



Fragment 7

Making anxiety speak, it's all we have been doing since the dawn of time. As for anxiety, "between enigma and certainty", it is mute, a "temporal funnel", a "petrification", an "appalled silence" says Lacan. Seen from today, in the early 21st century, it imposes itself as the ascendant affect of the Anthropocene. This is what the great contemporary clamor with such multiple voices says. However previously, with Heidegger for example, it was considered the quintessential metaphysical experience of speakers, if the "before what" of anxiety was indeed "being thrown" into the world. Facticity of existence. It was already a change in the mooring of anxiety, one that can be read in our history, let's say from Luther onwards, to set a few markers. A passage from the anxieties of the penitent in the Middle Ages or, more originally, from Abraham's sacrifice to the godless man of our time. Blaise Pascal, facing the "starry sky", utters the cry of this shaking: "The silence of these eternal spaces frightens me", without as yet knowing whether it is fear in front of a god who is silent or a god who has disappeared. Hence, no doubt, the fundamentally necessary gamble. Another century later and Kierkegaard with his formula of "anxiety as a condition of sin" was making the very possibility, the first "before what" of anxiety, and was therefore already taking note of the facticity of existence.

All this is to remind us that despite its well-established ontological value, what we make anxiety say is a function of history. And here opens our question of the properly psychoanalytic variation regarding the mooring of anxiety.

When Heidegger evokes the "before what" of anxiety as "being thrown into the world" and Freud speaks of *Hilflosigkeit*, the dereliction of being without recourse, the resonances seem similar. The only thing that stands out, however, is that Freud, no metaphysician by any stretch of the imagination, insists on adding the "before what" of a very present, original danger, the first wound, the trauma as he calls it, the inexhaustible source of the perpetuated anxieties of neurosis and, more broadly, of all those who speak.

What a success for this theory of anchoring anxiety in trauma! According to today's vox populi, is there still any psychological suffering that cannot be linked to trauma - as an all-purpose exoneration, no doubt.

Lacan doesn't seem to be saying no, "what we have to surprise" via the surprises of free association, "is something whose incidence was marked as traumatic¹". This seems to be familiar territory in psychoanalysis, but Lacan immediately evokes the lesser-known "imbecility" that this traumatic incidence implies - if, at least, we postulate that it comes from the reality of situations. This will force us to question the cause again... not imbecility.

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¹ Lacan J., « La psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité », *Autres écrits*, Seuil, 2001, Paris, p. 353