup> On the passer's side, it is only about his transmission of something that is not transmittable, without adding anything of himself to it. It is about transmitting, if not constructing, or in any case, organising, without being in interpretation. Here too, one has to take a wager on the proximity of the passer's experience with that of the passand, but there is a gap: the passer is still in the way of analysis, and as passer, he is not in the analytic act. After governing, educating, psychoanalysing, one could almost make passing the fourth impossible task! But as with the other ones, one is confronted by it again and always.

In conclusion, one could apply to the passer as well as to the passand and the cartel of the pass this Lacanian aphorism: "This in no way authorises the psychoanalyst to be satisfied in the knowledge that he knows nothing, for what is at issue is what he has to come to know".<sup>120</sup>

Translated by Chantal Degril

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Lacan J., Discours à l'EFP du 6 décembre 1967, Scilicet 2/3 p.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Idem., p. 23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Idem., p. 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of October 9 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 6.

# DEBATE ON THE AMS AND THE PASS

The Proposition of Jacques Lacan of 9 October 1967 at 50

This is an important anniversary for our School since we have kept the Pass alive for 20 years ...

# Opening remarks for the Study Day of September 30, 2017, organised by the French members of the ICG

Anne Lopez

The ICG [International College of the Guarantee], having taken up the question posed by the previous ICG about the nominations for AMS that were made null and void, continued the debate via the Internet. It is rather ironic that this debate was open for six months because in fact it is a debate that has accompanied us from the beginnings of our School, and it was in order to underline that that the ICG opened the question via the Internet for that period as a kind of anniversary of the 50 years since Lacan presented his Proposition of October 7. I thank you for your presence, for bringing your voices and your opinions on this problem.

The date that was chosen has fallen somewhat badly in that some members in the region of Toulouse (the preparatory intercartel for the National Study Days) as well as our two current AS [Analysts of the School] and certain members of our ICG are busy and have sent apologies for their absence. This is certainly rather unfortunate but that does not prevent us from advancing the debate in order that the ICG can propose, at the end of its mandate and during our Encounter of the School on September 13, 2018, some possible modifications on the nomination of AMS.

I remind you that in Medellin there was a vote on the possibility *of all the members* of the School proposing names for AMS, along with their reflections and reasons.

The Pass is this rather clever instrument for stirring the waters and producing discomfort and does not let us bury the question of what "of the" psychoanalyst indicates, or permit us to stop questioning all those with parts to play in this procedure and whom we cannot do without.

I was looking at the incredible production of papers on the Pass by numerous people since the creation of the School. It is considerable. The Pass does not leave us alone; it bothers us.

I realised, after having arranged this Study Day with my colleagues, that we have not given a place to speak to those psychoanalysands who were not nominated and yet who have definitely drawn benefit from it in their analytic experience. Let's remember how in

*Television* Lacan said ironically, "Happy are those cases in which fictive 'passes' pass for an incomplete training; they leave room for hope".<sup>121</sup>

A Pass without nomination is worth more than no Pass at all; not doing the Pass or taking the risk of doing it are not the same, as risk always accompanies the psychoanalyst.

Remember that the Pass is an offer made by the School to those who desire to practice there and to seize this offer. There is nothing obligatory about it. It is a generous offer because it supposes an enormous mobilisation of members ... and of libido.

I now leave the floor to Colette Soler who, as she always does, is going to give us a precise work on the designation of the passer. This question concerns an important part of the work of AMS, work that is expected by the School and will perhaps clarify for some of us the time of the passer, the moment of designation

Translated by Susan Schwartz

# The passer, a clinical approach

## **Colette Soler**

I have already commented on the theme of the passer many times, notably during the International Encounter of 2011 in Paris. The text is in *Wunsch 12*. The question is always the same: what is the analyst's compass when designating a passer?

In Lacanian terms, there is no other compass than the structure. It is a question of whether the experience is structured and if so, going beyond individual singularities, there is both an experience and a clinic that we can say is analytic. If it is not structured, then there is no common experience, only a collage of case reports, which is not enough to make an analytic clinic, as Lacan marked it.

There is an anxiety about the compass in relation to what a passer might be. It inhabits those who could designate passers but who question themselves about how to recognise the time of the pass that Lacan identified as a particular moment in an analysis that continues in its course. It is defined as "the end of the transferential relationship".

It redoubles the experience in the *dispositif* where sometimes we meet passers who, far from being passers, are ... screens. There are not so many of them, but it happens. It can lead to the strange situation where the testimony of two passers gives the impression that there are two different passands, for example.

What reference points did Lacan construct that could orient us? We know that the problem with Lacan is that he did not stop advancing, and did not always say the same thing. A major, well-known example: after decades of speaking about the subject of the unconscious, he refers to the unconscious without a subject. The examples could be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Lacan, J., Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A.

Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 4. Autres écrits, p. 510.

multiplied. What about the moment of the pass and the passer? Is there one, or are there several, conceptions of the passer among Lacan's constructions?

Let's take the major texts that we know: the "Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School" of 1967, before the writing of the analytic discourse that dates from "Radiophonie"; in 1972 there is "L'étourdit" – he had constructed the analytic discourse in the mean time, but the theses are the same; then, the "Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI" of 1976, the last great text on the course of an analysis.

All three refer to the object *a* that Lacan reaffirms in the Preface, saying in relation to the Pass that he invented it, "having produced the only conceivable idea of the object",<sup>122</sup> after a century of psychoanalysis that speaks of "the object relation", for it started well before him. Yet the major terms of this Preface differ. These are essentially truth and the real. Does that imply a change with regard to the passer?

I note that these texts do not aim at the same moment in an analysis. In the Proposition it is about the turning point [*virage*] of the pass, a moment in the course of an analysis, according to Lacan, which is distinguished from the end of the analysis. In the Preface, it concerns the end of the analysis, when one leaves one's analysis, a completed analysis. The Preface does not speak explicitly about the passer or the moment of the pass; I think that it is presupposed, without anything changing there. This is what I would like to try to show.

We know the expressions Lacan uses in the first two texts to situate the moment of the pass. There are three principles: traversal of the fantasy, subjective destitution, and mourning the object. With the idea that the destitute subject has re-joined his being-object, if I can say it like that, the object that he is and knows himself to be. But then, what exactly is the mourning for the object on the clinical plane?

In the writing of the fantasy the object is written *a*; it sutures the gap in the speaking being. This object makes what Lacan calls his "guarantee", that is, his base, his indubitable foundation, despite all his neurotic doubts. So when Lacan says "mourning" on what does this mourning bear?

He connects this mourning with the vacillation of the fantasy's guarantee; it is thus mourning for the object as that which sutures the subject, not divides it. In other words, it is mourning for the object at stake in the sentence or scene of the fantasy. Now, what does this sentence and/or object say? Nothing other than what each one has always believed – and that "always" means from the dawn of memory – about what he thinks he has been for the "traumatic parent" – that is, in the interpretation that he has made of this traumatic parent, which at first, Lacan calls the barred Other.

The two examples from the Proposition are clarifying in this regard. There is the one that is represented as a turd falling across the screen made by his father's newspaper, in the supposed dejection of the father's thoughts. As for the other, it is the little voyeur who was under the gaze of the pre-pubertal split, without doubt an image of the castration of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Lacan, J., The Preface to the English-Language Edition, in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. ix.

the Other. We could put them into an image, which is what Lacan calls elsewhere the phenomenological veil of the object.

