



IX° SCHOOL MEETING – EPFCL, JULY 23rd, 2026, SÃO-PAULO

## Pass to the analyst: aporias of the testimony

### Prelude 3

Beyond the nominations, the primary interest of the pass is to keep open the question of the analytical act and the analyst's desire, thanks to which that act is possible. This desire, which Lacan specified in 1964 as the desire to obtain the absolute difference<sup>1</sup>, only comes about at the end of analysis. What the cartel of the pass must interrogate is if this desire has turned up in the passant.

To say that it is thanks to the analyst's desire that the analytical act is possible is to attribute a performative value to that desire. Which implies that such a desire is only verifiable once the act has taken place, but for reasons of temporality, the only thing the cartel of the pass can do is to ask whether the necessary conditions are in place for the analytical act to take place, and one of those conditions is that the trainee has assumed their own difference.

Absolute difference refers to identity, that is, to what is most singular in the individual and which owes nothing to identifications with the Other. If we take into account Lacan's latest contributions, we can consider this difference as the real that constitutes the "Unarity" of the speaking-being's jouissance<sup>2</sup> (*parlêtre*). But if the subject wants nothing to do with his "being-of-jouissance," it is because the real (*hors-sens*), which is at stake, desubjectifies him, dismantling the signifiers through which he attempts to represent himself.

However, just because the subject wants nothing to do with it does not mean that this real—which defies thought—can be forgotten. The proof is that it repeatedly emerges in the various formations of the unconscious (slips of the tongue, bungled actions, dreams, symptoms). It is precisely this repetition that, in an analysis, allows us to identify and recognize in this real the mark of a singular jouissance. The recognition of this mark, which is equivalent to identification with the symptom, could be stated as follows: "I am this mode of jouissance that determines my actions and my words." From this, we can deduce that the end of the couch experience leads to the subversion of "I think, therefore I am."

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan J. (1964). *Los cuatro conceptos fundamentales del psicoanálisis*, Seminario XI, Paris, Seuil, 1973, p. 248

<sup>2</sup> El *hablanteser* (*parlêtre*) constitutivo del inconsciente real, designa a la vez el ser de falta y el ser de goce (*l'être de manque et l'être de jouissance*).

It is to this subversion of the Cartesian subject—reduced to its mental representation—that Lacan alludes when he states, in 1967, that the aporia of the narrative of the analytical act stems from the fact that in this act “the object is active and the subject is subverted<sup>3</sup>». This means that, in the act itself, the analyst does not think, since thought is incapable of grasping the real. This is why the analyst “is made of object a,” that is, the object of “surplus jouissance” (“plus-de-jouir”), which the analysand transfers onto him. Let us say, then, that it is by lending himself to representing this object that the analyst allows the analysand to recognize their absolute difference. And it is precisely in this that the analyst’s desire is performative. It should be noted, however, that sustaining this act, in which the analyst does not think, results from the conclusion that imposes itself once one has taken the time to think psychoanalysis.

Identification with the symptom, at the end of analysis, ensures a singular form of bond with the sexual couple, but implies, above all, that the analysand has taken into account the knowledge without a subject that lies in the real. The problem is that, in seeking to verify whether this is the case for the passant, the cartel of the pass faces this aporia, which stems from the fact that, in the real unconscious, one exists as a speaking-being (parlêtre), but cannot recognize oneself as a thinking subject. And, as we know, testimony comes from a subject who thinks. So, if “where I think, I am not” and “where I am, I do not think,” what can demonstrate that the subject has taken into account the real that identifies him? Lacan answers: the satisfaction that marks the end of analysis<sup>4</sup>. This affect serves as a demonstration, insofar as it bears witness to a know-how-to-do with the jouissance of their symptom that puts an end to the jouissance-of-sense (joui-sens) of the lying truth.

Let us conclude, however, that far from being an automatic effect of the cure, satisfaction is the result of an ethical choice—that is, of the being's response to what is discovered of the real that identifies them. And it is precisely this ethical choice that the pass cartel must evaluate in the passant, since only this choice will enable them to recognize the absolute difference of their analysands. Finally, let us emphasize that, beyond the evaluation, what in the pass can serve as a teaching for the School is the production of knowledge that results from what the passant has learned from his or her analytical journey.

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<sup>3</sup> Lacan J. *The equivocation of the subject supposed to knowledge*. Conference given in Naples on 12/14/67, published in *Scilicet* n° 1, pp. 31-41

<sup>4</sup> Lacan J. *Preface to the English edition of Seminar 11*. In *Otros Escritos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 2012, p. 600