



IX SCHOOL MEETING OF THE IF-EPFCL, JULY 23rd, 2026

Pass to the analyst: aporias of the testimony Prelude n°1

In our title, we did not use the interrogative form. That there are aporias in testimony is a fact. What, then, are the consequences of this, and do they necessarily entail an aporetic guarantee of the pass to the analyst?

Let us refer to Lacan's speech of December 6, 1967, at the EFP. What does he say, among other things? "There is no Other of the Other." There is no ultimate guarantee that validates the Other. The School, the ICG, and the cartels of the pass do not deviate from the rule, otherwise they would contradict it.

"There is no truth about the truth." Transmission by the passeur, like the testimony of the passant, a construction in the aftermath, can only be incomplete. There is no complete, total, guaranteed truth. Already, with regard to the end of analysis, Lacan spoke of the aporias of his account.

"There is no act of the act either." It is therefore impossible to repeat it identically and derive a universal norm from it.

From these three aporias, we can deduce that there is also no guarantee of the guarantee of the pass to the analyst.

However, it sometimes happens that a cartel unanimously expresses its certainty about the pass to the analyst, which may seem to contradict the absence of any guarantee. What kind of certainty is this, then? We probably need to differentiate between dogmatic certainty, which refuses to be questioned or challenged (we know, it's the truth), and what we might call analytical certainty, which is not a verdict (we decide, it's an act).

The aporias of testimony do not constitute an impasse for the act.

This leads me to differentiate between aporia and impasse, although the two terms are often used interchangeably. With impasse, thought stops, cannot go any further. Aporia, on the other hand, is more like a hole around which thought revolves. Impasse prevents, blocks, renders powerless. Aporia, although demonstrating an impossibility, does not cause impotence; it pushes us to seek.

Therefore, does the dispositif of the pass function despite or because of? Despite its aporias considered as simple limits, i.e., "that's the way it is," "you have to deal with it," or because of its aporias, particularly those of testimony, i.e., as a foundation?

"That's just the way it is" could be understood as "that's enough," but at the risk of producing complacency.

The second hypothesis suggests that there is always something left to explore, which implies that knowledge is never completely closed, but rather in constant circulation.

Aporia is not a defect of meaning, it is not what we do not understand, but what we cannot resolve. It is not a flaw in the *dispositif*, but its condition. Without aporia, testimony could be limited to answers to a questionnaire and fabricate an ideal of the psychoanalyst. On the contrary, what cannot be resolved is the very basis of the act of testifying, with its inherent impossibilities.

Aporias, while they may lead us to vagueness, arbitrariness, and confusion, actually compel us to rigor. I am referring here to another quote from Lacan, taken from his speech at the EFP on December 6,

1967: “if the hero's fog makes the listener laugh, it is because he is surprised by the rigor of the topology constructed by his fog.”¹

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¹ J. Lacan, Discours à l'EFP du 6 décembre 1967, Silicet 2/3, Seuil, Paris, 1970, p 14