The mourning of the pass, or traversal of the fantasy, is thus the mourning for the object's imaginary and symbolic envelopes, namely, of all that can be represented of it in the little story by means of which each one accommodates himself to the desire of the Other, and that is transferred on to the analyst. This mourning comes with an emergence, I could perhaps say an advent, of the object in so far as it is unsayable, refractory to narrative, and which causes every saying, although it cannot be said. Hence the disbeing of the analyst, subject supposed to know. We are then – I cite Lacan – "at the end of the transferential relation", of the relation to the subject supposed to know that is now "not essential". Psychoanalysis, Lacan already said in "Science and Truth", is not the science of the object.

How does that accord with the construction in the Preface? It accords perfectly and changes nothing.

The Preface situates the beginning of the final phase of the analysis at the moment where, in the space of the transference (*l'esp d'un laps*), the space of the said elaboration of the transference dedicated to saying the Truth, the impasse of the Truth becomes clear. What I am calling the impasse of truth in the Preface is formulated thus: 1) – it is only "half-said" [*mi-dite*], a "mirage" of the final word and 2) – it lies, which means that its signifiers and its representations of the object miss the real of this object that remains unsayable.

Parenthesis: This is not the same impasse as that of Freudian analysis. It is an impasse that holds to the structure of language, but the Preface is used to demonstrate that it does not make an impasse for analysis.

But what does the truth of the impasse say, the truth that the analysand discovers, or rather experiences? What is it to speak [*dire*] the truth throughout the analysis and, often very complacently, to speak [*dire*] of what I called the imaginary and symbolic envelopes with which the fantasy clothes the "the missing object" and which the analyst is supposed to know. To construct his fantasy, as we say, which consists in condensing the complaints that we believe we have uttered about the Other and to traverse it, is to measure how much this incomplete truth lies. I can speak the truth, I say it, but I miss the real. To approach this impasse is to open the phase of mourning for the fantasmatic object, and of subjective destitution, to approach the impossible to say of the object. This is equivalent to what I call in the Proposition the end of the relation to the subject supposed to know.

I conclude thus that uncovering the lie of the truth and traversing the narrative of the fantasy are one and the same. From one text to another, not from passer 1 and from passer 2. The turning point of the pass is that where this failure is made perceptible, it is not that we cease to believe in its truth – it sticks to our skin, indelible – but the belief in the import of the saying of the truth is shaken, its limit perceived in some way.

That is not sufficient for leaving analysis as the three texts affirm. The end of the transference relation is not the end of the analysis. The analyst's function does not end

when he falls as subject supposed to know. And peace "does not immediately seal this metamorphosis", of the subject supposed into the unsayable object, the Proposition said.<sup>123</sup> "*L'étourdit*" marked the duration of the mourning that finishes in being achieved, and the Proposition emphasises the time for balancing the confusion between the lying truth and the beyond sense of the real that precedes the satisfaction of the end. That gives different endings but no change for the passer.

Only our *dispositif*, such as it actually functions, is not focussed on the turning point [*virage*] of the pass, not for passands, not in the Cartels, not in the general discourse of the School.

The passands try hard to testify to their completed analysis, they do not speak of mourning but of the satisfaction of the end, and the Cartels themselves are interested in the completed analysis, and in the discourse of the community. We largely consider that the nomination sanctions a testimony of a finished analysis, while the non-nomination leaves the thing in suspension. We must take note of this, I think.

This was Lacan's idea and he said it: the Pass has nothing to do with the end of analysis.

Even when he affirms that "I am a poem not a poet" could be a word to indicate the pass, this does not imply that this may be a word indicating the end; it says only that he discovered that the UCS poem is without a subject. The idea that he had about his Pass was very far from what we say about it today. He went so far as to say that a nomination of AS does not imply that one enters into analytic practice, and he expected the confirmation of the *dispositif* relative to the turning point of the pass. Without doubt, all of that was tied to his own practice at a certain date, just as the Freudian impasse is tied to Freudian practice. For Lacan, this became a practice of the cut – the handling of which today seems to have been lost, although we speak of it abundantly.

Without doubt we must take note of this gap, but it makes the designation of passers so much more problematic, because however we evolve, our current way of handling this designation supposes that the distinction between the turning point of the pass and the end of the analysis is effective in the one who designates. And how would it be if, beyond the texts, he has not learned it in his own experience? Such is the circle that makes analyses themselves dependent on the *dispositif* of the Pass.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

#### Regarding the designation of passers

## Jean-Jacques Gorog

By way of introducing my commentary, I would like to reconsider the definition of the AMS [Analyst Member of the School], because it is starting with this definition that a designation is possible. I am afraid that it isn't by wanting to give, at any cost, too much weight to the function of the AMS that an interest in psychoanalysis can be renewed. For

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Lacan, J., Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6. 1995, p. 10.

Lacan, it was a matter of responding to a didactic imperative, imposed by the creation of the School. Of responding to it, but without having it turn into a final exam. And then, with Swift as the figurehead, what Lacan had mocked a few years earlier, that is, exercising power over the formation of psychoanalysts,<sup>124</sup> he must now assume all responsibility for in his School, and quite alone. It is not as funny as the critical irony demonstrated in 1956. No wonder he specifically underscored the place of this text as a model for his proposition:<sup>125</sup>

"Before reading this proposition I emphasise that it has to be understood against the background of a reading, or a rereading, of my article, "Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts" in 1956.

The AMS represents the School to the world, and thus, for Lacan, he is designated in accordance with practical criteria that are as simple as possible, such as his renown, his presence within the analytical field for some time, etc. Moreover, Lacan specifies that this designation of the AMS will be made inevitably, but could be slowed down or hastened according to each case. In this way, he gives a precise indication of what this title designates, implying there is no place for "blowing one's own trumpet" too much, and I believe one shouldn't take too seriously the inscription of the titles on the graph of desire made by Lacan in the first version – which he didn't return to later – which I would qualify, if I dared, as a humorous exercise. Indeed, qualifying the AMS as the  $s(A)^{126}$  amounts to making him a symptom of the *dispositif* of the Pass, since this is what this algorithm designates in the graph. So, let us rejoice: that the function of this AMS would be somewhat risky was inscribed in it from the start! Let us say that the AMS is a concentrate of the ironic remainder of this distribution, adopted by Swift, between the Sufficiencies, the Necessary Goods and the Little Shoes – more precisely, the Necessary Good, without considering the soul (*àme*).

To this AMS (AME), a function which I happen to incarnate, is reserved the task of designating the passers, as a way of animating this AMS a bit, which is indeed the minimum for being a "soul" (*âme*), a soul of the School no doubt, a treatment which again underscores the mockery.<sup>127</sup> So, as an AMS I have had to choose from among analysands those who seemed to me to have changed – I mean those whose subjective position had shifted significantly during the analysis – often analysands who weren't members of our association and even those who declared only slight bonds with our professional milieu. Indeed, I remain convinced that it is essential for the experience of the Pass to be as open as possible for passers – this would also be valid for passands, but they aren't exactly my responsibility – passers who are a little less taken in by the biases we inevitably carry, by political cant, so that their presence can bring some additional

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup>Lacan, J. «The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956, in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English.* Trans. B. Fink. New York and London, Norton & Company, 2006, pp. 384-411.
 <sup>125</sup>Lacan, J., Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, pp. 1-13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> Lacan, J., in *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, pg. 590. Author's note: It's written as S(A) in the published text, but this doesn't exist in the graph, which makes me conclude that it's a typographic error. Let's remember that this text is the transcription of a recording...

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Editor's note: Here the author plays with the homophony between "*âme*" [soul] and *AME* or *Analyste Membre de l'Ecole* [Analyst Member of the School].

benefit to our experience of the Pass. Of course, it is also an illusion of authenticity, but nonetheless, I was able in these cases to verify a truly remarkable way of adapting to the function. In return, we can deduce from this that the *dispositif* is wholly operative, and doesn't depend on people but on respecting the function.

Having said that, the Pass maintains within itself that defect which takes me by surprise, too: how to respond to the question [of the designation of passers] without revealing some secret of the persons involved? Or even the intimacy of that which determined my choice of designating someone, within a precise moment of a long analysis. Because, if I speak of a significant change in the subjective position, you will want to know more about what I mean by that, and rightly so. The occasion may arrive, for example, with this utterance of a person who, very far from practising psychoanalysis, and with a profession that he wasn't close to abandoning, suddenly poses himself the question of becoming a psychoanalyst. And I see that this sign corresponds to important and precise modifications. Of course, this wording, to become a psychoanalyst, wouldn't have the same value within our circles, where it can come too early or even be present from the beginning, "I want to become an analyst", which thus puts the analyst in an awkward position. It goes without saying, but if I highlight it, it is in order to insist on the difficulty of responding to the question without going into the singularity of each case. Nevertheless, in my mind, I went over the passers whom I had been able to designate, and more precisely the exact moment in their treatments.

In reality, numerous factors help to bring about this decision each time. Even if it happens that the change in subjective position is abrupt, and even if it is linked to a precise moment in the analysis, an interpretation, an equivocation, what is indispensable is a certain amount of time, in order to realise that this modification has indeed taken place, and this time can be quite long. Let us remember that once the symptom has faded, it no longer preoccupies the patient, who doesn't have any reason to speak about it, and we only learn of this by chance. I remember a phobic patient, someone especially afraid of planes, who told me one day that he just obtained his pilot's license – as a result of which I learned that the phobia had, if I may express myself thus, taken wing. Therefore, an interval exists, and it is moreover doubled by the delay between the moment when the passer is designated, and the moment when his name is drawn by a passand.

In spite of it all, here are a few examples that I have encountered, which could have contributed to making up my mind between the contingencies and the course of a treatment.

- A marriage that comes to testify to a clear change of direction after a long and chaotic development.

– A divorce... with the same comment.

- A jealously, the reason for starting the treatment, which suddenly crumbles after quite a long time.

- The recognition, of a mother's madness that was very difficult to obtain.

The above are related to the treatment, but this is accompanied by:

- An excessive belief in "THE" psychoanalysis, a reminder always to be made of the Lacanian " $Y \ a \ d'l'Un$ " [There is something of One], and that "THE" psychoanalyst doesn't exist. The experience of the passer is very instructive in this regard. Let us not take ourselves too seriously is also the lesson that Lacan takes from Swift.

- Conversely, the analysed dilettante who doesn't consider his analysis to be much of a thing and who, as a passer, encounters the weight of the experience.

- Or the one hesitating to make the step to psychoanalyst, a step that would be justified in my opinion.

- Or yet, the one who would gain a certain advantage – again, in my opinion – from coming closer to a School of psychoanalysis, in order to become more interested in what conditions psychoanalysis, that is to say the very conditions which had rendered his own treatment possible, beyond the therapeutic dimension, and towards the ethical.

I could go on, but the defect which I evoked earlier, the secret, doesn't allow me to, as well as the time that I have been given. You will have understood both the great significance that I accord to this experience, and the impossibility of deducing from what I have said any kind of a rule for designating a passer.

Translated by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

#### The designation of the passer ... designation of refuse

#### Didier Grais

Regarding the Pass, Lacan said that he wanted to know what was going on in the head of someone who chose to take up the place of analyst. Today we are being asked about what has passed through our heads in order to have designated a passer! The formulation of this question made me smile at first, but I must assure you that trying to find an answer was not so easy. Especially when I realized that this has already been worked on and debated by many colleagues of our School and even written about in some issues of Wunsch. I recommend to you in this regard issue number 12 with the transcript of a round table entitled "The discernment of the passer", and also issue number 11, which includes a lexicon on the passer and a specific text by Carmen Gallano entitled "The designation of the passer: an oriented wager".

So – what to say that is new about the designation of the passer, without centring it all on the function of the passer? This is to evoke what precedes the work of the passer, ie., to speak about the nature of the tie that links analyst and analysand without going into the singularity of the case, in order to try and transmit something.

We know that it is the responsibility of the AMSs in our School to establish the list of passers and it is, it seems to me, a considerable responsibility such that it has taken me some time to integrate before designating my first passer. Perhaps because I have in

mind the force of Lacan's sentence in the Italian Note: "the passers dishonor themselves in leaving the thing uncertain". Indeed, it is their responsibility not to leave the cartel of the Pass in doubt after their testimony. So how to designate a passer who is not going to be, one could say, *dishonorable* with regard to himself or to the analyst who designates him? All AMSs are therefore, in the course of things, confronted with this question of the designation, or not, of an analysand as a passer. It is also a necessity if the procedure of the Pass is to work and to continue in our School.

When we talk about the passer, the sentence that comes up most often is this quotation from Lacan taken from the "Proposition of October 9, 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the school" (*Autre Écrits* p 255) where he writes that the passer "... is still this pass ... ". In effect, to speak of the designation of the passer obviously involves evoking this moment of the pass since it signifies for the analyst of the future passer that he has previously recognized in his treatment this moment of pass, this subjective turn. To say "in his treatment" suggests an equivoque, because it refers of course to the treatment of the analysand, the one potentially proposed as passer, but it also calls up his own, ie., that of the AMS, of the analyst who designates the passer! Nevertheless, the analyst should be able to stand on something other than his own treatment in order to recognize this turn in his analysand, if only because the pass is a moment of structure, and is not to be based on the affect that one has.

In fact, in 1967 Lacan clarifies the location of the structure of this moment, at the same time as he proposes a procedure whose ambition it is to grasp what happens to the one who has brought his treatment to term. It is also because of this that the Pass not only authenticates a particular analysis but also in a certain way the analyses, even the analysts, of the School. It testifies, through this, to a certain analytic formation. It is also in this regard that it concerns the whole School. It thus involves the responsibility of each, but also the responsibility of the School, since it has to see to it, as Lacan said, that there is "the analyst" there.

Lacan, moreover, was counting on this procedure in order that his School not be reduced to a Society and so that, in the way of vouching for the analysts that it forms, it could take support from "a new mode of accession of the psychoanalyst to a collective guarantee". In calling the Pass both the passage to the analyst and the testimony of this passage, Lacan devises a knotting between the analytic act and what can be vouched for in the practice of the analyst.

In 1974, in the 'Note on the designation of passers', Lacan addresses the ASs who were the only ones at the time able to designate passers. It does not suffice, he tells us, for an analyst to believe that he has arrived at the end of an analysis of one of his analysands, to make him a passer. We have here a first distinction between the end of the analysis and the passer. For the end of an analysis may have made, he says, "only a functionary of the analytic discourse." To which Lacan adds that "the functionary is not thereby unworthy of the Pass," because he, the said functionary, can testify to his first steps in the function.

What seems to matter to Lacan in this brief note is that in order to collect a testimony from another, it is necessary to evoke another dimension (*une autre dit-mension*), namely, "to know first of all that the analysis of the complaint, only makes use of the truth." The

passer has learned from his experience that the truth that gives meaning to the complaint is used only in order to limit knowledge of the unconscious. Indeed, the passer is certainly still anticipating knowledge, in wishful thinking about meaning, but he has perceived all the same a limit in this quest for meaning. And in the same way he perceives the dead ends of the subject supposed to know, even if the love of knowledge is still sometimes pregnant.

Still later in this note about the passer, Lacan writes: "Anyone could question the other about it, even at the risk of being seized by it oneself". Seized by what, one wonders? In fact, this involves this 'dit-mension' between knowledge and truth. For, adds Lacan, "he may enter into his function without recognizing what brings him there". Perhaps there, it seems to me, is the point of the question, namely, what brings someone to enter into such a function? I will stop the reading of this note there, it has already been commented on many times whenever designation of the passer is mentioned.

So not only is it for the passer to be able to gather the truth of the discourse of the passand, but also to be in this gap between knowledge and truth. It is this last feature which constitutes an addition to Lacan's sentence in the Proposition of 67 and which I have already partially quoted: "From where therefore could we expect a valid testimony on the one who gets through this pass, if not from another who, like him, is still this pass ... ".

It is clear that a passer is not a functionary of analytic discourse; a passer is an analysand but not just any analysand. It is thus a question of trying to say what particularizes this analysand. We can first postulate of course, that passer and passand, while being very close, position themselves differently with regard to this moment of the Pass. I will say that the passer is situated, somehow just before the passand, since he is seized, there, without knowing that he's there, while the passand, he thinks he is there, and that's why he presents himself for the Pass, to ask for verification of this pass, in naming it. The passer perceives something he cannot yet name.

The role of the passer in the procedure is that of messenger of the Pass. Admittedly he is only the pivot, but it is on him that the whole is articulated, even though he has asked nothing. That which the passand comes to cross over, ie., what he is going to say essentially, the passer is still in! What the passand is going to speak is still present for the passer who is going to transmit this testimony. He even waits for the solution from the mouth of the passand, he waits to hear his own solution (that of the passand), that which he (the passer) cannot yet formulate.

The passer is therefore an analysand on whom the Pass rests. The analyst who has designated him may see his act questioned. I remind you of this other sentence of Lacan in the Italian Note: "as the analyst is only authorized by himself, his failing passes to the passer ...". So the analyst who designates a passer designates this moment of pass in the cure of his analysand. This implies at least that he can recognize it, that is to say that he can pass to knowing the experience through which he has brought his analysand to this point. This passage to knowledge is exactly what is at stake in the Pass.

But the analyst is not alone in this moment; there is nothing shocking in him speaking about it in supervision in order that another analyst help him to confirm this choice or not! One must not neglect here the importance, and even the necessity for, supervision in a School of Psychoanalysis.

The role that reverts to the passer in the transmission is therefore double-sided. And the AMS that designates him must take this into account. For at first glance one might think that it is exclusively a passive role: to store up in order to transmit, but there is also an active dimension in it: to select, to present and even to take a position.

The lovely metaphor of the 'sensitive plate' that I have read several times in regard to the passer, and which does not seem to be Lacan's, is not sufficiently convincing because it places perhaps too much emphasis on this passive role of the passer. Admittedly he is unmoored from the transference, having as support only his own unfinished analytic experience. He is awaiting a knowledge about the Pass, which exposes him to disarray and to a loss - often very disagreeable - of subjective markers. I remember that Colette Soler spoke during a Meeting of the School about what she calls 'the zone of turbulence' in which the passer finds himself. Because, while we can acknowledge that he is a 'sensitive plate', it is still necessary that the objective be targeted, and that this is for the passer to do. It is in the process of this operation that his judgment becomes established, which does not of course lead him to deciding whether or not there has been a pass, but which must all the same enable him to to have an idea ... and not just a small one.

For the passer, while certainly selecting what is said, is on occasion affected, but he must also encourage such a passand to say more if he wishes. He does not cease from working on a judgment and by a judgment, from which he knows that the personal conclusions that he will be able to draw have no bearing on the final outcome, since as we have seen, it is not his responsibility to make a decision, and in addition, it is always possible that the passer who works in parallel with him holds a contrary opinion. This does not prevent any passer from having his own opinion on the Pass he has heard, an opinion that he expresses directly or not but which he must pass on to the cartel in the testimony.

At that point, the problem of finding the reference points in order to carry out this function, other than pure intuition, can be posed. The desire to know, based on the knowledge built up, is certainly a necessary support, but it is limited because what's involved here is to transmit something that is particular, not known, in the face of a framework of knowledge. How to get one's bearings in a situation of being wrong and yet of saying right? How to act in the direction of the logic, without the affects serving to seal off the truth? How to act justly without the recourse of interpretation or the handling of the transference, since the work of the passer is outside transference, even if this work cannot be done, it seems to me, outside a transference to psychoanalysis. For the passer must know a little about the procedure of the Pass and be able to assume a certain commitment to the work of the School. It's difficult in these conditions to be able to designate a passer totally unmoored from the work of School. These are also questions to be asked by the AMS before designating a passer.

The passer must therefore be able to hear a truth and a meaning that is not his truth, nor the meaning he gives to his experience, but the truth and meaning of another. In other words, the AMS must also be able to locate in his analysand a certain degree of commitment and responsibility towards the Pass in order to designate him as a passer.

To conclude, I want to try and tackle a point that is not mentioned much, I want to speak about the position of the analyst at the moment when he designates a passer. Indeed the question of designation appears at a time when the analyst is subject to, affected by, a profound modification of the transference. During the treatment, the place of knowledge is found to be somewhat hollow; the subject that the analysand supposed in this place, is discovered to be lacking. There is a knowledge, that has been built and continues to form in the treatment, but the analyst hears that the attribution of this knowledge is withdrawn from him. He becomes almost anyone. It is from this desupposition of a subject to knowledge, and because he has a very precise idea of the end of the analysis and not only of a particular analysis, that the analyst can designate an analysand as being the pass. In doing so, he realizes, as Lacan said, "the dis-being of the analyst" that the analysand brings about, he puts it into effect, he accomplishes it ... in addressing himself to the School. Indeed, he extracts himself from the treatment and extracts the name of the analysand from the intimacy of the treatment in order to make it public. With this name that he designates as passer, the analyst designates himself as remainder, the possible refuse of the operator for whom he has borne the weight, up to this point and for some time, of the semblant of being, and it is perhaps this which he must be able to bear in order to designate ... sometimes ... a passer, ie., to accept the designation of refuse!

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

## The incredible passer of the ball

Irène Houssin

It has been more than a year since I had my experience as passer, so it is in retrospect that I will speak to you about the impact that this function had on my treatment.

To approach this I would like to speak to you of my feelings and then of my designation: the question that arose concerning my relation with my analyst. I would also like to refer to my meeting with the passand. In fact, we met several times as this seemed to be necessary.

In reading accounts by some passers I discovered that there was a similarity in the effects that this experience produced on their treatment and on their relation to the School. For example: the passers were surprised by the passand's first call. They also testified to a fall of the "subject supposed to know" which was produced in their treatment at the moment of the designation.

I too was surprised when I received the passand's call. But for me the greatest surprise was my analyst's choice; why did he designate me at this precise moment in my

treatment? For this designation to be produced, what had happened without my knowledge?

I had had some relief in my treatment, but at the moment of being designated I had traversed a great difficulty in my analysis, for the same complaint would return each session. I wondered at that moment how to come out of this impasse.

I confess that I felt confronted by a paradox. I experienced both a certain pride at having been designated by my analyst and yet I did not understand the reason for this designation; it was beyond me. I assumed that the designation was going to produce changes in my analytic process.

A short time later, I started experiencing changes in my transferential relationship. With regard to his position in relation to knowledge, the analyst's place had shifted because he was the bearer of a desire and this desire concerned the School.

I had a dream; after having received the call of the passand "my analyst threw me a baseball" This dream lodged itself inside me; I had the sensation of something ungraspable. I felt as though I was in the grip of the Other's game. I could refuse this designation; I would not take up the function of passer, yet I could not shy away from the analytic interpretation that the dream constitutes.

However, I finished by thinking that my analyst's discernment that had put me in this position was due to the fact that I could *hear* a testimony. The fact of being a passer placed me in another *dit-mension*, "the one that implies knowing that the analysis of the complaint only makes use of the truth".

From the first meeting I knew that the passand had worked long in her analysis, yet her testimony concentrated on what had happened in the 15 months prior to the end of her treatment. I was surprised by the manner in which the passand constructed her testimony in choosing these last months of analysis and making of them the link with her long analytic journey.

Before I met the passand, I only had a vague idea about passers. I had read some testimonies and they emphasised that there was no instruction manual for the practice of passer. So I listened to the passand's narrative, taking some notes for fear of forgetting important things. When I heard her story some questions concerning maternal language arose, for the passand and I had different mother tongues.

Is it possible that such a difference could introduce misunderstandings or hinder the transmission of the testimony? It seems to me that behind our differences – that of language for a start – something else emerged.

After the passand used some expressions that were specific to her history, she revealed her anxiety and asked, "Do you follow me?". Then, when I acquiesced, she said, "incredible". I realised that after this "incredible" I had stopped taking notes.

This "incredible" interpellated me. I doubted that I had heard her clearly. But I knew that my function was not that of understanding but rather that of a scribe and as Lacan said, "To pose questions when things do not appear to be clear". Thus I found myself sensitive both to reception, and to my non-knowledge, the difference from the other.

Today, I would say that it is incredible that such a *dispositif* permits a passer – always a stranger to the *lalangue* of the passand – to transmit his story when he speaks and to understand the language of the passand.

I would say that what is important in this experience between passand and passer is to grasp the modes of jouissance. Although each one can have his mode of jouissance with his language [*langue*], something else emanated from this meeting where the mother tongue is only the support.

Coming back to my dream and to my title, "The incredible passer of the ball", I would add that it is incredible that my analyst introduced me to this passer at this point in the game. As a consequence, in my current analytic experience, I have become more familiar with my relation to the Other and more available to listening to the other.

To finish, I would say that after a year of having lived my experience as passer, my idea about the Pass has changed. For a long time this *dispositif* of the School was an unattainable ideal for me. To be a passer allowed me to set this ideal free and, as a result, to approach theory in relation to the *dispositif* of the Pass.

From the moment of my designation, my complaint, which had become an impasse, started to disappear, leaving a place to act. As for my transferential relation, I continue to see changes as a sort of destitution of a supposed knowledge, yet without leaving the analyst.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

## Being a passer, what effects...

Marie Paule Stephan

I was not informed of my designation. The call from the passand was a surprise. I was, and still am, very proud and very touched by the trust and the honour of this offer, and thank all the analysts who allowed me to have this experience. I heard myself accept this proposition very quickly. This "*out*" was evident. I had been waiting for this moment, for so long, at a time when it did not come. The call arrived at the time when I no longer expected it. The joy and the disquiet were mixed:

- The joy at having this opportunity to be drawn by lot, at being able to come close to this *dispositif* of the Pass, and to listen to a testimony.
- The worry and the disquiet associated with the seriousness and the responsibility of this function of the Passer.

My surprise was even stronger, since for several months a question was on my mind and occupied my sessions, leaving me in a sort of wandering. I did not feel that I was carried by the desire of the analyst, or what I thought this desire represented. The desire to <u>be</u> an analyst had fallen. The identification, the idealization, and the subject supposed to knowledge were no longer there to support me in the desire to fulfil this function. The Other was no longer asking me anything, was no longer guaranteeing anything. I was

crossing a void. I was humming along [*ronronnais*] in this discomfort, waiting for magic to do its trick, feeling that this wait was a bit illusory. I was feeling good in my life, good in my love life. The analysis worked and opened up other fields of interests.... I ended up telling myself that if this desire were not going to come back, I would stop waiting and would turn towards other fields of interest. I felt myself being attracted to the idea of having more time to dedicate to them.

In my treatment, a year before, I grasped how much of my existence revolved around one signifier, an S1 tied to the fragment of a little nursery rhyme from my childhood, as well as my family name. I examined this element in many ways, along with all its equivocation and possible combinations. It had crafted me in my positions, my fixations of jouissance. I knew that I had hit something essential, that I was orienting myself towards the end and it seemed long.

I met the passand twice, with a one-month interval, each time being for one and a half to two hours.

I, of course, read all I could find about the Pass and the function of passer to ease my anxiety. I spoke about it in analysis. I soon found out that I was not going to find a ready to use "*savoir faire*". The Other was not going to give me any answer. I needed to invent my way of doing it and to be there.

During our first meeting, I asked few questions. I was afraid that by interrupting the thread of his testimony something would break and hinder his associations. I took notes, lots of them. I was afraid to understand too quickly in the enthusiasm of the situation, and to forget primordial elements – dates, names, and important signifiers of certain dreams.... I wanted to stay as close as possible to his enunciations, to his expressions, letting myself be permeated and impressed, in the sense of a mark. I knew that the time between our meeting and my testimony in front of the Cartel of the Pass could be long. My questions came at a second time following this encounter, along with the need to refocus on certain points. We agreed on a second meeting.

The way that this passand chose to speak about his treatment struck me immediately. Several years had passed since the end of his analysis, but his saying [dire] remained fresh and outstandingly precise. The elements of his history were important but they were only as accompaniment to the comprehension of what had been built as *fixion* for him. It was a presence in the link, and yet it was detached from him, as if this history no longer belonged to him. From his analysis that lasted over twenty years, only a few scenes at the time of a turning point [*virage*] two years before the end of his analysis condensed the thread. At the time of the Pass, his whole relationship to knowledge and truth had swayed. His relationship with the unconscious had been modified. Sense had lost its aura. There was not in him, as I had expected, an attempt to demonstrate, a will to stick with a theorization, a need to give <u>the</u> proof of anything. It was up to me to find, if I wished, the fall of identifications, the crossing of the fantasy or the identification with the symptom. But was I there for this? The Cartel of the Pass was waiting for signs of the advent of the real. I was trying to grasp the coordinates. I was feeling things more than I could conceptualize them. His saying was established, concise, stopping on a few key

words, a few dreams, which gave it a stunning force and clarity. It helped me in what I wanted to transmit.

In my notes, I extracted a thread that appeared to be most likely to pass on the singularity of his experience, his encounter with the real and the fall of meaning. There was a style, evident in his words as well as in a beautiful freedom in tone. His energy and his enthusiasm were communicated and they transported me. I decided to trust my perception, to say it as it came, while staying as close as possible to what I had heard. I knew that I had met an analyst; my energy and my re-emerging desire were indicative. I wanted to transmit this.

My testimony in front of the Cartel of the Pass was scheduled shortly afterward. I had my notes with me, in my hand. They reassured me. I did not use them. This was an experience of accepting the absence of mastery. I forgot, of course, several enunciations that I found important. Throughout my testimony, I felt myself permeated by emotions. I had come to deliver what I thought was fundamental from the sayings I collected. That was speaking through me as if I had lent my body. At the same time, I came out a little stunned but with increased energy. Was that what it was to be impacted by the real unconscious, as I had been in certain moments of my treatment? The Cartel members had been listening. Extremely attentive, they asked a couple of questions. Their seriousness as well as their joy gave me the hope that something had crossed beyond my saying and my upheaval. But was it enough? Coming out, I crossed the second passer. I was reassured that not everything depended on my testimony. I was impressed that several of the Cartel members were foreigners. They spoke French but were asking for clarifications regarding certain turns of phrase, certain equivocations.

A few days later, the passand called me. He had been nominated AE and wanted to let me know. I was as happy about his nomination as if he had been a member of my family.

This experience woke me up from my lethargy and took me out from this in- between humming along. Not only by the effect of surprise that my designation gave me, but also by the upheaval, the proof of this real life experience itself. In 1972, Lacan ended his allocution to the Belgium School of Psychoanalysis in talking about the experience of the Pass for all, as something absolutely consuming, burning, absolutely capsizing. This is what always aroused my surprise and my admiration for Lacan, this capacity to create innovative dispositifs that work. How, without having experienced the effects could he have had such a precise vision of this function?

My analysis took another turn. I could testify to this tornado in which I had been carried, and yet there were elements that were impossible to translate. As in analysis, I could try to come closer but there was an inevitable limit. I had accepted the unsayable. I was asking myself about the international dimension and thus about the plurilinguistic nature of the Cartel. The difficulty in grasping some of the subtleties of the language did not impact the process in any way. A few weeks later, I had this dream: "I am at a Study Day of the School and I had come to speak about my experience. I prepared my intervention, it was written on a nice linen cloth. When I take it out of the envelope, only a few scraps of words remain visible here and there. Only letters remained as the rest was washed out and illegible." The text is no longer there, and I can no longer hang on to it. The words

of my passand speaking about his sessions of analysis, prior to this turning point of the pass, were coming back to me: "There were months of extremely short sessions." His analyst would cut every effect of meaning, which led him to make the decision and also from the turn of his analysis.

I was questioning my practice, the interpretation, and the cut. How to sustain the passage through meaning that is necessary for a long time, and yet, without trying to find an answer, to understand, in short without feeding this meaning? How to invent, case by case, leaving the events behind and bringing about the unprecedented?

In analysis, I was talking a lot about the School. I had been the delegate of a pole, I was teaching at the Clinical College of Bourgogne Franche-Comté, yet I felt minimally tied to the School. I knew the School was necessary, but I perceived it as being distant. Those encounters with the *dispositif* of the Pass, with the passand, his nomination, the Cartel of the Pass were simple, strong and authentic moments. I wanted to make more encounters. The quality of the listening and the welcome of the members of the Cartel, this invitation to bring my contribution made me feel that I belonged to this particular School, the School of this particular Pass and the pride of being its member. I am enthused by the intensity and the fragility of the *dispositif*. I discovered its creativity and the freedom of to testify about my experience, my theoretical advances and/or participate in tasks that allowed it to work institutionally.

I was questioning what was left of the irreducible in me, which included that there was no final word.

Prior to the summer vacation, I had another dream: "I was in a subterranean maze. I am walking, guiding myself with names and places written on signs. Those signs become incomprehensible. They are either incomplete, or in a foreign language, I pace the unmarked corridors and I have no other direction to guide me in my journey. Then at a crossroads, I recognize a sign on which "exit" is written. I am happy and leave." I remember two dreams I had a few months before I was designated as passer. I was trying to get out of a dark hallway the same way, guided by a thread of light. The first time, on getting out I was hit in the head and lost consciousness. The second time, there was a straight and narrow staircase that stopped at a vertiginous void. I was not ready. This feeling of a possible danger indicated to me that it was not the moment. Not so easy to come closer to the real. Here, it was simple. Until then, I perceived the desire of the analyst as an extreme demand in its requirements, like a constraint to my freedom. This experience shook this superegoic representation. In this too I will do it my way, in trying to invent something that suits me.

Translated by Barbara Shuman

#### AS, Nomination, non-permanence

### Anne Lopez

First of all, I would like to speak a little about this term 'nomination'. It is used for both AMSs and for ASs. And yet it does not represent the same specificity in regard to the real that it covers. For the AS it seems obvious that it is a term offered by Lacan with humour since it makes one think of the first lallations of the little human being. But it does encompass an effective end of analysis, which one can think of as concluded by various encounters which have brought an end to the quest. One can speak quickly of the castration effect, of knowing how to be a dupe of the father, of (doing without but knowing how to make use of) separation, of encountering the real of lalangue and the effects of the reduction of jouissance with regard to the symptom and, without doubt, of knowing how, and by what route, all this has happened, this knot of neurosis. It's not only about traversing the fantasy, nor a recognition of the object that one thought one was for the other, but starting from impossible encounters, it's also about the appearance of an unprecedented desire which cannot be said, "which is articulated where it is not articulable". It articulates itself, arousing affects that are life-giving, enlivening, coloured with satisfaction and/or enthusiasm.

I take up again Marie-Nöelle Jacob-Duvernet's expression of "muffled satisfaction", far from blissful satisfaction since it is accompanied by the desire to transmit and certainly not to sit back in satisfaction. It seems to me that the nomination encompasses what the subject will never know of his being, a knowledge of the unconscious, impossible to know all: under the nomination, a hole.

This liveliness does not stop up the solitude of which the speakingbeing remains inconsolable; but it is a solitude that is overt in the bonds with others, without doubt marked by a certain style peculiar to each - solitude which makes an "inconsolable" of the speakingbeing. It's a beautiful expression of Marie-Noëlle Jacob-Duvernet's, AS, who, through tracing the life of Victor Hugo, brings us to this phrase which he kept before his eyes: "Life – it is exile".

For the AMS (AME) the word makes the soul (*âme*), "ironic figure" says Lacan in the *Letter to the Italians*, for it cannot be taken for god - as soon as we talk about the soul, religion appears - but it has, I think, to come to life (*a-nimer*), to ensure that the soul of our School exists in order to maintain the sharp thread of analytic discourse which is held only in polyphonic voices. We often find it hard to agree on what this selection of AMSs requires as the minimum milestones. Have they finished their analysis? I have pointed out on the internet that it is never a matter of urgency to nominate someone an AMS, for this can sometimes act as a stopper to a potential request for the Pass. What is known of their practice, of their competence, of their knowledge through writings, teachings, supervision, were they considered convergent by the different members of the ICA, The International Committee of Accreditation? We must take account that here too there is a difficult point of not knowing when it concerns members we are not familiar

with, and who are known only to the few who propose them in the Committee. This is the consequence of an International School that is expanding.

Each of us must remain vigilant when it comes to proposing names, not to soften, ie., to give way to insistent demands. To give way, if one is not convinced, makes this nomination an "appointment to" which crushes and swallows what Lacan has elaborated in these two aspects of the guarantee. This would amount to a social award like a university title, as in the IPA where some are promoted to 'didactician' (Training Analyst) and thus "appointed to" analyze. None can be appointed to analyze. Yet it's necessary, of course, to have a minimum of trust and esteem regarding one's colleagues since not all of them are familiar with those who are "proposed". Analytic experience is the only didactician.

## The psychoanalyst

Lacan in the Letter to the Italians (1973) radicalizes his proposition on the psychoanalyst of the School. He knows his people well, his students, and he asks them to look for the AS. I quote him: "The analyst said to be of the School, AS, will henceforth be named on the basis of his submitting to the test called the Pass – although he is not obliged to do so, since the School also has delegates who do not offer themselves in this way. They are called Analyst Member of the School, AMS. The Italian group, if it hears me, will keep with naming those who apply for entry on the principle of the Pass, thereby taking the risk that they might not pass ... The Italian group is not in a position to provide this guarantee", p. 307 in *Autre Écrits.* It is at once an invitation to attempt the Pass, and a summons to become a passer, in order to find the possible AS. This is a particular conjuncture for Lacan at that moment. But he strongly urges the AMS to head towards the Pass ... One notes the absence of complacency in Lacan: "they are not in a position to provide this guarantee ..."

It's necessary to know that the passer is for Lacan a considerable demand ... You can find this Note on the passers in the first *Monthly Letter of the School of the Cause*, spring 1974, and also taken again in the *Wunsch 11*, in the *Thesaurus on the Passer*, p.75 in French, p.76 and 77 in Spanish, p, 83 in Italian. In the *Letter to the Italians*, Lacan emphasizes the desire to know which is no longer tied, as in the treatment, to the love of knowledge and the desire of the Other. This is an advance, a crossing of the horror of knowing specific to each one.

Our thinking in the ICG has focused on the particular point of the AS's desire to know. It isn't a question of making the desire to know permanent because, like all of us, they have to sustain, transmit, open questions, try to invent a knowledge "grown within themselves", and nothing in psychoanalysis is definitively acquired. But their naming has made visible what many do not want to know:- the destiny of remainder, of waste, which keeps alive the analytic experience, ie., the position taken by the analyst in the analytic discourse. Our wish would be that this mark, made by the "congeners" (Cartel of the Pass), simply be the dates of entry and exit of the function of the AS. I have spoken about "vintage", but for we French who love good vineyards, that's a little too marked ...

In its dictionary definition, however, it (vintage) is also a number which indicates the date of a coin or a medal. Lacan spoke of the naming as "*affûtiaux*", an old French word signifying an ornamental object without value.

I think it would be well to have a trace, a mark of the former ASs with that of the new ASs, *with the dating*, because that would make a series. This sequence of ASs would be the product of the School, thanks to some who knew how to bring the analytic experience to term, thanks to the teaching and the formation received in our School. A fragile but precious product for us all: an AS is not the *nec plus ultra* of psychoanalysis, but is linked to other ASs produced by the School in the Pass, an experience quite unforgettable in certain respects and allowing a lively and fresh transmission of experiences both singular and cumulative.

It seems to me that our guarantee would show its face a little more, although fragile and always to be renewed. It is true that in the directory there are the names of the ASs who are fulfilling their function. But this is a little thin and by their small number they appear as flowers so rare that it can only inhibit some from testing themselves in the Pass.

Psychoanalysis in our time is in a position that is much weakened by the "discoursecurrents" which mix the word 'psy' up with any practice at all. It is for us to be able to say that we do not do just anything when it comes to the formation of psychoanalysts; people of good will are generally very interested in our guarantee, which belongs to these new modes of communication "in networks" and on an international level.

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

# Where are the AMSs? Marc Strauss

As you know, the preceding ICG asked us to wake up the AMSs. I am summarizing, but, *grosso modo*, that's it. They need to wake up to their responsibility for the analytic discourse. This responsibility requires them to pay attention to the intension, by way of their implication in the *dispositif* of the Pass, by participating in the ICG and designating passers. Obviously, this designation in itself implies questions that are quite fundamental for psychoanalysis and could suffice to orient theoretical reflections of the AMS.

To put it differently, if we expect new insights from the ASs, it is the AMSs who are guarantors of the analytic discourse. This means that if they claim adherence to Lacan they cannot be guardians of any dogma, and that also means that they must denounce deviations and compromises. How are we to distinguish new insights that accord with questions posed by our time from deviations or compromises?

For example, is an analysis carried out by Skype possible? Only for a while, or entirely? Or, more modestly, does this tool, novel even in relation to the telephone known to

Freud and Lacan, modify the Freudian *dispositif*? And what are the consequences of this modification?

It is not a matter of being for or against Skype, social networks, modernity, but rather of considering their effects on our practice. I gave a trivial example, but there are many others we could debate.

The only problem is that The AMSs do not exist. Just like the woman, the article is barred, in this case, "The." We talk a lot about one by one, but in fact the AMSs function one by one, apart from their participation in the *dispositif* of the pass. They do not exist as a whole. Even the ASs exist more than they do: we willingly devote a part of our School Study Days to the interventions of the ASs. To me it seems unfair that there is no agency, no link in our School where the AMSs could be represented in order to deal with the problems of the analytic discourse not linked to the *dispositif* of the Pass.

Is it not this lack that led to the success of Bernard Lapinalie's proposition: to mark the induction of a new AMS with a ceremony. This might make us smile, given that, as we know, AMSs are anything but new in their institutional path. If they don't yet know their function, we might imagine they were wrongly nominated. What remains then is the ceremony, which marks the crossing of a threshold.

Besides, if one expects everything from the function and nothing from the persons, then it seems to me there is something missing in the functioning of the structural workings of the School as far as the AMSs are concerned. This is why I propose that, once this threshold has been crossed, they find a welcoming place that would provide the body of AMSs with an institutional organ for their questions and their debates. Why not an international committee of the AMSs, charged with animating and coordinating these debates for the entire international organization? And at each International Rendezvous, this committee would present us with a report, which would be a kind of state of the union of the AD (Analytic Discourse), the questions posed in the IF-SPFLF, and the relationship of the IF-SPFLF to society. Of course, I am aware of the objection to adding another agency to an already highly complex organization that takes up much of our energy. But this agency would have the merit of making the AMSs exist and would let them know that it matters to be guaranteed by a School which rests on the teaching of Lacan and gives weight to their speech. In brief, it gives them not only a reason, but also a desire to wake up.

Translated by Devra Simiu

# Xth RENDEZVOUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL OF THE FORUMS

# VIth INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTER OF THE SCHOOL

Of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field

# The Advents of the Real and the Psychoanalyst

Xth Rendezvous of the International of the Forums of the Lacanian Field

# The School and the Discourses

## "What joy do we find in our work?"

VIth International Encounter of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field (IF-SPFLF)

## Presentation of the theme of the Rendezvous of the IF

It will be twenty years since the creation of the Forums of the Lacanian Field following the initiative launched in Barcelona in July 1998. This was a new course which, following the path traced by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, appeared as a movement of counter-experience with the goal of creating a School of Psychoanalysis that was effectively born in 2001.

Twenty years later, we are meeting together once more in Barcelona, these and many others, on the occasion of the Xth International Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF and of the VIth International Encounter of the School. We have the essentials: the impetus from the desire for an international community, the involvement of the Forums of Barcelona and the rest of Spain in its organisation in order that it arrives safe and sound, and the title of the Rendezvous that is going to give us, during this time, the axis to the work of the community.

The advents of the real and the psychoanalyst. An enigmatic title in the semantics of "advent" in the plural – plurality of the diversity of elements of what is real, thus the plurality of its accepted meanings, from "what always returns to the same place" as obstacle to well-being, to the real that can overflow —; enigmatic too in the complex relation between these two terms, the dependence of the second in relation to the first, but not only that ...

If, as Lacan affirms in "La Troisième", the future of analysis depends on what comes [advient] from the real and not the inverse, what are the consequences from these advents — sustained by the scientific discourse — for social links and in particular for the analytic discourse, that which solders the analysand to the pair analyst-analysand?

Thus a title that produces questions for us, that keeps us awake, a title that will make us work. There is no advent of the real that does not truncate the illusory and wished for experience of continuity in the speaking being, it is a matter of the trauma of the Other

as constitutive, or of the real of the jouissance of the body, that of the accident, or of what the advances of science produce. That is to say that every advent of the real implies an effect, an immediate effect that is one of affect – anxiety – or more silent, incalculable effects, that are diffused in the social and we observe that they do not cease to produce new forms of segregation. It is not in the hands of the psychoanalyst to reduce the advents of the real; the psychoanalyst can respond, he can, as Lacan tells us, counter it.

Rosa Escapa and Ramon Miralpeix General coordination for the Organising Committee

## Scientific Committee

Sandra Berta, Rithée Cevasco, Diego Mautino, Silvia Migdalek, Patricia Muñoz, Susan Schwartz, Colette Soler.

## **Organising Committee**

Rosa Escapa and Ramon Miralpeix (coordinators), Jacqueline Ariztia, Jorge Chapuis, Carmen Dueñas, Ana Martínez, José Sánchez, Teresa Trías.

## Information

Telephone: +34 683 576 111 <u>rosaescapa@gmail.com</u> <u>miralpeix@copc.cat</u>

## Place

Barcelona International Convention International Centre (CCIB): <u>http://www.ccib.es/</u>

## Presentation of the theme of the International Meeting of the IF-EPFCL

Marc Strauss

"... There is for you - you should want it - another way to overcome your revolt of the privileged: mine for example. I only lament that so few people who interest me are interested in what interests me."

J. Lacan, Ornicar no 49, p. 7.

Lacan's founding of his School of psychoanalysis is inscribed in a history of discourses. The latter gives the School its place in the social field and it also assigns its tasks.

Admittedly, Lacan's founding of his School precedes in fact the writing of his mathemes of the discourses. However, it does not precede his effort to give an account of the analytic experience through a discourse that did remain unprecedented until Freud. Its emergence responded to a reality that was itself unprecedented, in the form of a symptom that had become untreatable. In effect, the symptom does not date back to Freud. It is correlative to the very existence of speech. It needed to be recognised as such though in order to retrospectively shed light on its historical avatars.

As such, the master's discourse and that of the hysteric show solidarity in their confrontation with one another. The signifying order imposes a division, which responds to an irremediable cut between the signifier and the signified. As a result, the master's discourse, which relies upon consenting to the One that makes an exception of itself, never goes without the subject's shaded part that the hysteric attires herself with, in order to complete it.

These two were once sufficient to order the world. However, faced with the disintegration of the empire of the One, the master had to find refuge behind knowledge in order to continue speaking in the name of all.

The university discourse constitutes therefore a "regression" with regard the hysteric's effort in her call for truth. The subject finds himself cut off from truth, in a suffering that has become impossible to articulate and thus has been made inaudible. This suffering, in that way delegitimised, became all the more loud as science – by becoming based on measurable counting - erased the interlocutors of the time: the priest and the physician.

From then on, a new interlocutor was born for the subject, the psychoanalyst of course. As he himself suffered  $[p\hat{a}tit]$  like the hysteric from the violence of the new master, he knew how to listen to her and give her back her reason.

Freud's project was to make the new forms of violence in civilisation more bearable, even attenuate them. We can say that he succeeded in changing his contemporaries' view on the human species, its motivations and its achievements. But at the same time, he perhaps triggered exaggerated expectations. Today, the market's triumphant discourse increasingly undoes the traditional links.

In reaction, Lacan never promoted in the name of Freud the ideal of the "collective". On the contrary, he insisted on the link based on the 'one by one'. However, he founded his School, thus a collective, and he wanted it to be unprecedented, on the same scale as the novelty of the analytic discourse, by integrating its acquisitions in its functioning, including those relating to the analysts' selection and guarantee.

This concern for coherence aimed at, not only the School's internal functioning, but also at the function Lacan assigned to psychoanalysis: to be an operation against the discontent in civilisation, of which the School was to constitute the base. However, the School must make itself be heard as a recourse, whether it is in defending and preserving its field or in conquering a larger one, whether it is limited to perpetuating the analytic experience or to having an influence on societal choices.

However, we know that the contemporary discontent is based on a thirst in relation to the lack in jouissance [manque à jouir]. In effect, the originality of the capitalist discourse, in which Lacan saw a performance, is that it proposes its own treatment in the form of an endless pursuit. Whether they know it or not, the subjects that are determined by this discourse are caught in it. So how can the analytic discourse indicate another solution

[*une solution autre*]? Why renounce the thirst in relation to the lack in jouissance and its intoxicating torments, and in the name of what?

It is clear that, today, we find ourselves in a particular moment within the psychoanalytic movement and the models are lacking that could help respond to this. After having aroused an almost blissful incredulity among the opinion makers, psychoanalysis is again the object of a strong suspicion, if not a rejection for charlatanism. Besides the methods based on the chemistry of molecular interactions and on statistics, neuro-behaviourism competes to gain its own place on the market.

A call for the psychoanalyst's intervention obviously suffers from that devaluation.

A few questions arise from this:

What does, in our functioning of the School, discernibly pertain to each discourse?

How do we control in our School our processes of selection and guarantee? How do we situate them within the order of the discourses, if we accept that not one of them can go without the other three to form the ordered round of desire?

How does the fifth discourse, that of capitalism, which undoes the round in order to impose itself alone, intervene in it?

How can psychoanalysis offer to treat the impasses of the subject if the contemporary discourse sustains itself on the fact it does not accept any impasses?

Between a monastic withdrawal and the threat of fragmentation that accompanies it, and an imposture doomed to collective reprisal, what strategies could we adopt in order to sustain the re-conquest of both the Freudian and the Lacanian fields.

> Marc Strauss, 2 September 2017 Translated by Chantal Degril

The VIth International Encounter of the School will take place on September 13th, 2018, in Barcelona; the Rendezvous of the IF follows on September 14th and 15th.

The CIOS and the ICG 2016-2018 will be responsible for determining the programme.

On September 12th, 2018, from 16h to 20h, the fourth Symposium on the Pass will meet with the last two ICGs, the corresponding Secretariats of the Pass and the passers who took up their role during that period, for a reflection on the functioning of the *dispositif*.

# Programme

12 September 2018: Symposium on the Pass

13 September 2018: International Encounter of the School

14 & 15 September 2018: Rendezvous of the IF

16 September 2018: Assemblies

# Tariffs

	Full fee			Students under 28 years		
	Encounter of the School	Rendezvous	The three days	Encounter of the School	Rendezvous	The three days
	1 day	2 days	280€	1 day	2 days	3 days
Until 13/08/2018	160€	290€	330€	80€	150€	170€